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Abstract
The fall of Communism in 1989 presented a unique opportunity for social psychology
to contribute to the understanding of these historic events. Through the framework of the
theory of social representations, lay meanings and understanding of terms such as
‘democracy’, ‘the individual’ and ‘the community’ were examined in Slovakia and in
Scotland. Lay representations of complex concepts are likely to be formed, maintained and
changed by both implicit and explicit processes. Some features of representations may be
deep-seated and transmitted across generations and across cultures, relatively resistant to
change. Others are shaped by already existing thinking schemata and reflect more current
social practices. Questions asked where, what were the effects of 40 years of Soviet
totalitarianism on the meaning of these terms in Slovakia compared to Scotland, a stable
democracy. What aspects of meaning are shared, what aspects vary and reflect the specific
political, economic and social histories of these two nations.
Data were collected over various phases from 1992 to 1996. The primary methods
used were word associations and the rating of single terms through the use of various rating
scales. Some interview data were also used.
Results indicate that aspects of the meaning of democracy was relatively stable and
shared between Slovaks and Scots. For both samples, democracy was conceived primarily in
relation to freedom and to value terms such as rights, justice and equality. Compared to the
Scottish sample, the meaning of democracy in the Slovaks revealed a highly emotive aspect
which reflected the inter-relationship between the current political and social climate with
that of their more recent past. For meanings attached to the terms ‘the individual’ and ‘the
community’, results varied depending on the method. Conceived of as separate terms, the
overall content of meaning of both ‘the individual’ and ‘the community’ were not largely
iii
shared by the Slovaks and Scots, lending some support to the dominant view that Soviet
totalitarianism destroyed or distorted naturally occurring communities. Taking a more
holistic approach and viewing the individual/community as a relational whole, shared aspects
of meaning could be identified which were more deep-seated and enduring over histories and
cultures, other aspects, in Slovaks, reflected more their recent past.
These results are discussed in terms of a structural approach to social representations,
which emphasis both stability and change in how meaning is formed, maintained and
changed, as well as the multi-layered nature of meaning.
iv
Acknowledgements
I am grateful to many people who either directly or indirectly contributed towards this thesis.
Firstly, I would like to thank my supervisor, Ranald MacDonald, for his support,
encouragement, guidance and good humour throughout.
My thanks also go to Ivana Markova and Rob Farr whose dedication and hard work ensured
that the projects and the team meetings ran as smoothly as possible, a difficult feat
considering the variety of viewpoints, backgrounds and histories involved.
Also, my thanks go to the other members of the project- Ferenc, Ewa, Velina, Helene and
Marie-Claude, we had many fruitful discussions and a lot of fun. In particular, to Jana, her
boundless energy and enthusiasm was always inspirational.
Peter, Stephen and Bruce for their technical support, they were always there when needed.
Whatever weird computing glitch I presented, these were always resolved, in good humour.
Finally, my special thanks go to Tom, Kristina, Nikola and ‘M’.
vTABLE OF CONTENTS
CHAPTER 1: STUDY BACKGROUND.................................................................................................................. 1
GENERAL BACKGROUND AND THE RESEARCH TEAM ............................................................................................... 1
SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS OF DEMOCRACY ............................................................................................................ 1
GENERAL ORGANISATIONAL ASPECTS...................................................................................................................... 3
DATA ORGANISATIONAL ASPECTS ............................................................................................................................ 4
SPECIFIC ROLES ......................................................................................................................................................... 5
ORIGINAL CONTRIBUTION......................................................................................................................................... 6
PUBLISHED WORK FROM DATA PRESENTED IN THIS THESIS ..................................................................................... 7
CHAPTER 2: SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS ..................................................................................................... 8
NEW PROBLEMS FOR SOCIAL PSYCHOLOGY IN A NEW EUROPE.............................................................................. 8
Social psychology: the absence of ‘social’?..................................................................................................... 11
Changing paradigms: From Cartesian to Hegelian ........................................................................................ 17
FRAMEWORK OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS......................................................................................................... 28
What are Social Representations ...................................................................................................................... 28
The function of social representations.............................................................................................................. 36
The structural approach.................................................................................................................................... 39
How social representations are examined........................................................................................................ 50
THE PRESENT STUDY ............................................................................................................................................... 52
Methods used in the current study .................................................................................................................... 53
The use of word associations ............................................................................................................................ 53
Rating scales and interviews ............................................................................................................................. 56
The use of the three methods- summary of data chapters................................................................................ 57
CHAPTER 3: THE POST-COMMUNIST PERIOD ........................................................................................... 59
THE COLLAPSE OF COMMUNISM ............................................................................................................................. 59
THE FALL OF COMMUNISM VIEWED AS HISTORY .................................................................................................... 61
TRANSITOLOGY ....................................................................................................................................................... 63
vi
THE NATURE OF THE REFORMS ............................................................................................................................... 64
CULTURE, HISTORY AND MEANING ....................................................................................................................... 66
SUMMARY OF OVERVIEW ........................................................................................................................................ 69
CHAPTER 4: POLITICAL CONCEPTS AND POSSIBLE LEGACIES......................................................... 75
DEMOCRACY ........................................................................................................................................................... 76
As an historical concept .................................................................................................................................... 76
Democracy within classical political science – 20th century conceptions....................................................... 79
Democratic culture ............................................................................................................................................ 80
SOVIET PASTS .......................................................................................................................................................... 84
Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism ............................................................................................................................ 85
Totalitarianism................................................................................................................................................... 87
What was totalitarianism................................................................................................................................... 87
Authoritarian – Totalitarian Regimes............................................................................................................... 88
The nature of Soviet realities ............................................................................................................................ 90
The structure of the regimes.............................................................................................................................. 91
Consequences of Soviet realities....................................................................................................................... 92
THEORISING SOCIAL CHANGE ................................................................................................................................. 94
Civil Society ....................................................................................................................................................... 96
Social representations and spheres of communication within a communist perspective ............................... 99
Authoritarian personalities ............................................................................................................................. 102
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................................... 106
CHAPTER 5: TWENTIETH-CENTURY HISTORY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA........................................ 108
VERSAILLES PEACE TREATY................................................................................................................................. 108
The first transition to democracy in Czechoslovakia ..................................................................................... 109
Ethnic and national issues in the First Czechoslovak Republic .................................................................... 109
National Politics of the period ........................................................................................................................ 110
Economic situation of the period .................................................................................................................... 110
vii
First Czechoslovak Republic: conclusions ..................................................................................................... 111
THE COMMUNIST TAKE-OVER IN 1948.................................................................................................................. 111
THE PRAGUE SPRING............................................................................................................................................. 113
THE ‘NORMALISATION PERIOD’ FROM 1968 TO 1989.......................................................................................... 114
Dissident activity during ‘normalisation’....................................................................................................... 115
FROM THE VELVET REVOLUTION IN 1989 TO SEPARATION................................................................................. 116
The Restitution and Privatisation process...................................................................................................... 116
Economic trends in the region ........................................................................................................................ 117
The separation of the Czech and Slovak Republics........................................................................................ 119
IDENTITY AND RELIGIOSITY.................................................................................................................................. 122
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................................... 126
CHAPTER 6: HISTORY OF SCOTLAND......................................................................................................... 129
1707 ACT OF UNION – AUTONOMY AND INTEGRATION ...................................................................................... 129
EMPIRE, INDUSTRIAL AND ECONOMIC PROGRESS ............................................................................................... 133
SCOTTISH POLITICS ............................................................................................................................................... 134
POST WWII ........................................................................................................................................................... 137
THATCHERISM AND SCOTLAND ............................................................................................................................ 142
CONCLUSION ......................................................................................................................................................... 148
CHAPTER 7:  THE MEANING OF DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA AND SCOTLAND IN 1992 ........... 150
DEMOCRACY IN A WORLD OF TENSIONS ............................................................................................................... 150
REPRESENTATIONS AND DEMOCRACY ................................................................................................................. 152
TOTALITARIANISM AND LANGUAGE..................................................................................................................... 153
SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS AND COMMUNICATION.............................................................................................. 156
STAGES IN THE DEVELOPMENT OF PROPAGANDA................................................................................................. 158
COMMUNIST RE-DEFINITION OF DEMOCRACY ...................................................................................................... 160
THE POST-COMMUNIST CONSTRUCTION OF DEMOCRACY.................................................................................... 164
METHODS ............................................................................................................................................................... 166
viii
PARTICIPANTS ....................................................................................................................................................... 166
MEASURES............................................................................................................................................................. 167
PROCEDURE........................................................................................................................................................... 167
RESULTS ................................................................................................................................................................. 170
WORD ASSOCIATIONS........................................................................................................................................... 170
Representation of Democracy in Semantic Space.......................................................................................... 170
Comparisons between Generations in the Slovak Group .............................................................................. 173
Comparisons between Generations in the Scottish Group ............................................................................ 174
CATEGORIES OF ASSOCIATIONS EVOKED BY THE TERM DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKS AND SCOTS ......................... 176
Log-linear analysis of the nine categories by national group ....................................................................... 177
COMPARISON OF THE SCOTS AND SLOVAKS ON THE DEMOCRACY RATING SCALE ............................................. 178
Descriptive analysis of the rating scale.......................................................................................................... 179
Separate factor analysis of the rating scale for Scots and Slovaks ............................................................... 181
Factor Analysis of the Rating Scales across the two national samples......................................................... 183
Comparison of Factor Scores between the Slovaks and Scots....................................................................... 185
DISCUSSION........................................................................................................................................................... 190
DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM ................................................................................................................................ 191
STRUCTURE OF MEANING...................................................................................................................................... 193
CHAPTER 8: THE MEANING OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COMMUNITY IN SLOVAKIA AND
SCOTLAND ............................................................................................................................................................. 197
INDIVIDUAL/COMMUNITY DEBATE....................................................................................................................... 198
The freeing of the individual ........................................................................................................................... 198
Freedom from and Freedom to ....................................................................................................................... 200
Individualism as an economic principle ......................................................................................................... 201
Individualism as a political principle ............................................................................................................. 202
Re-defining individualism and morality ......................................................................................................... 202
THE FALL OF COMMUNISM: THE INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY.......................................................................... 206
ix
WHAT IS COMMUNITY ........................................................................................................................................... 206
THE INDIVIDUAL, THE COLLECTIVE AND THE COMMUNITY UNDER SOVIET DOMINATION................................. 208
Destruction of local communities and the enforcement of collectivism ........................................................ 209
THE INDIVIDUAL IN WESTERN EUROPE................................................................................................................ 212
Modern conceptions of Western Individualism .............................................................................................. 212
METHOD ................................................................................................................................................................. 218
PARTICIPANTS ....................................................................................................................................................... 218
PROCEDURE........................................................................................................................................................... 218
RESULTS ................................................................................................................................................................. 221
LOCAL COMMUNITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL: AN ANALYSIS OF WORD ASSOCIATIONS. ........................................ 221
Content analysis of word associations to the term ‘local community’ by two generations of Slovaks and
Scots ................................................................................................................................................................. 221
Log-linear analysis of the categories of response to ‘the local community’ in two generations of Slovaks
and Scots. ......................................................................................................................................................... 223
Content analysis of word associations given in response to the term’ the individual’ in two generations of
Slovaks and Scots............................................................................................................................................. 225
Log-linear analysis of the categories of response to ‘the individual’ in two generations of Slovaks and
Scots ................................................................................................................................................................. 226
A SEMANTIC SPACE ANALYSIS OF ASSOCIATIVE NETS. ........................................................................................ 228
THE COMMUNITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL: AN ANALYSIS OF RATING SCALES...................................................... 231
Descriptive analysis of the Community Scale................................................................................................. 232
An analysis of two items from the Individual and Community Scales........................................................... 233
Factor analysis of the ‘Community Scale’...................................................................................................... 234
The construction of a comparator set of items from the Individual Scale..................................................... 236
Comparison of the two national groups on the three sets of items................................................................ 237
DISCUSSION........................................................................................................................................................... 243
INTERDEPENDENCIES BETWEEN INDIVIDUAL AND COMMUNITY ......................................................................... 245
xSTRUCTURE OF REPRESENTATIONS....................................................................................................................... 247
CHAPTER 9:  CHANGES IN THE MEANING OF THE TERM ‘DEMOCRACY’ IN SLOVAKS AND
SCOTS....................................................................................................................................................................... 249
POPULAR SUPPORT FOR DEMOCRACY ................................................................................................................... 252
COMPARATIVE SUPPORT WITH ‘TRADITIONAL’ DEMOCRACIES ........................................................................... 254
CHURCHILL HYPOTHESIS – DEMOCRACY AS THE ‘LESSER EVIL’ ......................................................................... 255
BEYOND THE DEMOCRATIC ‘LESSER EVIL’ – ALTERNATIVES TO DEMOCRACY................................................... 260
METHODS ............................................................................................................................................................... 267
PART 1 (A) ASSOCIATIONS TO THE TERM ‘DEMOCRACY’ IN SLOVAKS AND SCOTS OVER THREE TIME PERIODS.
............................................................................................................................................................................... 267
Participants and general procedure ............................................................................................................... 268
Reclassification of the word association data ................................................................................................ 268
PART 1 (B) ASSOCIATIONS TO THE TERM ‘DEMOCRACY’ IN SLOVAKS AND CZECHS OVER TWO TIME PERIODS.
............................................................................................................................................................................... 269
PART 2: COMPARISON OF SCOTS AND SLOVAKS ACROSS A RATING SCALE OF TERMS RELEVANT TO
DEMOCRACY.......................................................................................................................................................... 270
Demographic summary for word association and rating scale sections....................................................... 271
PART 3: INTERVIEWS WITH SCOTTISH AND SLOVAK PARTICIPANTS ON THE MEANING AND EXPERIENCE OF
DEMOCRACY.......................................................................................................................................................... 272
Interview Schedule........................................................................................................................................... 272
Participants and general procedure ............................................................................................................... 274
Method of analysis........................................................................................................................................... 275
RESULTS ................................................................................................................................................................. 277
PART 1 (A):  SCOTTISH AND SLOVAK ASSOCIATIONS TO THE TERM ‘DEMOCRACY’ OVER THREE TIME PERIODS
............................................................................................................................................................................... 277
THREE BROAD CATEGORIES OF RESPONSE............................................................................................................ 277
DEFINITIONAL CATEGORIES OF RESPONSE............................................................................................................ 279
xi
Slovak changes over time ................................................................................................................................ 282
Scottish changes over time .............................................................................................................................. 283
EVALUATIVE CATEGORIES OF RESPONSE.............................................................................................................. 284
Changes over time in the evaluative responses in Slovaks and Scots ........................................................... 286
PART 1 (B):  SLOVAK AND CZECH ASSOCIATIONS TO THE TERM ‘DEMOCRACY’ ACROSS TWO TIME PERIODS. . 290
THREE BROAD CATEGORIES OF RESPONSE............................................................................................................ 290
DEFINITIONAL CATEGORIES OF RESPONSE............................................................................................................ 291
EVALUATIVE CATEGORIES OF RESPONSE.............................................................................................................. 297
PART 2:  COMPARISON OF SLOVAKS AND SCOTS ON THE DEMOCRACY RATING SCALE...................................... 301
Descriptive analysis of the rating scale.......................................................................................................... 301
Factor Analysis of the Rating Scales .............................................................................................................. 302
Comparison of the two samples across five of the seven democracy factors................................................ 305
PART 3:  SCOTTISH AND SLOVAK INTERVIEWS ON DEMOCRACY, 1996............................................................... 310
Descriptive account of the interviews ............................................................................................................. 310
A comparison of Slovak and Scottish definitions of democracy .................................................................... 312
Experienced and Ideal Democracy ................................................................................................................. 313
An ideal democracy in Scots and Slovaks....................................................................................................... 315
Past/present comparisons in the Slovak sample............................................................................................. 317
DISCUSSION........................................................................................................................................................... 321
THE STRUCTURE OF MEANING............................................................................................................................... 322
SLOVAK AND CZECH WORD ASSOCIATIONS TO DEMOCRACY .............................................................................. 330
CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS .......................................................................................................................... 333
DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM ................................................................................................................................ 333
THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COMMUNITY .............................................................................................................. 336
CONTRIBUTION...................................................................................................................................................... 337
REFERENCES ........................................................................................................................................................ 341
xii
1CHAPTER 1: STUDY BACKGROUND
“It is more difficult to pass over from totalitarianism to democracy than from
democracy to totalitarianism...democracy calls for deep-going, value-oriented
changes in the public mentally - it calls for time”
(Karl R. Popper, 1990)  Interview with K.R. Popper in: Moscow News, No. 46, Nov 25-
Dec 2.
General background and the research team
What can social psychology contribute to the examination of macro-social events
such as the fall of communism in Central and Eastern Europe at the end of 1989? Although
many observers and researchers across political science, economics, history and philosophy
were engaged in charting and examining the historical revolutions through the lens of their
own specific disciplines, the contribution, if any, of social psychology to the understanding
of ‘democracy’ was being debated by a group of social scientists in 1990. The research teams
were made up of researchers from both sides of the former ideological divide. In itself, this
was a ‘minor’ revolution’ taking place within the wider political, economic and social
revolutions across Europe. Our Eastern European colleagues were now free to enter the
debate and exchange ideas in a manner which would have been relatively unheard of just a
short time before.
Social representations of democracy
The plan to initiate research into the social representations of democracy and other
political phenomena was originally formed by J. Plichtova1 (Bratislava) and I. Markova
(Stirling) in the Spring of 1990, very soon after the collapse of communism in the former
Czechoslovakia. Later that year, in July 1990, during the General Meeting of the European
Association of Experimental Social Psychology in Budapest, J. Plichtova and I. Markova
began the planning and the formation of a European study team.
                                                 
1 For simplicity, ‘accents’ have not been included within the text
2The first workshop, “The Transition to Democracy” was organised by J. Plichtova at
Smolencie Castle, Slovakia, 10-14th October 1990, under the auspices of the Slovak
Academy of Sciences. There were 20 participants at this workshop from Poland, Hungary,
Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, France and the UK. The workshop identified a range of issues
such as individualism, democratic thinking and identity as topics that could be studied in the
newly emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe. The papers presented covered
issues such as the local problems of the development of a democratic political system in
Bohemia and Slovakia, to the social and nationality problems after the collapse of
communism in November 1989 and the birth of the parliament in the Czech and Slovak
Federal Republic. Other papers concerned more general issues. Professor Rob Farr discussed
individualism as a cultural phenomenon of modern Western democracies. Professor I.
Markova talked about the question of personal and social identity. Other papers covered
topics such as totalitarianism in Nazi Germany, authoritarian attitudes, nationalism and anti-
Semitism in Central Europe and the present forms of these phenomena. From this workshop
a Democracy Study group was formed which initially included Professor S. Moscovici
(Paris) Professor R. Farr (London) Prof I. Markova (Stirling) Dr J. Plichtova (Bratislava) Dr
F. Eros (Budapest) Dr V. Topolova (Sofia). The study group, led by Prof I. Markova,
formulated a theme of a possible European research project ‘The individual in democracies
and the market economy: changes in the social representations and identities’. A follow up
meeting was held in Paris in January 1991 funded by the Maison des Sciences de l’Homme
with the addition of Dr E. Drozda-Senkowska (Paris). It was agreed at the start of the
meeting that the original aims were too broad and that the planned research should be
focused on the study of democracy while the study of identity could remain an optional extra
for individual research groups. Professor I. Markova obtained funds for Dr J. Plichtova to
spend two months at Stirling to collect data for a small pilot study on social representations
of democracy in 20 Scots and 20 Slovak respondents. I joined the team in early 1991 during
the period of the pilot study and remained a member of the team until the entire programme
ended in 2000.
During the period (1992) when major funding was being sought, both by the Central
European and the Western European nations, it was decided to carry out a study examining
the representations of democracy in Slovakia (Bratislava) and in Scotland (Stirling). This
project involved data collection from 300 Slovaks and 275 Scots and included both word
3associations and a rating scales of political and economic terms relevant to democracy. This
study was funded through a University of Stirling small grant and involved I Markova and
myself from Stirling, along with J Plichtova in Bratislava. The data from this original study
forms the basis of Chapter 6 of this thesis.
Funding was subsequently obtained jointly by Prof R. Farr (London) and Prof I.
Markova (Stirling) from the ESRC. It’s title was ‘Individualism in a period of rapid political
and economic change’ (R000234908). It involved 6 research centres: London, Stirling, Paris
(E. Drozda-Senkowska) Bratislava (J. Plichtova) Prague (O. Mullerova and J. Hoffmanova)
and Budapest (F. Eros). The project started on 1st October 1993 until 30th September 1996).
During this period ( September 1994 to August 1996) F. Eros (Budapest) obtained funds
from the Soros Foundation with a project entitled ‘Conversion to democratic thinking in
Central and Eastern Europe’ which enabled a stronger and more productive research link to
be established between the Western European and the Central and Eastern European research
teams. The research teams included in this Soros funding came from Hungary, Poland, the
Czech and Slovak Republics and Bulgaria. The UK funded multi-national project was
designed to proceed in various stages throughout the three year period and the additional
funds to F. Eros from the Soros foundation allowed greater collaboration between the
participants from all of the centres to meet, discuss and review each phase.
In effect, primarily due to the additional Soros funding, the ESRC project was
designed comprising two main phases of data collection.
Phase 1: (1994) focussed mainly on the social representations of ‘the individual’ and
‘the community’ in Western and Central/Eastern European nations. The Slovak and Scottish
data-sets from this phase forms the basis of Chapter 7 of this thesis.
Phase 2: (1996) The second phase focussed on the social representations of
democracy across the study nations. The Slovak and Scottish data form the basis of Chapter
8. In addition to the Slovak and Scottish data-sets collected during 1996, some comparable
data from the Czech Republic are also included in Chapter 8.
General organisational aspects
Importantly, this research programme, the published work arising from it and this
present work could not have taken place without the joint collaboration between the many
researchers taking part from a number of European nations. It is therefore important to clarify
4the general organisational aspects of the study and the specific roles performed by the
members of the research teams. The 1992 study included only participants from Slovakia2
and Scotland. The 1993 to 1996 study included a number of researchers with data
collected from various Western European and post-communist nations: three Western
European nations were included (Scotland, England and France); and three post-communist
nations (Slovakia, Czech Republic and Hungary).
Although the funding was primarily UK held, the research process from the outset
was very much a collaborative affair between the various researchers involved. Through
numerous research meetings, involving the entire teams, the research was planned and the
research tools were devised, refined and further refined as a joint collaborative effort. This
was felt to be necessary by all involved to eliminate any ‘western’ bias to the instruments
used, questions asked etc. Prior to the commencement of the data collection periods,
meetings were held to refine research tools that had been previously circulated. In addition,
during these meetings, long and complex translation issues were also resolved. As all
research teams had members who were bi-lingual/multi-lingual, the original translation of the
materials took place initially in each centre, with follow up meetings to finalise the
translation process. Although the designing of the research materials was very much a
collaborative project involving all members of the research team, the major analysis of the
various data sets took place in Stirling and was, for the main, under my direction. Although,
once completed, all teams had access to all data sets for their own analyses purposes.
Data organisational aspects
The data-sets contained in this present work have been drawn primarily from two
nations: Slovakia and Scotland (although some comparable data are included from the Czech
Republic in chapter 8). The research materials came from the jointly designed collaborative
effort of all members of the team. For the Slovak quantitative data-sets (i.e. questionnaires),
these were either sent to Stirling in their raw form to be entered into SPSS for analysis (as
was the case for all data-sets), however, latterly (for security reasons), they were entered into
                                                 
2  At the beginning of this research (1992) Slovakia formed part of the joint Czecho-Slovak state and during
1993 the separate Slovak and Czech Republic were formed. ‘Czechoslovakia’ will be used to refer to the
communist period, ‘Czecho-Slovak’ will be used, where applicable, to refer to the period after the fall of
communism up to 1993, when the two separate Republics were then formed.
5a pre-formatted SPSS file in Slovakia, with the final completed data file sent to Stirling for
analysis. For the text-based data, such as word associations and interviews, translations were
initially carried out by Jana Plichtova in Bratislava in collaboration with Ivana Markova in
Stirling. Further elaboration, for example, more detailed examination of the word association
data and interview data were worked on jointly between Jana Plichtova and myself, as often
as possible this was through face to face sessions.
Specific roles
As in the case of such a large-scale, multi-national research programme, all members
of the team brought a significant amount of expertise necessary for the successful completion
of such a venture. A large amount of this expertise is necessarily difficult to isolate and
quantify. Consequently, the work presented in this thesis falls outwith the ‘norm’ as
comprising, from the outset and throughout the course of the various studies, a collaborative
process. My own specific contribution throughout the course of the various projects included
collecting all of the Scottish based data sets, managing the day-to-day running of the projects,
coordinating the data collection across the research centres, refining and finalising the
research tools, processing the data-sets from the various centres, carrying out the final
analyses of the various data-sets and contributing to the writing of final reports and research
papers. Within the context of the of the work presented in this thesis, across all of the data
chapters new or additional analyses have been carried out and an additional data set has been
added not appearing in any of the jointly produced published work.
If any one of our colleagues can be singled out and identified as contributing in more
directly ‘measurable’ way, this would be Jana Plichtova from Bratislava. From the initial
small pilot study, when she first came to Stirling, to the ending of the research programme,
we had a very strong collaborative working relationship. Her expertise in the use of word
association methods was invaluable. During the time when the first major study was being
planned, and through her experience of conducting the small pilot study, she devised a simple
but highly effective method of typing, collating and quantifying large word association data-
sets. Word associations formed a major component of both the background research
programme, and also forms a significant portion of this present work. Based from her initial
expertise, we jointly worked on further refining analyses methods for the word association
data. Necessarily, the data presented here requiring translation was also initially worked on
6jointly between, J. Plichtova, I Markova and myself. The Slovak and Czech, text-based data-
sets were initially processed in Slovakia. Thereafter, after the initial processing, these data-
sets were worked on jointly concerning translation issues and the more detailed
categorisation issues. However, the subsequent analyses and interpretation was carried out by
myself.
Original contribution
The original aims contained in the main ESRC proposal entitled ‘Individualism in a
period of rapid political and economic change’ which formed the background of this present
work were focused on the question of individualism and collectivism in a period of rapid
change. These aims were:
1. To identify, empirically, forms of individualism during a period of rapid
political and economic change in four European countries (6 research centres). It
is predicted that the collapse of the communist ideology will produce forms of
individualism that are quite distinct from those needed to drive a market economy
or to establish a civil society.
2. To explore the semantics of terms relating to individualism and in the practical
reasoning of participants in regard to individualism and collectivism in their daily
lives.
3. Bearing in mind previous typologies of individualism, as those of Reisman,
Bellah and Ziehe, to formulate a typology of individualism more appropriate to
current political and economic realities within Europe.
4. To contribute to the theory of social representations by extending the range and
mix of methods used in their study; by studying forms of individualism in a
variety of different economic, political and cultural contexts both within and
between the four countries.
Three qualitative approaches were included in the main project grant: these were word
associations, interviews and focus groups. The use of various quantitative rating scales of
political and economic terms was not part of the original grant. However, to enable an
7independent study examining specifically the meaning of democracy through the addition of
this method, rating scale sections were added to those other methods contained in the grant.
This present work extends that outlined in the original grant by the incorporation of a
dimension of time, specifically, through the examination of changes in the meaning of
democracy in Slovaks and Scots across three periods: 1992, 1994 and 1996. Although the
main theoretical background of the major grant holders was that of social representations,
this present work extends this by focusing more on a structural approach to the theory (not
included in the grant) by examining what remains stable and what changes over time in
Scotland and Slovakia.
Published work from data presented in this thesis
1992 study: Chapter 7 presents word association and rating scale data collected during this first study
involving Slovaks and Scots, focusing mainly on issues related to democracy, and appears in:
Moodie, E., Markova, I. & Plichtova, J. (1995) Lay representations of democracy: a
study in two cultures. Culture and Psychology  1, 423-453).
ESRC Phase 1 (1994):  Data presented in Chapter 8 arises from this first phase of the data collection
from the larger ERSC funded study, focusing mainly on issues related to the individual and the
community and appears in:
Moodie, E. , Marková, I. & Farr, R.M. (1997). The meanings of the community and of
the individual in Slovakia and Scotland, Community and Applied Social Psychology,
Vol 7, No. 1, 19-37.
ESRC Phase 2 (1996): Chapter 9 contains data arising from various periods- 1992, 1994 and 1996,
again mainly focusing in issues related to democracy. Word association data from the original 1992
study are added to that collected again across Slovaks and Scots during 1994 and 1996 and appears in
reduced form (for 1992 and 1994) in:
Markova, I. & Moodie, E. & Plichtova, J. (1998) Social representations of
democracy: stability and change in word meanings.  In A.V. Rigas (eds.) Social
Representations and Contemporary Social Problems Athens:Ellinika Grammata, p
155-177.
This chapter extends this through the addition of data for 1996, and also through the inclusion of
word association data from the Czech Republic for the period 1994 and 1996. Part of the interview
data presented for Slovaks and Scots in this Chapter are included in:
Marková, I., Moodie, E. & Plichtová, J. (1999). Democracy as a social
representation. In M. Chaid & B. Orfali (eds.) Social representations and
Communication Process, Jönköping: Jönköping University Press.
8CHAPTER 2: SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS
New Problems for Social Psychology in a New Europe
In 1991, Serge Moscovici in his Tafjel Memorial Lecture entitled ‘New Problems for
Social Psychology in a New Europe’, likened the sudden and unexpected collapse of the
Communist regimes as in many ways equivalent to the ‘Big Bang’, in essence, a ‘social Big
Bang’, in which Europe was broadly split into participants and observers of a large life-size
historical experiment. The nations formerly divided by, and held behind, the Iron Curtain had
not only been participants, but were also wholly embedded within the vast social structures
of ‘actually existing socialism’, and who now found themselves suddenly experiencing the
collapse of these former totalising regimes. For those observers from the other side of the
great ideological divide, democracy, in its formal usage, for example in political debates, the
media and in specialised literature is viewed primarily as a political regime based on abstract
principles and conditions ensuring some form of individual freedom. However, taken outwith
its formal understanding, Moscovici reminds us that although linked to ‘rituals of elections
and rules of exchange’:
“its features spill over into all aspects of life…see it in family relations…in education… in
everyday conversations and mannerisms. All perspectives and expectations of people, their
public lives, motivations are more and more framed by this institution…it has become a
culture…a unity of cognitive structure…the way we represent the world” (ibid, p7).
Democracy transcends ‘what is political’ and ‘what is economic’, and incorporates
the spheres of ‘the social’, of ‘the individual and society’, the cultural and the historical –
“not to concentrate our energies in understanding it would amount to behaving like an
astronomer disregarding the birth of a new galaxy” (ibid, p6).
9The collapse of communism in Central and Eastern Europe, of course, carries great
significance for the practical daily lives and activities of the people directly involved. Not
only were the people experiencing the collapse of Soviet totalitarianism, an oppressive and
imposed regime that formed their everyday existence, irrespective of whether or not they had
applauded the regime, they are also having to come to terms with understanding and
interacting in their everyday lives new forms of political and economic institutions, mass
social and economic change and which in reality turned up-side-down all aspects of their
previous lives.
Not only does ‘democracy’ transcend what is political and what is economic, ‘Soviet
Communism’ also shared these features. Repeating Moscovici’s quote here, but substituting
‘democracy’ with ‘Soviet Communism’ may carry equal weight and relevance –
[Soviet Communism] ‘its rituals of elections and rules of exchange’… “its features spill over
into all aspects of life…see it in family relations…in education… in everyday conversations
and mannerisms. All perspectives and expectations of people, their public lives, motivations
are [were] framed by this institution…it [had] become a culture…a unity of cognitive
structure… [the way the world was represented]”
The focus of this work is on the meaning of democracy, the individual and the
community in Slovakia and Scotland. It aims at the exploration of these concepts from a
distinctly social perspective, that of, the theory of social representations. Social knowledge,
social representational theory proposes, is a function of the inter-relationship between values,
beliefs, practices and interaction that are anchored in historical, economical and politically
constituted social contexts (Moscovici, 2001). A social representation is the elaboration of a
social object, for example, democracy, by a certain community, for example, in Slovakia and
in Scotland. Social representational theory aims to show the nature of this elaboration, and
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how consensus, conflict and tension along with the dynamic relationship between stability
and change in social meaning contribute to this elaboration process.
Social psychology is one of the few disciplines that is capable of understanding the
synthesis between the individual and the social. Conceiving of the interplay between
individual cognition and the constantly changing social world being actualised through the
interconnectedness of individuals, social psychology should be concerned with the social
nature of thought and the ways in which people understand and change their social existence.
The position taken in this present work is that if social psychology is to proceed or to
contribute in any meaningful way to the understanding of macro-social phenomena it cannot
do so within the traditional confines of the discipline and under which the dominant
perspectives largely theorise the individual as asocial without history or culture. As
Moscovici (1972/2000) argues social psychology must begin to pay attention to the
interdependence of the individual and the social, not as a science of the individual or as a
science of groups or society, but must begin “to discover the deeper aspects of reality…the
general dynamics of knowledge…in which certain concepts are destroyed and other ones are
created” (ibid, p118). Moreover, not only should social psychology pay particular attention to
the fundamentals of social change, the creation of new social realities, the creation of new
meaning structures but also to what remains stable and relatively resistant to change, to the
dynamic relationship between stability and change (Moscovici, 1991).
To clarify the theoretical position underlying this present work, and to position the
theory of social representations to that of social psychology, requires an examination of how
social psychology as a discipline has developed, how it has conceived of its objects of study,
how its history has shaped its present, and also how alternative conceptions may further the
scope of the discipline. Here I will argue that the more dominant approaches in social
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psychology have been centred on a reductionist, individualistic and positivistic framework
that reduces what is individual and what is social to a variety of dualities. Furthermore, I will
argue that within social psychology, social representational theory conceived within an
Hegelian framework places the individual in a more wholly social position, one that
transgresses these dualities and conceives what is individual and what is social as
inextricably interlinked.
Social psychology: the absence of ‘social’?
Social psychology is not a unified discipline but a hybrid discipline informed through
two of its parent disciplines, that of, psychology and sociology. In broad and simplistic terms,
psychology’s main focus is on the individual; and in sociology, society is the focus. How
these two wide fields may be inter-related is the major concern of social psychology. The two
parent disciplines have been separated from one another for some time and have traditionally
been studied by different branches of thought. This is evidenced today through the co-
existence of both psychological and sociological forms of social psychology (Farr, 1996).
Although never entirely clear-cut, these divisions have been articulated in relation to
American/European forms of social psychology (Philogene & Deaux, 2001);
mainstream/indigenous forms (Farr, 1993, 1996) and at a more fundamental epistemological
level through the distinction between Cartesian and Hegelian paradigms (Markova, 1982:
Purkhardt, 1993). These debates came to the fore during the 1960s/70s in the so-called ‘crisis
of social psychology’ (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995; Greenwood, 2004) when the promise of
social psychology to tackle major social issues began to be questioned. However, to
understand the present challenges in contemporary social psychology it is necessary to
examine its early roots.
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 What has been termed the ‘individualisation’ of social psychology can be traced back
to various sources, the contribution of the Allport brothers (Gordon and Floyd) in the first
half of the 20th century in defining and setting the framework for the subsequent progression
of the discipline (Farr, 1996), along with the rise of more sophisticated public polling
methods, greater employment of multi-variate statistical procedures and the experimental
method (Daziger, 2000). Within the broad field of psychology, social psychology’s identity
has been based on its taking a particular account of the human social world and the
influences on behaviour that derive from it. According to Gordon Allport (1954), for
example, social psychology is best defined as a discipline that uses scientific methods in “an
attempt to understand and explain how thoughts, feelings and behaviour of individuals are
influenced by the actual, imagined or implied presence of other human beings” (p5),
therefore, primarily viewing the individual as a responder to the social. This definitional
statement has received general agreement from social psychologists for half a century and
has influenced and framed the socialisation of successive generations of graduate students
(Farr, 1996). In an earlier period, between the wars, Floyd Allport, within a more
behaviourist stance, equally denounced the ‘social’ in social psychology through his well
known statement “there can be no psychology of groups which is not essentially and entirely
a psychology of individuals” (1924. p4) leading to what Graumann (1986) has called the
individualisation of the social. It is clear from the Allports’ statements that the prime focus of
social psychology was the individual. Fifty years later, in one widely used textbook, Baron &
Bryne (2000) state that “the focus of social psychology is squarely on the individual” (p9). In
fact, for Baron & Bryne, it is precisely this focus on the individual that sets social psychology
apart from other social science disciplines such as sociology, anthropology, political science
and history.
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There was not always such a great divide between academic disciplines. For example,
Farr (1993; 1996) discusses Le Bon’s writings as encompassing both the individual and
society (a culture); Wundt’s experimental science was primarily a science of the individual,
however, his numerous volumes of Volkerpschologie was a science of culture with the
objects of study being language, customs, religion, myths and so on. Similarly, in the early
decades of the 20th century, American social psychology also retained a ‘social’ dimension to
concepts such as attitudes and prejudice. These were viewed “more than common attitudes
held individually by a plurality of persons…as collective phenomena that is not mere
summations”, and could be directed towards both social and non-social objects (Greenwood,
2004, p4). The concern of social psychology was more firmly within the realm of the
‘social’, separate and distinct from individual psychology which was more concerned with
the psychology and behaviour grounded in instincts, individual reasoning and non-social
learning (ibid). What these psychologists recognised was that one needs both an account of
the individual and an account of society (or culture) within social psychology. Although they
often drew a contrast between them (the individual and society), however, within the earliest
roots of the discipline both the individual and society were prime objects of study. Partly
through the misunderstanding and misconception of the more social forms of social
psychology emanating from Europe as constituting a ‘group mind’, ‘crowd behaviour’ or
‘conformity’ which would challenge the cherished notions of individuality and rationality
held since Enlightenment times, Allport and his followers firmly placed social psychology on
a path and direction which would reject socially engaged forms of cognition, knowledge and
behaviour (Greenwood, 2004). Through the editing out of sociological forms of social
psychology such as Mead’s social behaviourism, Blumer’s symbolic interactionism, Thomas
& Znaniecki’s social attitudes and Ischeider’s studies of interpersonal relations social
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psychology became firmly individualised (Farr, 1996). Specifically, in relation to the concept
of ‘attitude’, through adopting a highly cognitive approach, G Allport in his classic chapter
on attitudes in the 1935 Murchison Handbook of Social Psychology individualised this
theoretical concept. By the selective editing out of all the social and collective forms of the
various definitions, attitudes became to be defined purely in terms of an individual’s
predisposition to respond (ibid).
For many, the rise of cognitivism in psychology, in general, and social cognition in
social psychology, in particular, has further de-contextualised the individual, leading to a
discipline more focused on studying the asocial individual without history of culture, with the
‘social’ in social cognition merely referring to the study of cognition directed toward other
persons or groups (Greenwood, 2004; Augoustinos & Walker, 1995; Jost & Kruglanski,
2002).
A history of social psychology reveals how its roots have restricted the study of the
social or the inter-subjective. Markova (1982) has described how the discipline was framed
in the context of Cartesian dualities of mind/body, self/other or individual/society. Descarte’s
glorification of the I and his conviction that “the I is the starting point of knowledge and
certainty” (p16) have diminished the scope of the discipline. Here mind is conceived as
separate not only from body, but also from its material and social world. Within this
framework it is difficult to grasp the essential social nature of mind and self.
Cartesian assumptions are deeply embedded in the discipline of psychology in which
the explanation and understanding of individual and social behaviour rest on the duality of
inner/outer, self/other which uproots the individual from his/her social context. The
separation of the individual from social, cultural and historical contexts results in a type of
enquiry which places the examination and understanding of beliefs as characteristics of
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personality or cognitive style. The underlying assumption being “that beliefs are enduring
and are conjoined by underlying principles (such as attitudes to authority). The argument for
a functional basis of beliefs-serving cognitive or personality ‘needs’ is much stronger if
beliefs are seen as consistent and bounded” (Haste, 2004, p418).
Following this type of thinking, one of the most well known psychological theories
linking ideological or political belief systems to personality attributes is The Authoritarian
Personality (Adorno et al, 1950) which, according to the authors, predict the potential for
fascist and anti-democratic leaning and behaviour. Conducted at the University of California
at Berkelely, the study was part of a larger research project aimed at examining the
psychological bases of anti-Semitic prejudices. This work was heavily influenced by World
War Two and led to the development of a number of measures theorised to predict
authoritarian tendencies. Drawing heavily on early socialisation experiences, in their
conclusion, the authors state “a basically hierarchical, authoritarian, exploitative parent-child
relationship is apt to carry over into a power-oriented, exploitative dependent
attitude…conventionalism, rigidity, repressive denial, and the ensuing breakthrough of one’s
weaknesses, fear and dependence are but other aspects of the same fundamental personality
pattern” (p951). The two basic tenets of this research are: in times of crisis individuals
socialised in an authoritarian way display a characteristic typology of personality and
cognitive styles and position themselves on the political right (Oesterreich, 2005), and that
there is a psychological relation between the content of fascist beliefs and the irrational
cognitive structures that sustain them (Durrheim, 1997). The underlying assumption being
that individual personality traits or cognitive styles are stable, static and invariant entities
which then can be mapped on to political or ideological beliefs which, through virtue of this
relationship, are also stable, static and invariant. This thinking reduces both the mind-in-
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general and the nature of political beliefs or ideology as asocial, acultural and ahistorical. As
Durrheim points out, the origin of this body of work was both empirical and political:
empirically to link individual psychological functioning to ideological beliefs, and politically,
to account for the unexpected rise of Nazism as a major social movement in Europe. The
resultant nine trait syndrome was devised through obtaining differences between extreme
scores, those scoring High and Low, with the liberal majority being rejected from the sample
included in the final scale construction (Martin, 2001). Through a selective procedure for
devising the typology Adorno et al had theorised the bases of authoritarianism in the
ideological contents on which the political right and left diverged, “thereby assuming that the
left constituted the antithesis of the irrational right” Durrheim, 1997, p633). However, not
long after the Adorno et al (1950) studies associated authoritarian traits with right wing
fascist beliefs, as Durrheim (ibid) reports, numerous other studies argued that similar traits
were identified as underlying Communist beliefs “ with changed socio-political conditions
the law of ideological irrationality could be expanded to encompass the left (emphasis in
original: p631).
Virtually every aspect of the original conception has been shown to be
methodologically flawed, such as the use of uni-dimensional scaling techniques, biased and
highly selective sampling, a priori assumptions of a typology the authors knew to exist
resulting in the development of a typology which was mutually exclusive- authoritarian or
non-authoritarian (Martin, 2001; Ray, 1988, 1990; Durrheim, 1997). Conceptually it is
flawed as being seen to serve a specific set of (then) current ideological needs under which
questions of political psychology became highly politicised. (Durrheim, ibid). However,
more importantly, as Duckitt (1989) argues, the theory was conceived within a reductionist
framework to explain a highly social phenomena and which ignored the question of the more
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socio-dynamic processes such as group membership or the dynamic inter-relationship
between self/group identity processes.
Changing paradigms: From Cartesian to Hegelian
In contrast to the Cartesian framework dominant in social psychology, social
representations conceived within an Hegelian framework focuses on those aspects of
knowledge and meaning that have been neglected by mainstream social psychology. For
example, cognitivist approaches such as social cognition, based on a Cartesian framework,
decomposes complex social phenomena into simpler discrete units and which disregards the
mind as a dialogical entity. Dialogicality here refers to the underlying principles and
processes involved in the making of meaning and the dynamic socio-cultural construction of
knowledge based on a Hegelian framework of dialectics (Markova, 2003). Social
representational theory, based on a Hegelian understanding, is focused on the contents and
structure of common sense knowledge, and in doing so postulates that the individual and the
social are co-determinants of a social reality which exists neither in the head of individuals or
as an external reality but requires the interdependence of both (Markova, 1996; 2003).
This is in direct contrast to those mainstream approaches in which individuals are
reducible to either behavioural outcomes or as the bearers of behavioural influences, where
the social is conceived of as simply the presence of other people as the carriers of social
influence or as responders to social variables. This type of explanation then attempts to
disentangle the complexities introduced by cognitively sophisticated human minds occupying
a varied social life through introducing a strong element of lawfulness into social
psychological explanations. For example, Feldman (1995) states that social psychology is the
study of “how individual thoughts, feelings and actions are determined by others…social
psychology seeks to discover the broad, universal principles that underlie all social behaviour
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(p6). Most typically these adhere to some type of lawful determinism and are often presented
in the language of ‘underlying regularities’. As Shaver (1987) argues, social psychology aims
to discover the underlying regularities that occur despite the unique experience that each
person may bring. Following on from this he draws parallels to making weather forecasts and
predicting human behaviour, in both instances “determinism still applies…because human
social behaviour is at least as complex as the weather” (p30).
Contemporary social psychology can arguably be seen to be not ‘social’ at all, at least
in relation to its theoretical accounts which appear to invoke a non-social realm of ‘causal
variables’, however intricately these may be conceived, as explanations of the rich social
realm of the human mind (Harre, 1993; Moscovici, 1972). Mainstream social psychology has
been, and largely continues to be, committed to the presuppositions of traditional
experimental psychology, which itself has borrowed assumptions from the natural sciences
(Gergen, 1973; Daziger, 2000, Markova, 1982).
However, as Markova (1982) points out, in talking about, for example, a Cartesian or
a Hegelian paradigm we are not always referring to a clear cut and absolute division - in
direct and total opposition to one another, but as underlying sets of presuppositions which,
whether implicitly or explicitly, guide the research process and our conceptual framework.
As she further points out “the conceptual frameworks of research workers are not tidy
showrooms where everything is in place. It may well be that a researcher accepts the
presupposition that the mind is individualistic while at the same time holding that the mind is
dynamic” (p8). More often, however, the prevailing paradigms reflect the often
unquestioned, taken-for-granted scientific ethos of the time until these are fundamentally
challenged by events or phenomena that cannot be explained or explored through the existing
paradigms. These fundamental challenges to the prevailing ethos often do not present
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themselves as problems that can be resolved through changes within science but through
changes of science. For example, “Einstein’s theory of relativity shaking the foundations of
Newtonian physics…significant changes in science appear to have occurred through radical
shifts in the way scientists view reality” (Crotty, 1998, p36). Einsteinian frameworks have
not completely supplanted Newtonian frameworks, both are necessary depending on the
phenomena under question. Similarly, within psychology various paradigms may co-exist,
once again, depending on the specific nature of the enquiry. Markova (1982) notes that in
certain areas the Cartesian paradigm may well prevail, however, for more complex issues
such as those examined in social psychology the Cartesian framework excludes, by virtue of
its presuppositions, an understanding of the individual mind as a dialogical entity ie. defined
by its interaction with the environment which has a contextualised, mutable and dynamic
existence. To conceive of entities as dynamic and not stable, holistic and not discrete, we
need a paradigm shift to a Hegelian framework.
Knowledge within the physical sciences is largely constructed around relatively stable
and predictable entities. Change, as a phenomenon, may be more directly quantified,
measured and the dynamics of movement, of interaction and of reaction can be established
with some degree of certainty and are not historically or culturally linked. This is not to argue
that aspects of the focus of scientific enquiry are not socially relevant: social life impinges on
the direction of science just as scientific discoveries impinge on social life. The progress of
science itself is a product of human history. However, the movement and properties of
elements, concepts of attraction and repulsion and so on are set within fundamental laws that
guide knowledge and the progress of enquiry. In contrast to the physical sciences, for Gergen
(1973), social psychology is primarily an historical enquiry, it deals with phenomena that
fluctuate, are often non-repeatable, are socially and culturally linked and consequently
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fundamental principles cannot be so readily defined.
In the context of Cartesian philosophy there is an antithesis between science and
history, the former is more concerned with universals and the latter with particulars. There is
no such contradiction between the universal and the particular within an Hegelian
framework. Here what is universal and what is particular co-exist in a mutual and dynamic
relationship. For Markova (1991; 1996) this is one aspect that distinguishes the theory of
social representations from Cartesian social psychology and places social representations as
inhabiting a symbolic environment (in some cases possibly a universal) but being expressed
through the activities of individual (particulars). Universals are not taken as mere
summations of common features but are always expressed in a dynamic way through
particulars, thus viewing universal/particular in a co-complementary relationship.
The Cartesian and Hegelian paradigms are based on different sets of presuppositions.
These can be exemplified through their differing conceptions of the nature of knowledge and
the subject/object relationship. Based on varying dualities, for example, individual/social,
mind/body and so on, the Cartesian paradigm extends these to the nature and acquisition of
knowledge through dualisms between the knower and what is known; from the subject and
from the object. The nature of knowing is thus conceived as either the world must be
somehow brought into the mind or that the mind must somehow grasp the structure of the
world seemingly independent from it. Under this conception the nature of knowledge
requires two separate elements, under which the knower is either the individual or the
collective, along with the object of knowledge (Markova, 2003).
Markova (ibid), by drawing from semiotic theories of mind, conceives of the
relationship between the knower and the known, between the subject and the object, as
comprising a triadic relationship in which individual/social, self/other, along with the object
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of knowledge, forms the basis of the construction of meaning and knowledge. This she
expresses as ‘Ego-Alter-Object’ or ‘Self-Other-Object’ where the ‘Other’ can mean another
person, for example in a face to face dialogue, or a group, a culture and so on. This unit
cannot be decomposed into its constituent parts, by doing so, for example, by disregarding
either the ‘Self’ or the ‘Other’ reduces the nature of knowledge as either residing in the
individual or in the social. These triadic relationships can be further expressed as comprising
nested relationships reflecting, for example, “I-You-Object (local situation) vs I-You-Object
in a cultural context, with a third movement being a newly constructed meaning (Markova,
2000, p113). What is central to this triadic relationship is not only that it conceives of the
individual and the social in more wholly interdependent way but there is an inherent tension
residing in the Self-Other component of the triad in relation to the object and that this tension
is the source for driving social change and forms the foundation of knowledge (Markova,
2003).
Hegelian dialectics conceives of thought and knowledge as involving the creation of a
synthesis from thesis and antithesis. Purkhardt (1993) describes this as knowledge being
acquired through a circle returning within itself. Nisbett et al (2001) characterises Hegelian
dialectics in terms of three principles: firstly, the principle of change reflecting the idea that
reality is not a process that is static but dynamic; secondly, the principle of contradiction is
expressed in the idea that, for example, good/bad, old/new may exist in the same object and,
in fact, depend on one another for their existence and finally, the principle of holism, that is,
attempts to isolate components from their larger whole is misleading and reductionist (p301).
The principle of contradiction exemplifies the role of ‘tension’ inherent in Hegelian
thought. However, as Markova (1997b) points out, there is a great deal of confusion in the
terminology used in the understanding of Hegelian dialectics, and of the principle of
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contradiction. The use of terms such as oppositions, antinomies and so on implies a source of
tension between two discrete entities rather than a source of tension within a dyad. What is
central, whether using the terms oppositions, antinomies etc, is that an object or concept is
only understood in relation to the other, as a relational whole in a mutually interdependent
way. Adding to this confusion is the idea of different kinds of opposites; these can be thought
of as contraries or as contradictions. Contraries would include black/white,
freedom/oppression; whereas, contradictions would include black/non-black, freedom/non-
freedom. Contradictions are mutually exhaustive and have been contained in thought since
Aristotle in the law of con-contradiction, under which “a thing cannot be something and not
be that thing at the same time” (ibid, p243). This thinking remained implicit until around the
19th century when challenged by Hegel whose specific interest lay in contradictory forces,
not in contradictory discrete categories in the Aristotelian sense, but in contradictory
relationships within dyads.
As this is a crucial foundation to Hegelian dialectics and to the Hegelian paradigm in
the social sciences, Markova (1997b, p244) expands on it more fully. For example, if we
wish to examine those ‘healthy’ and ‘unhealthy’ in two nations, we construct categories
containing criteria reflecting these two separate states. Such a process would indicate a
particular state of affairs at a particular time in two nations. However, if the concern is the
study of change, in terms of healthy and unhealthy, or the understanding or meaning of
healthy and unhealthy, these two terms are now viewed as mutually co-determined, one
makes sense in relation to the other and will become part of other meaning systems, for
example, particular medical knowledge systems or socio-cultural systems. Being embedded
in a more complex social system the concept ‘healthy/unhealthy’ is now interdependent, their
meaning will co-change together and they now form a relational whole.
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As Markova (2003) further points out, contradiction, itself, is not the force driving the
dynamics of knowledge and meaning but the inherent tension within the contradiction, or
more specifically, the relative tension residing in the ‘Self-Other-Object’ triad. The relative
strengths of these three components, she theorises, may underlie representations based on
beliefs and on knowledge. As Moscovici (1998) points out, the origins of social knowledge
lies not in pure reasoning or information nor in the negation of reasoning or information, but
in a complex relationship based on ‘beliefs’ that do not require validation, or indeed may be
impervious to validation, and to ‘knowledge’ which may be backed up by validation, by fact
or by explicit information. What is characteristic of a ‘belief’, broadly speaking, lies in the
subject/object relationship, in that, the individual, group or culture do not necessarily
contribute directly to its formation, more often arising through history and through culture. In
relation to belief based representations, Markova (2003) has theorised that the ‘Self-Other-
Object’ triadic relationship privileges the ‘Self-Other’ component with less emphasis on the
‘Object’; whereas, more knowledge-based representations may privilege the ‘Self-Object’
component to the expense of the ‘Other. These, she theorises, may be more likened to
scientific, professional and more evidence based thought. However, it must be stressed that
all three components are still in operation, it is the relative strength which varies. It must also
be stressed that, in reality, the process of disentangling knowledge and meaning based on
belief or knowledge is never clear cut and will necessarily contain a simultaneity of the two.
Old beliefs may co-exist with new knowledge, even with new knowledge that may contradict
them. This clashing and contradiction is the dynamic process underlying the nature of social
thought conceived within an Hegelian framework, and underlies that of the theory of social
representations. For Moscovici (1998) the understanding of the mental life of individuals or
groups, and the meaningful contribution of social science to social issues will fail if we fail to
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recognise the complex relationship between faith and knowledge or between belief and
knowledge: “ the poverty of cognitivism is not that it ignores meaning; it skips beliefs”
(p254). However, as Markova (2003) stresses, these are, for the moment, theoretical
conceptions rather than empirical conceptions.
The nature of the enquiry, the fundamental assumptions and the kind of questions
raised under traditional epistemologies differ to those under a social representational
approach based on a Hegelian framework. Although more mainstream social psychology is,
of course, concerned with the individual and the social, however, as previously argued, these
tend to be phrased in terms of either the individual as a source of influence on the social or as
responders to the social.
The more socially grounded nature of cognition is not new in psychology. Within
social developmental psychology, Vygotsky was distinctive in articulating a profoundly
social explanation of human psychology. By adopting and elaborating an Hegelian
understanding of developmental psychology he stressed that psychological phenomena
originate in social interaction and social life (Purkhardt, 1993). Vygotsky’s approach to
cognitive development is sociocultural, that is, it progresses from the assumption “that action
is mediated and cannot be separated from the milieu in which it is carried out” (Wertsch,
1991, p18). Vygotsky's theory consists of the interaction between four main notions: higher
mental processes, mediation, psychological tools and internalisation. Briefly, these four
notions interact in the following way: higher mental processes are the primary distinction
separating man from other animals and they allow man to distance him/herself from the
world and to act instrumentally upon it. Because they are socially meaningful processes,
external to the individual, higher mental functions are always mediated. This mediation is
achieved through psychological tools or cultural tools. When the individual masters the
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higher mental processes they are internalised and, in a sense, the social becomes available as
a tool. The process of internalisation is not neutral, not only does the individual transform
that which is internalised but the nature of knowledge is also changed is this process
(Vygotsky, 1983, in Kozulin, 1990). Vygotsky advocated that to understand human cognition
it is necessary to take into consideration the historical and cultural character of human
behaviour and learning, that is, individuals use not only physical experience but also
historical and cultural experience to make sense of the world; and also the social nature of
human experience, that individual experiences are only one part of the pool of experiences
that are available (ibid). Thus, for Vygotsky, learning, action and cognition are dependent
upon the triadic relationship comprising ‘Self-Other-Object’ and in doing so his thinking
transgresses the dichotomy that the mind is either primarily individual or primarily social.
This triadic relationship also precedes higher conceptual development and can be
identified during pre-conceptual self knowledge in infants. The evidence for this reference
triangle can be identified in the first few months of an infants life. For example, from around
the time of the first smile, infants develop social expectations and begin to explore the
consequences of their own actions on objects and the reciprocity of others (Rochat & Striano,
1999). From around 6 months infants move from a world relatively more centred on ‘Other’
to one more centred on ‘Object’. At this time, as argued by Rochat (2001), infants are pulled
by two contradictory forces: the exploration of the greater world (Object) and to remain close
to care-givers (Other). This Object-Other tension is displayed through the increasing
incorporation of other people into the infants world of objects. Joint attention, social
referencing and gestures such as pointing along with communicative vocalisations all display
an environment that is explicitly shared (Tomasello, 1995). Thus, within the first year of life
a referential triadic relationship is evident and through which infants display characteristics
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of not learning exclusively from another but through another (ibid). The nature of task-
solving within development also exemplifies the changing relationship between the Self-
Other-Object triad. For example, Rochat (2001) points to a Paigetian task of pulling a blanket
containing an attractive object which is easily solvable to a 9 month old infant, by around 18
months what appears as developmental regression through the request for help, reveals at a
deeper level the more dialogical and intersubjective nature of learning and development.
However, for Valsiner (1991) all too often the predominance of cognitivism within
developmental psychology focuses on when development occurs and which precludes the
question of how cognitive processes emerge and develop.
Similarly within social cognition, social schemas, a mainstay of the cognitivist
approach, have been conceptualised as “mental structures which contain general expectations
and knowledge about the world” (Augoustinos & Walker, 1995, p32) Under this view,
schemas form some type of information processing system to sort and organise social stimuli,
being largely conceptualised as residing within the head and with little or no consideration of
the origins of such schemas. However, Kashima (2000) has argued for the recovery and the
re-appraisal of the early writings of F.C. Bartlett, a founding figure of schema theory.
Drawing from his early work during the 1920s and 1930s, Kashima stresses the inherently
social and cultural understanding in his thinking. Focusing on experimentally-based serial
reproduction tasks, Bartlett demonstrated “how textual or pictorial stimuli that is unfamiliar
to the participants is transformed into something that is culturally understandable” (ibid,
p391). This is strikingly similar to the experimentally-based examination of memory recall
tasks within the core/periphery approach in social representational approach (Guimelli, 1993,
see below). Bartlett’s work, although based on simple rather than complex or naturally
occurring social events, reveals through serial reproduction tasks the movement of meaning
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across many heads, striking a chord with contemporary social representational theory.
Although not explicitly Hegelian in his thinking, Bartlett’s conception of social meaning was
dynamic, as Kashima states: “his configuration of tendencies was dynamic…they may be in
conflict, they may coalesce and integrate new forms and practices…interact with each other
in conflict or in harmony…producing the movement of culture (Kashima, 2000, p296).
Within the original roots of schema theory, Bartlett’s conception was inherently dynamic and
took the question of individual cognition and the social, cultural and historical movement of
ideas in a more integrative way, and one that is strikingly different from contemporary
schema theory (ibid). Similarly, for Moscovici (2000), Bartlett’s thinking was inherently
more ‘social’ than most social psychology is today.
Kruglanski (2001), within more contemporary social cognition, accepts that there has
been a predominance of focusing on phenomena largely occurring within the head, and
although sophisticated models may have been developed, these have been to the expense of
the socially inserted nature of cognition. Furthermore, when social contents have been
included in research designs these are viewed as secondary to the prime focus, that of, the
discovery of general laws and principles of how people relate to socially significant stimuli
rather than real and contemporary social issues. Similarly, for Augoustinos & Walker (1995),
the poverty of social cognition lies in its inherent tradition of focusing solely on the
individual.
Although the socially inserted nature of cognition is evident in the seminal work of
Vygotsky, and others, in developmental psychology (see Markova, 1990, for also an account
of Baldwin and Mead’s contribution); and in the early roots of schema theory in the social
cognition approach, little of this tradition, it can be argued, is at the forefront of mainstream
social psychology today. Social representational theory, understood within an Hegelian
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paradigm, conceives of individual cognition in a dynamic and socially inserted manner and
which transcends the underlying dichotomies of individual and social through a
conceptualisation under which one cannot be understood without the other, and from which
meaning and understanding involve complex and often nested relationships which cannot be
understood by reducing them to their constituent parts, into discrete entities.
Therefore, it can be argued that traditional social psychology, itself, provides little
guidance for the study of macro-social phenomena such as the meaning of democracy, the
individual and the community, in Scotland and Slovakia, two societies with very different
histories and present day realities.
Moreover, in accepting the complexities in examining lay representations of such
complex concepts such as ‘democracy’, ‘the individual’ and ‘the community’ in Slovakia and
Scotland within a social representational framework there is not one source of literature, or
one academic discipline, that would be sufficient. Aspects from political science, economics,
history and philosophy are all required to frame and understand the nature of the enquiry and
how these relate to the understanding of democracy in both societies. This present work
approaches these issues from a social representational framework, however, it would fail in
this endeavour if it didn’t cross the boundaries of other related disciplines. As Markova
(2003) notes, these academic boundaries are, in fact, artificially created by the various
academic communities themselves “thus depriving us of seeing social phenomena in
different perspectives and in the multi-faceted realities to which they belong” (p xiv).
FRAMEWORK OF SOCIAL REPRESENTATIONS
What are Social Representations
The theory of social representations was originally formulated by Serge Moscovici
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during the 1950s and early 1960s. In essence, the theory comprises a framework, or
perspective, to study complex psychosocial phenomenon in modern societies. The theory
emphasises the ‘social’ nature of human existence and thought and seeks to understand the
individual within his/her social, cultural, historical or collective milieu. By placing the
individual within a wholly social position the theory in no way accepts, or conceives of, the
individual as simply a passive conveyor of society, or simply as a product of society. But that
the individual and society forms a dialectical relationship, as a product of society, culture and
history through conventions, norms and values, and as an active participant reflecting
innovation, conflict and opposition, effecting social change. The individual and society is
thus viewed in an interdependent and dynamic relationship (Markova, 2000; Haste, 2004).
For Moscovici, social representations are conceived of as systems of knowledge,
meanings, mutual understanding and practices which is some way establish an order in our
material and social world. More specifically, they have been defined as:
“…by social representations we mean sets of concepts, statements and explanations
originating in daily life in the course of inter-individual communication. They are equivalent,
in our society, of the myths and belief systems in traditional societies, a contemporary
version of common sense” (Moscovici, 1981 p181).
Social representations are viewed as highly flexible and dynamic structures of
thought characterised by a continual re-constituting and re-cycling of common knowledge
and understanding which forms the panorama of everyday knowledge. Once created they
behave as autonomous entities or forces which guide thinking and meaning:
 “…they lead a life of their own, circulate, merge, attract and repel each other, give birth to
new representations…the more its origin is forgotten and its conventional nature is ignored,
the more fossilised it becomes” (Moscovici, 1984 p13).  Social representations are, at one
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level, what is often taken for granted, unquestioned and often below the level of immediate
awareness; and at one and the same time as dynamic tools which people use to make sense of
their worlds, to interpret and to understand change, the unfamiliar or what is threatening.
From its inception, the theory of social representations has been elaborated on and has
been developing to cover a wide range of objects of study, methods and theoretical concerns
through the framing of empirical investigations within the theory, from the continuing
theoretical articulations and also, to a some extent, through responses to its critics. Duveen
(2000) believes that the criticism that has been directed towards social representations is
partly due to Moscovici’s 1961/71 study ‘ Psychanalyse: son image et son public’ remaining
untranslated from the original French into English. However, notwithstanding the
inaccessibility of the original formulation of the theory to the Anglo-Saxon speaking world, a
growing body of literature is widely available to the English speaking community both
pertaining to the original work and also from further elaboration and clarification of the
theory by Moscovici himself, and others. Jahoda (1988) specifically questions the use of the
term ‘social’ representations as opposed to ‘collective’ representations from the original
Durkheimian conception from which Moscovici identified as an ancestor to his ideas
(Moscovici, 1984). Is this simply a confusion over terminology where Moscovici uses the
term ‘social’ to mean ‘collective’ in the Durkheimian sense? Farr (1989) has pointed out that
Moscovici has expressed his preference for the study of ‘social representations’, rather than
the study of ‘collective representations’, due to a fundamental difference between the two,
rather than simply a question of overlapping terminology. Moscovici, in 1998 (Moscovici &
Markova, 1998) points out that what characterised traditional societies, as opposed to modern
day societies, was a social reality that was more stable and homogeneous in nature, based
more on myths, sacred beliefs or religious truths. These were often already pre-established or
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pre-existing social realities, deeply rooted in history and culture. Markova (2003) in
‘Dialogicality and Social Representations’ has elaborated on this by outlining the
background of the theoretical thinking underlying both Durkheim’s conception of
‘individual’ and ‘collective’ representations, and Moscovici’s ‘social’ representations. The
origins of both of these theories of social knowledge can be linked back to the historic period
in time, or the nature of the societies studied, during their development. Durkheim
distinguished between ‘individual’ and ‘collective’ representations – with individual
representations being viewed solely as physiological or neurological phenomena, such as
individual drives, need or instincts. Collective representations became for him the essence of
a sociological theory of knowledge comprising beliefs, knowledge, images, symbols or forms
of social reality that were “external to the individual, who does not contribute towards their
formation” (ibid, p124). For Durkheim, social knowledge was primarily a stable form of
knowledge, if knowledge was not stable how could it be viewed as knowledge. For Markova,
the prominence of stability (or relative stability over time) was largely a feature of the types
of societies Durkheim studied -traditional or primitive societies- which arguably, would
reflect more stability, less diversity and change in social knowledge than in complex and
modern societies:  “as he [Durkheim] viewed collective representations as more or less stable
concepts, the question of change arose for him only as an empirical problem” (ibid, p130).
However, Markova further elaborates that Durkheim did recognise that there was some
relationship between individual and collective representations, however, this relationship was
not further elaborated on at the time.
Both stability and change are central to Moscovici’s theory of social knowledge
through an emphasis on the exploration of the variation and diversity of collective ideas in
modern societies. The original formulation of the theory was also closely linked to a
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particular period in time and to his own personal background, a political refugee from
Romania living and studying in Paris during the 1950s/60s. The prime question guiding his
thinking was how scientific or professional knowledge is transformed (or is diffused) into
common or spontaneous knowledge of ordinary people. The kernel for this arose from two
dominant forces operating at the time concerning the relationship between ‘scientific’
knowledge and ‘commonsense’ or ‘lay’ knowledge. As a Marxist during his youth in
Romania, Moscovici was aware of the Marxist’s (especially Lenin’s) position regarding
common sense thinking, or spontaneous thinking in ordinary people “ …they were
mistrustful about the spontaneous knowledge of ordinary people…[ordinary knowledge] had
to be stripped of its ideological, religious and folk irrationalities and replaced by scientific
knowledge…[they, Marxists] didn’t believe that diffusion, the communication of knowledge,
would increase the public level of knowledge…that scientific thinking, through propaganda
would replace common thinking” (Moscovici & Markova, 1998, p 377). The second force
was linked to the intense intellectual debates at the time concerning the material impact of
science in general, and to the opposition of scientific knowledge which was viewed as
rational, logical, progressive and superior to common-sense knowledge, viewed as irrational,
illogical and inferior. When scientific knowledge diffuses into the public discourse or public
knowledge it was believed that it became “vulgarised, as a devaluation, or deformation, or
both, of scientific knowledge” (ibid, p375). These observations led Moscovici to investigate
the then currently emerging scientific theory - psychoanalysis - and how this scientific
phenomenon was represented across various segments of French society, through the
examination of common-sense thinking/common knowledge with particular reference to the
contents and type of communication of across different types of mass media. This initial
empirical investigation formed the basis of his theory of social representations as a form of
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social knowledge.
Social representations, as opposed to ‘collective’ representations, seeks to examine
the variation, diversity and dynamics of social thinking and knowledge circulating in modern
societies in which there are many competing ‘voices of authority’. Social representations are
more modern forms of thinking and meaning adapted to more fragmented and decentralised
authorities of knowledge (Duveen, 2000). The theory in no way discounts that there are
aspects of social knowledge or social reality that are consensually or more ‘collectively’
shared, deeply rooted in culture and appearing relatively homogeneously or stable within
populations. For Moscovici himself, folk knowledge, or even folk science, was a relatively
rich and structured form of social knowledge and formed a prominent feature of his early life
in Romania (Moscovici & Markova, 1998). Although the existence of collectively shared
representations has been generally accepted as a form of social knowledge within societies,
the task for social psychology is to examine their internal dynamics, structure and function,
in essence, “in ‘splitting representations’ just as atoms and genes have been split” Moscovici,
1984, p16); to examine their ‘social’ nature  “social representations are social in that they are
the products of the dyad society-individual, and not the products of either of these
components of the dyad in separation from one another” (Markova & Wilkie, 1987, p401).
Moscovici  in 1988 further elaborated by indicating that there are three possible ways in
which a representation becomes ‘social’. Firstly, representations can be more or less shared
within a population or a culture without having been explicitly produced by that group.
Rather than ‘collective’, Moscovici uses the term ‘hegemonic’ representations and these may
appear to be relatively stable and homogeneous over generations, or even over centuries.
These are all-pervasive systems of knowledge, acquired over long periods of socialisation,
often taken-for-granted assumptions and beliefs, rarely questioned or brought to the surface
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of awareness. Kempny (1993) argues that common-sense knowledge separates truth from
illusion, appears as a form of ‘of-courseness’ it’s taken for granted, ‘what everyone knows’
and as a form of social knowledge is as totalising in its effect as any other. However,
irrespective of how consensual, collective, stable or enduring these representations appear to
be, they are still open to modification or become socially changed. For example Markova
(2003) discusses what is edible or inedible, clean or dirty within a culture may appear as a
fundamental taboo. These may remain consensually shared, are based on traditional, religious
or cultural practices and may remain unquestioned for decades or centuries, ‘collective’ in
the Durkheimian sense. However, as a result of some event or crisis, such as an ecological
disaster, famine, the contamination of animal feed, what had been previously been viewed as
edible/inedible or clean/dirty will change its content and structure, will enter and circulate
within the public discourse giving rise to new and diverse viewpoints, in turn forming the
genesis of new representations.
A second type of representation - ‘emancipated’ emerges through communication and
dialogue between social groups who have some level of close communicative contact with
each other “each group or sub-group creates its own version of reality and shares it with the
other” (Moscovici, 1981, p221). These appear to function through some type of negotiation
process, though the exchanging and sharing of knowledge and beliefs. For example, the
representations of health or illness through the exchange of knowledge of medical
professionals, paramedics, lay beliefs, healthy or sick individual or groups.
Finally, there are representations that are more ‘polemical’, these are more
antagonistic, confrontational and intensively oppositional or mutually exclusive, and may be
more characteristic in times of social conflict or intense social change revealing struggle and
opposition within or between social groups.
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Although Moscovici highlighted the above three ways in which he viewed
representations as ‘social’ rather than ‘collective’, these should not be conceived of as three
distinct forms or levels of representation easily identified or examined. Modern societies
carry a variety of social realities, beliefs and meaning systems, all will merge and mingle,
transform and elaborate the content, structure and meaning of social representations. Public
discourse surrounding a new or unfamiliar phenomenon will necessarily reflect any or all
three of the differing types of representations which, in turn, reflects the various competing
knowledge systems, different sciences, different ideologies, religions, taboos or differing
conceptions of morality and so on. For example, the media coverage of AIDS as it was
emerging in the 1980s reflected all kinds of hegemonic, emancipated or polemical
representations. Being both unfamiliar and threatening, the disease was portrayed and
discussed widely in terms of deeply rooted taboos, as a punishment striking out at increased
sexual liberties embedded within religious or morally based beliefs (for example ‘gay
cancer’); within traditional medical and biological models of disease, medical ethics and so
on. These, in turn, were elaborated on and commentated on, for example, through
professional and scientific discourses, by the media, by various interest groups, by infected
individuals, by those who perceived themselves or others to the safe or unsafe (Markova &
Wilkie, 1987; Markova, 2003;  Farr, 1995). Social representations as the evolving products
of the stocks of knowledge are thus transformed into forms of social ‘knowledge’ through a
vast array of both explicit and implicit processes from expert professional and scientific
discourse and understandings to lay social practices and shared understandings – we take on
representations and re-represent them, they are “re-thought, re-created and re-presented”
(Moscovici, 1984, p24).
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The function of social representations
Social representations do not form an undifferentiated mass in the minds of
individuals ready to be accessed or elaborated in a random or irrational way, they perform a
function in social thought and are theorised to be a structured component of social thought.
Although, social representations are viewed by Moscovici as “always in the making”
(Moscovici & Markova, 1998), there are certain criteria that are arguably crucial in the
‘when’ and ‘how’ they are to be examined. A commonly asked question is - can the theory of
social representation be used to examine just about anything? The answer to this is both yes
and no. Any object, event, phenomena can become an object (in the wider sense) for social
representations. Wagner (1995) argues that the creation and/or elaboration of the contents or
the structure of social representations rarely occurs in the “absence of practical necessities”
(p126). Being particularly prevalent in times of social upheaval or change when their
structure and contents are revealed they should be examined within the background of social
change when new events or phenomena stir up collective memories, beliefs, values, and
where individuals have a desire to understand, or to solve an emerging social problem
(Markova, 2003). It is within the dynamic space between what is shared or taken for granted,
often previously unquestioned, and what is debated on and argued about that social
representations take on a force of their own and become, in essence, new forms of social
knowledge. Duveen (2000) discusses this in terms of ‘points of tension, or ‘cleavages’
occurring in society in which social objects, events or phenomena can be more local or
transient. For example, representations of a student protest movement (Di Giacomo, 1980);
representations of Brixton (Howarth, 2002); representations of new technology within a
school (Chaid, 1999); or more global and reflecting macro-social events and phenomena. For
example, representations of war and peace (Wagner et al, 1996); representations of Europe
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(De Rosa, 1999). Wagner (1993) lists over 70 published articles (up to 1993) reflecting the
range and diversity of topics included within a social representational framework including
representations of science, technology, biology and medicine, health and illness, mental
health, handicap, the body, childhood, inequality, work and unemployment. However,
whether reflecting more local or transient events where cleavages and tension may be more
confined to particular groups within society or to social change at a more global or macro-
level, social representations are complex and multi-layered encompassing both what is past,
known and taken for granted as well as what is new, emerging and changing (Markova,
1996). As social representations, in themselves, are never self-explanatory, being generated
in the complex communicative practices of everyday life they must also be explored and
examined within the context of relevant local, social, cultural and historical backgrounds
(Moscovici, 1993).
The underlying function of social representations is to give the unfamiliar a familiar
substance and it has been theorised that through two interdependent processes, anchoring and
objectification, that individuals familiarise the unfamiliar (Moscovici, 1984). As individuals
we have a primary need to make sense of an unfamiliar object, idea or event or to make less
threatening that which is threatening. We make sense of what is unknown by giving it
meaning. What is new or changing is set within a structure of knowledge and meaning we
already have and with which we are already familiar. Social representations have a stabilising
effect in times of social change or upheaval, yet at the same time, they are necessarily
characterised by tension, opposition and are often contradictory in nature (Markova, 2003).
New knowledge is anchored to old knowledge, abstract ideas are objectified and turned into
something more concrete and familiar.
Through these two processes of anchoring and objectification social representations
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are formed and elaborated (Moscovici, 1984; Lui, 2004). For example, past knowledge about
the political process or political ideologies will facilitate the integration of new knowledge.
This new knowledge will initially be connected to that which was previously known. For
example, if a new political party or political process emerges this will first be anchored to
political parties or processes that are already in some way familiar, known and experienced:
“individuals, groups…return to what is already known, how the already known can be used
in the present situation, even if this new is totally new” (Orfali, 2002, p400). Without this
initial anchoring process this new event will remain in the realm of the unknown and
unfamiliar and not become part of common sense or common knowledge, it fails to become
represented. Anchoring has primarily a stabilising effect on social representations, it may be
more inner-directed, draws on shared knowledge from the past and/or the culturally familiar.
Objectification is the process of making this new event or phenomena more of a reality,
turning the abstract into something more tangible, in effect turning it into a social
representation.
Objectification is a more fluid and dynamic process than anchoring, reflecting change
rather than stability, more outer-directed and draws more on the current experienced world
(Bauer & Gaskell, 1999; Lui, 2004; Joffe, 2003). Through the dynamic process of recycling
and the interdependencies between anchoring and objectification, reflecting both stability and
change, new forms of social reality circulate and emerge, become solidified and form the
genesis of new representations. For example, drawing once again on the emergence of AIDS,
when this was first brought to the public’s attention, this new emerging disease was initially
anchored, in Europe, to an historic representation of the black plague (Farr, 1995). With new
knowledge constantly emerging from medical science and epidemiology concerning the virus
and the nature of the virus, AIDS became more commonly anchored to other known, more
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recent, and more graspable diseases such as cancer or to outbreaks of other mass sexually
transmitted diseases such as the syphilis outbreak earlier in the century. Farr (ibid, p14) states
“a threat remains vague until it becomes tangible”. In many circumstances a vague threat is
more threatening than a more tangible one, which may be more understandable, and hence
potentially controllable. It is here, Farr argues, that the social representations of AIDS (or any
challenging phenomena) can take on a force of their own, and are often separate and distinct
from any medical, epidemiological or specialist ‘evidence’. It is the diverse forms of
evidence, various systems of knowledge and competing representations that people draw on
that characterise the stable, shared or conflicting nature of social representations. How the
virus is spread, social groups more vulnerable, beliefs about morality, education, basic
individual rights such as freedom of information versus medical confidentiality all compete
and mingle in the process turning the representation of AIDS, through a dynamic process of
‘re-representation’, into a more concrete and objectified entity in its own right; they have
become social representations, forms of social knowledge and forms of social reality.
Just as social representations are formed and circulate in order to make sense of, to
integrate or to understand what is changing or unfamiliar, the nature of social representations
themselves are highly complex and multi-faceted. The question thus becomes, if social
representations are always in a state of relative stability, flux and change, how can they be
identified or examined?
The structural approach
Since its inception social representational theory has emphasised the interdependence
between socially shared knowledge and individual cognition and how this process is shaped
through communication. One of the most demanding aspects is the examination of this
interdependence along with that of individual or group variations within one single theory
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without falling prey to either psychological or sociological reductionism. The apparent
paradox of social representations encompassing what is stable yet dynamic, shared and yet
personal, runs the risk of what is gained at the level of its theoretical elaborations may be to
the cost of its empirical elaboration (Laszlo, 1997). In many respects the theoretical and
empirical elaboration within the theory is still a ‘work in progress’. One consequence of
accounting for the interdependencies between the individual/social aspects of thought with
the dynamic interplay of stability and change was to open the way for the application of
various theoretical and empirical perspectives under which the focus has always been on the
search for innovation and understanding rather than on confirmation or prediction
(Moscovici, 2001).
The existence of the dual process of anchoring and objectification as underlying how
representations are generated, maintained and structured have been aspects of the theory
since its inception. In no way discounting these original formulations, other approaches
concerning the structure and organisation have more recently been proposed. These can be
thought of a loosely comprising three complimentary schools of thought, each privileging
varying aspects of the theory : the core/periphery approach (Abric, 1993, 1996, 2001;
Guimelli 1993); the role of organising principles in the socio-dynamic approach (Doise et al
1993, 1999; Spini & Doise, 1998; Clemence 2001) and the role of themata (Moscovici &
Vignaux 2000; Moscovici, 2001; Markova 2000a, 2003).
Core/periphery approach
A body of research originating from the School of Social Representations in Aix-en-
Provence has developed a structured approach to the theory which in some ways attempts to
resolve the apparent inconsistencies or paradoxes that social representations encompass both
stability and change in social thinking. Social representations are theorised to show structure
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consisting of a central core and peripheral elements (Abric, 1993; Guimelli, 1993). Although
specific empirical elaborations are somewhat lacking in the Anglo Saxon literature (the
majority of the primary sources are in French), the research group have communicated
aspects of their theoretical approach in summarised and short commentary form, as have
other secondary sources (eg. Lui, 2004; Markova, 2003).
One, or a number of elements, make up the central core of a representation and these
are conceived of as relatively stable and relatively consensual elements which serve to unify
and give meaning to the representation. Two representations are said to differ if contents of
their central core differ (Markova, 2003). The central core contains the fundamental elements
of a social representation “determined by historical, sociological and ideological conditions”
(Abric, 1993, p75), are “stable, coherent, consensual and historically marked” (p76) and also
“resist change and are relatively consistent and continual” (p75). Whereas the cental core
gives stability to a representation, the peripheral elements allow flexibility, change and
greater heterogeneity  of meaning within the representation, within or between particular
contexts. Peripheral elements perform a protective function around the cental core allowing
“contradictions…more sensitive to the immediate context….allows adaptation to concrete
realities” (p76). It is the relationship, or the interdependencies, between the core and
peripheral elements of representations which characterise their stability, dynamism and
transformative nature. Central elements may represent ‘old knowledge’ and peripheral
elements are more linked to what is current and what is changing or challenging to that
knowledge. It is theorised that it is the relative balance of these two structural components of
social representations which allows for the evolving nature, the adaptation and the
transformation which characterises social knowledge. If new knowledge, changing social
conditions or new practices are not in contradiction with existing representations the
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peripheral elements will absorb what is new or changing without causing any change to the
overall meaning of the representation. Here the representation will still be ‘structured’ in the
sense of displaying a stable core and more peripheral elements, however, the actual content
of the structure of the representation (the fundamental core which gives meaning to the
representation) will not be changed or transformed. In this respect, two representations may
be deemed the same if the cores are similar but their peripheral items differ. More
fundamental changes are conceived of as either “progressive structural changes: the central
nucleus of the representation changes state but without a sharp break….now contains more
numerous inclusions…..continues to ensure coherence of the entire representation”
(Guimelli, 1993, p87) or “brutal transformations ….directly challenging the central
significations (core) of the representation…leading to a total and direct transformation of the
central core and therefore of all the representation (Abric, 1993, p78).
The existence of the elements of the central core as a system giving meaning and
coherence to representations has been experimentally demonstrated through the use of a
memory task (Guimelli, 1993). Using data generated from the contents of social
representations of the ‘artisan’ as the stimuli for the memorisation tasks, better recall was
obtained for those items making up the central core of the representation compared to the
peripheral elements. More interestingly, in another condition where the central items were
absent from the list, the participants included these items in the lists recalled. According to
the author, the participants attempted to “restore meaning and coherence to material which,
without the central elements, would remain too weakly structured…and difficult to
memorise” (ibid, p86).
Socio-dynamic approach
Rather than focusing on the concepts of stability and change in the structure of the
43
representational field, Doise et al (1993) have suggested a model for the quantitative
examination of what they refer to as the organising principles of social representations which
aim to highlight the underlying principles governing social representations and the anchoring
of such shared knowledge in pre-existing sociological and psychological systems. In fact, for
Doise et al (1999) social representations can be defined as organising principles of symbolic
relationships between individuals and groups. Based on a body of research on the social
representations of human rights (Spini et al, 1998; Doise et al, 1999; however see also
Clemence, 2001 for an application of the model outwith human rights) the model elaborates
on and provides a solution to the complexities inherent in social representational work, that
is, data is collected from individual minds, however, the theory encompasses the
interdependence between individual cognition and the socially shared representations
reflecting social groups (Laszo, 1997). Their model concerns three primary issues: the
organisation of the representational field, the organising principles of inter-individual
differences and their anchoring in symbolic meaning. These issues are based on three
assumptions: that there exists a shared (not consensual) field of common knowledge about an
object, that the contents of social representations are structured ie variations in individual
positioning, and that this structure reflects other socially held beliefs and meaning systems
(social anchoring) (Doise et al 1993). Moreover, the model has elaborated the concept of
anchoring by identifying three forms of anchoring: psychological anchoring corresponds to
value choices and attaches the representation to general beliefs or value systems; sociological
anchoring refers to the specific belonging of individuals to various groups and attaches the
representation to a social group or position between social groups (eg economic status,
political or religious affiliation); and psycho-social anchoring (attaches the representation to
individual positions) (Doise et al, 1998).
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The model implies various stages or phases in the examination of social
representations. For example, in the comprehensive examination of the social representations
of human rights across 35 countries (Doise et al, 1998) designed a questionnaire based study
to examine five main aspects of the social representations of human rights. Based on the
original 1948 declaration of human rights (UDHR) the questions were designed to examine
the extent to which the beliefs and attitudes of the respondents correspond to the document as
originally laid out (common understanding); the examination of the coherence of attitudes
towards the various articles accepting that different weights may be assigned to these
(individual positioning). Social anchoring was assessed across three contexts: in relation to
other value systems, for example, through utilising Rockeach’s values scale (anchoring in
values), conflict within and between the various articles as well as personal experience of
discrimination and conflict as a function to belonging to different groups (anchoring in
representations and experience of conflict) and finally, anchoring in national contexts which
utilised external sources of national information such as human rights enforcement
documents and national development indices.
Both of the above approaches have generated a great deal of attention in social
representational research and constitute frameworks for the progress of empirical research.
Both acknowledge that social representations involve the interdependence between the
individual and the social and the inherent complexities in integrating these in a meaningful
way. However, for Lui (2004), the core/periphery approach may be limited to purely that of
the contents of social representations, viewing the approach as being primarily static by
focusing more on the internal organisation of representations and which overlooks the social
and communicative dynamics. In contrast, Moscovici & Vignaux (2000) see both the
core/periphery approach and that of the socio-dynamic approach as being analogous. Both
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account for stability in social thinking through the theorising of the central core and
organising principles; and that of social variability, through the greater flexibility of the
peripheral elements in the core/periphery approach and the nature of social positioning in the
socio-dynamic approach by reducing ambiguity and which makes them relevant across
various social contexts. Whereas, for Moliniari & Emiliani (1996), a combination of both
approaches may be required to fully account for social representations. The core/periphery
approach, although accounting for the concepts of stability and change in social
representations, may not adequately account for the anchoring of the structures to various
social dynamics, which is more elaborated in the socio-dynamic approach where, the specific
focus is on those aspects such as the production and reproduction of social representations of
structured groups. Where the socio-dynamic approach may be lacking is in the elaboration of
the deeper underlying generative and organisational aspects that allocate this meaning (ibid).
The role of themata
More recently the concept of themata builds on these debates by stressing more the
interdependencies between social representations, on the one hand, and the role of
communication, on the other.
The concept of themata was first proposed by Moscovici in 1992 in his introductory
address at the First International Conference on Social Representation in Ravello,
subsequently published in 1993. In 1994, in collaboration with Vignaux, the concept was
further elaborated in relation to the dual process of anchoring and obectification, however,
only in 2000 was this work translated into English. Quoting Moscovici, specifically on
themata (1993 p 167) “folk knowledge is grafted on canonic themata that motivate or compel
people in their cognitive search”. This conception of themata is strikingly similar to what
Moscovici previously referred to as “hegemonic representations” (1988, p221) and also
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draws from the core/periphery approach by stressing that there are “non-negotiable
meanings” (1993, 165), however, these may not always be accessible to immediate
consciousness but act as mooring points to those floating around at the more peripheral level.
Themata are conceived of as first principles, primary conceptions, primitive notions
or preconceptions comprising beliefs (the American dream), maxims (we are what we eat),
social definitions (psychoanalysis is confession) or symbolic (Euro currency) ( Moscovici,
2001). At a fundamental level themata relate to the concept of social representations as social
representations are always derived or are generated from conceptual elements established
over a long period of time, that new thought is dynamically linked to old thought. In the
graphic model showing the connections between these various concepts (Moscovici
&Vignaux, 2000, p183) propose a hierarchal sequence starting with themata from which the
anchoring process is derived, followed by objectification from which themata eventually
change as the outcome of the process triggered by new objectifications. Such a circular
conception of the dual process of anchoring and objectification may suggest that anchoring
and objectifying are ultimately one process; or possibly that they form complimentary
wholes, both contributing to stability and change in representations where one may be
foregrounded at the expense of the other under varying contexts. For example, in the case of
anchoring, stability can be conceived as figure and variability as ground and vice versa for
objectification (Markova, 2000a).
Markova (2000a, 2003) advocates that themata are derived conceptually from the
presupposition that the nature of thinking and communication is antinomic, that thinking,
perceiving, knowing and expressing meaning in antinomic form, through polarities or in an
oppositional nature, has a long tradition in human thought. Here it is important to point out
the distinction between ‘theme’ and ‘thema’. The terms ‘theme’ and ‘themes’ are used in
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many contexts in the human and social sciences. The analysis of themes or various versions
of content analysis underlies qualitative research in the social sciences. Usually ‘theme’ is a
non-specific term which may be substituted with terms such as ‘account’, ‘topic’, ‘content’,
and so on. ‘Thema’ (singular) and ‘themata’ (plural) have been taken from Holton’s (1975,
1978 cited in Markova 2003) proposal that throughout the history of science various schools
of thought were developed through dyads or triplets such as ‘analysis/synthesis’ or
‘constancy/evolution/catastrophic change’. ‘Themata’ are, therefore, distinguished from
‘themes’, being drawn from the Greek where it is expressed as ‘something laid down’ and
which, in the current context, corresponds to something primary, to source ideas or to
something with generating properties (Moscovic & Vignaux (2000). ‘Thema’ and ‘themata’
are not terms that could be substituted by other terms, for example, frame or account, instead
they are theoretical concepts and in the present context themata generate the structures of
social representations.
Although much of our communication, through various modes such as conversation
and dialogue, the interpretation of texts, the transmission of collective knowledge, the mass
media and so on is antinomic, we may speak and think in terms of antinomies we are,
however, often unaware of their existence. For an antinomy to become a communicative
thema there must be something socially significant about it, it must become problematic in
the social sense and there must be some tension around its meaning. Markova (2000)
suggests that these antinomies are what Moscovici terms canonic themata and form the basis
for the origin and generation of social representations. Therefore, the origin and genesis of a
social representation is shaped by these central themata, that they are mutually
interdependent comprising “an essential characteristic of dialogical movement” (ibid, p444),
and that tension and debate surrounding a social object results in a dialogical reconstruction
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of the boundaries of meaning and therefore, act as a force in the genesis, circulation and
dynamics of thought.
In principle all antinomies in thinking can become communicative themata although
they may have been dormant in thinking and language for some time, however, during a
change in the political or social context they may become activated and start generating
social representations. Without being foregrounded they simply remain antinomies and do
not transform into communicative themata (Markova 2000a, 2003) For example the
antinomy medical confidentiality versus divulging a patient’s medical status has been part of
thinking for centuries and still forms a medical students oath, however, during the AIDS
crisis this basic antinomy in thinking became thematised. Based on data derived from
dilemmas presented to focus groups (Plichtova, 2001) demonstrated this antinomy as forming
communicative themata in relation to the particular socio-political culture under which the
various focus groups lived, and how much danger they personally perceived themselves to be
in. Similarly, Lui (2004), examining ideas relating to quality of life in Chinese society after
political and economic change, identified the thema ‘having/being’ as crucial in
understanding these issues under greatly enhanced material rewards and freedoms. In
addition, it was shown that different social actors who share the same culture adopted
different views and meaning to the same themata, for example, between rural and urban
Chinese.
Although historical in origin, retaining historical consistency, themata are not
historically bound but their content and intersection with other oppositional categories
change as a function of the specific social, cultural and material context. For example, as
theorised by Moscovici (2001), there are core themata that may possibly stem from a deeper
system of cultural beliefs. These he terms ‘arch-themata’, however, they still remain context
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specific such as the arch-themata of ‘nature’, is specified by different core themata in
different contexts, for example, organic food in the nutrition context. Themata can be thought
of as organising elements of meaning that form a concrete link between individual cognition
and communication while also retaining an emphasis on the social and historical
embeddedness of social thought. The concept of themata organises the social representations
of social groups in terms of organised wholes of interdependent perspectives rather than as
individual structures, representations or discourses.
For Markova (2000) “the concept of themata, more than any other, not only shows the
socio-cultural embeddedness of social thinking, but also provides a basic starting point for
generating social representations (p442). As Moscovici (2001) points out, this is still very
much a work in progress, therefore, there are still aspects that require both theoretical and
empirical clarification. For example, it has been suggested that there might be a number of
central elements, to which Moscovic (ibid) refers to as multiple core notions, clustered into a
core, and a number of peripheral elements existing around this core (Moliner, 1995). What
appears unclear is the relationship between the idea of themata to that of the central core in
the core/periphery approach. The concept of ‘themata’ and that of the ‘core’ do, however,
appear to be related. Elaborating on the thematic approach, Moscovici links the concept of
themata to that of the core, central in the ideas of Abric and colleagues, in that, ‘equality and
friendship’ are identified as the core of the social representations of the ideal group, and these
initial themata usually generate several other core notions of the same belief which are
specific to a social domain” (Moscovici, 2001, p31).
What is clear from these various approaches is that social representations reveal a
structure. This structure relates to the movement of thought and language and that there is a
dynamic tension between stability and change. Constancy may be reflected in the central
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aspects of the representation (core, common understanding, themata) grounding new
knowledge into pre-existing thought. Peripheral elements, organising principles, social
positioning and the antinomic expressions of themata reflect the genesis of new social
representations, the change and dynamism linked to current contexts. This present work
follows this structural approach by assuming a relatively stable core and more flexible
peripheral elements; that the concepts of the central core and of themata are closely related
and, depending on context, themata or the central elements may be elaborated in terms of
antinomies.
How social representations are examined
Social representations thus conceived comprise both content (the different aspects
making up the representation) and a dynamic aspect (how they are formed, changed,
expressed revealed or hidden across varying contexts). The methodology used in their
examination will necessarily be guided by the specific questions that are posed. Farr (1989)
has pointed out that no single method is privileged, or dominates, a social representational
approach and that the primary objective has been to establish social representations as a
phenomena worthy of study in its own right and the methods of investigation employed have
always been a secondary issue from the primary one, the isolation and identification of social
representations.
The complexity of social representations implies that there is not one single method
that is applicable and from its inception almost every method known with the social sciences
have been used (Sotirakopoulou & Breakwell, 1992). In addition to the question of which
method, or methods, should be selected in their examination, the dynamic aspect of social
representations, ie. that they are not stable entities but are the outcome of the continuing and
‘unceasing babble’ circulating in society encompassing both historical (old knowledge and
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meaning) and current (new knowledge and meaning) has led Bauer & Gaskell (1999) to
argue “the study of the ‘social representation X’ take on the character of a research
programme, rather than a single cross-sectional study” (p178). The use of a methodology that
attempts to capture the dynamic elements also heavily underpins the structural aspect of
representations in which the central core is perceived to be relatively stable and the
peripheral items more context dependent. A single, comparative study may identify aspects
of representations which are shared between groups, or differ between groups, their core
items may be similar or they may vary, peripheral items may vary, and so on. Such an
investigation may be useful in examining the contents of a representation and often may be
the prime question of interest. However, to more fully explore the complexity of social
representations certain criteria appear to be essential. These include: a combination of
methods involving both those that are more ‘open’ (interviews, focus groups, associations)
and those that are more closed (questionnaires and surveys); an element of time dimension
and a consideration of elements of the process that are context based (de Sa, 1996). Here
‘context-based’ refers both to the understanding and interpretation embedded within different
historical or cultural backgrounds and also to the nature of data gathering technique/s
employed. For example, responding to questions on a pre-determined set of items in a
questionnaire or survey, to further elaboration within an in-depth interview and
argumentation or the confrontation of opposing views through a focus group setting.
Markova (1996) has drawn attention the fact that human thought is multi-layered,
operating at different levels of awareness. In broad terms, unconscious thought is largely
automatic, habitual, unreflected upon and produced largely without awareness. In contrast,
conscious thought is based more on reasoning, reflection, making comparisons, making
judgements involving more conscious engagement. However, of course, in reality human
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thought cannot be neatly separated, all forms of knowledge will simultaneously co-exist but
“by combining different empirical methods, one might at least to some degree, evoke thought
at different levels of awareness. With respect to the structure of social representations, one
might be able to discover those thought contents that are relatively stable, and those that are
more volatile, and easily accessible to consciousness” (ibid, p192). Only by taking into
consideration such issues can the structure and dynamics of social representation be more
fully explored (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999; de Sa, 1996). In reality not all studies can hope to
address all of these issues in their entirety.
The present study
This present study is set within the broad context of the fall of communism which
occurred across Europe during 1989. It aims to explore the social representations of ordinary
people of terms, such as ‘democracy’, ‘the individual’ and ‘the community’ in Slovakia and
in Scotland. In terms of the vast political, economic and social change occurring over the
period of the 1990s, in one respect this endeavour is narrow, by focussing mainly on the
meanings of various single terms or concepts. In no way can a study, or a series of studies
within a relatively modest research programme, cover the complexities of the issues that may
be of concern or relevant. Although the questions asked over the course of this investigation
are relatively narrow, the use of a social representational framework forces the researcher to
widen the perspective by considering not only aspects concerning the methods used during
the research process, which are, of course, not unique to research within social
representational framework, but also to pay attention to a range of other aspects not generally
taken into consideration within a study falling under the umbrella of social psychology. In
attempting to come to an understanding of what the terms ‘democracy’, ‘the individual, ‘the
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community’ mean to the people of Slovakia compared to that in Scotland, the researcher
necessarily makes a number of decisions regarding what specific aspects are of relevance
here. Although, the revolutions were sudden and largely unexpected for both the people in
the region, and for the Western observers and commentators; often dramatic, through the
collapse of previous political, economic and social structures, these events did not occur
within a vacuum, social knowledge about events and concepts are linked to and dependent
upon frameworks of pre-existing forms of social reality, knowledge and meaning systems
(Moscovici, 1984; Wagner et al, 1999). The understanding and meaning for the people
concerned will not only be dependent on past meaning, understandings, experiences and
practices, for example drawn from their communist, or pre communist, pasts, but also their
present day experiences and realities and to their future hopes, fears and expectations. Social
representations reflect both what is present and absent (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999).
Methods used in the current study
In the main, two methods are employed in the current study – word associations to
various political and economic concepts and rating scales. However, in addition, data based
on in-depth interviews are also presented in Chapter 8. In both the word associations and the
rating scale components, the tasks involved responding to single words or concepts and
across both the word associations and the rating scales the list of stimulus terms in the
associations and items in the rating scales were the same. In this way it was hoped to
examine the kinds of data obtained through the use of two methods in the understanding and
meaning of terms such as ‘democracy’, ‘the individual’ and the ‘community’ in Slovaks and
Scots.
The use of word associations
The use of word association techniques has a long history in psychology, having been
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used by a variety of approaches from psychoanalysis to verbal learning and cognitive
processing (Cramer, 1968). In 1965 Deese stated that “we study associations in order to make
inferences about the nature of human thought, and these associations are cast in the language
which embodies our thought…to the extent that verbal behaviour is the mediator of thought,
modern association theory is a theory of thought…[the current concern]…is an effort to use
associative properties of explicit verbal behaviour as a model for the implicit verbal
processes of thought” (ibid, p4). However, he further points out that a large part of the work
based on associations has been concerned with the temporal sequencing of associations, the
process of getting from one idea to another, while relatively little attention has been paid to
the organisation, or structure of thought.
Common preconceptions often reflect the idea that the kind of data obtained through
word association techniques are commonplace, trivial or obvious, “this impression of
banality disappears when data from groups with different backgrounds are compared and
when the stimulus words of popular interest (e.g. social issues) are used” (Szalay & Brent,
1967 p165). It is in the nature of the distribution of responses which uncover the underlying
subjective or psychological meaning, often below the level of awareness and which reveal
understanding at a deeper level than may be obtainable through other methods. Associations
are viewed as socially agreed upon meanings reflecting the cultural frames of reference
shared by the various groups to which the respondents belong (Szalay & Deese, 1978).
Methods used in word association techniques vary from free associations where the
respondents are required to provide the first response that comes to mind to controlled
associations where, for example, opposites or antonyms are requested. Verbal free
associations can be further divided into discrete free associations where one response is
requested for each stimulus term or continued free associations where the same stimulus is
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presented repeatedly and the respondents have to produce either a specified number of
responses or as many as possible within a specified period of time. Finally, continuous free
associations presents the stimulus term only once and the respondents are requested to
continue responding to the stimulus term for a specified number of responses or specified
time, resulting in data which reflects more a chaining effect of associative meaning.
Generally, uses involving multiple responses to stimulus terms employ methods of the
weighting of responses, in which earlier responses are assigned greater weights than
subsequent responses (Szalay & Deese, 1978). In the context of this present study discrete
free associations are used, that is, one response was requested for each stimulus term.
The resultant data-sets acquired through word association techniques can be subjected
to various types of analyses. All associations given in response to each stimulus term are
compiled into group response lists or ‘dictionaries of response’ for each term used and from
each sample, or sub-sample, under consideration. These ‘dictionaries of response’ are highly
group or sample specific showing the salient components and characteristics of meaning of
each of the stimulus terms (Szalay & Kelly, 1982). Each of the dictionaries thus obtained
from each sample, or sub-sample, can be compared in their content and distribution of
responses for each stimulus term under consideration. Generally, this procedure involves a
process of reducing the original raw data-sets into contents of categories through a content
analysis of all responses given (Szalay & D’Andrade, 1972). This can be thought of as a
more ‘vertical’ examination of the data obtained through associations by considering all
associations produced for each stimulus term, for each sample. In addition to this ‘vertical’
approach, the inter-relationships between terms can be examined though various similarity
measures. Measures of similarity are usually obtained by directly asking respondents to
select or sort items on the basis of their similarity or dissimilarity. Measures of similarity can
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also be accessed through word associations tasks. In contrast to the ‘vertical’ approach which
examines all responses produced for each term, similarity measures examine ‘inter-word
associative frequencies’ ie. “words which frequently elicit the same association are scored as
highly similar, while words which rarely elicit the same association are scored as dissimilar’
(Szalay & D’Andrade, 1972, p56). This can be thought of as a more ‘horizontal’ examination
of the data-sets obtained through word association techniques by examining the inter-
relationships between the various terms. In the present study both approaches are used in the
examination of the word association data, and more details are given in Chapter 6.
Rating scales and interviews
In word association tasks the respondents produce the first word that comes to mind
immediately and such responses are likely to be the culturally shared beliefs, something that
is not thought about but evoked more or less automatically. In contrast, rating scales require
the respondents to respond in a specified manner, eg. ‘how important or not important are the
following terms in relation to your understanding of ‘democracy’, asking the respondents to
explicitly consider the relationship between each item and the specified target. The terms
included in the rating scales presented in this study are the same terms that were used in the
word associations tasks. Therefore, two tasks containing the same list of items are presented,
the word associations reflecting largely unconsciously produced meaning and understandings
and rating scales requiring more considered and reflected upon meaning and understandings.
At yet another level one can ask the respondents in interviews various aspects of
democracy, what is their understanding of democracy, what it is or what it is not, thus
requiring rational answers, explanations justifications and so on.
In the use of these three methods requiring different levels of explanation and tapping
into different levels of awareness it is hoped that aspects of social representations that are
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more stable or more flexible, depending on the given context can be identified.
The use of the three methods- summary of data chapters
Chapter 7 presents data from the initial 1992 study and specifically asks, ‘what does
democracy mean to Slovaks and Scots’. This question is framed within the background of the
Soviet regime’s attempts to change and re-define various political concepts. The meaning of
the term ‘democracy’ was accessed through two methods: word associations to the term
‘democracy’ and a rating scale of the importance of various other political and economic
terms and their relative importance to democracy. Through the use of word associations it
was hoped to elicit spontaneous and relatively unreflected upon meanings to the term
‘democracy’ across both samples. Through these ‘dictionaries of responses’ can a common
representation be identified across both samples? Which aspects are shared or not shared? Is
there a core meaning pertaining to both samples? Has the experience of living under two very
different political regimes resulted in very different representations of democracy? In
addition to examining the meaning of democracy through the free responses to the term
‘democracy’, the position of the term ‘democracy’ in semantic space in relation to the
position of the other terms included was also examined. The rating scale task presents the
examination of the meaning of democracy within a different context, by being required to
respond to a pre-determined list of terms the respondents are forced to consider at a more
reflective level the association between each of the terms and the target, democracy. These
data are examined descriptively, then through a factor analysis and Multi-variate Analyses of
Variance.
Chapter 8 follows a similar format to Chapter 7 through the use of both word
associations and rating scales tasks. However, here the focus is on the meaning of the terms
‘the individual’ and ‘the community’. All responses given by the Slovaks and the Scots to the
terms ‘the individual’ and the community’ are examined through a content analysis of the
responses given. What do these two terms mean to the Slovaks and the Scots, how are they
represented within the differing backgrounds of the oppression of the individual and the
destruction of communities under Soviet communism and Western individualism and
liberalism? Can a common meaning be identified across the samples, what varies between
the samples? Similar to above, the positioning of the two terms the ‘individual’ and the
‘community’ are examined in semantic space in relation to the other terms used in the word
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association task. In contrast to chapter 6 where one rating scale was used, in this section two
rating scales are used. For both scales the terms are the same, however, the respondents
initially rate each term in relation to the importance to the individual and again in relation to
the importance of the community. Again the data are examined descriptively, then through
factor analysis with a comparison of the two samples across the factor scores.
Chapter 9 moves the focus back to the term ‘democracy’ and contains a number of
different data-sets. One part relates specifically to stability and change in the meaning of
democracy over time in Slovaks and Scots. Can we identify changes in the core meaning of
democracy over the course of the period between 1992 and 1996. Stability and change in
meaning was accessed through an examination of the meaning of democracy through word
associations to the term ‘democracy’ across three time periods: 1992, 1994 and 1996. Have
the realities of the democratic process changed the representations of democracy? Can we
identify greater change in representations within Slovaks or relative stability across both
samples? In addition to a time dimension focussing on stability and change in representations
within Slovaks and Scots, data are presented for Slovaks and for Czechs for the period 1994
and 1996. Can we identify a common ‘post-communist’ meaning of democracy in Slovaks
and Czechs who had shared a common history for a large part of the twentieth century, had
shared the immediate period following the fall of communism, but now form two
independent states with differing present economic and political experiences. Two other data
sets are included from the 1996 period for Slovaks and Scots: a rating scale similar to that
presented in Chapter 7 (although not identical in the terms included) along with data from in-
depth interviews carried out across both samples relating to various aspects of democracy.
The inclusion of the interview data allows the examination of the meaning of democracy
during 1996 in greater depth, how democracy is talked about? how is it defined? how does
the meaning of democracy as accessed through interviews differ to that obtained through
word associations and rating scales? how is meaning of democracy is structured and
expressed across both samples.
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CHAPTER 3: THE POST-COMMUNIST PERIOD
The collapse of Communism
What does the collapse of communism mean to the ordinary people of Central and
Eastern Europe? What meanings do terms such as democracy, the individual, the community
carry? What is the relationship between the individual and society in Slovakia and in
Scotland? two nations from either side of the former ideological divide? What are the main
issues the complexities, the major obstacles? The collapse of communism and the possible
different meanings of such complex phenomena, as reflected in the minds and understood by
ordinary people- the focus of this research- was also being approached by various academic
disciplines. However, within these specialist conceptions, questions concerning the main
issues, the complexities, the major obstacles, interpretations and understandings were framed
within their own professional conceptions, their own frames of reference, meaning systems
and expertise - through political science, economics, social science and through history.
Consequently, the period during the 1990s was not only dynamic and changing for the people
and the nations directly involved in the political and economic transitions, it was also equally
dynamic and changing within the various academic disciplines and specialists concerned.
The aim of the present chapter is to place the present study within an historical
perspective, that of, the fall of Communism. It comprises an overview of the complexities of
the political, economic and social transitions occurring across Europe. It examines how the
fall of Communism has been approached by the various specialist disciplines involved, and
how the complexities were viewed by the various disciplines involved. In doing so it places
the examination of the social representations of democracy within a multi-faceted and multi-
layered perspective, which encompasses a variety of frames of reference and from which the
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examination of complex macro social phenomena, such as democracy, cannot be abstracted
from.
The literature base surrounding the political and economic transformations taking
place across Europe during the 1990s can be very broadly split into two strands. The political
and economic literature tended to view the transition process from a more or less top-down
fashion (macro-level) emphasising issues such as how to manage and run post-communist
economies, the role of governmental institutions, the setting up of legislative bodies, the legal
system, the existence of multi-party, free elections, and so on. Not only were the transitions
framed and understood within these broad political and economic requirements, under
normative, specialist understandings of democracy as a form, or forms of government, others
were approaching the transition process from a more bottom-up (micro-level) perspective
and were more concerned with the transition of the social structure and the role of individuals
in the newly democratising nations. Although not ignoring the importance of the
institutional-building aspects of the transformation process, these bottom-up approaches were
laying greater emphasis on the social and cultural aspects of the transformations. Concepts
re-emerging and being re-interpreted included the importance of ‘civil society’, of
‘democratic values’, of ‘trust, of ‘social capital’, of citizenship and the changing nature of the
‘private and public spheres’ of individuals in the newly democratising nations. The nature of
the regimes being rejected was also being re-examined, either through a specific
‘sovietologist-type’ assessment of why they collapsed, the stages of collapse or more
commonly under a broader re-assessment, or re-interpretation, of the nature of the Soviet
system, the legacies it left behind and the obstacles it may present. For many commentators
the nature of the rejected Soviet regimes, in many ways, form the fundamental historical
foundations from which the present and future can only be understood against. Although
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‘communism’ and ‘totalitarianism’ were rejected, and collapsed as structures of power and
authority, throughout a large part of Europe from 1989, these two other ‘traditionally large
political’ concepts also became more prominent in the literature.
Yet another strand emphasised not so much the past experiences but the present day
realities. In a period of such rapid political, economic and social change individuals may
suffer disappointment, become impatient with regard to the speed of reform or frustrated with
the inefficiency of new political elites or lack of political or economic stability.
Although often treated separately in the specialist literature the practical issues that
concern the policy makers in the setting up of new institutions, the skills required by the
people in dealing with new institutions, new social practices, the past experiences of living
under communist rule along with the direct daily experiences of living under a changing
regime are all inter-related in creating the social reality of the people in post-communist
societies. These will all play various roles in how individuals’ represent and understand the
changing political and economic challenges.
The fall of communism viewed as history
There was no doubt that on the world stage the rapid and unexpected fall of
communism signified one of the major turning points in world history. These events were
viewed as a victory of capitalism over communism, as the ending of the bipolar world which
helped to maintain post-war stability, as the ending of the ‘great European narrative’ of two
world wars, depression, communism, fascism and Nazism (Smolar, 2001; Soutou, 2000).
Fukuyama in 1989, viewed the fall of communism as in some respects signifying ‘the
end of history’. As the final and last major challenge to liberal democracy had now collapsed
there were now no major divisive ideological barriers left. For Glenny (1993) the collapse of
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a closed system of government allowed a ‘rebirth of history’. The removal of the totalitarian
regimes would now enable these nations to resume their history and their course to
democracy. However, as pointed by Lewis (1993) both the ‘end of history’ and the ‘rebirth of
history’ are misguided and simplistic. The achievement of the many varieties of economic
and political liberalism, as implied by both historical accounts, is not a certainty for the
nations involved. Secondly, the continuation of the interrupted histories of the various
nations which can now be resumed, implies a false uniformity, a linearity in the progression
of history.
From outwith a global historical perspective and framed specifically in relation to
previous political transformations occurring within Europe itself, like those of Spain and
Portugal, there is nothing from the history of these transformations which aids the
understanding or from which any theorist could predict the likely path or outcome for the
Central European nations (Nelson, 1993). The fall of communism has been described as the
‘third wave of democracy’ since the 1970s (Rose & Shin, 2001) and the previous political
transformations within Europe itself, those of Spain and Portugal, were not comparable to the
widespread transformations facing the nations of Central and Eastern Europe. In Southern
Europe, only one kind of transformation was necessary, the move to democratic rule. Under
dictatorship, both Spain and Portugal had relatively thriving capitalist economies, with high
foreign investment, and in particular, Spain’s economy was growing at a faster rate than
other European nations (Nelson, 1993). For the post-communist nations of Central and
Eastern Europe the political and economic transformations were very different and more
complex. Not only were these nations rejecting the oppressive single- party State of
Communism, but also the rejection of a closed, command economy. Compared to Southern
Europe, the nations of Central and Eastern Europe were experiencing, depending on
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viewpoint, a ‘double transformation’ - political and economic (Nelson, 1993); a ‘triple
transformation’ - political, economic and cultural (Haerpfer, 2001, Holmes, 1997); or even a
transformation of greater complexity with the addition of geo-political-ethnic groupings
(Leff, 1997; Peteri, 2001, Glenny, 1993, Kuzio, 2001).
Transitology
After the fall of communism and during the 1990s a body of literature has evolved
out of what is generally termed ‘transitology’. The term transition, in this literature, has been
used in a variety of ways. For some, ‘transition’ or ‘transition to democracy’ has been used
loosely as a term or phrase simply to refer to or describe, in a variety of ways, the post-
communist period in Central and Eastern Europe. Transition, in a broad sense, is an interval
between two different political systems (Bozoki, 1994) and differs from that of ‘reform’ and
also differs from classical revolutions. In the context of the events of 1989 the term
‘revolution’ has been applied. However, largely due to the general non-violent nature of the
process, qualifiers such as ‘peaceful revolutions’ or ‘gentle revolutions’ are added. Transition
may also be used more specifically to describe some broad historical trend that ends in some
type of western, liberal, political institutions. This usage implies some pre-determined
meaning to these events, and that a goal has been identified with some nations succeeding
and some failing. Here, compared to the historically longer process of democratisation in the
West will the nations of Central and Eastern Europe have to move through a number of
stages in a few critical years. In this respect, are the post-1989 nations going through an
accelerated ‘catch-up’ process? Guilhot (2002) examined the idea of ‘transition’ as it was
applied in Marxist thinking and up to 1989. He identified the paradox of phrasing the post-
1989 revolutions in the framework of ‘transition’, when in effect, the origins of this type of
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thinking was central to Marxist theories of absolute laws of historical and societal
development where, for example, ‘the dictatorship of the proletariat’ was one of the
transitional stages on the path to communism. Haerpfer (2001) also questions the usage of
the term ‘transition’ for the post-1989 period, arguing that there is no clear point A or point
B, viewing the usage of the term as being too goal-directed which in no way reflects the
changing and dynamic social nature of the period. Plichtova & Eros (1997) point out that the
traditional ‘transitology’ conceptions largely ignore the complexities of the psychological
and the social nature of the process. Similarly, Ralf Dahrendorf (1990), one of the earliest
commentators of the post-1989 period, although accepting that the road ahead will indeed
consist of many stages and transitions, conceives of the nations of Central and Eastern
Europe of having primarily abandoned a closed system for an open society, for which there is
no single vision of but many varieties of. He views the defining feature of 1989 not being the
transition from one thing to something else, but primarily the death of a closed world guided
by a monopoly of truth. The present usage of the terms ‘transition’ or transition to
democracy’, ‘nations in transition’ etc will be used in a very general way to refer simply to
post-1989.
The nature of the reforms
The terms used to describe or label and the nations of Central and Eastern Europe
over the last decade or so are varied. ‘Post-communism’, ‘post-Soviet’,‘post-totalitarian’ and
‘de-communisation’ all refer to what went before rather than to the present or the future.
Terms such as ‘proto-democracies’, ‘fledgling democracies’ or ‘incomplete democracies’
refer, in general, to the present or to what is being pursued. The questions being asked were,
which route will the nations take in their rejection of communist rule?
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The major difficulties which theorists encountered during the 1990s were based
firstly on what was being reformed, ie. the unique process of simultaneously transforming
both political and economic spheres. Secondly, the very nature of what was being rejected,
Soviet rule, which not only destroyed and then imposed structures of State and society but
also attempted to destroy old values and beliefs and impose new values and beliefs. The era
of post-communism necessarily brought with it much rethinking of democracy and market
reforms with intellectuals from both sides of the former Iron Curtain debating about what
really makes a free and democratic society.
Sztompka, a Polish sociologist, in 1996, viewed the revolutions of 1989 as not only
the breakdown of the old-style political and economic regimes and institutions along with the
necessary formation of new institutions and structures, nor as primarily the ‘return to
Europe’, a return to the ‘West’ or a return to some other sense of ‘normality’. What the
events of 1989 signified was the of the beginning ‘of the construction of a new social order
from a strange mixture of components of various origins” (ibid, p120).
Dahrendorf (1990) identified three main components which were necessary for the
transition from communism in Central and Eastern Europe: the political, the economic and
the social. These are not conceived as stages in a linear and progressive way whereby one is
completed and another one entered, but all start together. What is central to Dahrendorf’s
thesis is “the incongruent time-scale of the political, the economic and the social” (ibid, p72)
with the time-scale of each running at different speeds and thereby creating tension. Basic
constitutional and political changes can be introduced in a matter of months. In this respect,
the ‘hour of the constitutional lawyer’ is the shortest. Reforming centrally controlled,
command economies into some type of functioning free market economies may take many
years. Therefore, the ‘hour of the economist’ runs at a slower pace than the hour of the
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lawyer. The longest is the ‘hour of the citizen’ - “the social foundations which transform the
constitution and the economy from fair-weather to all-weather institutions...and sixty years
are barely enough to lay these foundations” (ibid, p93). In reality, these three main stands
cannot be neatly separated, they are all interrelated. Political theorists may indeed narrowly
focus on constitutional and political issues, economists may point to macro indicators such as
GDP growth in their analysis of the transitions process, and often the tension between the
political and constitutional reforms with the speed of economic reforms may be the focus of
attention of both. However, for Dahrendorf, the citizen is the main foundation which firmly
anchors the varying time-scales and the tensions of political and economic reform, “the hour
of politics and the hour of the economist mean very little without the hour of the citizen”
(ibid, p93).
Culture, History and Meaning
The concept of ‘culture’ is a complex, multifaceted and multi-layered  phenomenon
and the purpose here is not to extensively review this literature, but to consider aspects which
may aid the examination and the understanding of the political, economic and social
transformations in post-1989 Europe.
How people interpret and structure the meaning of complex macro-social phenomena
such as the political, the economic or the social world is largely shaped by events and
meanings generated in the past (Wagner et al, 1999). Historians also argue that to enable us
to fully examine political or social phenomena in contemporary society it is necessary to take
a ‘deeper’ view. For example, the historian Eric Hobsbawm (1997) reminds us “ there are no
people without history, who can be understood without it” (p22) and that “the past is a
permanent dimension of human consciousness, an inevitable component of institutions,
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values and other patterns of human society” (p13). He also reminds us that often over
relatively long periods of time broad history deals with societies and communities for which
the past is, more or less, a pattern for the present. Not that the past can be taken to dominate
the present, all societies go through a process of continual social change and innovation,
which, however, are largely adapted to within a relatively formalised social past by
modifying belief systems and by ‘stretching’ knowledge frameworks. At other points in
history, through either scientific, technological or dramatic social change, society is
transformed beyond the point where the ‘old’ can no longer be taken as a pattern for the
‘new’. In effect, dramatically fracturing the apparent continuity of a sense of the past.
However, even when major historical bounds or discontinuity appears to form a break or
boundary between what is past and what is present, the sense of past still exerts a
considerable force on social knowledge and understanding. This can occur, for example,
through either a total rejection of some aspects of the past and/or a sense of nostalgia, either
real or imagined. The rejection of history or a growth in nostalgia are in no way limited to
periods of time or to societies where sharp ‘historical breaks’ occur, all societies and
communities reject, or have a sense of nostalgia in varying degrees, of what things were
before in order to aid their understanding of what is present or what the future is to be
(Hobsbawm, 1997).
The question which necessarily arises is, how far back in time is it necessary to go in
order to discover dominant features of the past which may, or may not, play a part today in
how the people of Slovakia may represent democracy, their understanding and meaning of
the rejection of Soviet domination, and the understanding and meaning of the newly
emerging political, economic and social transformations. Glenny (1993) notes that one of the
most striking aspects a visitor gains is the richness and diversity of the histories and cultures
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surviving within the various nations across the region. In collective memories individuals
may draw from a whole ranges of ‘pasts’, distant and not so distant. Nation-specific histories
and cultures are powerful forces in the understanding of the present and what is new and
changing.
Within the transformation literature the term ‘culture’ has been used to refer to
various aspects of the traditions and history of the various nations, with cultural ‘heritages’
generally being used to refer to those aspects which may aid or promote the transitions from
communism to democracy. Glenny (1993) believes that Czechoslovakia’s own specific
‘democratic heritage’ between the two world wars as in some way aiding their transition,
across both institutional spheres (political and economic) as well as socially, compared to
other nations within the region without this more recent heritage. Cultural heritages can also
be conceived of as arising from the more distant past such as a common shared European
heritage of individualism originating from the Renaissance and Enlightenment period in
European history (Markova et al, 1998) encompassing values such as self-determination,
human dignity, freedom, independence from authority and individual rights; or from a
mixture of origins over a longer period (Davies 1997). Davies points out that historians tend
to view Europe’s cultural traditions as arising from various historical and cultural heritages,
emanating from the North, South, East and West portions of the continent. These all merged
and mingled over varying periods of time, arising from common core values of Christianity
along with the interaction of non-Christian tendencies, with enlightenment thinking and so
on. Europe has been too complex to present a clear cultural heritage, however, from the
complicated strands of European history a shared sense of freedom, equality, fraternity, rule
of law, tolerance of diversity, enterprise culture, democracy and individualism can be
identified.
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In addition to cultural heritages, which arguably may aid the transition process, there
are those who emphasise cultural and historical legacies. Legacies are taken to reflect more
the negative impact of decades of Soviet-imposed regimes which in some way will present
obstacles in the transition process. For example, legacies can mean the practical aspects such
as poorly functioning economies, the existence of a large, inefficient and unmodernised
industrial base or the lack of institutions required for the functioning of a market based
economy. Although these may be more tangible, the solutions to these issues facing the
nations in transition are not straightforward (Agh, 1998; Schoplin, 1993a). In addition to
these more institutionally-based legacies presenting obstacles, other obstacles run deeper and
appear more as ‘cultural’ legacies. These cultural legacies reflect a common ‘bloc culture’
shared by all the post-communist nations and arising through decades of externally imposed
Soviet regimes.
Summary of overview
This section has very briefly outlined the main themes and areas of interest in the
specialist literature during the period from 1989 onwards. Whether viewed from within a
narrower institutional or organisational approach, for example, the setting up of the new
political and economic structures of governance or from within the broader individual /
society / cultural approach, and of course, the inter-relationships between the two, the views
arising from a range of specialists reflected the overall complexity of the transitions. For
those focusing on the institutional approach, the complexities were the simultaneous collapse
of both political and economic structures, along with the necessary setting up of new
structures. This ‘double’ transformation itself could not take place within a vacuum, no
nation could ‘start afresh’. The setting up of the new institutions take time and involve the
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complicated process of dismantling old institutions, and also the grafting on of the new to
remnants of the old. This involved aspects of looking ‘towards the west’ for models to guide
the transformation process, for example, in relation to liberal democratic theory, the
functioning of markets, trade etc (Mazower, 1998).
Added to the ‘hard’, institutionally- based ‘double transformation’ approach was the
growing awareness of the increased complexities arising from the addition of the cultural
aspects of the transitions, what Sztompka (1993;1996) refers to as the ‘softer aspects’, the
intangibles, the cultural habits, meanings, understandings and ways of thinking and doing
arising through the shared experience of Soviet rule. Irrespective of the various nations own
specific cultures and histories, what binds them together is the shared experience of
Communist rule – a shared communist bloc culture rising over and above any distinct
national ones. Although termed ‘soft’ by Sztompka, these issues were not viewed as
insignificant to the process of transition. New interest was awakened concerning the role of
‘democratic culture’ or ‘democratic values’ as pre-requisites for the emergence of
democracy, for the stability and the consolidation of democracy, and the circular question of
whether the experience of democracy leads to certain values and practices or whether these
are necessary requirements (Mishler & Rose, 2002; Jackson & Miller, 1996; Fleron, 1996).
Just as the political and economic institutional changes could not be viewed from a vacuum,
the role of individuals, the changing individual/society relationship and the deeper cultural
legacies added to the complexities and from which the economic and political aspects could
not be understood abstracted from.
It is clear that only after the fall of the Soviet regimes that their true natures can be
fully understood, both with respect to the framing of the period within a more historical
perspective and also to understanding of how the past may shape the present and the future.
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Through the benefit of hindsight and through the increased availability of new historical
documentation, it is now understood that the Soviet regimes, both in the Soviet Union and
also those imposed on the satellite nations after WWII, were conceived of as more than
simply economic and political systems, but were very different kinds of societies (Hosking,
1992). In light of the opening up of archive material, new historical documentation, and also
to the increased freedom of individuals from behind the former Iron Curtain to document,
describe and evaluate the Soviet period necessarily led to an increase in published books and
journal contributions from a wide range of specialists interested in the revolutions from both
sides of the former divide. The bulk of the newly published material generally fell within the
traditional academic boundaries of history and the political and economic literature, however,
within the social sciences, sociology was gaining prominence.
The examination of post-communist period was, necessarily, approached by the
various academic communities through their own perspectives. From the various academic
disciplines involved, historians, it can be argued, approach macro-social events from a
diverse range of viewpoints. Perspectives range from the detailed biographies of prominent
actors, in-depth political and economic analyses to social and cultural aspects; arising from
the analysis of historical documentation, to interviews, life histories, literature and the arts
and the social and cultural life of the people themselves (Evans 1997). There was, however, a
tendency for the major historical works of the period to base their perspective, analysis and
interpretation of the Soviet period as comprising a ‘bloc system’. The terms ‘Soviet’ ‘Soviet
model’ or ‘Soviet regimes’ do carry two potential usages: as that pertaining to the Soviet
Union itself and also to the satellite nations incorporated into the Soviet bloc after WWII. As
pointed out earlier, the various nations incorporated into Soviet domination all had rich and
varied pre-communist pasts, in addition, their communist periods also varied, as do their
72
post-communist presents. For prominent historians, for example, Davies (1997) firmly
believes that, in effect, what may differentiate the satellite nations from that of the Soviet
Union is purely the length of time exposed to Soviet regime, 40 years and 70 years,
respectively. In fundamental terms, the incorporated Central and East European nations
followed similar patterns to that of the Soviet Union, they were all ruled by oppressive State-
run regimes based on Communist ideology. Similarly, Hosking (1992) also strongly argues
that the countries of Central and Eastern Europe repeated the path taken by the Soviet Union
itself during the period of the 1920s, 30s and 40s and “after 1948 it would not be unrealistic
to regard the Central and Eastern nations as constituting a Soviet Empire, such was the
degree of control exercised by the Soviet regime on them” (ibid, p320). However, those
within social psychology whose interest lies in the understanding of the present through the
dynamic interplay with that of the past emphasise nation-specific contexts, including pre-
communist, communist and post-communist. For example, Topolova (1997) for Bulgaria,
Laszlo & Farkas (19970 for Hungary, and Plichtova & Eros (1997) comparing Slovakia and
Hungary.
Opinions do vary as to whether to emphasise similarities and differences either
between the satellite nations themselves or between the satellite nations with that of the
Soviet Union. The various disciplines will all approach these issues from their own pre-
suppositions and theoretical frameworks of what is relevant or not relevant for their own
analyses and interpretation. Taking a social representation approach to the meaning of
democracy in the post-Communist era entails placing greater emphasis on aspects of nation-
specific political, economic and social contexts, both historical and more current, and how
these various contexts interplay in a dynamic way in the process of meaning making. In this
regard Chapter 5 is focused solely on the history of Czechoslovakia from the period between
73
the wars when it became an independent nation-state, through its separation into the Czech
and Slovak Republics and up to 1996, the period of this present work.
In examining the meaning of democracy in Scotland, a stable democracy with that in
Slovakia, a newly emerging democracy, this present work in no way conceives of Scotland as
a ‘stable society’. Democracy, as a system of government, may not have been challenged,
removed or reinstated in Scotland, and in this respect it is a stable democracy relative to that
of Slovakia. However, comprising a political, economic and social context Scotland, like any
nation, cannot be conceived of as stable or unchanging. In addition, this present work, also,
does not conceive of Scotland as comprising a normative benchmark against which, for
example, Slovakia, can be judged or evaluated. The understanding of democracy in both will
reflect the inter-relationships between their own histories, their own prior understandings and
present day realities reflecting their own constancies and tensions in a dynamic way.
Chapter 6 specifically examines Scotland’s political, economic and social history
from 1707, when the UK central State was created up to the period of 1996, the period of this
research. This was, however, before Scotland achieved greater separation from the central
UK State through the creation of a separate devolved parliament sitting in Edinburgh.
From this brief overview of how the transition process has been conceived, whether
from the conceptions of the experts involved or from the context of the ordinary people, it is
evident they were complex and involved many different levels of understanding. Prior to the
examination of the histories of the two nations, Chapter 4 examines a number of the key
ideas emerging in the specialist literature that have only been touched on briefly here.
Concepts such as ‘democracy’, ‘totalitarianism’ and ‘civil society’ were all gaining renewed
impetus in the literature. This took more than purely an ‘academic’ interest in these concepts,
across and within the various disciplines, but reflected practical issues of how these concepts
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have been traditionally conceived and their relevance in understanding both the communist
and the post-communist era.
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CHAPTER 4: POLITICAL CONCEPTS AND POSSIBLE LEGACIES
This Chapter examines some of the concepts and ideas that were gaining prominence
in the literature as a result of the political and economic transitions in Europe after 1989. The
first section examines the concept of ‘democracy’, briefly throughout history, and then within
more traditional ‘western’ conceptions of the term. Specific Soviet understandings and usage
of ‘democracy’ are considered in Chapter 7. Although Slovakia, like the other nations in the
region, rejected Soviet domination during the course of the revolutions, expert opinion
identified the Soviet period as defining the nations pasts, and within the social sciences, these
shared historical legacies will, it has been argued, form the foundation of the democratic
transition process. Therefore, the nature of the rejected Soviet regimes is also examined.
 The present usage of the terms “Soviet’, ‘Soviet model’ or Soviet regimes’ refers
both to how these systems were originally conceived, understood and put into practice in the
Soviet Union itself and also to the later transference to the satellite nations of the Soviet bloc.
Within the examination of the Soviet period the question of whether or not totalitarian was an
applicable concept in relation to the Soviet period is also considered, and to whether or not a
system of power conceived as totalitarian has any significance on the potential legacies of the
period. The following sections examine the nature of the rejected regimes, in general terms,
in relation to potential legacies and to an examination, more specifically, of civil society and
to that of the public/private spheres.
Although concepts such as ‘democracy’, ‘civil society’ and ‘private/public spheres’
all constitute separate sections in the present chapter, it is important, however, to point out
that these are not conceived of as separate and distinct from one another. It is clear that these
are all in themselves highly contested and highly over-lapping concepts within the various
specialist literatures. For example, various disciplines may approach the conceptualisation
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and understanding of terms differently. Political scientists may pose different ideas of civil
society than social scientists or, one social scientist may talk of the importance of civil
society, whereas another may frame these same ideas as meaning ‘public space’ or as the
‘role of individuals’. What is evident that as soon as a researcher starts to consider the
democratic transitions from outwith a ‘simple’ procedural aspect, touching upon any of the
‘large concepts’ often leads to an inter-disciplinary, or within-disciplinary, battle of ideas. It
is not the intention here to enter into these debates in any great depth, but to draw from the
various conceptions and their potential usefulness in explaining and framing the past
experiences of the social actors in the understanding of the transition process from a
multiplicity of viewpoints.
DEMOCRACY
As an historical concept
The concept of democracy has had a chequered past, for the Greeks, the term
‘democracy’ referred to the ‘rule of people’, although it was not clear who ‘the people’
were’, and what was the meaning of the term ‘to rule’. Plato conceived of democracy as
meaning the rule of the incompetent (Davies, 1997). Although the ‘idea’ of ‘democracy’ first
took shape in ancient Greece, it didn’t survive and was replaced universally by more
tyrannical regimes (Sen, 1999).
Across the philosophical and political science literature there is general agreement
that democracy, as referring to a form of political organisation, came into being more or less
around the late 18th century (Ford, 1989). It was during this time that the term democracy
came into usage and challenged the existing forms of authority, namely as movements
against order based on the idea of aristocratic rule. The familiar institutions of the time were
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based on legally and hierarchically defined birth-based privileges, the monarchy and
established churches. The peoples of Europe at this time experienced a divided society: the
traditional ‘aristocratic order’ and the move to ‘democratic order’. In Central European
history, Poland was probably the first state to include, in its constitution of 1791, some form
of ‘people power’, although not totally abandoning the authority of the monarchy or God,
what form this new order may take, its institutions and procedures were still to be ‘invented’
(Markoff, 1997)3. Almost two centuries earlier in Scotland, both John Knox and George
Buchanan believed that although political power was ordained by God, this power was
wholly vested in the people, and not in the hands of the nobility or the clergy. However, in
the realities of the late 16th century this was an open invitation to general anarchy (Herman,
2003). The heritage of Buchanan’s formula for democracy in government remained strong
within the Church itself, with the Church of Scotland being historically the most democratic
religious body in Europe. The church elders and even the ministers themselves were
democratically elected by the congregation (Devine, 2000).
When de Tocqueville wrote about Democracy in America (1835) it was still unlikely
that the term democracy was used much in ordinary language (Neass et al, 1956). For de
Toccqueville, democracy was viewed as the tyranny of the majority and Edmond Burke
called democracy on the French model “the most shameless thing on earth” (Davies, 1997,
p131). However, after the revolutions in France, ‘democracy’ became anchored in the
public’s thought to values such as freedom, human rights and justice and became more
widely used as a key term in political terminology. Modern economic structures and
language were primarily forged through the British Industrial Revolution and modern
                                                 
3 Markoff, J. (1997) Where and When Democracy was Invented: unpublished manuscript
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political terminology and ideology were formed largely through the ‘age of democratic
reforms’ emanating from France (Hobsbawm, 1962).
However, it was generally during the Twentieth Century that the idea of ‘democracy’
became firmly established within political terminologies as a system/s4 of government to
which any nation is entitled, and indeed as a dominant belief or universal value which many
aspire to (Sen, 1999). Although democracy as a political concept may have had a long and
contested history, Davies (1997) argues, that even today there is still very little consensus
about the real ‘essence’ of democracy. In theory it may advocate many fundamental virtues
or values like justice, freedom, equality, respect for individuals, human rights and so on, that
few would disagree with or withhold. In practice, however, democracy as a system of
government can take many forms and rather than democracy as a system of government that
any nation is entitled to or as sets of universal values that all aspire to, all that can be said
with any universality, for Davies, is what exists today, as has always done, the “almost
universal abhorrence of tyranny” (ibid p131).
If, in general terms, democracy as a key concept in the international political
vocabulary of the late twentieth century is viewed as the ‘ideal system’ of governance, and
more specifically, if democracy is a necessary requirement for future entry into the European
Union (Mishler & Rose, 2002; Schimmelfennig et al, 2003), then typically questions of
interest might be, how can the move to democracy be measured in terms of ‘models of
democracy’? are there sets of criteria that can be used to identify a regime as democratic or
not? are there clear political or economic indicators to chart the progress of transformation?
                                                 
4  For Soviet conceptions of democracy as a system of government see chapter 7.
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and how useful are these in the examination of the meaning of democracy after the fall of
Communism?
Democracy within classical political science – 20th century conceptions
Within the modern literature there may be as many definitions of democracy as there
are democracies, with these referring not only to the system being described or defined, but
also the background of those supplying the definition. A key element in the numerous
debates is an overall lack of consensus in what democracy actually is, whether or not to
include economic or social aspects or whether to restrict the use of the term to purely the
political aspects (Diamond, 1999). There are a few classic definitions which are cited by or
referred to by numerous writers. One of the best known ‘idealist’ definitions of democracy
comes from Robert Dahl which contains around seven conditions: elected officials, fair and
free elections, inclusive suffrage, the right to run for office, freedom of expression,
alternative information and the right to form independent groupings (Rose & Mishler, 1996).
Rose et al (1998) reduce these to four basic requirements necessary for democracy: rule of
law free, and fair elections, accountability of government and the existence of a civil society,
that is, a society in which there are formal or informal organisations existing independently
from the State, although protected by the State.
Rose & Shin (2001) further split these four basic requirements for democratisation
into two separate processes (a) the introduction or existence of the institutions of a modern
state (rule of law, institutions of civil society and governmental accountability) and (b) fair
and free democratic elections. Arguing that established democracies, such as the UK, initially
became modern states by establishing the rule of law, the growth of institutions of civil
society and governmental accountability and only gradually introduced universal suffrage
with fair and free elections. In contrast, the countries of Central and Eastern Europe are
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attempting  “democratisation backwards by introducing free elections before establishing
such basic institutions such as the rule of law and civil society” (ibid, p333). Here the main
issues to be faced by the post-communist nations relate to the order in which these are
processes are established, with free elections preceding the basic institutional framework.
The idea of free elections as the central aspect of democracy forms the basis of one of the
most minimalist conceptions of democracy, that of, reflecting more or less the world as it
really is – the ‘realist’ or ‘electoral’ - approach to democracy, proposed by Joseph
Schumpeter (Diamond, 1999). Under this minimalist conception, all nations from the former
communist bloc would fulfil the criteria by having had at least one free election since the fall
of the previous Soviet regimes (Rose & Mishler, 1996).
In reviewing the modern literature on comparative politics, Munck & Verkuilen
(2002) point to the inadequacies in how the concept of democracy has been conceived. Often,
they argue, indices are generally limited to the procedural/institutional aspects, ignoring the
social or economic aspects. Democracy, as a multi-faceted and multi-layered concept, is thus
reduced into attributes which in turn are further broken down into components of attributes
resulting in eventual indices which are too complex to deal with in any meaningful way at the
analyses stage. These analyses issues are generally then ‘resolved’ by the process of
aggregation of variables with the crucial question of the choice at which level to aggregate.
The authors’ conclude that this is  “often…through reducing the data to the highest possible
level…often into one single score” (ibid, p22) thereby reducing the complexities of a multi-
dimensional phenomenon to a uni-dimensional score.
Democratic culture
Similarly, questions surrounding the political, economic or cultural factors that may
drive support for democratic governance have also been viewed in such a reductionist way.
81
The question of democratic culture carries relevance for both the ‘traditional’ democracies
and the newly emerging democracies of Central and Eastern Europe, and although the idea of
democracy was being heralded across the newer emerging democracies of Central Europe,
support for democracy was viewed to be in decline in many of the older democracies.
Through the use of large-scale public opinion surveys, various crises were being identified in
the traditional democracies. Support for democratic governance was being replaced by
political apathy, low voter turnout, a general disengagement from the political process, lack
of confidence in political institutions and a general sense of disconnection between the
individual and the State (Norris, 1999). Aspects such as support for regime performance,
support for various democratic institutions and the role of political actors have come under
scrutiny (eg. Dalton, 1999; Klingemann, 1999; Fuchs, 1999) as has the role of political trust
(Mishler & Rose, 2001). These approaches tend to draw a theoretical link between support or
non-support for various aspects of democratic governance, positive or negative attitudes
towards political elites or confidence / lack of confidence in various institutions with that of
democratic culture. The issue of democratic culture is thus reduced, in many respects, to that
of democratic support.
Rarely, within social psychology, itself, has the concept of democracy received
specific attention, however, Lewin’s (1943/67; 1939/67) experimentally based study of the
differences between democratic, autocratic and laissez faire groups in children being an
exception. As a psychologist, Lewin felt it necessary to apologise to sociologists for crossing
boundaries into their field (1939/67, p71). He objected to their criticism that psychology
ignored social facts, he also rejected their point of view that only a social group has a reality
and that the individual person is no more than an abstraction. Instead, he argued, it is the
interdependence of the individual and of the group that can explain group dynamics. Lewin’s
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studies were rooted in the prevailing social issues of the time and the deep concern, in the
1930s, of the Nazi indoctrination in Germany.
However, Lewin’s study of democracy was narrow and he was convinced that the
phenomenon of democracy could be understood on the basis of experimental research,
through the manipulation of group relationships. While such experiments simulated some
features of social dynamics, they were abstracted from broader societal and cultural contexts
under which such dynamics function. While in theory Lewin emphasised the cultural
embeddedness of the phenomenon of democracy, his experimental work was studied largely
as individual, or artificially created small group, behaviour.
Questions of democratic culture raised within the post-communist perspective have
generally been broader-based than those posed within the traditional political literature.
Rather than theoretically linking the issue of support or non-support for various institutional
aspects of the democracy with that of democratic culture, the main issues being raised were
how can a democratic culture develop among people who have lived for decades under
autocratic regimes (Fuchs, 1999); what are the necessary pre-requisites for the emergence of
stable democracies, for transition, for consolidation (Shin, 1994); does a society have to ‘fit’
for democracy or does it become ‘fit’ through democracy (Sen, 1999). In view of these
concerns Berezin (1997) takes a less reductionist stance than those often portrayed within
traditional political thought by arguing that recent historical events across Central Europe
require a re-evaluation of terms such as ‘political culture’ and ‘politics and culture.’ He
views the usage and meaning of these two terms as not being reducible to one another. The
term ‘political culture’ are meanings embodied within the realm of politics as a bounded
activity. Here, similar to the ideas of ‘democratic culture’ (above) in which the ‘culture’
viewed necessary for democracy is closely bound to support for various attributes, or
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components, of democracy. Whereas, the term ‘politics and culture’ encompasses “broad
cultural themes, that are sometimes mobilised in the service of politics and sometimes not.
These themes would exist independently of their political uses. The task of the social analyst
is to understand how these two intersect” (ibid, p363). Similarly, Schopflin (1993a) takes a
broad approach by viewing democracy beyond mere political representation of individuals.
The idea of democracy also carries inherent moral codes, rules of conduct, in both the rulers
and the ruled, giving substance to the fabric and coherence of society by providing an organic
and reciprocal relationship between the individual and the institutions of State.
Although the issues raised have been broader and more holistic in their
understanding, how these have been approached have been questioned. Dahrendorf (1990)
commented that one of the unifications taking place after the fall of communism was that of
language “two systems based on two ways of looking at the world required two languages
…we may now still need interpreters…but we no longer need ‘ideological translation”
(p11/12). However, as pointed out by Berezen (1997), great caution needs to be applied when
talking about, in comparative terms, any concept or aspect of modern democracy, however
taken-for-granted these may appear to some, as many of these are highly contextual and
cannot be easily transferred to other geo-political locations. Haste (2004), similarly, drew
attention to the occurrence of a researcher’s findings of a more ‘sophisticated’ understanding
of democracy in the USA, as opposed to that in Central Europe, as clearly displaying
thinking that is deeply embedded in North American thought and practices with little
understanding of the need not only to consider what is believed or understood across varying
cultures, but also very little attempt to understand how and why. Davies (2001) points to the
inherent weakness of viewing the complexities of the democratic transitions through a
particularly ‘western’ frame of reference. All to often, he argues, prior to the fall on
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Communism, Western observers and commentators tended to analyse and interpret the
Soviet-based systems through their own particular institutional and political frameworks.
Significantly, what these commentators failed to understand was the existence of “a system
where lawlessness was the norm…the rules of the ideology changed from day to day…they
did not possess the language to describe what they saw” (p36). Simon (1996) and Davies
(1997) both point to this same weakness in the theoretical conception of the post-communist
societies after the fall of communism. Theoretical conceptions of democracy are too often
based on the understanding and use in the developed democracies, that the experiences under
Soviet Communism cannot be approached under the normal language of understanding “ the
realities were so alien to the experience of democracy, that standard western concepts did not
apply (Davies, 1997, p1094).
SOVIET PASTS
The understanding that neither democracy or communism can be thought of as
bounded concepts, reduced purely to that of their constituent parts and framed within the
political realm, but encompass the political, the economic, the social and the historical in
dynamic ways (Moscovici, 1991) is also reflected by Hanson (1995), who argues, that it is
necessary to begin “to re-examine our theories of the Soviet system before attempting to
explain post-Soviet developments” (ibid, p119). Here the interest and the understanding of
the Soviet period is not so much a closing of the chapter on the Soviet era, but reflects the
ongoing relationship between Soviet pasts and Post-Soviet futures, how these intersect, the
impact they have not only on political mechanisms but how they form the interest between
the individual and the social, the cultural and the political, the past and the present (Berezin,
1997). Political regimes for Janos (1996) comprise various ‘means’ and ‘ends’ which come
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together and extend beyond that of purely the political realm but contribute to a culture
comprising meaning and symbolic expressions that underlie social relations among
individuals as well as that between the individual and the State.
Marxism-Leninism-Stalinism
The relationship between political theory and practice is complex for any political
regime, however, possibly more so, in relation to the Soviet model which was based on grand
ideological theories and utopian visions. The term ‘theories’ is used in the plural as the
underlying theoretical underpinnings of the Soviet model were based on the ideas of Marx
put into practice by Lenin and Stalin. Commentators generally refer to the Soviet model as
‘Marxism-Leninism’, others use the multiple term ‘Marxism-Leninisn-Stalinism’ adding the
contribution of Stalin on the political regimes which were dominant throughout a large part
of Europe during the twentieth century.
Marx’s thoughts were based on the ideas of dialectical materialism, although the term
was probably never used directly by Marx himself (Holmes, 1997). For Marx, the forces
driving society were ideas conditioned by the material world, in particular in relation to the
changing modes of production and the resultant class antagonism in society. The dialectical
aspect of his thinking arises from the tension between the material conditions of the different
classes making up society. The progress of society is always in a state of tension, between the
present state of affairs and what is becoming. In contrast to the dialogical nature of thought
conceived within social representational theory where the tension between ideas and
expressed through communication is the driving force behind the dynamics of history and
thought, the progression of history, for Marx, was led through tension between the material
conditions (McLellan, 1980). For Marx, in contrast to that of dialogism as conceived within
the social representation approach, there were various ‘scientific laws’ and identifiable
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patterns in the dialectic nature of change.
From the economic theories of Marx, both Lenin and Stalin were to add their own
variants which were necessary to achieve their own specific goals. One of Lenin’s first steps
after the revolution of 1917 was to abolish the non-Communist press, viewing press freedom
as “a weapon in the hands of the world bourgeoisie” (Volkogonov, 1999, p74). During the
period from around 1917 to 1924 various other mechanisms were put into place by Lenin
which were to characterise the nature of the following Soviet regimes: the abolition of all
private property and private ownership, all other political parties were banned except the
Communist Party, a commitment to a planned economy along with vast networks of secret
police (Cheka) and secret informers to contain the ‘enemies of the people’ (Holmes, 1997).
Volkogonov (1999) has described how  “…in a few short years Lenin was able to do so
much it is hard to believe one man capable of. The Party had become a state within a state, its
dictatorship a fact. Religion was replaced by Bolshevik ideology. Party absolutism…became
a fact, coercion a permanent feature. Democracy and civil rights became bourgeois
manifestations” (ibid, p78).
Stalin’s leadership from 1924 further intensified those policies and practices put into
place by Lenin. The major characteristics signifying Stalin’s contribution were the
collectivisation programme, within the Soviet Union itself, which resulted in extensive
famine and death (Montefiore, 2004) along with his State controlled programme of terror set
in place to counteract growing resistance to his methods. Although possibly not to the same
extent as the State terror initiated during Stalin’s time, terror was a pervading feature of the
Soviet led regimes set in place in the satellite nation incorporated under Soviet rule after
WWII (Meuschel, 2000).
Although the regimes, which spanned seven decades across the USSR and four
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decades across the satellite Soviet States, may have varied across time, the policies and
practices, set in place by Lenin and Stalin from around 1917 and enduring through to 1989,
had a fundamental unity. Political centralism, dictatorship, lawlessness, ideological
monopoly, national manipulation, state ownership and a centrally-controlled economy have
all been identified as defining features of Soviet rule through to the Gorbachev years
(Service, 1997). For the nations of Central and Eastern Europe incorporated into the Soviet
bloc Stalinist Communism was to become their reality irrespective of their individual
historical, political, economic or social traditions (Schopflin, 1993a).
Totalitarianism
Numerous political labels have been applied to the Soviet led regimes, one of which
was totalitarian. The interest in totalitarianism, as a broad political concept, has varied across
the latter half of the twentieth century. For example, the socio-economic conditions
favourable to how totalitarianism emerges as a system (Schapiro, 1972; Arendt, 1967, 1973)
to more specifically, reflecting more current interest, whether it was applicable to the Soviet
Union throughout the period from Stalin to Gorbachev or to the Soviet satellites under
domination since the end of World War II (Kershaw, 2000; Meuschel, 2002). Has this simply
been a concept that has been loosely applied carrying no significant explanatory power? As
Schapiro (1972) notes for the use of political concepts in general,  “a concept which appears
valid when first applied becomes obsolete through change…though force of habit…lack of
care in the use of language the old concept may continue to be applied” (p16); or does it
carry explanatory power that may be directly applicable to the Soviet style regimes and
would therefore carry relevance for the broader understanding of the post-Soviet period.
What was totalitarianism
Hannah Arendt in 1973 viewed the Soviet totalitarian system as so unlike any other
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social system in world politics, “they operate[d] according to a system of values so radically
different from all others, that none of our traditional legal, moral or common sense categories
could help us to come to terms with, or judge, or predict their course of action” (p460). More
recently, and after the collapse of the regimes, Stroinska (2002) described totalitarianism as a
system “ where the group in power exerts total and complete control over every aspect of
life, requires obedience from every individual…controls the sources and means of
information (through censorship) …behaviour through secret police and informers…the
means of production through a centrally controlled economy” (ibid, p23).
The issue of terror as a characteristic has been widely debated. Hannah Arendt in
1967 viewed totalitarianism as a system of terroristic rule ending in the Soviet system during
the post-Stalin period. Hanson (1995) argues that the era after Stalin was a form of
totalitarianism without terror, however, as pointed out by Meuschel (2000) the nature of
terror in the post-Stalin period changed from open blind terror to a more subtle mixture made
available through advancing technological methods of surveillance, although, still able to
create widespread fear and suspicion. Other issues debated in the political literature concern
the definition and identification of totalitarianism through the employment of typologies. For
example, the best known, and also most contested, being that of Friedrich & Brezezinki
(1956, in Kershaw, 2000). Contention arises through whether it is necessary for all identified
aspects to be present and whether or not all carry equal weight (ibid).
Authoritarian – Totalitarian Regimes
In conceiving of the Communist period as a shared social reality which intersects
with that of the rejection of communism and the move to democracy a more instructive
approach is one based on the understanding of the nature of the regimes and how they
functioned. Here the general understanding of authoritarianism and totalitarianism may be
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more relevant. Although still based to some degree on some form of typology, the significant
aspect separating these two regimes is on the extent to which they interfere with the daily
lives of the people. Rose (1995) distinguishes between these two political regimes, and social
systems, through their differential use of power. Totalitarian regimes attempt to maximise
their power to interfere, as much as possible, in the everyday lives of the people,
significantly, in relation to those aspects of life that may be considered private or non-
political. The prime focus of this power is to deny or to obstruct individuals from creating
alternative spheres of social activity free from State control. In contrast, authoritarian
regimes, although highly restrictive, may leave various aspects of lives untouched. For Guo
(1998) authoritarian regimes generally leave untouched aspects such as wealth, status, social
values and private property, are rarely guided by grand ideological ideals or possess a single
historical truth. All totalitarian regimes are by nature authoritarian, but not all authoritarian
regimes are totalitarian, “even an authoritarian regime with a single party system need not be
totalitarian; it becomes so when the party claims for itself the people’s moral education and
attempt to subjugate individual consciences and thought control” (ibid, p276).
Gorbachev’s failure to understand that the Soviet-led regimes were mutually
exclusive with that of the multiplicity of competing voices of democracy was evident in the
nature of their eventual collapse and signified their totalitarian nature (Karklins, 1994).
Gorbachev’s policy of glasnost (openness) was the catalyst that finally led to the crumbling
of the regimes. His aims were a “regime hybrid where elements of democracy such as partial
press freedom would be grafted onto the old-style Soviet polity without altering its
nature…totalitarian models are based on the opposite assumption – on strict control over
communications and ideology…(and that) tampering with this would bring the whole
structure down” (ibid, p31). When the policy of glasnost broke the monopoly over
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communications, through partial press freedom, it provided the catalyst for the undermining
of the central ideological claim to being the possessor of a single truth, now there was no
single truth. When this foundation began to fracture, other fractures rapidly emerged such as
the lessening of the ability to undermine attitudes through propaganda and censorship, a
lessening of the ability to undermine behaviour through coercion, and so on.
In whatever ways the previous regimes are debated within the specialist literature in
relation to their eventual collapse, or the main catalysts for collapse, these regimes did
survive intact across Europe for several decades and formed the political, economic and
social reality for vast populations across various nations.
The nature of Soviet realities
The all-pervading nature of totalitarianism is clearly exemplified by the Stalinist
slogan “ He who is not with us - is against us” (Schopflin, 1993a, p78). The realities of the
regime can be conceived in terms of black and white, good or evil, for the party or against the
party, with no shades of grey tolerated. All strata of society were subjected to the
enforcement of the Soviet model, from the level of individual citizens to social groups, from
political and economic institutions to the higher levels of the party members and party elites
themselves.
The party claimed that it was not possible to be ‘communist’ in politics and ‘non-
communist’ within the spheres of the workplace, schools and the family, and so on. This
over-riding feature at the core of the system was fulfilled in a variety of ways (Schapiro,
1972). For example, through the strict censorship of dissenting views, the purging of all non-
ideologically correct information to the extent that virtually no subject or topic became
exempt, from the re-writing or re-interpretation of history to that of literary production.
(Hosking, 1992, p223). To remain silent, however, was not an option, as it was essential for
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the regimes to actively bring consciousness to the masses from above (Schapiro, 1972).
Through propaganda, along with the total control over education and over all forms of public
communication, the regimes attempted to indoctrinate the masses.
The use of symbols and rituals were a dominant feature of the Soviet regimes. All of
the satellite nations were subjected to mass Soviet rallies where non-attendance may be noted
and taken as possible dissent. Slogans which glorified the Soviet Union were common, and
all individuals were expected to publicly display their loyalty to the Party. Major rituals
included the Soviet ‘show trials’ and these were later held in all of the satellite nations except
Poland and the GDR (Schopflin, 1993a). The underlying purpose of the ‘trials’ were
numerous, from the symbolic nature of the ‘all-seeing and all-hearing’ party and its power in
identifying dissent, the forced confessions of the accused that ‘legitimised’ the Soviet order
and also the more direct political purpose of purging the party of undesirables and those
deemed untrustworthy.
The structure of the regimes
Outwardly, the regimes maintained the appearance of other political systems, ie. the
institutions of State and society, of government, parliament and local government, trade
unions, writers’ guilds and so on. These were, however, merely puppets of the Party-State
and in reality the Party took control of the day-to-day running of everything (Rose, 1994a).
To achieve State control to this degree required a high level of bureaucracy, from managers
and party organs within the workplace and within local communities (Volkogonov, 1999;
Service, 1997). Control was held in check by one of largest secret police systems ever
conceived, comprising vast instruments of oppression (Davies, 1997). The lives of ordinary
citizens soon became engulfed within a system of petty rules and regulations in which
subservience and passivity was to become the best way to ensure a quiet live.
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Prior to Soviet domination the incorporated satellite nations were highly
differentiated and socially stratified, a few, for example, Czechoslovakia and the GDR were
industrially superior to the more agrarian economy of the USSR (Glenny, 1993; Hosking,
1992; Leff, 1998). Politically, economically and socially, both within and between nations, a
‘levelling-down’ process was introduced (Schopflin, 1993a). Politically, this included the
abolition of all political parties except the communist party and economically, through State
control of the economy the Party had power to hire or fire individuals at will and if dissent
was suspected individuals could be exiled from their communities or sent to forced labour
camps. This level of control was exercised through the highly sophisticated ‘nomenklatura’
system where each appointment, at whatever level, in any area of life, was strictly controlled
and supervised by the Party (Hosking, 1992). Socially, through the control of the mass
media, all alternative expressions of opposition and all other intermediate levels of social
organisation were destroyed. In effect, the Soviet-led regimes attempted to destroy all aspects
of civil society (Bernhard, 1996). Davies (2001) describes the nature and functioning of the
regimes as a series of tangled webs - and at every web centre, its own spider. From the
supreme nomenklatura with the ‘grand spider’ at its centre, the webs radiated down from the
Kremlin to the party organs. The supreme law was the Kremlin, laws were applied to the
party organs in the same arbitrary fashion as to the ordinary citizens, there existed a radius of
fear emanating downwards from the Kremlin with no individual, either party elite or ordinary
citizen, free from the arbitrary control imposed from above.
Consequences of Soviet realities
Based on the understanding of the experiences and realities of living under Soviet
Communism, concerns were being raised, and predictions were being made, about exactly
what kinds of societies would emerge under post-communism (Schopflin, 1993a).
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Politically, the Soviet regimes had kept the ordinary people remote from the real
functioning of the system, the large gap between the official rhetoric and the daily realities,
fake pseudo-elections and all forms of conformity left a legacy of not only intense
disillusionment of the past political sphere, but also a high optimism of democracy as the
magic saviour, as the curer of all ills of society (Pietrzyk, 2003; Klicperova et al, 1997). For
Holmes (1997) this void would be filled by anything viewed as anti-communist, in effect, the
meaning of democracy would be based on the opposite of the communist experience.
However, concerns ran deeper than that of inexperience of democracy or the workings of a
market-led economy but that the socio-psychological state of the average citizen was one of
emptiness (Karklins, 1994). These sentiments were mirrored by Vaclav Havel, the President
of Czechoslovakia, in his 1990 New Year Address, when he described the Czechoslovakia
that was emerging after Soviet control as a society “where the people are morally ill…we
live in a contaminated moral environment…we became used to saying something other than
what we think…we learned not to believe in anything” (cited in Gouvier, 1996, p153). The
very values, meanings and practices necessary for survival under Communism were viewed
as being different from those that may be required under societies dismantling Communism.
Havel (1996, in Fleron, 1996) viewed that this process required not only the destruction of
old beliefs but also the learning of new beliefs: “when the Communist power and ideology
collapsed…the values and forms of human behaviour collapsed with it…people cannot
absorb a new structure overnight…to build a new structure of living beliefs and to identify
with these takes time” (ibid, p241). Not only were questions of values being raised but also
that of the nature of social relationships. Society itself was viewed as an instrument of
coercion through the memories of terror, of denunciation leading to a lack of intermediate
social groups and the absence of a normal medium of social exchange (Forgas et al, 1995).
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Gibson (2001) views the major characteristic as being one of a society of disconnected
individuals; and for Hoskings (1992) the consequence of Soviet realities compelled the
individual to live two lives, a public one, mouthing the ritualistic phrases of the ideology, and
a private one, shared only with trusted friends and family. Klicperova et al (1997) have
described the daily realities of living under Communist rule as constituting a post-communist
syndrome. Specifically, for Czechoslovakia after the Prague Spring and during the
‘normalisation’ period (see Chapter 5), through the intensification of oppressive methods the
people were further silenced from alternative action. This led to a variety of defence
mechanisms affecting all areas of life. In effect, the system attempted to keep the people in a
state of immaturity to fit the aims of the regime. All individual initiative was severely
punished leading to lowered self-esteem, collective learned helplessness, withdrawal into
private life and total alienation from society. Fear of denunciation led to increased anxiety,
the arbitrary nature of oppression resulted in double standards, wide distrust and corruption
and to an overall decline in civility.
THEORISING SOCIAL CHANGE
Dominant in the literature was the idea that Soviet pasts were an essential factor in
the understanding of the present and that of the future. However, this has been conceived of
in different ways. Traditional political and economic thought viewed the transition to
democracy largely in terms of a comparative process. Based on the experiences and
understandings in the ‘West’, the nations in transition were evaluated in terms of institutional
aspects and implicit in this was some form of political determinism resulting in some type of
eventual political and economic convergence (Blokker, 2005). The bulk of the newly
emerging transition literature intersected the boundaries of the political and economic
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literature with that of sociology and psychology. Although this literature produced a great
deal of commentary, along with that of prediction, little theorising of social change was
evident. To this end, Szakalczai (2001) contends that this emerging literature has indeed
failed to contribute to the ideas of social change in any meaningful way. He argues that
through the conception of the transition process as being dualistic in nature, which viewed
communism and democracy as two states and conceived as goal directed (communism Æ
democracy), was a misguided understanding of the process. However, rather than conceiving
of communism and democracy as being mutually co-determined under which one makes
sense in relation to the other, as a dynamic and shifting process of social change, Szakalczai
argues that the transition period, itself, constitutes a particular and unique phase. Here it
could be argued that this thinking simply changes from one based on one duality, that of
communismÆdemocracy to two dualities, communismÆtransition; transitionÆdemocracy
with further complexities in the process reduced to other dualities. Haerpfer (2001) also
accepts the importance of a non-goal conception of a move from communism to democracy,
however, he argues for the suspension of theorising in such a period of rapid social change.
Implicit in this understanding is that theories concerning social change require some type of
stability in order to evaluate the process of change.
Although highly dominant in the literature was the idea that understanding the present
was, in many respects, dependent upon the understanding of the nature of Soviet pasts.
Through the use of discourses reflecting the legacies of Communism this influence was
largely conceived of as uni-directional, that is, the legacies of the realities of Soviet pasts
would disrupt, halt or negate the process of social change; whether from legacies reflecting
social practices and the social fabric of Soviet societies to legacies of distorted beliefs,
values, and the personalities of individuals socialised under Soviet pasts.
96
Nowhere was this more evident that in the concept of civil society. Indeed within the
transition literature it was rare to find commentators who did not in some way refer,
explicitly or implicitly, to the destruction of civil society as a major legacy of communism
impeding the transition process and arising through a distorted social space comprising a
very different private/public sphere distinction and/or to specific patterns of reasoning,
beliefs or cognitions in individuals socialised under, and adapted to, daily Communist
realities.
Civil Society
The origins of the idea of civil society has its roots in the history of political thought
and its contemporary manifestations are often contested. Conceived of during an earlier
period of intense political, economic and social change in Europe during the 17/18th centuries
when the old societal order was changing. Feudal and religious orders were crumbling and
individuals were acting out private concerns in the public sphere (Tester, 1992). Specifically,
for the thinkers of the Scottish Enlightenment, ethical behaviour, related to the changing
economic sphere, could no longer be based on higher authorities and civil society represented
a shared arena signifying a mutual and reciprocal relationship between the individual and the
wider society (Berezen, 1997).
Civil society, as originally conceived, was necessarily grounded within a particular
historical period in which ‘private’ economic needs were being increasingly communicated
in the public sphere. Modern conceptions of civil society have questioned this original
formulation by declaring that it may no longer contain the economic sphere (Ku, 2000); if the
economic is excluded then what about the role of trade unions or small business
organisations, is the ‘civi’l separate and distinct from the ‘political’ sphere (Foley &
Edwards, 1996) or does it constitute a sphere outwith the State but protected by the State or
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working in partnership with government (Hodgson, 2004).
Although there remains continual intellectual debate asking what remains within or
what falls outside it, what its boundaries are, Sztompka (1998) argues, that within the context
of the post-communist period the concept of civil society has acquired three different
meanings, broadly arising from three theoretical traditions. As a sociological concept it is
taken to be more or less synonymous with ‘community’, the public space or public sphere
comprising various autonomous groups between the level of the family and the state “the
totality of social institutions, both formal and informal, that are not strictly production
oriented, nor governmental, nor familial” (ibid, p192). Secondly, as an economic concept,
and closer to its historical roots, as an autonomous sphere of economic activities and
economic relations based on private ownership. Finally, cutting across both the sociological
and economic understandings, civil society, conceived as a cultural concept involving the
existence of various values, norms and implicit understandings of which there are many,
including reciprocity, loyalty, cooperation, tolerance and trust (Sztompka, 1998).
If civil society, or the public sphere, is considered in broad terms as comprising some
form of autonomous and general access to meetings, groups, or organisations involving
public discourse and debate, as generally conceived under traditional western thought
(O’Connel, 2000) this becomes problematic when transferred to Communist societies
(Oswald & Voronkov, 2004; Schopflin, 1993a). These issues are further compounded
through the use of standard distinctions and ideas of ‘private’ and ‘public’ as conceived in
western thought and applied to the Communist period. In western thought, three broad
spheres of communication may be identified: the private, the public and the State with the
borders between the three being relatively fuzzy. Where there can be a clear line of
demarcation found this is generally between the ‘private’ and the ‘public/State’ spheres. In
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participative and liberal democracies “the public sphere is regarded as a mediating level
between the State and private interests…the absence of this kind of sphere constitutes a
precarious legacy for post-Soviet consolidation and for civil society” (Oswald & Vorkonov,
2004, p101).
For Tong (1995), under non-oppressive regimes if political or economic performance
is lacking various options are available: the leave option or the protest option, neither of
which were available under repressive Communism. The only other option available was the
‘soft exit’ option, described as an exit from the ‘official’ society to the ‘second’ society and
primarily displayed through the general retreat into private life. The spheres of
communication under Soviet regimes can be conceived more as two separate and distinct
spheres, mutually exclusive, and in opposition to one another - the ‘public‘(official/State)
sphere and the ‘private’ sphere - with what was allowed to be expressed in one, not
appropriate for the other. Boundaries existed between the private and the public, with the
private sphere growing at the expense of the public. This split between the private and the
public resulted in citizen’s living their lives in two distinct ‘spheres of communication’ or
‘life-worlds’ (Scheye, 1991; Klicperova et al, 1997), with each sphere carrying its own rules,
codes, regulations and language. Personal concerns and wider societal concerns became
taboo in the public sphere, largely resulting in the everyday life experiences and concerns of
the citizens occurring, as far as was possible, outwith the public realm. Soviet citizens’
increasing distancing from the public sphere led to a paradoxical ‘state/citizen’ relationship
which, Oswald & Vorkonov (2004) argue, continues to dominate the post-communist
structure. During the communist period the State claimed almost total control over everyone
and was the main provider of goods and services. At one level, the State was avoided as far
as possible or passively tolerated. At another level, it was viewed as hostile, distrusted, and
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as regulations were arbitrary, as a resource to be exploited through the second economy or
through theft (Schopflin, 1993a). The post-communist period has not significantly changed
this ‘citizen/state’ relationship with citizens “confronting the State with all-encompassing
expectations and demands…at the same time they distrust the State…refuse to engage in
public affairs…continue to understand this realm [public affairs]…not as a collective good
but as a matter of State responsibility” (Oswald & Vorkonov, 2004, p114). Golubovic (1994)
views the continued dependency on a paternalistic state and the lack of voluntary
engagement in the public sphere as arising from the fear of newness, with unfamiliarity
comes uncertainty and risk, and for many what is desired is stability and certainty.
Social representations and spheres of communication within a communist perspective
Social representations have been conceived of as a specific type of social knowledge
produced, circulated and changed within the public sphere of modern societies. As pointed
out earlier, Moscovici (2000) conceived of representations as ‘social’ rather than ‘collective’
to reflect the differentiation of knowledge, networks of people and the varieties of competing
sources of knowledge produced in modern societies, in contrast to that of traditional
societies. Jovchelovitch (1999), drawing from the writing of Hannah Arendt (1958),
conceives of the public sphere as the sphere where individuals can enact in communication
and behaviour the very essence of plurality which characterises the human condition. Rather
than distinguishing between traditional and modern societies, Jovchelovitch talks of
traditional and de-traditional public spheres. Traditional public spheres were characterised
through a lack of differentiation in social thought circulating in the public sphere, a type of
knowledge held by all members of a community with little opportunity for effective change
in such knowledge, being guided by strong social bonds or tied to some higher authority such
as religion. In contrast, de-traditional public spheres under the context of modernity is a
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public space where social representations as symbolic phenomena are produced, circulated
and changed under processes of conflict and tension and where differentiation and dissent
can co-exist and become socially negotiated. Jovchelovitch (2001) further divides de-
traditional public spheres into two dimensions, that of every day life, the sphere of the
streets; and that comprising the arena of politics, a more institutionalised public sphere.
These two spheres become linked through the role of mass communication.
Totalitarian communism through the nature of its oppression, through State control of
the mass media and all other forms of forced conformity, in effect, attempted to reduce or
destroy all forms of spontaneous activity and thought, where the everyday public sphere was
an institutionalised public sphere. In fundamental terms, through the reduction of public
spheres which would allow voices of dissent to be articulated, through strict socialisation
practices and through the interference with as much of daily life as was possible, the regimes
attempted to create new social representations, to effect change in the very thinking and
beliefs of the people (Moscovici, 2001). All knowledge, social practice and institutions were
guided toward truth as laid down by the Party. Public spheres under totalitarian communism
may be likened to those of traditional public spheres, guided by one single authority
proclaiming one truth. However, there is one fundamental characteristic differentiating these
two types of public spheres: communism prevented the production and circulating of other
knowledge through force, fear and coercion. Whereas within traditional public spheres the
power and authority guiding such knowledge was recognised, consisting of beliefs or self
evident truths and held together through strong social bonds (Jovchelovitch, 2001).
Although the State and Party mechanisms proclaimed a single truth the people
themselves, rather than internalising these ‘truths’ to become their truths, acquired various
defensive mechanisms to adapt to the dissonance between Party ‘truths’ and public fiction.
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These defensive mechanisms acquired by individuals have been described as being
compelled to live under two distinct spheres of reality (Sztompka, 1993); an authoritarian
mentality (Golubovic, 1993); a post-communist syndrome (Klicperova et al, 1997); divided
selves (Scheye, 1991); closed social minds (Kempny, 1993) and post-totalitarian stranger
(Grekova, 1996). For these writers, the acquisition of these particular defensive mechanisms
involving habits, beliefs and practices are all substantial legacies from the communist era and
were viewed as presenting obstacles, impeding the process of social change. Although, in no
way am I negating the existence or importance of such legacies, beliefs or practices that were
required for survival under communism, however, as Jovchelovitch (2001 states “ when
societal conditions change so does social knowledge” (p166). Conceiving of the experiences
of communist rule as being non-adaptive to social change, or to that of democracy, and
largely viewed as uni-directional carries a non-dynamic view of social knowledge and social
change, and which precludes the question of the intersection between that of stability, change
and innovation in social thinking and practices.
Rather than the public sphere conceived as a space containing boundaries, reduced in
form, civil society or the public sphere can be more thought of as varieties of dynamic social
processes, performing different functions and conferring different meaning under various
socio-historical contexts.
Different forms of civil society developed and existed under communist regimes.
These largely functioned through either passive resistance, for example, through escape and
apathy or active resistance, through hostility and opposition (Wierzbicka, 1990). Resistance
may take various forms, from disengagement from the public sphere and the subsequent
withdrawal into private networks of trusted contacts, family and friends, and which became
increasingly essential in acquiring goods and services in a general climate of economic
102
shortages (Howard, 2002); or as more active resistance, through ‘minimal civil society’
comprising underground and secretive anti-communist movements and dissident groups,
operating in opposition and directly against the state, in essence, a ‘revolutionary civil
society’ (Pietrzyk, 2003; Smolar, 1996). For Smolar (ibid), a form of civil society which
functioned to oppose an oppressive and centralised single power proclaiming one single truth
may no longer function within societies with growing plurality in beliefs, comprising many
possible political, economic and social truths. However, for both Moscovici (2000) and
Karklins (1994) the speed and nature of the crumbling of the regimes, after the lifting of
oppressive mechanisms, were indicative of the emergence of many voices being expressed
through new and emerging forms of public spheres and civil society.
Authoritarian personalities
Klicperova et al (1997), drawing from the theoretical underpinnings of the
authoritarian personality of Adorno et al (1950) have hypothesised the existence, at the
individual level, of specific cognitions and attitudes developed under Soviet style
socialisation that will persist in the thinking of individuals into the post-communist period.
As earlier indicated, Adorno et al (1950) maintained that the development of various
cognitions and cognitive styles are the expression of a deeper structure of the personality
which arise from rigid socialisation practices during childhood. In more modern terminology,
parental style during childhood and the overall family climate are seen as the decisive
factors. Although generating some interest in the literature, the link between childhood
socialisation experiences and later cognitive style is far from conclusive. With respect to the
childhood socialisation literature, Ray (1990) contends that the degree to which cognitions or
cognitive style generalises is highly unpredictable, particularly where the parents are the
authorities concerned. Summarising the literature he produces evidence where rigidity in
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parental style led to competitiveness, rather than submissiveness; rebelliousness rather than
passivity and so on. Socialisation experiences, he argues, are too complex to map onto
specific cognitive style or beliefs, and if any link can be found this does not generally extend
beyond that of early adolescence.
As earlier indicated, and more specifically within the communist and post-communist
contexts, Klicperova et al (1997) point to an overall post-communist syndrome comprising
patterns of cognitions, attitudes and behaviour which will prevail. These include learned
helplessness, a respect for authority, abuse of civic virtues, anti-civic culture and chauvinistic
nationalism. These were hypothesised to emerge after the initial stage of euphoria
immediately after the collapse of the regimes and, although developed under communism as
adaptive strategies, they would produce patterns of cognitions such as passivity instead of
problem solving, a tendency to follow populist solutions and obedience. The period after the
initial euphoria would, for Klicperova (1998), reflect “consensus that countries should be free
and prosperous but the finer details were still yet to discovered and negotiated, such as the
balance between freedom and law-enforcement, the ratio between freedom and equality”
(ibid, p3). Here, however, it must be noted that these relationships, for example, between
freedom and law enforcement, are always in a state of tension and negotiation, whether in the
context of the aftermath of democratic revolutions or in ‘stable and long-lived’ democracies.
Democracy is a demanding and conflicting system and the very nature of democracy, and
that of the social thought, requires these ongoing tensions and negotiations. There was, as I
have already indicated, a tendency in the transition literature to consider communism and
democracy as two distinct entities under which the rejection of one would lead to the
emergence of the other. This is implicit in Klicperova (1998) when she talks of the collapse
of the repressive regimes “which would allow a spontaneous restoration of democratic
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regimes, at least in those with a democratic heritage” (p3), the failure of which she argues
lies in “prevailing personality traits” (p3). Dunn (2005), in his historical analysis of
democracy argues that the survival and strength of democracy lies not in its regime
requirements, for example, in the many varieties of institutional forms or aspects of
governance it has historically carried, and continues to do so, but as a body of thinking.
Democratisation, as a fluid and changing process, carries many different rhythms and is
always subject to different pressures and tensions and that the relevance of democracy as an
ongoing process today, remote from its original conception, is its continuing adaptability to
these pressures and tensions.
For Klicperova et al (1997) successful transitions may be dependent upon the severity
of oppression experienced under Soviet rule, with those experiencing greater oppression
suffering the most disruption in transition. Czechoslovakia, after 1968, has been described as
experiencing one of the most oppressive in the region (Davies, 1997; Markova et al, 1998).
Glenny (1993) describes the period from 1868 to 1989 in Czechoslovakia as reflecting moral,
political and economic devastation. In contrast, Hungary, during the latter period, had a much
more relaxed political and economic experience than Czechoslovakia (Plichtova & Eros,
1997).
Drawing from the typologies of Almond & Verba (1989), Klicperova et al (1997)
examined various types of civic culture in the Czech Republic, Hungary and the USA. Using
a student sample from each nation, 48 politically based statements were compiled to reflect
the typologies of civic culture identified by Almond & Verba: participative culture,
comprising attentive and involved citizens; parochial culture, signifying indifferent citizens,
and subject culture, characterised by citizens aware of politics but acting in an obedient and
deferential manner. Using a Q-analysis, statements were devised to reflect theoretical
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constructs, sorted by the participants through the degree of agreement/disagreement, the
analysis then transposes the data resulting in the clustering of participants with common
profiles into factors. Using only low and high scores, the main interest was in the degree to
which the resultant schemata would either confirm political alienation, hypothesised to be
characteristic of the post-totalitarian syndrome, or confirm the civic culture of the American
sample. Findings did not support the existence of a post-totalitarian syndrome in the Czech
and Hungarian samples (anti-civic culture). Against predictions the most robust civic culture
was identified in the majority of the Czech sample, Hungarians revealed more ambiguity,
Czechs showed little evidence of alienation, and in contrast to the prediction, a substantial
number of Americans revealed alienation and an anti civic culture. The authors state that
while a number of phenomena in post-communist countries indicate the existence of a post-
communist syndrome, this was not upheld in the data. The authors, along with that of
Klicperova (1998) have been instrumental in describing the daily realities of life under
Communism, as well as the daily realities of living under societies in transitions. As already
indicated, legacies from the communist period formed a significant part of the transition
literature and which were predicted to producing a negative effect on the process of social
change. The above study suggests that such legacies may not present themselves directly
within a political context, but as Berezin (1997) argues, as broader themes which may or may
not be expressed purely within the political realm but which may form many intersections
with other cultural phenomena. In the process of sense-making such legacies cannot be
conceived as rigid schemas in the minds of individual people but are socially enacted
carrying both the potential for constraining and enabling social change in a dynamic
relationship.
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Conclusion
From the examination of the concepts and ideas dominant in the literature, it is
evident that various commentators from a variety of backgrounds viewed the transition
process as highly complicated and were largely pessimistic. Drawn from the traditional
democracy literature, from the ideas surrounding the nature of totalitarianism to those who
viewed the relevance and importance of civil society and the public/privates spheres,
common themes can be identified. Although approached from different backgrounds, the
lack of opportunities for political engagement and participation, the destruction of social
bonds and the disruption of the private/public spheres of individuals led to the creation of
societies comprising beliefs and practices adapted to survival under Communism. Although,
many may argue for the importance of some form (or forms) of ‘democratic culture’ as
requirements, what these are, and how they function appear not to be easily identifiable.
Although drawing from this literature, this present study conceives of the phenomena
of social change and meaning making as a more dynamic process than is generally portrayed.
Cultural specificity is an implicit assumption of social representational theory, however, it
does not conceive of historical or cultural contexts as being predictable but that meaning and
social change is derived dynamically from a variety of sources. In this respect, the concept of
‘communist legacies’ forms part of this tension, in fact, it provides the tension and the
multiple meanings from which social actors draw from as a function of changing contexts
and practical demands.
 In whatever ways the relationship between Communism and democracy may be
conceived and understood by specialists interested in the transition process, this present study
focuses on the meanings and understanding of ordinary people. In what ways are the
dominant understandings of the specialists reflected in the minds of ordinary people.
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Are the legacies of Soviet domination, so prominent in the minds of the specialists, also
prominent in the minds of ordinary people?
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CHAPTER 5: TWENTIETH-CENTURY HISTORY OF CZECHOSLOVAKIA5
Versailles Peace Treaty
The new Czechoslovakian State came into being as the result of the outcome of the
negotiations of the Versailles Peace Treaty at the end of World War I. The main aim of the
Treaty, through the re-drawing of geopolitical boundaries, was based primarily on the
principle of national self-determination, with an additional underlying aim of reducing any
future tensions in Europe. The large crumbling Empires with unsettled ethnic and national
groupings were considered to be too unstable, smaller independent states were thought to be
less likely to lead to an increase in tension. The plans for the Treaty were huge and complex,
and had the almost impossible task of attempting to unify a Europe which, in the past, had
never been stable with the peoples forming varying kinds of intertwining histories
(MacMillan, 2001).
Geographically, Czechoslovakia gained territory by retaining more or less its Czech-
land boundaries, with the addition of the German Sudeten regions along with the territory of
Silesia which contained a relatively high proportion of Polish populations. These generous
boundaries were in part due to the plan of the Treaty to not allow Germany to gain an
increase in any of its boundaries. There had been no historically well defined boundary
between Slovakia and Hungary, and once again the re-drawing of the boundaries favoured
the Slovak portion of the new Czechoslovak State.
During the inter-war period the Czechoslovak State underwent its first attempt in
 the transition to democracy, the second attempt was much shorter lived and fell between the
time of the Allied victory and the Soviet invasion, the 1989 revolutions were its third
attempt. During the period from the ending of World War I to the end of the 1980s,
Czechoslovakia has cycled between all major forms of political regime: democracy, fascism,
democracy, communism, democracy.
                                                 
5 In the main, the background source material for the history of Czechoslovakia has been drawn from C.S.
Leff’s (1997) ‘The Czech and Slovak Republics: Nation Versus State’. Other sources are cited, where
applicable.
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The first transition to democracy in Czechoslovakia
Czechoslovakia’s first experience of transition to democratic rule was viewed as a
triple transition encompassing political, economic and ethnic dimensions (MacMillan, 2001).
Firstly, an attempt to create a stable parliamentary democracy under independent statehood,
arising out of Habsburg rule; secondly, to build a independent economy from the previous
imperial economy. Finally, and in some respects more importantly, the need to integrate the
separate Czech and Slovak past experiences in the former Austrian and Hungarian parts of
the old dual monarchy, along with the integration of the relatively high number of German
and Hungarian minorities now included in the new state as a result of the re-drawing of the
geographical boundaries.
Ethnic and national issues in the First Czechoslovak Republic
Czechs and Slovaks, both being Slavic people, share an almost similar language,
religious leanings for both were Catholic or Protestant, both had been part of the Austro-
Hungarian Monarchy although, the Czechs were more closely linked to the economically
better developed Austrian part of the dynasty, with the Slovaks linked more to the lesser
developed Hungarian portion. Ethnic and national differences were to plague the political,
economic aspects of the first Czechoslovak Republic between the wars. From the beginning
the Slovaks wanted a hyphenated name to reflect the two Slavic identities. Ethnically, this
would have been complicated as the new Republic also contained relatively high numbers of
Hungarians, and in addition, the German population almost equalled the number of Slovaks
in the total state (Leff, 1997). From the Czech point of view, allowing some measure of
independence, even through the hyphenation of the name, may have opened up the way for
similar concessions to be given to the other national groupings. A common Czechoslovak
state was viewed, by the Czechs, as insurance against the equal desire for some measure of
independence for the Hungarian and German population. Tomas Masaryk, the first President
of the Republic, thought that a common Czechoslovak alliance would result in a total Slav
population greater than the Hungarian and German population who had been the dominant
partners during the period of the former Habsburg rule.
During the first Czechoslovak Republic the major problems were linked to national
issues affecting both the political and the economic spheres. Political parties tended to draw
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support from national groupings, whether these were Czech, Slovak, German or Hungarian.
President Masaryk assumed that these problems would be relatively short lived, through
education he believed the following generations of Slovaks would be more agreeable to
integration. The Slovaks viewed integration more as Czech colonisation and domination,
termed ‘Czechoslovakism’, rather than the promoting of economic development of the
Slovak territories. In retrospect, the attempt and general failure to integrate the Czech and
Slovak peoples should come as no surprise as there had been no common historical state
before 1918 and both peoples were experiencing differing present day histories. Later this
period was commonly known by the Czechs as their ‘golden period’, no such sentiments
were held by the Slovaks (Glenny, 1993).
National Politics of the period
Politically, during the inter-war period, Czechoslovakia was the only state in the
region to be ruled through a fully functioning parliamentary democracy with competitive free
elections. Others states in the region were all ruled under some form of authoritarian style
government (Glenny, 1993).
The political guiding force during the inter-war period was Tomas Masaryk who,
during that time and for some time later, was hailed as a national hero(Broklova, 1995). His
style of leadership heavily influenced the political arrangements and was described as
humanistic, under which the various minorities were freely allowed to organise their own
political parties, and were always included in the coalition governments of the period.
However, a system of proportional representation, with the inclusion of minorities, resulted
in very fractionalised governments with up to fifteen parties winning seats in each election.
Each new parliament involved extensive negotiations along with the additional problem of
the formation of new cabinets between election periods. From 1918 to 1938 there were
fifteen new cabinets, each lasting, on average, not more than a year (Leff, 1997).
Economic situation of the period
In general, the Czech lands were economically better developed than most of the
other regions in the area; even the lesser devolved Slovak territory was better developed that
its neighbour, Hungary. During the inter-war period Czechoslovakia became a growing
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industrial power giving rise to an economic class structure more similar to the better
developed Western nations. However, the depression of the 1930s differentially affected the
various ethnic groups, the Slovak and German industrial bases being badly affected leading
once again to arise in ethnic tension. The Nazi invasion also added to ethnic tensions and not
helped by the Slovak leaders being summoned by Hitler to accept a separate State, cooperate
or suffer the consequences.
Minister Benes’ concluded that, in the past, the Czechoslovak State had been too
heavily dependent on Western influences, in the future there should be greater balancing
between Western and Soviet interests (Leff, 1997).
First Czechoslovak Republic: conclusions
Czechoslovakia’s first attempt at transition to democracy was bolstered through its
relatively high level of economic development along with a growing level of industrialisation
providing a differentiated class structure which helped to stabilise the political climate.
However, the Czechs and the Slovaks never reached an agreement on their positions to one
another. Political, economic and ethnic issues continued to interact and these tensions created
both the political and economic divisions which contributed to the break-up of the State by
the Nazis.
The communist take-over in 1948
When the communists entered Czechoslovakia in 1948 the country was ethnically
less diverse than it had been during its inter-war period, with around 90% of its population
made up of Czechs and Slovaks. After 1945, Benes resumed the Presidency, believing he
could work well with the Soviets. Negotiations began with Gottwald, the Communist leader,
with the Communists given eight out of twenty-five ministries, gaining in the 1946 election
around 38% of the vote. Communist infiltrations of the trade unions and the police began.
Although Czechoslovakia was the last to fall to the Soviets, unlike its neighbours
membership of the communist party was not illegal during the inter-war years. The
Czechoslovak Communist Party (KSC) always had the ability to legally gain support and
stand in elections. Winning around 10% of the vote and holding parliamentary seats, the
party only went underground during Nazi occupation. Therefore, at the time of the Soviet
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liberation the Communists already had some level of public support, strengthened by
President Benes’ continued belief in building stronger alliances with the East. These all
coincided with the push by the Soviets for greater domination in the region (Leff, 1997).
In Czechoslovakia a reasonably high level of industrial working class also helped the
growing communist appeal. Election campaigns held in early 1948 saw the Communists
pushing for land reforms and tax relief for farmers and these efforts were bolstered by large
public rallies. The opposition, at the time, had no similar mobilisation strategies. However,
during February, twelve non-communist ministers resigned, believing they could bring down
the government and force new elections. The threat of a general strike, increasing violence by
the police and workers all indicated that widespread fighting may erupt, leading possibly to
Civil war. Benes accepted Gottwald’s plan for a new cabinet which led to further purges of
institutions of the State. This turning point in the history of Czechoslovakia came to be
known the ‘The Glorious February Revolution’, with even those in the population not
entirely favourable to Communism still viewing the aims of the Revolution to be worthwhile.
However, the vision of the pro-communists of the time was for a more just and fair society,
the eventual imposed Soviet model in no way can be compared.
As Leff 1997) describes, in the early stages of the Soviet take-over new opportunities
arose for those in society denied such opportunities in the past. For example, peasants sons
could rise to high positions in the army, workers sons could gain an education through party
schools. The communists managed to mobilise support from portions of the population who
would be loyal supporters of the regime. However, almost immediately, the true nature of the
Soviet model came into being and the large scale purges began, thousands were imprisoned.
A series of ‘show trials’ forced greater obedience (Schopflin, 1993a). The communist leaders
feared only Stalin, great excesses were committed to show loyalty to the regime. Even its
own leadership was not protected from the purges to cleanse the party of anyone who had a
‘past’ or who was simply thought not to be entirely supportive of the party system. For
example, anyone who had spent the war in the West, Jews in top party positions and Slovak
nationalists were all seen as being too independent in their thinking and were among those
included in the purges.
Economically, the dominant Soviet power was less developed than many of its
satellites (Glenny, 1993). The problems for the better developed nations, like
Czechoslovakia, were compounded not only through a reduction of its previous industrial
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and technological supremacy, but also through the drastic shortcomings of the Stalinist
economic and industrial model. There were no extra incentives for competition and by the
1960s Czechoslovakia’s growth fell to zero. The technological and scientific developments,
common after WWII in the West, left the Soviet system and its satellites well behind. Added
to the backwardness of the Soviet model was a growing and pervasive level of corruption.
The use of personal favours and bribes extended from the top elite to the general population.
It became normal and expected to steal from the state, known as the second or grey economy.
What was the carrot that helped the system limp along? The basic answer is that people had
no real choice. However, the regime offered some basic level of consumer protection and
economic security to its citizens for political peace (ibid). Prices for basic goods were held
constant with rent, food and heating costs heavily subsidised. Under the Soviet system the
concept of unemployment was absent and no Soviet regime had any mechanism in place for
unemployment benefits. Within the Czechoslovak constitution, employment was guaranteed
and fell under a basic human right along with free health care, full maternity leave etc. The
regime took great care to ensure some basic level of living conditions in an attempt to avoid
deprivation which might lead to public revolt. In no way could the ordinary citizen be said to
have a good standard of living, as comparable to developed nations of the West, however, the
population were kept above absolute deprivation level. Although having the right and the
obligation to work, many were underemployed, but a poor job was balanced against some
measure of basic living security.
In contrast to the Czech territories, the Slovak territories were economically boosted
under Soviet rule and for the period during the Communist rule economists have argued that
around 10% more investment was directed toward Slovakia, with education, health and
cultural studies possibly achieving higher levels than this. By 1960s the Soviets were
confident enough with their grip on Czechoslovakia to proclaim that it was no longer a
‘peoples democracy’ but that Czechoslovakia was to become the first ‘socialist state’, The
Czechoslovak Socialist Republic (CSSR) (Leff, 1997).
The Prague Spring
Between January and August 1968 Czechoslovakia experienced a short period of
hope of reform with some greater freedom of expression. The Communist leader, Alexander
Dubcek, aimed to revitalise the economy and politics. His reforms were to be in line with the
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Communist system, believing that this could be upheld through a greater level of public
support. These reforms were not comparable to the eventual revolutions of 1989, but have
been compared, in many ways, to the opening up of the system similar to the Gorbachev
period during the 1980s, however, still communism (Davies, 1997). The reforms included
some measure of decentralisation of the economy, some Federal solution to the Slovak issue,
greater openness in public discussions. In general, some loosening of the tight control of the
Soviet system to one that was more flexible and responsive to public demands. The initial
step was the loosening of the tight censorship of the media along with reassurances to
Moscow that the Soviet system in Czechoslovakia would remain loyal to the Soviet model.
However, the opening up of the media immediately offered voices to non-communists, anti-
communists and all other dissident groups. The Soviet system relied on the tight control of
the public media and any reduction of censorship was not only a threat to the regime in
Czechoslovakia but also sent a message to the other satellite nations of the Soviet Union, thus
viewed by Moscow, as a direct attack on the regime. Soviet tanks quashed the reform.
Moscow was forced to reinstall the leadership and a strong message was sent to all Soviet
states that no level of reform would be tolerated by Moscow (Leff, 1997)
The ‘Normalisation period’ from 1968 to 1989
For a time after the Soviet tanks crushed the uprising it seemed that some of the
reforms of the Prague Spring may indeed be possible. Dubcek was reinstated, but by 1969
Gustav Husak had taken over the leadership. The period after the failed uprising until the late
1980s ‘normalisation’ began and is described as the restoration of continuity with the pre-
uprising period. Normalisation in practice entailed intense political and social repression and
the return to ideological conformity. This level of repression was unique among the
communist bloc as a whole with Czechoslovakia now experiencing one of the most
oppressive regimes across the region (Davies, 1997; Markova et al, 1998). Glenny (1993)
describes the period from late 1968 to 1989 in Czechoslovakia a reflecting total moral,
political and social devastation.
Leff (1997) had described the wide-ranging nature of the oppression which resulted in
the tightening of control of all aspects of life. Throughout the uprising the secret police had
photographed everyone who had spoken at public meetings, along with individuals in the
crowds. Large scale purges began. For a while, during the period, the people who had
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experienced some level of freedom of expression and hope for the future were silenced, and
were suffering for it. The Husak regime required conformity and obedience in all aspects of
life, this extended to the humanities, social sciences and the pure sciences. Art had to adhere
to a rigid socialist realist formula. Many of the most creative individuals were silenced,
imprisoned or sent into exile. In addition to the high level of oppression of the people, the
Party itself was purged of all reformist or potentially reformist individuals. Publishing
houses, theatres and film studios were all placed under new directorship and censorship was
strictly imposed. The leadership along with the intense repression more or less remained until
the 1989 revolutions (Higley et al, 1996).
In addition to the increased level or surveillance and oppression, Husak also tried to
obtain acquiescence to his rule by providing an improved standard of living. He returned
Czechoslovakia to a strict command economy with an increased emphasis on central
planning and for a short period the Czechoslovakian people experienced an increased
standard of living and access to consumer goods which were relatively rare in other Soviet
bloc countries. However, this could not be sustained and economic decline followed.
Materialism encouraged by a corrupt regime produced cynicism, greed, nepotism, corruption
and a lack of work discipline. Stealing from the State became the norm and the late 1970s
through to the 1980s was a period of total economic stagnation (Davies, 1997; Leff 1997).
Dissident activity during ‘normalisation’
Through the 1970/80s the regime’s renewed emphasis on obedience and conformity
began to be challenged by individuals and organised groups. Only a few of such activities
and organisations could be thought of as political in the Western sense, however, the regime
viewed any independent thought or action, no matter how small, as defiance of the Party. The
regimes response to such actions was harassment, persecution and imprisonment. In effect,
Husak used all the tyranny of the Party’s social control to destroy the soul of the Prague
Spring and of the people (Davies, 1997).
By the late 1970s organised dissident groups such as Charter 77 began to emerge. The
Charter’s main aims were to document abuses of human rights, although it never attracted a
great deal of support, many of signatories supportive of the aims were arrested, interrogated
and often dismissed from their employment (Glenny, 1993). It is, of course, difficult to
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document the true extent of dissident activity as these were by nature underground activities,
however, heavy propaganda from the Party was used to mould public opinion against the
dissident groups with campaigns in the official media to isolate them from society and to
create fear and hostility. Lack of media opportunities and being geographically separated
added to the difficulties for the dissidents to voice their views and gather support. The vast
majority of the public viewed the dissidents not a heroes but as a group of individuals who, in
their cause may be voicing what is believed but that it was foolish to voice these opinions so
openly. Their voices became more or less isolated from the public, remaining underground,
and not forming in size any movement comparable to that found in Hungary or Poland (Leff,
1997; Glenny, 1993).
From the Velvet Revolution in 1989 to separation
Almost from the beginning of the transformation process period, from 1989 onwards,
the resolution of the historically ongoing question of the future of the Czech and Slovak
States began to be debated. These political debates were also necessarily entangled with the
debates surrounding the overall transition to democracy and a market economy.
One of the major tasks confronting the new regimes was the question of how to
attempt to begin the transformation of a totalitarian run, centrally administered command
economy into a more market-led, capitalist economy. This transformation required a high
degree of State intervention with large-scale changes to all aspects of the economy. There
were no rules to follow for this level of restructuring. Two issues were prominent during this
period, the question of privatising a previously state-controlled economy of which around
95% had been centrally controlled. The second issue was closely linked to the first, the
question of restitution ie. restoring to former owners, or their descendants, properties or
enterprises nationalised by the Communists without compensation.
The Restitution and Privatisation process
After extended and complicated debates, the restitution process restored around
100,000 private properties and small enterprises back to their pre-communist owners or
descendants (Leff, 1997). The remaining problem was what to do with large number of
properties and enterprises never in private hands. Here two solutions were possible, foreign
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investment, which was never popular, or domestic investment. This was further complicated
by the size and extent of the business enterprises commonly found under communism. These
tended to be very large and employing often thousands of people. If foreign investment was
not initially welcome, who domestically had the means to invest in these enterprises? Partly
due to the lack of high debts, more commonly found in other post-communist nations, a
voucher scheme was introduced which allowed every adult citizen to purchase, at a relatively
low rate, books of coupons which enabled them to buy shares in companies entering the
privatisation process (ibid). This was thought to initially give a ‘kick-start’ to the
privatisation process and to allow individuals to invest in, and become part of, the new
economy. Uptake, however, was initially slow. Through an increased public campaign, along
with a number of entrepreneurs who were willing to guarantee a percentage profit if
individuals bought into shares through their investment companies, uptake grew in
popularity. Compared to other post-communist nations in the region, the Czech privatisation
process was relatively rapid. This was due to the combination of not only its relatively good
financial position but also to the prime political agenda of the time, the need to push for a
relatively quick phase of economic restructuring. During the first phase of the coupon system
Slovaks were entitled and did participate, however, the long negotiations over the financial
arrangement of the separation resulted in Slovaks temporarily losing their rights to vouchers
purchased. In the Czech Republic, the planned second phase of voucher sales continued after
separation, However, in the Slovak Republic, the planned second phase did not happen. After
separation, Prime Minister Meciar preferred a slower route to the privatisation process.
Economic trends in the region
The push for the swift privatisation process in Czecho-slovakia was primarily
engineered by Vaclav Klaus, the Minister of Finance, and later in 1992 as Prime Minister. He
was keen to pursue a route of a full free market economy rather than a mixed economy, and
at a faster rate rather than a gradual transition. The adverse effects of this were risky as he
was always more radical than public opinion. The knock-on effects of the possibility of
increased unemployment, low growth and high inflation would be counter-balanced with a
more radical break with the past. The trade-off was low popularity with the public versus an
initially painful, but hopefully, improving, economic climate.
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Economic trends in the period 1990 to 1992 indicate that a serious blow was
delivered to the Czecho-slovak economy (Leff, 1997). For this three year period, 1991 was
the most disastrous with inflation increasing by almost 60% (annual percentage change),
unemployment rose by 6%, GDP and industrial growth both fell by 16% and 23%,
respectively. These economic trends cannot be linked entirely to internal economic
restructuring policies but were also due to the overall collapse of trade within the post-
communist bloc as a whole. Although Klaus appeared radical in his economic restructuring
plan, unemployment figures were tempered by a policy which offered a reduction in wages to
allow workforce numbers to kept relatively high. Here differences emerged between the
thinking of the economists and that of politicians. Economists tended to view increased
numbers in the unemployment rate as being a sign that economic restructuring was working,
old inefficient and over-staffed enterprises were being streamlined into more efficient ones.
Public opinion during this time was mixed. Massive economic restructuring would
necessarily result in a split between those who gained and those who lost. A fine balance
would be required to ensure that not too many lost, for too long, otherwise support and
stability would be compromised. Although vast inequalities were emerging between the
winners and the losers, differences were also evident between the Czech and Slovak
populations of the joint state regarding the speed and nature of the economic restructuring
process. Data from 1990 (Leff, 1997, p186) indicates that the Czechs were more willing to
accept harsher conditions to ensure a faster economic transformation than Slovaks, more
Czechs were willing to accept price increases, or loss of current employment, than Slovaks.
Around 50% of Slovaks indicated that the state should secure employment and a reasonable
standard of living, compared to around 30% of Czechs. Although these data suggest that
Czechs were more willing to accept a greater level of individual economic downgrading than
possibly the Slovaks would, these figure relate only to 1990 before any major economic
restructuring effects were experienced. Whether or not there appeared to be variation
between the Czechs and Slovaks concerning the balancing of the reforms, one aspect
concerning the ‘winners’ was clear to both. The majority of the economically winning
portion of society tended to be the old elite - the ex-communist leaders - who could with
insider knowledge and experience take advantage of the changing circumstances (Higley et
al, 1996). The ex-managers and leaders of the communist period were now the new ‘red
capitalists’ and the restructuring was viewed largely as benefiting very few, other than the
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ex-communist elite.
The separation of the Czech and Slovak Republics
The new Slovak Republic came into being on the 1st of January, 1993. Political
debates and opinion polls, before and after the separation, were not highly favourable to
separation. The decision to separate was surprising as the joint Czecho-slovak State was
predicted to have one of smoothest transition processes within the region as a whole, and for
a separated Slovakia, the transition would proceed with greater difficulty, and at a slower
pace (Wightman, 1993). Historically, whether part of the Austro-Hungarian monarchy or part
of the joint State, Slovakia was always weaker than its partners. Politically, Vladimir Meciar
was a prime figure in the separation issue. Although temporarily removed from power due to
splits in his party - Public Against Violence - he fought the 1992 election campaign as a
strong defender of Slovak interests. His main political messages were the slowing down of
economic reforms along with constitutional changes within the rhetoric of Prague
interference of Slovak interests. After his political success and within the climate of intense
debates with Prague, the only solution possible was for each of the two nations to
independently go their own way.
Although, historically, Slovakia was economically the weaker partner the actual
breakup of the State created its own economic problems through increased border and trade
regulations between the two states. The setting up of new trade licensing agreements, import
duties and transit regulations led to a reduction of around 30% in trade between the two
states. During the initial period of separation, the Czech Republic could attract foreign
investment, whereas Slovakia struggled. Politically and economically the Czech Republic
remained relatively stable and by the mid-1990s its priorities became foreign policy and
entry into NATO. The Czech and German declaration on their mutual interests was signed in
1996. Macroeconomic indices prompted the Czech Economic Minister to proclaim that the
Czech Republic no longer can be thought of as an ‘emerging market’ but that it had already
emerged (Leff, 1997). The optimistic view of the Czech Republic was, through tight fiscal
responsibility and a stable political system, it had  managed to avoid serious financial
setbacks in the restructuring process. The pessimistic view was that the painful stage was yet
to appear. Difficult decisions were left unresolved such as the instigation of the new
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bankruptcy laws combined with the use of subsidies to retain a larger than necessary
workforce in the hope that the private sector would be stable enough to cushion the effects of
having an overstaffed workforce.
Up to the mid-1990s the Czech Republic appeared to be surviving the political and
economic changes relatively well, however, other issues were beginning to emerge. A
number of corruption scandals concerning banks and insurance companies led to increased
suspicion among the public in general. Strikes of physicians were an expression of problems
within the health service, and the public were becoming seriously concerned about the levels
of crime. A high proportion of crime statistics concerned fraud. Racist issues were also
beginning to emerge directed towards Romanies (gypsies).
As Leff (1997) describes, after independence, and compared to the Czech experience,
Slovakia’s progress was more troubled. Meciar was now free to pursue his own, more
gradual, road to economic restructuring. This he described as being neither socialist or
capitalist. Both domestically, and to the wider community, his political and economic
messages were perceived to be mixed. Viewed as a populist, his messages reflected a desire
not to upset the Kremlin of the one hand and also a firm wish to join the West, on the other.
Whatever his political messages were, the economic trends reveal that similar to the Czech
experience, indices took a rapid decline during 1993 (the first year of separation). However,
in the two subsequent years indices were beginning to improve. Inflation started to decline
and GDP and Industrial Growth increased. One main area where disparity between the
Czechs and Slovaks emerged was in the unemployment rates. For Slovakia, unemployment
was constant at around 14% for the three years compared to only around 3% in the Czech
Republic for the same period (ibid). Apart from the unemployment rates, Slovakia’s
economic trends, in general, compared quite favourably to that of the Czech Republic.
Additionally, within the post-communist region as a whole and including unemployment
rates, Slovakia was fairing better on macroeconomic indices than other nations such as
Hungary or Poland. Although, the unemployment rate does have a direct bearing on the daily
lives of the people, and may in itself cause some concern over stability, in general, economic
performance indicators themselves were not the main issues of concern in Slovakia during
the mid-1990s. Political instability, Meciar’s style of leadership, a sense of unfairness
surrounding the privatisation and restructuring process were all problematic. Meciar’s third
cabinet consolidated its power at the expense local governments, the business sector, trade
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unions and cultural institutions. Having cancelled the second wave of privatisation voucher
sales introduced by the previous government, the process continued by the direct sale of
national assets through the agency of The National Property Fund which was not directly
answerable to parliament. Throughout his various periods in power, Meciar was linked with
intense cronyism through maintaining a tight control on the privatisation process to the
advantage of his friends, of having too high a concentration of power in too few hands and in
constantly changing the rules of the Party game creating a dictatorship of the majority
(Kirshbuam, 1997). General concerns over political stability were linked to the balance of
power between the Prime Minister and President along with cronyism and strong divisions
within the ruling parties. Meciar was targeted and labelled as a menace to democracy. The
main problems were linked to the behaviour of the political elites, with non-confidence votes
becoming commonplace resulting in a high turnover of individuals. The internal problems
were linked to policies enabling certain political elites to gain control of the economy and
society, through a privatisation process viewed as undemocratic and non-market based and
these were thought to be potentially divisive. Meciar’s style, although highly populist, had
been criticised for not being based on rational argument resulting in a low level of political
dialogue. Meciar’s success has been based on his charismatic style of leadership which was
lacking in his political opponents. Up to the mid-1990s Slovakia’s main problems have been
intense internal struggle between Prime Minister and President, with Meciar’s proposals
being vetoed by the President with Meciar constantly reaffirming his populist support. Low
tolerance for differences in political thinking and a generally low level of political dialogue
and transparency were evident. Slovakia’s internal political instability did not go unnoticed
in the wider political community. This prompted the German Chancellor Helmut Kohl in
1995 to express concern that the internal politics based on centralised control and weakened
democratic institutions were a major stumbling block to Slovakia being considered in the
expansion of the EU (Kirschbaum, 1997). In march 1996, The United States State
Department annual human rights report on Slovakia expressed concern for the treatment of
minorities. This along with the government’s continuing dismissal of public officials, the
intimidation of opponents in government, the misuse of authority by the police, and
government interference in the media all contributed to Slovakia not being among the
Central-European nations under consideration for entry into NATO (Leff, 1997).
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Identity and Religiosity
For many small nations surrounded by larger and more powerful neighbours, identity
becomes a crucial issue. For Czechoslovakia, and the subsequently formed Slovak and Czech
Republics, the question of identity has been heightened in the aftermath of 40 years of
oppressive Soviet rule, the move to democracy and to a free market economy. In whatever
ways questions of identity are approached in the social sciences it is clear that there is
nothing fixed or immutable about identities. Rather, the concept of identity reflects ongoing
relationships and not actual properties of individuals, social groups or nations (Brown et al,
1998 ). Hall (1992) refers to identity as forms of ‘hybridity’ under which, in this case,
national identities are subject to the role of history, to political representation and to
differences, however, these are unlikely to be pure or unitary. The multi-faceted and
relational nature of identity is revealed in the way that identities are not fixed and that
competing identities emerge and challenge and compete with each other. For example,
Scottish identity has waxed and waned over the course of history, largely through its
relationship with the central UK State. However, these are not simply binary categories such
as ‘to be Scottish is not be English’, fixed and unchanging but reflect a representation, a
discourse that carries meaning and which, under varying periods, ‘identity relationships vary
(see below).
Following the fall of communism, the nations of Central and Eastern, Europe
formerly under Soviet rule, were all going through the process of securing new identities as
separate and independent nations. This is not to argue that under communism distinct
national identities did not exist but that each nation was now free to pursue its own route to
sovereignty. In fact, one major fear during the early transition period was that there would be
a rise of nationalism across the region (Glenny, 1993; Kuzio, 2001).
In contrast to Scotland, where national identity or nationalism has not been linked to
deep cultural markers such religion or ethnicity, either historically or in the present context
(McCrone, 1992; 1998), in Central and Eastern Europe national identity has always carried
strong religious and ethnic underpinnings and “nowhere is the relationship between church,
state and nation more complicated…in post-communist politics than the Slovak Republic
(Brynes, 1997, p282). For both Slovaks and Czechs the predominant religion is Catholicism
(Leff, 1997). Recent data indicate that that around 60% of Slovaks and 40% of Czechs
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identify themselves as Roman Catholic with also those proclaiming non-religious status
differing between the two nations (40% Czech; 10% Slovak) (www.eu2005.gov.uk).
However, as Froese (2005) points out a better measure of actual religiosity is church
attendance with data for the 1990s indicating that only 6% of Czechs were regular attenders
compared to around 33% of Slovaks. Standard explanations in the fall of religiosity as a
function of modernity or a post-communist religious revival or differing present day
economic or demographic differences cannot account for the divergence of religiosity in
Slovaks and Czechs. For Slovaks and Czechs there is a relationship between religion and
nationalism which is both historically linked and also reflects complex, current and divergent
ethnic, political and religious divides (Broklova, 1995; O’Mahony, 2003).
For Bryne (1997) understanding the religious differences between Slovaks and
Czechs today requires an examination of their histories, recent and not so recent, under which
the Czech nation advocated anti-Catholic sentiments in their search for nationhood while
Slovaks advocated a close bond between Catholicism and Slovak nationhood.
The changing historical situation in the Slovak and Czech Republics will necessarily,
for both nations, re-awaken returns to the past in the search for a renewal of national identity.
The search for ‘golden periods’ in a nation’s past and/or significant individuals or guiding
forces are powerful meaning systems for many nations (McCrone, 1992). For the Czech
people, Jan Hus, a 15th century religious martyr is still an inspirational figure. Hus was a
Catholic priest, highly critical of oppressive church practices who was burned at the stake for
heresy, his followers known as Hussites became highly symbolic figures for Czech national
sentiments along with anti-Catholic sentiments. Anti-Catholicism was further strengthened in
the Czech people during the period of imposed Habsburg rule when the ancient Bohemian
throne was taken and Catholicism was imposed on the Czech people by their Austrian rulers.
In contrast, the Slovak people were ruled by the Hungarian portion of the joint dynasty and
under which Catholicism was linked to Slovak identity in direct opposition to the reformed
Calvinist and Lutheran churches of the Hungarian rulers ( Froese, 1995). Therefore, prior to
the formation of the first Czecho-slovak state after WWI both Czechs and Slovaks sense of
identity was tied to either pro-Catholic or anti-Catholics sentiments. Masaryk, the first
president of the newly formed independent state was a central figure in the cultural history of
the Czech people. He was not only a politician but a philosopher and sociologist and his
lasting intellectual legacy and influence on the Czech people was extended past the period of
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the first republic to the following major historical events during the twentieth century: the
Nazi occupation, the post war era, to the Prague Spring and the revolutions of 1989
(Broklova, 1995; Glenny, 1992). The relationship between small states, democracy,
European and world progress was the focus of his intellectual struggle culminating his most
well known work ‘The Czech Question’ (Broklova, 1995) which was written under the final
period of Habsburg domination. Through this influential work Masaryk participated in the
establishment of a national identity which unified the philosophy of modern democracy and
humanistic ideals. Masaryk’s scholarly enquiry reflected on the Czech position in Europe and
the specific destiny of a small nation at the crossroads of many borders: Germanic/Slav,
western/eastern Christianity, Protestant/Catholic, Czech reformation/German counter
reformation (Broklova, ibid: Pysnet, 1995). For Masaryk, the Czech Question was a religious
question, and that the crises of man was always intertwined with crises of religion.
Catholicism, he viewed as being supportive and indicative of an authoritarian state and which
inhibited the development of science, of philosophy, of freedom of thought and the
development of man as autonomous and a free thinker. Based on centuries of religious
conflict and the constant struggle between larger and smaller states, Masaryk’s humanistic
conception argued against a closed patriotic identity based on the struggles between powerful
religious authorities and for him what is ‘national’ is always subordinated to what is
humanistic. In effect Masaryk aimed to “create different politics and affect the thoughts of
the Czech people…to establish how the Czech nation lives culturally…to present the Czech
nation as a European nation” (Broklova, 1995, p 75). Masaryk’s  vision for the Czech lands
was realised as he led for the Czech people during their ‘golden period’ of an independent,
democratic statehood after the period of WWI. However, as already indicated, this period
was viewed by the Slovak people as their ‘golden period’, to the contrary, the first Czecho-
slovak Republic greatly intensified the idea of Czech domination from Prague, and further
intensified nationalistic sentiments in Slovaks.
During the period of Czechoslovakia’s independence from 1918 liberal thinkers and
reformists continued to advocate anti-Catholic nationalism in the creation of a popular
movement called ‘Away from Rome’. This movement was adopted by Masaryk who saw no
place for the Roman Catholic church in the newly independent state (Froese, 1995). During
the later Nazi occupation the relationship between nation, church and state further
intensified: the Czech portion was occupied by the invading Nazi forces while the Slovak
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region gained independent status ruled by Tiso, a Roman Catholic priest (ibid).
During the Communist era religious activities were vastly repressed, however, not
extinguished and where allowed were channelled by the regime into largely anti-Catholic (or
anti-Rome) activities. An already declining Catholicism in the Czech people aided this
repression. Dissident activity, before and after the Prague Spring, in contrast to other
communist nations, was not largely Church led but through an underground movement,
known as Charter 77, led by intellectuals, inspired by the writing of Masaryk and viewed by
the Slovaks as primarily a Czech affair (Glenny, 1992). After the initial wave of optimism of
1989 Czech anti-Catholic sentiment was again renewed, Czech/Slovak relations became
intensified with the Slovaks pushing for full independence heightened by Meciar’s strong
rhetoric of pro independence conjoined with pro-Catholicism. As Froese (1995) concludes,
the Czech’s more secular state and the Roman Catholic Church’s inability to capture the faith
of the people is unusual in the post communist region as a whole. However, his drawing from
the separate histories of the Slovak and Czech people reveals that Catholicism and the
national interest has historically been in tension for the Czech people; whereas, for the
Slovaks, Catholicism historically defined their national interests.
However, in addition to this historical divergence between national interest and
religiosity in the Slovak and Czech people, the post-communist period, in the Czech
Republic, has drawn up complicated current issues linked to the relationship between Church
and State and this relationships extends to that of civil society and, in Slovakia, there exists
ongoing tension between that of Nation, State and Church.
For O’Mahoney (2003) the relationship between Church and State in the Czech
Republic also reflects fundamental underlying issues between the role of the State and that of
the autonomy of civil society. By placing the Church as one of the many organisations of
civil society, he argues that the Church/State relationship in the Czech Republic can be
identified as a fundamental feature of how civil society was viewed by the Klaus
government. Based on the question of financial independence from State control and through
the continued refusal of State authorities to proceed with the restitution process of Church
lands and property after the fall of Communism has led to debates concerning the role of the
State to that of civil society. O’Mahoney contends that in the minds of the politicians a more
financially secure and independent Church could position itself and compete with that of the
political process. For Luxmoore (1997), during the mid-1990s, the liberal-led government
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was being compared, in many respects, to that of the former communist leaders in their anti-
Catholic and anti-church prejudices. These issues touch upon the fundamental questions of
the role of civil society within a democratic system, to the question of not only freedom from
domination but also to that of the equally important dimension, that of autonomy, the
freedom to act and to create alternative spheres of authority. Implicit in Prime Minister
Klaus’ thinking, his policies and his government was a reduction of access to these
competing voices of authority through fear that they would undermine the fundamental role
of government (O’Mahoney, 2003).
In Slovakia, Prime Minister Meciar campaigned for independence under the discourse
of Catholicism emphasising the historical nature of this relationship, however, after
independence, he changed his discourse to one stressing ethnic Hungarian as being anti-
Slovak. His sentiments can be identified through his policy for the preservation of the Slovak
national language. The majority of the Hungarians within the Slovak borders are Catholic,
however, as pointed out by Brynes (1997), there is a shortage of Hungarian speaking clergy
within the Hungarian populated areas, leading to an overall exclusion of Hungarians to
pastoral care and that this has put the Catholic Church in a complicated position. The Bishops
have always been, and remain, committed to the Slovak national cause and to the particular
historical relationship between the Slovak nation and the Catholic Church. During the period
of the mid-1990s the Bishops although willing to accept Hungarians into their pastoral care
they would only do so only if they were integrated and were members of the Slovak Catholic
church. For Brynes (ibid) Catholicism as a religious identity in Slovakia has not been able to
subordinate national identity where the majorities and minorities belong to the same church.
This, underpinned by Meciar’s strong Catholic and national sentiments along with the
Bishops’ unwillingness to oppose the government, has resulted in the Church in Slovakia
remaining institutionally, linguistically and pastorally confined along ethnic lines.
Conclusion
The Czech and Slovak Republics shared over 70 years of common history, also
sharing the initial period after the rejection of Communist regimes, however, after separation,
these two nations have had differing political and economic experiences. Before separation,
the joint State was predicted to experience a relatively smooth transition process; after
separation, the challenges ahead were thought to be greater for the Slovak Republic.
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Czechoslovakia, compared to the other nations in the region, has had a unique
political history, primarily through its democratic period between the wars. This experience
of democratic rule was expected to bolster its political and economic transitional period.
However, during Soviet rule, after the failed Prague Spring, it experienced one of the most
oppressive regimes across the region and under which all forms of spontaneous activity by
the people was silenced (Glenny, 1993). Czech political and cultural history has been heavily
influenced through the humanistic vision of Masaryk in guiding the people away from an
inward looking nationalistic vision, linked historically and negatively to Catholicism, to one
which encompassed a wider Europe. This was borne out by data from Evans & Whitefield
(1998), and although basing their analyses on the more specific issue of party politics, found
that in the Czech Republic forces predominant in their understanding of the transitional
period were linked to economic issues, speed of reform and also their relationship with that
of the West. However, the current political context once again brought to the forefront the
relationship between Church/State as a relationship in tension. Rather than under the context
of identity within Europe, in its historical dimension, this tension was now within the context
of that between State and civil society and encompassing a fundamental aspect within a free
and open democracy, that of, the freedom and autonomy of various groups in society to
provide alternative voices of authority. The repression of financial autonomy of the Church
was being viewed as indicative of an underlying political climate, reminiscent of the culture
of Soviet repression, of government undermining the plurality of social groups.
The interwar period of democratic heritage was not viewed in such positive terms by
the Slovaks. Tensions in Slovak history have always involved the ongoing identity issues in
relation to its more powerful neighbours or rulers. After the separation into the Czech and
Slovak States, these tensions have not been primarily with its relationship with the Czech
Republic. Under the present context, through the inclusion of around 10% of Hungarian
minorities within the Slovak territory, along with characteristics specific to Meciar’s rule,
new tensions were being brought into conflict. In the transition period, although economic
issues were pressing, for Butova & Butova (1993) these came secondary to the more
complicated relationship surrounding identity and citizenship, of national and minority
questions, of defining the national community and the rights and benefits associated with
this. The Church’s unwillingness to oppose the authority of government may bring to the
forefront tensions such as those relating to Church/State/Nation or those linked to
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Minorities/Majorities and which may be a more dominant issue in the minds of the people in
their understanding of the transitional period than those aspects of democratisation relating to
directly to economic or political aspects.
Added to this additional complexity facing Slovakia was the general political climate
of the time, led by Meciar, and under which, in 1997, the Commission concluded that
Slovakia did not satisfy the political conditions set out by the European Council for entry into
the EU or to NATO (Harris, no date). However, the period after 1998, and outwith the period
of this present research, Slovakia entered into a major turning point through a combination of
greater constitutional order, improvement in the treatment of minorities leading to improved
internal stability and increased international standing (ibid).
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CHAPTER 6: HISTORY OF SCOTLAND
1707 Act of Union – Autonomy and Integration
Prior to the 1707 Acts of Union Scotland was an independent nation state. The
country’s previous lengthy struggle with England, its more powerful neighbour to the south,
was the cause of the Wars of Scottish Independence, forcing Scotland to rely on trade,
cultural and often strategic alliances with a number of European powers, most notably
France.
In 1707, the Scottish and English Parliaments enacted the Acts of Union, which
merged the Kingdom of Scotland with the Kingdom of England, creating the United
Kingdom of Great Britain. The Union dissolved both the English and the Scottish
Parliaments and transferred their powers to a new Parliament sitting at Westminster in
London which then became the Parliament of the United Kingdom. Given the centuries of
hostility between the Scots and the English the political union between the two nations was
not a certainty. The impetus behind the union was primarily English, with the benefits being
largely economic for the Scots (increased access to markets previously controlled by the
English) and military-political for the English (through the safeguarding of its borders along
with the addition of military assistance during a period of continued wars with France)
(Devine, 2000).
Scotland’s political, economic and social history is often subsumed under that of the
UK as a whole, primarily due to the United Kingdom being viewed as a unitary, centralised
State arising from the Westminster parliament. Within various political and economic
analyses Scotland is often treated as a region, much like other regions of the UK as a whole.
If differences emerge these are interpreted along the lines of regionality. For example, within
the often employed ‘North-South divide’ in UK political and economic classification, the
‘North’ often includes Scotland along with various regions of Northern England. In the
1996/97 British Social Attitudes Report, John Curtice, in his contribution entitled ‘One
Nation Again?’, classified Scotland in varying ways; at times by itself but he also includes it
along with various parts of northern England and Wales. Implicit in his understanding and
reflected in his title, Curtice clearly links the concept of nationhood with political
convergence or non-convergence across the UK as a whole. However, applying the concept
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of the ‘nation-state’ as an economic, political or cultural backdrop is problematic for
understanding Scotland. After the Union Scotland became a strangely hybrid society through
the separation of the State (British) and Nation (Scottish), under which Scotland may be
clearly thought of as a ‘nation’ but has long since lost its formal ‘statehood’ (McCrone,
1992). Within the numerous debates in the social sciences it is now relatively common for
sociologists and political scientists to distinguish between the construct of ‘State’ (the object
and institutions of government), ‘nation’ (a ‘people’ possessing a common identity) and
‘civil society’ (a systems of networks of exchange and interaction) with the growing
understanding that these three constructs may or may not display alignment (Calhoun, 1999;
Walby, 2003).
The fundamental aspect to the understanding of Scotland’s political, economic and
social history is not the voting away of political sovereignty in 1707, although itself
signifying a major historical point, but that fundamental aspects of Scottish society remained
intact after the Union. In many respects Scotland remained relatively self-governing and
autonomous within the Union. Scotland’s political, economic and social development since
the Union can be more fully understood not through the idea of regaining autonomy but of
retaining it. Three major aspects of Scottish society remained intact after the political union:
the legal system, the church and the educational system, these were separate and distinct
from those operating in England and these distinctions still largely remain today, although to
a lesser extent (McCrone 1989, 1992). In addition, Scotland has retained its own banking,
currency and its own forms of media from print to television.
Scotland’s legal system is based more on Roman law of Continental Europe and
which combines features of both civil and common law. The retention of this has ensured
that in legislative matters the Westminster parliament has had to pay particular attention to
Scottish issues and that any legislation fits into the Scottish framework. The main institutions
of the legal system have remained distinctive eg. the courts, legal training and the
professional bodies of lawyers, along with a unique system for child justice featuring the use
of Children’s Panels (Brown et al 1998).
The predominant religious leaning for both Scotland and England is Protestant,
although in Scotland this takes the form of Presbyterianism and in England an Episcopalian
or Anglican form of Protestantism exists. The Presbyterian nature of Scottish Protestantism
can be traced back to the Scottish Reformation, initiated in 1560 and led by John Knox and
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was strongly Calvinist in form. Throughout the 17th and 18th centuries, the Church of
Scotland (the Kirk) maintained a strict theology and kept a tight control over the morality of
the population (Devine, 2000). The Church had an overwhelming influence on the cultural
development of Scotland in pre-modern times. During this period Calvinism was more than a
religion in the narrow sense but a social and political ethos deeply rooted in various
institutions and social relationships. It has been likened to a hegemonic ideology, although
highly flexible and adaptable to a range of changing social and political conditions
(McCrone, 1992). The Scottish Church had been fiercely against all previous attempts at
political union of the two nations, as had the Scottish people themselves. The Act of Union in
1707 was finally passed through the Scottish parliament only with the agreement of the
Scottish Church and codified in the Articles of Union was the guarantee of the continued
independence of the Church of Scotland (Devine, 2000). Presbyterian Protestantism has in its
roots a powerful democratic element whereby “the equality of all men before God is
asserted…every man was entitled to his voice…that wisdom may be found in anyone”
(Checkland, 1984 cited in McCrone, 1992). What makes Presbyterian Protestantism of the
Church of Scotland distinct from that of England is the democratic structure of the
institution, specifically the Minister is supported by a committee of lay Church elders (the
Kirk Session) all elected by the local Church congregation. The Kirk Session had wide
ranging responsibilities within each parish district- poor relief, parish schooling and also a
key local judicial role through the running and supervision of low level local courts which
had the power to punish and also to refer offenders to higher courts (Devine, 2000).
The system of Education in Scotland is distinctive within the UK as the earliest to
implement a system of general public education. The early roots were in the Education Act of
1496 which first introduced compulsory education for the eldest sons of nobles, then the
principle of general public education was set with the Reformation establishment of the
national Kirk which, in 1561, set out a national programme for spiritual reform, including a
school in every parish. In 1633 the Parliament of Scotland introduced a tax on local
landowners to fund this, subsequently strengthened through the Education Act of 1696 which
remained in force until 1872 when the State began to take greater control of education
however, still remaining distinctively Scottish (Devine, 2000; Brown et al, 1989). Education
has always played an important role in passing on tradition and the formation of national
identity in Scotland (Paterson, 2001) and the Scots have always prided themselves that, in the
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past, they had more universities than England and that these were more socially mixed with a
higher proportion of entrants from the lower social classes. Educational emphasis, both
secondary and higher, is general based, more similar to Continental Europe than to England
and in contrast to the English middle class, more Scottish middle class send their children to
State schools than to fee paying private schools (Kellas, 1980). The roots of the greater social
heterogeneity of State education can be traced back the parish school system founded in
earlier centuries which were viewed as the ‘cradle of democratic intellect” (Devine, 2000,
p91) and under which the children of ‘lairds’ (landed gentry) mixed with the children of
ordinary ploughmen. In addition to the pride in the egalitarian roots of the educational
system, its distinctiveness remains during the 20th century and is fiercely guarded and
comprises different curricula, examinations, teaching methods and social mix.
In addition to the retention of separate religious, legal and educational institutions
after the Union, governance in Scotland was characterised by a high degree of localism
operating at the level of the city, town burgh or county. These local councils and
administrative boards were run through a combination of elected and non-elected officials
and had wide ranging responsibilities including public health, prisons, policing, road building
and housing along with growing responsibilities for education and economic development
(Brown et al, 1998). Scotland’s place within the Union was viewed as a partnership rather
than domination by a larger neighbour in contrast, for example, to that of Ireland and Wales
(Weight, 2003). This overwhelming sense of partnership within the Union along with the
existence of what can be described as a self-governing local State with a high degree of
autonomy was aided by the central parliament in Westminster paying relatively little
attention to Scottish affairs. Constitutionally the Westminster parliament’s main focus was on
‘macro’ policy such as raising taxes, foreign affairs and defence with the day-to-day
economic and political affairs run locally or nationally within Scotland itself. When conflict
arose this was not perceived in terms of England’s domination over Scotland but under the
main conditions and principles of the Union itself- free trade, liberty and minimal
government (Weight, 2003). This underlying Scottish attitude to the political union is
reflected by those North of the border often referring to it as a Treaty of Union, those South
of the border as an Act of Union (ibid).
Nationalism in the form of separatism was not a common discourse and Scotland’s
identity after the Union and through the 19th and early 20th century can be described as
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‘unionist nationalism’ under which Scotland’s separate identity remained strong under the
terms of the Union. These two apparently contradictory terms managed to co-exist in Scottish
politics and identity, no faction felt disenfranchised enough to want to change and even when
the Union was first questioned during the 1880s these questions were in framed within the
discourse of reform rather than separation (Brown et al, 1998). The British State, in many
respects, was ‘invented’ through the Act of Union. However, political union itself was not
enough to enable a sense of Britishness (unionism) to co-exist with that of Scottishness
(nationalism) for much of the period from 1707 until more recent times. As Colley (1992)
points out what helped the Scottish, and the English, to embrace unionism was a shared
Protestant worldview, despite it’s varying forms; along with long and protracted wars against
Catholic France and Empire building. Protestantism, war, empire and monarchy were the
dominant forces which helped shape a separate common British identity. To these Weight
(2003) also adds a pride in British democracy as a unifying force binding together the various
nations.
Empire, Industrial and Economic Progress
Following the Act of Union and the subsequent Scottish Enlightenment and Industrial
Revolution, Scotland became one of the commercial, intellectual and industrial powerhouses
of Europe. The backbone of Scottish industry was centred around the ‘heavy’ industries such
steel, coal, shipbuilding and engineering. These, along with its traditional prominence in
textiles, enabled Scotland to became a major industrial economy linking markets across the
globe. For a small nation like Scotland industrial output was impressive, for example, taking
ship alone, by the late 19th century 48% of ship tonnage launched from the UK was built on
the Clyde shipyards (Knox, 1999). Colley (1992 ) points out that although the island of Great
Britain was (and often still is) referred to as ‘England’, rarely has the Empire been referred to
as anything but ‘British’. Scotland’s role in the Empire not only conferred significant
economic benefits but also strengthened Scotland’s distinctive identity. The Presbyterian
inheritance of thrift, independence, work ethic, education and prudence were all being
exported by eminent Scots to the wide regions of the Empire. Similar to the Union, Empire
was clearly understood to be a partnership within the UK and under which Scotland’s
interests were managed and negotiated through distinctive Scottish institutions.
Scotland’s industrial and economic successes continued to rise, peaking around the
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period of WWI. At the end of the ‘Great War’ the heavy industries, on which the prosperity
of Scotland had been built, from around the 1760s, began to decline. Post WWI, Scotland
experienced lower levels of industrial growth and higher rates of unemployment compared to
other parts of the UK. Greater competition across Scotland’s traditional heavy industries
from Continental Europe exposed the overall weaknesses of its industrial economy.
Continued reliance on the traditional heavy industries with little or no industrial
diversification in a changing world market aided Scotland’s industrial and economic decline
(Knox, 1999). The world recession of the 1920/30s hit Scotland particularly badly; in
addition to its heavy industries now experiencing reduced markets, these industries were
primarily located in the central belt and West and North-East coasts resulting in poverty and
deprivation being more heavily concentrated across highly populated and specific geographic
areas. This pattern of industrial decline and geographically concentrated areas of deprivation
was again repeated during the lesser, but still significant, recessions during the later 20th
century (Kendrick, 1989).
Scottish Politics
Until 1832 Scottish politics remained very much in the control of landowners in the
country, and small groups of merchants in the burghs. However, through a series of Reform
Acts, culminating in 1885, the franchise had grown to include every male householder now
having the vote, the secret ballot had become established and the modern political era had
started (Devine, 2000). There are four key dates in modern Scottish political history: 1832
heralded the beginning of a series of Reform Acts, each widening the franchise and bringing
with them Liberal dominance; 1886 signified the splintering of the Liberal Party over the
issue of Irish Home Rule and paved the way for new political force, that of the Conservative-
Unionist Party; 1922 saw the emergence of the Labour Party as the main opposition to that of
Conservative-Unionism and 1974 when the Scottish Nationalist Party (SNP) achieved its
highest popular support of around 30% of the vote (Brown et al 1998).
Liberalism was the dominant force in UK politics during a large part of the 19th
century, however, its base was always stronger in Scotland than in the rest of the UK,
reaching 80% of the vote four times during the 19th century. Scottish Liberalism had a broad
base after the Reform Acts, appealing to those whose beliefs were free trade, free speech and
freedom from political interference, drawing influence from the rationality of the 18th
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century; however, also appealing to those favouring greater social justice, drawing on the
roots of Scottish Presbyterianism whereby those who had risen to the top of society had a
duty towards those less privileged. Brown et al (1998) argue that this wide appeal, touching
upon deeply felt ‘common sense’ beliefs in Scottish society, served as a bridge between
Liberalism at the turn of the century and both the Socialist and Conservative-Unionist parties
that were to become dominant.
The widening of the franchise along with the Liberal split over Irish Home Rule
changed both the political climate and, to some degree, the constitutional climate in Scotland.
A break away faction of the Liberal Party formed the Liberal Unionist Party (unionist here
refers to the union with Ireland) made up of those more to the ‘right’ of the party and arguing
that commercial interests would be affected, Home Rule for the Irish would be a threat to the
continued success of the Empire. Although the Liberal Unionists did not merge with the
Conservatives until 1912, this fracturing of the party in Scotland was the beginning of the
end of Liberal dominance in Scotland and heralded the beginning the Conservative
dominance. (Devine 2000). The widening of the franchise also brought directly into the
political process the interests and concerns of the working man. Through the influence of
James Keir Hardie, a radical socialist, the Independent Labour party was formed in 1893 and
two years later it merged with disenchanted Liberals to form the Scottish Labour Party.
However, it wasn’t until later on in the 20th century that the Labour Party became a more
significant political force. Around the same period the Scottish Trades Union Congress
(STUC) was formed, signifying the start of the workers’ unions influence in politics. In the
short period between the late 19th century until the turn of the century the bases of political
parties more recognisable today were created, along with Scotland’s trades union movement
merging into mainstream left-wing politics (Knox, 1999).
Prior to this period, as already indicated, Scotland retained a great deal of autonomy
within the union. In fundamental terms all interests more directly affecting Scotland were
dealt with more locally and largely remote from the politics at Westminster. However, the
debates concerning Irish Home Rule brought up similar questions about Scotland and the
Union this, along with the move of central government to have a more direct influence in
social policy, brought into tension for the first time since the union the question of Scotland’s
place in the Union. The outcome of these debates was the setting up of a more formal post of
Scottish Secretary in 1886 specifically to oversee Scottish matters, subsequently incorporated
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into a reformed and expanding Scottish Office operating from Edinburgh from the early 20th
century (Brown et al, 1998).
The Scottish Office grew from around the period of mass electorate reform and
became the institution where Scottish administrative politics are implemented. Its major
growth period fell between the 1930s and 1950s, however, it has continued to grow and to
widen its remit well into the later 20th century. After its creation it administered those aspects
of policy arising from Westminster that were considered to be essentially Scottish such as
education and law. However, over time its remit grew to include a much wider range of
social policy concerns to include areas such as housing, child law, roads, agriculture, the
structure and financing of local government and economic planning. In effect, those aspects
of social policy that had been dealt with at a more local level during the 19th century, through
local boards and councils, were incorporated more centrally into the remit of the Scottish
Office (Brown et al, 1998). Its administrative climate is broadly consensus based and staffed
primarily by non-partisan civil servants. McCrone (1992) describes the Scottish Office as
operating as a bridge between the central UK State at Westminster and Scottish society
where policy is translated into the Scottish framework and vice versa. Policy arising from
Westminster passes through the administrative system of the Scottish Office whereby at each
stage negotiations take place involving the elected members, civil servants and special
interest groups. Members of these groups are appointed by civil servants not through partisan
alignment but through expertise. Out of this broad consensus based approach to policy
formation and implementation, legislation, until around the late 1970s, was accepted and was
passed through the Westminster parliament generally without any serious challenge (Brown
et al, 1998).
There are debates concerning the role of the Scottish Office as an administrative unit
in the politics and the culture of the nation. Kendrick (1989) suggests that its implementation
eroded any last remaining remnants of Scottish identity and autonomy, Scotland became
more firmly under the control of the central UK State. However, a stronger and more
convincing case is put forward by McCrone (1992 ) and Brown et al (1998) who argue that
the Scottish Office was a means whereby Scottish political and cultural autonomous identity
was retained within a growing UK State. They point out that if the Scottish Office had never
been created it would have been more difficult to address Scotland as meaningful political
unit. Scotland’s politics and economic concerns would more easily have been subsumed
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under that of the UK- to the status of a region - rather than as a distinct political, economic
and social culture. McCrone  (1992) includes the creation of the Scottish Office, along with
Scotland’s distinctive form of local governance, as equally important as the retention of the
‘holy trinity’ of its legal system, religion bodies and educational structures after the union.
Both McCrone (1992) and Brown et al (1998) conceive of the role of the Scottish Office as
constituting a specifically distinctive form of civil society operating in Scotland. The
distinctiveness of Scottish civil society lies in its ability to act as a mediator between a
centralised Westminster political administration serving a relatively autonomous Scottish
society. Its importance lies not only in the form of these administrative structures but more
importantly in their function, to confer a sense of separate identity. The importance to
Scottish society, culture and identity of this complex and interrelated set of formal and
informal institutions and practices became more evident in the late 20th century when policy
arising from Westminster began to challenge the role of the Scottish Office, and that of local
government, and which became instrumental in the greater desire in Scotland for some form
of independence from the UK state (McCrone, 1992, Brown et al, 1998).
Post WWII
Following WWII, Scotland’s political, economic and social culture can be split into
broad periods of time: pre and post 1979. As in all broad social trends these divisions only
become more visible long after the events contained within them have passed. The second
half of the 20th century broadly signified in UK terms: greater State involvement in the
economy and welfare, the beginning and the end of consensus politics and, specifically for
Scotland, the decline of Conservatism and the rise of ‘separatist nationalism’ as opposed to
‘unionist nationalism’ more dominant in the preceding periods.
Following two brief periods in minority governments during the 1920s, the Labour
Party had its first true election victory in the 1945 election. Throughout the rest of the 20th
century, Labour governments alternated with Conservative governments. The Conservatives
were in power for most of the period, with the Labour government suffering the ‘wilderness
years’ 1951-1964 (three straight election defeats), and 1979-1997 (four straight election
defeats) (Hutchison, 2001).
Post World War II, State intervention was not, in general, a politically contentious
issue. The prolonged period of modern warfare had brought the people under closer
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government control than ever before and marked the period where the relationships between
the people and the State changed (McCrone, 2005). Conscription and increased labour
control entailed greater centralised decision-making and centralised administration. Both
major political parties (Labour and Conservative) may lay different emphases on the role of
the State, however, in the main, up to around 1979, the political and economic model was
largely Keynesian. According to this thinking, the main duty of government was to manage
the national expenditure in order to maintain as fully as possible full employment. Labour
governments tended to emphasise direct governmental influence in the economy, exemplified
through the post war nationalisation of key industries programme, and both Labour and
Conservatives were committed to the emergence and expansion of the welfare state (Clarke,
1996). Greater State intervention in the economy and in social welfare underpinned the
political climate in the UK as a whole up until around the period of 1979 when the first of a
series of Conservative governments radically changed this post war consensus.
Like many other developed capitalist economies, the Scottish economy was subject to
external forces during the 20th century. A combination of UK based and external forces
contributed to social change in Scotland in the latter period of the century and these can be
briefly summarised as: the decline of the post-war consensus, the decline of the indigenous
traditional industries, a growing concern that the dominant political parties operating from
Westminster were failing to provide for Scotland adequate social and economic planning,
and the discovery of North Sea oil (Devine, 2000). Over the same period of time the Scottish
question came to the fore and the historic dialectic between autonomy/integration was being
rephrased in terms of not integration but of assimilation (Knox 1999).
 Post-war electoral behaviour in Scotland reveals two broad trends – the rise of the
Scottish National Party (SNP) and a growing divergence in the electoral performance of the
Labour (pro-Labour) and Conservative (anti-Conservative) parties north and south of the
border (Hutchison, 2001). As the 20th century progressed the significant issue was this
growing political divergence from England and the rise of a more explicitly nationalistic
political party- the SNP. However, as pointed out by McCrone, (1989; 1992), historically,
Scotland has often shown periods of political divergence from England, and probably more
so during the 19th century than during most of the 20th century; and the rise of the SNP, itself,
could not be taken as indicative of a similar rise in the desire for separatism.
The growing divergent electoral trends may be taken as evidence that people in
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Scotland want different things from those in England; that there were significant and
fundamental political value and political orientation differences emerging between those
north and south of the border. In raising the question of political culture, the crucial issue is
that different forms of political behaviour do not necessarily require different sets of social
changes to be in operation, the same social changes can be expressed differently in political
behaviour and culture. For Scotland, these are underpinned by historical institutional
structures, the differential function of the political parties north of the border, questions of
identity and through the power of history and myths to mediate change (McCrone, 1992).
Just as the Scottish Office, as an institution, forms a bridge between the UK State and
Scottish society, the political parties in power at Westminster and operating through the
Scottish Office serve as the foundation of this bridge. Whether the administration at
Westminster was Labour or Conservative controlled, the Scottish Office continued to operate
as a mediator between Westminster policies and their implementation at a Scottish level.
Whether the UK political administration was pro or anti Scottish devolution, which varied
over time, the role of the Scottish Secretary, whether Labour or Conservative led, had been to
mediate and implement policies arising from Westminster with specific reference to the
distinctive needs of Scotland (Brown et al 1998). Electoral success for political parties in
Scotland arise through how they are perceived to be addressing Scottish issues, with politics
in general largely judged by their effect on Scotland rather than through strong political
ideological differences (Kendrick, 1989). Similarly for McCrone (1992), the increasing
divergences in voting behaviour evident in the last 30 years or so of the 20th century are more
linked to Scotland’s sense of identity than to changing social structures or changing political
orientation or values. For example, the dominance of Conservatism in Scotland during the
early period of the 20th century arose primarily through its ability to translate and act as a
bridge between the central UK State and Scottish civil society, significantly so during a
period where the socio-economic structures were not fertile ground for traditional
Conservatism. Similarly, Labour’s differential success post World War II was aided by its
ability to transfer elements of the welfare state to meet specific Scottish demands. When this
bridge fails, as it did from 1979 onwards with the election of the first Thatcher government,
electoral failure results (McCrone, 1992; 2005).
Despite the powers of the central State, the Scottish have retained a distinct civil
society based on its relative autonomy and asserted in the sense of national identity. The
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sense of national identity became more explicit during the latter period of the 20th century.
For Weight (2003) this rise was largely the result of a failing sense of Britishness, arsing
through Britain’s declining dominance on the world stage, the loss of Empire and a breaking
up of the sense of Protestantism linked to Britishness. In Scotland, identity has not been
linked to deep cultural markers (McCrone, 1992; 2005), in contrast to, for example, that of
the Slovak nation (Brynes, 1997). Historically Protestantism was a binding British value,
however, from around the late 1950 to early 1960s the role of religion (Protestant/Catholic)
lost its discriminatory force and voting tendencies (Devine, 2000). Sectarianism, however, is
an issue in Scottish society today, largely confined to the industrial areas of the West coast
and expressed intensely, and occasionally violently, through Glasgow’s two major football
clubs (Ranger FC, Protestant; Celtic FC, Catholic). What Weight’s (2001) account fails to
address is for the Scottish people a sense of Britishness has co-existed with that of
Scottishness, forming a nested relationship. As Macintosh (1974) observed, the Scot’s have
two identities “it is an opt out solution which allows each person to imagine an alternative”
(cited in McCrone, 1992, p 23). Scots have been relatively happy with the existence of dual
identity and can readily distinguish between Scottish/British, recognising that these two
identities refer to distinct meanings, one referring to the legal and political constitutional
framework (State) and the other to identity (Nation); whereas, in the English, English and
British are largely taken to be synonymous (Crick, 1995). This relationship between Nation
and State in the Scottish people becomes more explicit when understood against political
behaviour, as Ascherson (1989) notes “politics North of the Border operate inside a web of
references…past and present…formal and informal institutions which are simply not shared
with the rest of the United Kingdom” (cited in McCrone,1992, p24).
Surveys reveal that social attitudes in Scotland do not differ markedly from those in
England; the Scots are no more concerned over issues such as social welfare, unemployment
or the economy than those south of the border (Knox 1999). For McCrone (2005) politics,
party political agendas and political orientation north of the border arise through these being
viewed through a particularly Scottish frame of reference and not through “some deep
structural socio-economic structures, because there are few, nor through different
values…but that the cultural prism for translating social change into political meaning and
action is different, has always been different, and if anything, becoming more so” (p79).
The rise of the SNP brought into sharper focus this Scottish dimension in politics.
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Although formed during the early part of the 20th century, it did not transform into a political
party proper until the late 1960s and peaking during 1974, this peak was largely linked to the
perceived decline of the mainstream parties (Labour and Conservative) to specifically
address Scottish issues. The SNPs popularity has greatly waxed and waned over time with its
peak popularity occurring during 1974 when it polled 30% of the popular vote gaining eleven
seats at the Westminster parliament (Hutchison, 2001), a level of succuss it has subsequently
failed to repeat. Its sudden rise during the 1970s can be attributed not necessarily to its
intrinsic attraction to Scottish voters but to the broader historical context of the time. Few
Scots during this period had the desire to break with the Union but wished to improve on it
through constitutional measures. Opinion polls during 1974 indicated that that about a third
of Scottish voters endorsed the SNP, however, only around 12% supported independence
(Devine, 2000). There appears no simple relationship in Scotland between party
identification, national identity and preferred constitutional option. For example, recent data
(McCrone, 2005) indicates that those people who identify themselves as ‘Scottish’ rather
than ‘British’ are not necessarily the same as those who vote SNP or favour independence. In
relation to party identification (Brown et al, 1998) show, from data collected during the mid-
1990s, that support for some form of independence, whether devolution or full separation,
cuts across party lines with substantial minorities of both Conservative and Labour
supporters favouring an option against official party policy.
The SNP in Scotland was, for many, a form of protest vote rather than genuine
commitment to Home Rule. Its rise was viewed by Westminster as a wake-up call, fearing
that unless Scottish issues were given more prominence the ultimate break up of the Union
was a real possibility. The move to ensure greater attention by Westminster to Scotland was,
in effect, more of a pragmatic response than an ideological one. Labour, governing on a small
majority, feared that unless the Scottish could be appeased valuable support lost from
Scottish Labour MPs sitting at Westminster would seriously threaten the long term success of
the Party. (Devine, 2000). The events of 1974 led to the planning for the first referendum on
devolution which eventually took place in 1979. SNP support was bolstered during the 1970s
through the discovery of North Sea Oil, allowing them a strong platform to argue for
Scotland to be taken seriously as a self-contained, economically viable, independently-run
nation under the slogan of ‘It’s Our Oil’ (ibid). By the time of the referendum the UK was
suffering one of its most destructive periods: mass strikes, industrial relation problems and
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unemployment all coincided to become what has been known as the ‘winters of discontent’,
and during which the main concerns of the people were these issues crippling the UK rather
than the questions of constitutional change. The referendum failed to achieve success, partly
through the last minute introduction of two conditions: that a simple majority favoured
devolution, and also a minimum of 40% of the electorate took part. In the end were was a
small majority in favour, however, this was achieved through only a 32% turnout (Hutchison,
2001). The question of devolution for Scotland was not be raised formally at Westminster
again until 1997, after the period of extended Conservative rule.
Thatcherism and Scotland
The new Conservative government of 1979, led by Margaret Thatcher, set out to
revolutionise British society and the economy with large sectors being opened up to free
market competition; along with the continued emphasis on the removal of power from the
trade unions and that of the privatisation of State industries. Their policies were often thought
to reflect purely market liberalisation, however, Conservatism from 1979 onwards contained
strong elements of a lessening of freedom with growing centralisation of powers (McCrone,
1992).
The Conservative policies between 1979 to 1997 can be briefly summarised as
comprising three main areas: the opening up of competition and privatisation, strict monetary
control and a more centralist and interventionist style relating to welfare, the health service
and local government, all phrased under the rhetoric of pure self-centred individualism
(Clarke, 1996; Brown et al, 1998). Charles Kennedy, an SDP Member of Parliament,
described Margaret Thatcher as the greatest of all Scottish Nationalists due to her ability to
unite most of the nation against her (Devine, 2000).
Control of inflation would take primacy over full employment, chiefly through the
raising of interest rates and by the end of the first year in government the rate had increased
to 17%, Although catastrophic for large areas of the UK, Scotland was particularly hit being
heavily based on the traditional industries. Between 1979 and 1981 Scottish manufacturing
fell by 11% and one-fifth of all jobs were lost. Worst hit were the traditional industrial areas
of the West coast, experiencing a loss of 36% and mining fell from fifteen pits to two. Not
only were the older industries affected but also the large multi-nationals moving into
Scotland through economic development after WWII (Knox, 1999). The level of destruction
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was likened by many in Scotland to the ‘highland clearances’ of the 18th century (McCrone,
1992), which, however, in reality bore no real historical parallel but served as powerful
images to represent and make sense of the present destruction. Although industrial decline
was not peculiar to Scotland during this period, and after, the power of historical myths are a
potent force in the shaping of meaning in Scotland.
The fall in Conservative support in Scotland during the 1980s and 1990s was spread
across all social and religious groups, even among those who would have traditionally been
supporters (Hutchison, 2001; McCrone, 1998). The fall was dramatic and steadily increased
until the time of the 1997 election when no Conservative MPs from Scotland were returned
to Westminster. For most of the period the Conservatives were in power they were so without
a political mandate in Scotland. This dramatic decline cannot be solely attributed to
economic policy and the resultant industrial decline. After almost total destruction of its
industrial base, Scottish industry was forced to diversify and its economy began to recover
during the late 1980s and 1990s. The service sector became more dynamic, as did banking
and finance; Silicon Glen, stretching across vast areas of the country included the largest
concentration of high technology industries and became known as the European leader in
semi-conductor manufacturing. In contrast to the industrial decline post WWI, Scotland was
in a stronger position due to this diversification which protected it, somewhat, from the major
forces of the recessions of the 1990s (Knox, 1999).
Rather than through purely economic policies, the decline of Conservatism in
Scotland has much deeper roots drawing from historical aspects of the nature of the Union,
viewed differently by the Scottish and the English, and thus refracted through different
political lenses in Scotland. McCrone, (1992, 1998; 2005) argues that since the Union
Scotland has always been different, however, this difference did not always express itself in
the political way as it has done so since the late 1970s. These differences remained largely
latent and not necessarily brought into the forefront of debate. However, the political and
social consequences of Thatcherism and Conservatism brought once again into daily
discourse the old antinomies of autonomy/integration and nation/union which historically
underpinned political meaning and social change in Scotland. These drew from old and new
meanings, comprising potent historical myths and current changing social conditions to effect
new understandings of Scottishness, identity, democracy and the Union.
Conservatism, under Thatcher, itself, also drew from its own deep-seated historical
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beliefs and meanings of the Union merging its own historical truths and myths with neo-
Conservative rhetoric resulting in specific policy actions at odds with the Scottish frame of
reference. In the past, ‘Scottishness/Britishness’, ‘Nation/State’, ‘Nationalism/Unionism’ in
Scotland were generally not in conflict with one another. This is not to imply that the nature
of Union since 1707 did not change, or that the meaning of these did not change and evolve,
but if conflict did arise this was generally resolved through measures of continuity,
negotiation and reform. However, a series of social and political events arising together from
around the period of 1979 onwards changed the political climate in Scotland. The
Conservative government failed to take seriously the historical understanding of the meaning
of the Union as primarily a partnership. They were not in favour of recognising or extending
any autonomy to the Scottish office, in fact, to the contrary, powers were removed. Many of
the agencies were reduced in their independence, this extended to Boards and committees
that advised on specifically Scottish concerns such as education, local governance and
welfare. These Boards and committees previously staffed along lines of expertise rather than
along party lines were now staffed by Conservative, ideological supporters, directly attacking
the previously cherished idea that the Scottish Office acting as a buffer between the power of
the central State and Scottish society (Devine, 2000). The move from concentrating on
macro-economic issues to that of social policy and local government through the introduction
of the free market into areas such as the health service and areas of private life along with the
reorganisation of local services, prompted Canyon Kenyan Wright to describe Conservatism
as the imposition of an alien ideology that rejected community and expressed itself as a direct
attack on Scottish civil society, system of education and local governance (ibid). These
feelings ran to a more fundamental level than merely discord with an unpopular government
or a series of unpopular policies, but as a moral issue through the centralisation of power
attacking and reducing alternative sources of power.
In 1988, a number of prominent Scots, drawn from a range of backgrounds, issued a
Claim of Right for Scotland containing an historical analyses and a strong statement for
renewed discussion over a separate Assembly for Scotland. Devine (2000) reproduces this
claim in full (p 610-611) with key points relating to the ideas surrounding consent and power
in a democracy. Under Conservatism, Scotland was facing a crisis of identity within the
Union and it was being governed without consent. The document also drew heavily on the
question of power and accountability in a democracy, of what can or cannot be done without
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popular consent. Similar to the views of Canyon Wright, these issues were not in direct
reaction to the merits or demerits of individual policy decisions but struck at the very heart of
democracy itself; if voices are distorted, not heard or removed, government receives
inaccurate messages or can ignore any message they do not like.
The differential success of Conservatism north and south of the border was complex
mix of institutional reform and the harnessing of and the attack on symbolic images and
meanings which, when combined, garnered support from the Scottish people to effect change
in the constitutional and political make-up of the United Kingdom.
For Crick (1995) the Conservatives, and the English in general, failed to distinguish
between Nation and State and under which ‘English’ became submerged with ‘British’, a
different image of Nation and State from that of the Scottish; along with the failure to
recognise that they were governing a United Kingdom comprising various nations each with
its own past, rather than an extended England. The Conservative appeals to national
sentiment and equating Conservatism with Unionism, drawing from their own historical
conceptions, were are odds with the national sentiment in Scotland (McCrone, 1992). The
Conservatives tried to appeal to the Scottish sentiment during their introduction of the much
hated poll tax, earlier in Scotland than in the rest of the UK, by drawing up images of Adam
Smith, (a potent Scottish Enlightenment figure) and by arguing that Conservative values are
in line with everything that is finest in the Scottish character; however, at the same time
refusing to address the historical terms of the Union, as a partnership, by insisting that greater
not lesser centralisation was required to break the dependency culture of the Scottish
(Devine, 2000).
For the English, Conservatism portrayed a potent mixture of themes including family,
duty, nation and tradition, however, also mixed with neo-conservative themes of self-interest
and competitive individualism at odds with the view that the Scots have historically had of
themselves (McCrone, 1992). For the Scottish, their distinctive form of civil society had been
both an institutional-based marker and a highly symbolic marker of its relative autonomy
since the Union. This institutional, social and symbolic carrier of Scottish identity was
pushed into opposition to the Conservative government between 1979 to 1997. The
Conservatives attempt to erode the power of civil society through it’s attack on institutions
such as education, local government and the public sector was perceived as an attack on the
identity of Scotland itself through the failure to uphold or recognise the historically
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negotiated nature of the political union (Brown et al, 1998). Conservatism and its resultant
effect on the political climate in Scotland was not due to different sets of values or the
changing of values north and south of the border but to questions of autonomy and identity
and how these are linked to the balance between democracy and authority (McCrone, 1992,
1998; 2005).
As Jenkins (1996) points out, identity is conceived of as a dialectic between
similarity/difference. For the Scottish, this similarity/difference is also inter-related with that
of ‘autonomy/integration’, ‘Nation/State’ and ‘Scottish/British’. These complex and
overlapping identities are not fixed or given but will vary depending on how such identities
are received, validated or rejected by others (McCrone & Keilty, 2000). Moreover, during a
period of social and political change, such as that experienced during the period of
Conservative rule when Scottish identity was perceived by the Scots to be challenged,
identity issues will rise, the sense of identity will become fore-fronted, opening up new
challenges and new possibilities.
What McCrone (1992) conceives of as Scottish myths Moscovici (2001) would
conceive of as underlying principles, guiding forces or themata that underlie representations
which pattern other related or new beliefs. As previously suggested Markova (2000a; 2003)
conceives of themata as displaying antinomic relationships where contradiction does not
imply an either /or relationship but as an interdependency. In reviewing Scottish history it is
evident that a significant thema has been that of autonomy/integration. This basic thema has
shown an inter-relationship between those of Nation/State and Scottish/British and which all
were being challenged during the latter period of the 20th century. In addition to these
McCrone (1992) views egalitarianism as a potent Scottish myth, arising from the past and
which still carries currency in Scottish thought. Myths, like belief-based representations, do
not require validation for their existence (Moscovici, 2001). Myths, like hegemonic
representations or themata survive not because they make sense of some past but that they
contribute to sense making in the present. They become re-invigorated, often remote and
from different contexts than their origins or even from unknown origins. What is significant
about myths or that of themata is not their existence or that they are brought to the forefront
of attention or public discourse but through their antinomic quality they can confer different
meanings to different groups, over different times.
The Scottish myth of egalitarianism can be traced back to the Presbyterian or
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Calvinistic form of Protestantism in Scotland’s history and linked institutionally to its
distinctive educational structure which did not restrict educational attainment to aspects such
as class or affluence. There has been some emphasis laid on the validation of these beliefs
through the analysis of historical documentation which does seem to suggest some support
for this claim (McCrone, 1992; Devine, 2000). However this myth goes beyond that of
validation and comprises, according to McCrone (ibid) almost a mystical quality “Man (or at
least Scotsman) is judged to be primordially equal; inequality is man-made, created by the
social structure he erects, or which are erected by others around him” (ibid, p90). Thus the
antinomy ‘primordial equality/man-made inequality’ can be used by different people, at
different times, one to justify the social order and by another to rectify it through political or
economic means. These myths have entered the folklore, popular sayings and the popular
literature of Scotland. For example, ‘we’re a Jock Tamson’s bairns’ (bairns is translated as
children), a saying that for all Scottish people is absorbed during childhood and often used
implicitly and explicitly in everyday speech. Although unknown in origin it confers a
common humanity, a shared and equal heritage. Similarly, the Scottish National Bard, Robert
Burn’s poem “A Man’s a’ man for a’ that and a’ that” signifies the equality of all people,
however, rather than a levelling down the poem confers more of an appreciation of the man
of independent mind, and for McCrone (1992) along with that of equality and the stripping
away of socially constructed inequality the underlying message is also one of fraternity, a
common brotherhood, a shared community.
Popular Scottish fiction around the Victorian era circulated and gave significance to
such Scottish myths. Typically following a format by which a lowly but talented boy within
an egalitarian educational system, aided by a local wealthy benefactor, rose above his lowly
roots by going to university returning to his community a hero. Although showing variations,
these Kailyard traditional tales all carried strong moral sentiments under which success and
achievement were always tempered with social responsibility. As McCrone (ibid) points out,
self-centred pursuit of profit offends the moral community if the social duties which wealth
brings are not carried out. These moral tales all reflected a time just past, conferring what the
historian Tom Nairn (1977) describes as an overly distorted and always backward looking
nature of Scottish society and under which the Scottish heart is separated from the Scottish
head, a romantic and mythical past always contradicting with the present. For McCrone
(1992) these myths survive and give meaning to the Scottish people because they are
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embedded implicitly in their thinking and in their identity and have been explicitly expressed
institutionally through the structure of Scottish society, through education, through civil
society and local governance and through the understanding of the nature of the Union.
Modern day equivalents can be identified in the SNPs slogan ‘equality in Europe’ (Devine,
2000) drawing from the belief in egalitarianism and to the historic dualities in Scottish
identity. Similarly, the Conservative’s appeal for the greater introduction of fee paying
schools in Scotland with financial aid for those less financially secure was not viewed by the
Scots as reflecting their deeply felt tradition of equality of opportunity through education but
as an attack on the retention of their distinctive system of education (Brown et al, 1998). As
McCrone (1992) points out the Scottish myths are multi-stranded and flexible depending on
their framing assumptions and context, they reflect both the old and new in a variety of
combinations and expressions.
Conclusion
Although Scotland’s past has not been as troubled as that for the Czech and Slovak
nations. Democracy, as a form of government, has not been removed or reinstated. Scotland
has not been faced with the complex nature of the wide-ranging political, economic or social
transitions occurring in the Slovak and Czech nations, the rejection of a highly oppressive
regime along with the setting up of new institutions of State and society. For Scotland,
democracy has always been understood within a nested relationship within a UK context,
historically as part of a negotiated political partnership which also conferred identity and
meaning to the Scottish people since the political Union in 1707. This partnership has, of
course, experienced various tensions in the meaning which it carried over its history where,
for example, the idea of Nationalism/Unionism within a UK democracy could co-exist,
although with shifting boundaries conferring various meanings dependent on shifting
political or economic contexts. However, for many, during the latter period of the 20th
century, this co-existence could not be so easily resolved or negotiated in the understanding
of democracy in Scotland embedded within a UK context.
The period of this research, 1992 to 1996, took place during the latter period of
Conservative rule and the final phase of the research occurred the year before the Labour
victory in 1997 which ended the 18 year period of Conservative rule. Soon after the Labour
victory the Scottish question again became current in UK political discourse with a second
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referendum on Scottish devolution held soon after the change in government, promptly
followed by the setting up of the devolved Scottish parliament sitting in Edinburgh. The
political and social climate during the period of this research was probably at its most
heightened in relation to discontent with the idea of Scottish democracy remaining nested
within that of a UK context. The boundaries of meaning under which Scottish political
identity, and national identity, with that of the historic meaning of democracy as being
something that could be negotiated and understood were being challenged, touching upon
fundamental aspects of identity and power and authority within a democracy. These may re-
express new forms of the historic antinomy of autonomy/integration, Scottish/British,
Nation/Union or may transform into and be expressed through new understandings of
democracy in Scotland.
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CHAPTER 7:  THE MEANING OF DEMOCRACY IN SLOVAKIA AND SCOTLAND IN 1992
“ When words lose their meaning, people will lose their liberty”
Confucius quoted in Stroinska (2002, p23)
The Soviet empire was created and then collapsed under the name of ‘democracy’. In
State and Revolution Lenin proclaimed “only under communist society...will a truly and
complete democracy become possible and be realised”. Almost seventy years later Mikhail
Gorbachev also announced that ‘democracy’ was to lie at the centre of his ‘perestroika’- a
process that was to lead to the dismantling of the Soviet regime set up by Lenin (Priestland,
2002, p111)
Democracy in a world of tensions
Soon after the ending of the Second World War and at an early stage during the Cold
War that followed, UNESCO proposed a fundamental study to explore the ideological
controversies between the East European socialist and the western capitalist systems, through
their various understandings of the concept of ‘democracy’. It was hoped that such an
undertaking, reflecting on the ideological differences between two major political systems,
might contribute to an easing of international political tension. In 1951 these efforts resulted
in a 540-page UNESCO publication entitled Democracy in a World of Tensions (McKeon &
Rokkan, 1951). Through this undertaking it became clear that the term ‘democracy’ became
a political slogan of many political parties, from fascist to communist, from capitalist to
socialist. As a political symbol it has been used to refer to almost anything from an ideal state
of affairs to a totalitarian regime that built a wall to keep its people from escaping. As part of
this research, Naess et al. (1956) identified 311 definitions of 'democracy' that have been
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produced since the time of ancient Greece by politicians, statesmen, philosophers, moralists
and humanists. Western politicians used the term ‘democracy’ mostly with reference to
forms of government for the people and by the people, a restricted use of the majority rule
and the protection of minorities. Other definitions were concerned with freedom of
expression and that democracy should recognize the dignity and worth of the individual.
Despite the fundamental ideological differences between the socialist and capitalist systems,
the Soviet politicians, just like those in the West, defined democracy in positive terms.
However, they clearly distinguished the Soviet definitions of democracy from their western
counterparts.
Lenin (1917/1992) contrasted Soviet democracy from other forms of democracy by
emphasising that democracy is a form of State and like any State it represents an application
of force against persons;  Soviet democracy recognizes the equality of all citizens and their
equal rights. And for elsewhere: democracy is a state which recognizes the subordination of
the minority to the majority:  an organization for the systematic use of violence by one class
against the other, by one section of the population against another. The relationship between
democracy and equality was also elaborated by Lenin: “Democracy means equality. The
great significance of both the proletariat’s struggle for equality and of equality as a slogan
will be understandable only if we correctly approach it as meaning the abolition of all
classes” (ibid, p87).
Stalin also spelled out the ideological differences very clearly. In talking about
freedom, he pointed out that only in societies in which there are antagonistic classes whose
interests are mutually hostile should there be several political parties. In such societies, there
are constant and irreconcilable struggles between capitalists, workers, peasants and kulaks. In
contrast, in the Soviet Union, there are no longer antagonistic classes and, therefore, there are
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no grounds for numerous political parties. In the Soviet Union, one party, the Communist
Party, courageously defends the interests of peasants and workers. While in the capitalist
countries democracy exists only for a minority of rich people, in the USSR, in contrast, there
is democracy for all the working people “only one Party can exist…that of the party of
Communists…the only thoroughly democratic constitution in the world” (Stalin, 1936 cited
in Vokolgonov, 1999, p83)
Forty years after the completion of the UNESCO study, the peoples of Eastern and
Central Europe are currently involved in the process of transforming themselves from a
Soviet style ‘people’s democracy’ to a more western type of democracy. This revives the
question of the meaning of democracy today to the peoples of Central and Eastern Europe.
Representations and Democracy
Certain symbolic social phenomena exist in cultures implicitly, for example,
generations of European citizens who were born after the French Revolution may adopt, and
implicitly share, various images that associate liberty, equality and fraternity with
democracy. It is not only that schoolchildren learn about the French Revolution, but that the
symbols associated with these events have become so salient that they have penetrated
literature, music, arts and institutions including ordinary language and the mass media.
However, the various conceptions and symbolic representations of democracy that are found
implicitly across cultures today did not evolve through a logical, sequential or passive
process, but over a long historical period of intense struggle and clash between competing
ideas. Individuals and groups, from various cultures, over varying periods of time and
drawing from various origins, have integrated the various tensions and the clashing of ideas
into new forms. Both cultures and democracy undergo changes through this dialectical
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transformation (Kim et al, 2002). Although such symbols may fit into different patterns of
interpretation and explanation in various countries and in different time periods, they have
become dispersed, over time, into the layperson’s ways of thinking.
While certain symbolic phenomena exist in culture implicitly, others are acquired
explicitly during an individual’s life-time experiences, through changing social conditions,
new events, or through instruction and persuasion. For example, many European citizens
have lived through several highly diverse political regimes that all called themselves
‘democratic’. Thus, an older generation of Czechoslovak citizens experienced Masaryk’s
First Republic that was established in 1918, and in which democracy was explicitly discussed
in terms of humanity and morality (Davies, 1997) and during the period of the cold war when
Czechoslovakia became part of the Soviet empire, the Soviet regime, too, proclaimed its
allegiance to democracy, or specifically, to Soviet style democracy (see below).
Lay representations of complex phenomena such as democracy are likely to be
formed, maintained and changed by both implicit and explicit societal processes. They are
shaped by the already existing thinking schemata, some of which may be deeply seated and
transmitted across cultures and which may be more highly resistant to change, however, they
are also shaped by explicit new social practices, new conventions or new political practices.
Totalitarianism and Language
There is no doubt that in the history of communication, and in particular, political
communication, that parties, ideologies, governments or other powerful institutions
manipulate concepts and ideas to serve their own ends. However, under non-oppressive
political regimes, these competing voices of authority will merge and mingle, drawing on
what is implicitly understood and what is changing, evolving into new forms of thought and
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understanding. Soviet totalitarianism, by denying individuals from having freedom from the
state, extended its control beyond the borders of the state by penetrating schools, the
workplace, communities and families (Klicperova et al, 1997). No institutions were
independent from its control; economic institutions, labour unions, academic and cultural
institutions of civil society were all subordinated to the regime. However, not only did
totalitarian communism destroy the institutions of government just as effectively as it
corrupted civil society (Service, 1997; Schopflin, 1993a; Hosking, 1992), it also aimed to
influence the realm of cognition through altering the very meaning of individual words and
phrases in the public thinking (Buchowski, 1994).
Accounts of the manipulation of language, specifically in relation to Nazi
totalitarianism, can be found in the writings of Viktor Klemperer, a Jewish Professor of
Philology, living in Dresden during the Nazi rule in Germany from 1933 to 1945. During this
period he kept detailed daily diaries in which he not only observed and described the realities
of living under the Nazi regime and its effects on daily life, he also kept notes on his
observations of the attempts by the Nazi regime to change the very nature of language
(Klemperer, 2000). These were later used in his Language of the Third Reich (see below). He
noted on numerous occasions that the complexity of language was being replaced by clichés
and verbal codes. These diaries are an important historical document not only charting the
rise of Nazism in Germany through the eyes of an ordinary citizen, but at the same time the
manipulation of language, by that regime, to create a new social reality. His writings clearly
demonstrate the very meaning of words and phrases being manipulated through ideology and
propaganda and the intense struggle he experienced throughout the course of the regime to
resist this manipulation.
Stroinska (2002) drew parallels across both major forms of totalitarianism in the
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twentieth century (Communism and Nazism) in their attempts to effect change in the public
thinking. Based primarily on extracts from the writings of Goebbels (Propaganda Minsister),
Czeslow Milozs (Polish Nobel prize winner for Literature), Friedrich Hayek’s (The Road to
Serfdom), and Victor Klemperer’s (Language of the Third Reich) she points to how language
was manipulated (in her term, misappropriated) to contain the masses, to create a new reality
and a new vision of society. For example:
“political propaganda is aimed at the masses…it speaks the language of the people…putting
complicated events and facts in a way simple enough to be understood by the man in the street”
(Goebbels, Stroinska: p24)
“beliefs must be chosen for the people and imposed upon them, they must become their beliefs, a
generally accepted creed which makes the individual…to act spontaneously in the way the planner
wants” (Hayek, Stroinska: p24)
“the most effective way of making people accept the validity of values…to persuade them is that
they are really the same as they already have but which was not properly understood…transfer their
allegiance from old gods to new…most effective way is to use old words but change their meaning”
(Hayek, Stroinska, p24)
 “I know that…all my awareness of being lied to and my critical attentiveness are of no avail…at
some point the printed lie will get the better of me when it attacks from all sides and is queried by
fewer and fewer and finally by no one at all (Klemperer, Stroinska: p24)
“the most powerful influence exerted neither by powerful speeches, articles, posters…not achieved
by things that one had to absorb through conscious thought or conscious emotion…instead Nazism
permeated the flesh and blood of the people through single words, idioms, and sentence
structure…imposed in a million repetitions…taken on board mechanically and unconsciously…words
like tiny doses of arsenic, swallowed unnoticed…appear to have no effect…the toxic reactions sets in
after all” (Klemperer, Stroinska: p26)
These extracts reveal that both regimes attempted to manipulate the common
understanding or common sense meaning of social reality. Specifically, to manipulate and
create new representations through the redefinition of core concepts and ideas.
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Social representations and communication
Different forms of communication circulating in society formed an integral part of
Moscovici’s original investigation into the social representations of psychoanalysis and how
this knowledge diffused, circulated and became elaborated in French society during the
1950/60s. A prime feature of this work was to examine the contents of communication, and
the forms of communication, within the mass media in relation to three pre-existing
ideological or social groups: liberal-bourgeois, Catholic and Communist. Three broad forms
of communication were identified: diffusion, propagation and propaganda along with how
the differing contents and forms were functional within the social groups where particular
anchors were already prominent or already privileged ie. already pre-existing (Bauer &
Gaskell, 1999).
Diffusion of knowledge was generally the form of communication within the liberal-
bourgeois media, characterised by more balanced and more neutral reporting of
psychoanalysis. The media content was intended to inform rather than to manipulate and was
not linked instrumentally to group coherence or group identity. Less resistance to the ideas
and practices of psychoanalysis was evident in the readership, it was not presented or
represented as a threat which challenged or upset pre-existing knowledge. Within the
Catholic press, psychoanalysis was presented and became represented by the readership in a
much more instrumental way, through the propagation of knowledge. Knowledge
surrounding psychoanalysis as a new scientific theory was integrated (or became anchored
to) within the framework of the dominant Catholic ideology by the acceptance and anchoring
of parts of the theory within the ‘confessional’ aspects of Catholicism and rejecting others ie.
the sexual connotations of psychoanalysis (Wagner et al, 1999). In contrast, the style of
communication within the Communist press was almost wholly in the form of
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propaganda, which rejected the idea of psychoanalysis altogether. Communication was in the
form of a battle encompassing conflict and incompatibility, and anchored within the
framework of international and national class struggle. (Bauer & Gaskell, 1999). The
propaganda style of reporting was aimed at promoting and maintaining a strong,
homogeneous group identity and the Communist readership were the most resistant to the
ideas and practices of psychoanalysis as a scientific theory (Wagner et al, 1999).
However, within France at the time, all forms of communication co-existed in the
media, with the different types of media all presenting a variety of ideas and knowledge
surrounding psychoanalysis, some in conflict, and others not in conflict with the various
competing knowledge systems. Individuals and social groups will differentially accept or
reject the ideas of a new scientific phenomenon partly within their own pre-existing frames
of reference. Moscovici’s work has shown how psychoanalysis was broadly received with
little resistance within the liberal-bourgeois framework, and accepted, although with more
resistance, within he Catholic framework, however, was fundamentally rejected, through the
use of propaganda style communication, within the Communist framework. He further
elaborated and theorised how propaganda, by focusing on linguistic insights through the use
of words, by associating them with new meanings and with alternative socio-cognitive
categories, attempts to create new meaning, a new common knowledge. By using words
selectively, by associating psychoanalysis with new meanings and with alternative socio-
cognitive-affective categories, the Communist Party hoped to generate new representations
which would then become part of common sense knowledge. Markova6 has summarised
aspects from Moscovici’s original work pertaining to the functioning of propaganda type
                                                 
6  Moscovici’s 1967/71 original work remains untranslated from French into English. I Markova has
summarised the relevant aspects, personal communication.
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communications and how the use of propaganda can theoretically effect such fundamental
changes.
Stages in the development of propaganda
 Moscovici developed a three-stage model showing how ideology, using propaganda,
attempts to create new social representations and change the existing meaning of words.
According to Moscovici, propaganda has two functions: firstly, a regulative function by re-
establishing and maintaining a group’s identity through creating oppositions between who is
and who is not a member of that group. Its second function is organisational, and is
concerned with the actual content of communication, by attempting to create new meaning,
in effect, a new social representation.
The first stage involves the rule of selection by expressing the relationship between
social representations and the structure of language. While the term ‘psychoanalysis’
originally had a general meaning, propaganda attempts to associate this
 meaning with certain socio-cognitive-affective categories with which it was not associated
with before. This new meaning becomes particularised, eg. it can be connected with science,
with a therapy or with an ideology. The French Communist party associated it with an
ideology, ie. with ‘class enemies’  such as ‘American science, ‘bourgeois science’ in an
attempt to discredit it.
The second stage: the rule of constraint means that the term ‘psychoanalysis’ was
repetitively only connected with certain categories, ‘American psychoanalysis’, ‘bourgeois
psychoanalysis’. In this way psychoanalysis was given a particular new sense  eg. as a
symbols of american life, american decadent culture or a pseudo-science. Here the word was
always used with an adjective or phrase of the propagandist’s own choosing thus avoiding
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any positive or neutral associations such as ‘psychoanalytic science’ or ‘therapeutic
psychoanalysis’.
The third stage determines in what order particular significations are organised, using
the rule of hierarchy: which specifications are more important and which are less important.
For example, the word ‘science’ became part of some kind of artificially created hierarchy by
placing ‘Soviet science’ at the top followed by ‘proletarian science’ and contrasting this with
‘American science’, ‘bourgeois science’. In this way, propaganda, through the selection of
associations between categories and through the rule of constraint, reduced the range of
significations in order to reduce the opportunities of a more free interpretation of meanings
by the audience. Through repetition, meanings of words and cognitive-affective categories
become stabilised and language becomes an independent system to perpetuate new meanings.
It is the constitution of this specific language which accomplishes the formation of a
new representation. Once this is achieved, words obtain their specific meanings and these in
turn justify their use in propaganda. Repetition of elements formalises and gives substance to
thinking, making it part of the individual's linguistic and cognitive repertoire. Moscovici’s
work has demonstrated the possible relationship between an ideology and the meaning of
words, with an ideology attempting to become a social representation. Once such links are
established they sink below the level of awareness and then may become taken for granted, a
part of culture.
Although there is general agreement that Communism (as did Nazism within
Germany) attempted to redefine many key political and non-political terms to serve their own
ideological ends, and as Moscovici has shown how during the 1950s in France, Communist
style propaganda was successful in forging particular social representation of psychoanalysis
through the manipulation of the content and the type of communication presented in the
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Communist press. However, although receptive within the French Communists at the time,
these were an already well structured and coherent social group, forged through a common
identity and common belief systems. Buchowski (1994) questions how such linguistic
manipulations might work in relation to large parts of Europe where the Communist ideology
was externally imposed from above and often in contradiction to the history and culture of
the nations involved, ie. in contradiction to the dominant systems of socially produced
knowledge.
Communist re-definition of democracy
Throughout the history of Communist thought, Soviet identity and thinking was forged
in relation to, and in direct opposition to, the ideology of ‘class enemies’ and ‘enemies of the
people’. Their own characteristic meaning of terms, concepts and actions were constructed by
an abstraction of their enemies’ meanings and actions and became anchored to and elaborated
in in opposition to these, whether in the realm of politics, the economy or morality
(Buchowski, 1994). This style of thinking could still be identified right up to the period of
Gorbochev during his attempts at democratic reform. Gorbachev’s discourse and thinking was
still often anchored back to Lenin and Leninism with western nations still being referred to as
the ‘capitalist enemies’. His attempts at reform were viewed and placed within a framework of
‘a return to principles of Lenin’, with the goal of perestroika in, Gorbachev’s words, “to
continue the cause of the [October] Revolution” (cited in Volkogonov, 1999, p457).
Similar to the linguistic manipulations illustrated above for the term ‘psychoanalysis’,
the Soviet use of the term ‘democracy’ was rarely used in an unqualified way but was,
generally, qualified by an adjective. For example, 'bourgeois democracy' contrasted with
'people's democracy' or ‘proletarian democracy’, with ‘Soviet democracy’ as representing the
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highest form of democracy (Naess et al, 1956). Soviet democracy was presented as the highest
of all forms democracy as it was based on the interests of all the working people, was rooted
within natural, scientific and historical laws of societal development and it expressed the
Soviet ‘common sense wisdom’. However, prior to the Soviet invasion of Central and Eastern
Europe, after WWII, the ‘common sense wisdom’ or ‘folk perceptions’ of democracy were
rooted within the more classical western conceptions of democracy, and although reflecting a
variety of meanings these generally included some form of government ‘by the people’,
through some form of ‘free elections’ with some features of ‘dispersed power’ and were
sharply contrasted to ‘dictatorship’, to authoritarian governments through ‘self-selected
leaders’ and to ‘centralised power’ (Buchowski, 1994). How could the Soviet understanding
reconcile the obvious conflict and contradiction in one of Lenin’s, (and his followers), core
concepts- that of ‘democratic centralism’ By using insights from linguistics, (i.e. schema
theory and cognitive dissonance) Buchowski illustrates how through linguistic tools and the
manipulation and extension of meaning, in a similar way to Moscovici above, the Soviet
understanding of such a contradictory phrase attempted to became a unified conception of
Soviet democracy. This can be summarised as follows:  in the attempt to understand or make
meaningful a new phrase like ‘democratic centralism’ individuals will draw on what they
already understand by these two individual terms. If the core meanings, or root meanings, are
in conflict with one another, linguistic dissonance occurs. Linguistic or cognitive dissonance is
a motivating state of affairs and individuals strive to reduce this dissonance or conflict. If this
conflict cannot be reduced by reconciling a variety of extensions to the core or root meanings,
either the dissonance will never be resolved and the phrase will remain meaningless and
dissonant, or one or both core meanings will have to give way to reinstate stability and
meaning. The Soviet attempts to reduce the obvious dissonance in this phrase was through a re-
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definition, or a reinterpretation, of the term ‘democracy’ to make it reconcilable with
‘centralism’. The linguistic games surrounding this were necessarily complex but can be
summarised, again from Buchowski (1994, p568).
Western democracy is superficial democracy and serves the capitalists’ interests
through the exploitation of all the workers, making western democracy chaotic and not goal-
orientated. Western democracy is based on the oppression of the masses, expressed through
oppression between the classes and therefore not based on the ultimate interests of the people.
By contrast, Soviet democracy is real democracy, it is humanistic in its values, its goal serves
to free the individual from the oppression arising from antagonistic class struggle and
exploitation from which mis-education and mis-information had confused him. Since
individuals were free from class oppression, Soviet democracy was ‘for the all people’ , and
therefore, in Soviet democracy, democracy can and should be centralised.
In addition to the corruption of meaning through complicated word games which
attempted to re-define various core terms to serve the communist ideology, other equally
corrosive linguistic techniques were employed. These aimed to reduce the complexity and
communicative nature of language and thinking through the mass employment of forms of
communication consisting of restricted vocabulary, stereotypical phraseology and slogans.
Within linguistics this has been termed ‘Langue de bois’ (wooden language), (Slama-Cazacu,
1997), and described as “pseudo-communication,  a paradoxical situation against ‘the function
of communication of language’, which however elicits action, and yet at the same time a
laziness of thinking” (p129). Although aspects of ‘wooden language’ can be identified in many
systems of communication, eg. often in the language of the military restricted vocabulary and
stereotypical phraseology can be identified, aspects have also been likened to the more recent
adoption of ‘politically correct’ language forms which adopts standardises phrases and
163
specified descriptive vocabulary (Spillner, 1997). However, it has been primarily identified as
a persistent and widespread form of communication across all communist and totalitarian
regimes (Stojanova, 1997). Its features were stereotypical, dogmatic and repetitive expressions
employing restricted vocabulary, cliches and slogans which were constantly produced and
circulated in society. Its functions were to stifle the plurality inherent in communication where
various interpretations, various meanings, are possible, to eliminate other ways of thinking, to
impose authority and present a new favourable, reality (Varga, 1997).
However, irrespective of the extent of language manipulation or the distortion of
reality through linguistic means, the Soviet regimes could not have succeeded in coercing
large populations across Europe without the use of other, non-linguistic, coercive methods.
For propaganda to be effective requires censorship, a relatively sealed informational arena
(Davies, 1997). Along with the total control of the mass media which prescribed and
controlled what could be communicated to the people, the Soviet authorities also largely
controlled and prescribed what could be communicated by the people. Control, through
oppression and fear, over all groups and organisations, from the workplace, school, party led
associations and institutions suppressed dissenting voices, the expression of alternative
viewpoints. Violence was justified by the Party as an historical necessity (Hosking, 1992).
Any expression of doubt about or criticism of the communist ideology was ruthlessly
punished. Communist propaganda introduced new phrases, for example, ‘rotting capitalism’,
‘the socialist work hero’, ‘parasitic intelligentsia’, ‘the removal of exploitation’, and so on.
These phrases were continuously broadcast on the radio and television, repeated at schools,
at public and mass meetings, and in the press. All educational and cultural institutions were
dominated by the communist ideology and were under the direct control of the Communist
Party. Starting in primary schools, children were taught new communist morality and given
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heroic examples of other children who were able to overcome their ‘subjectivism’ when the
Party proclaimed their parents, for political reasons, to be ‘enemies of working people’. In
many respects  “the language of totalitarian society became the property of the state, of its
political power, and imposing, through its singular voice” (Varga, 1997, p 177).
The Post-communist construction of democracy
This present research is, in some respects, similar to Moscovici’s study. What are
people’s representations of democracy, given that they have been subjected to a particular kind
of ideology and propaganda? do people who have lived under a totalitarian system (Slovaks)
view democracy differently from people who lived within a stable liberal democracy
(Scottish).
When this body of research examining the meaning of democracy was initiated in the
early 1990s, it was assumed that the communist ideology would have a significant impact on
people’s meanings of democracy in the nations of the former communist bloc. Here I am not
trying to argue that the people living under communist rule necessarily applauded that regime
at a conscious level. But, whether or not they agreed or disagreed with the regime, it was part
of their social reality. This reality was constantly represented in the media, at schools, public
meeting, posters etc. The regime, as indeed was intended, formed a panorama of everyday
life.
However, since 1989, the people of Slovakia have been involved in the process of
transforming themselves from a Soviet-based ‘people’s democracy’ to a more ‘Western type
liberal democracy’. This raises the question of what democracy means to the people of
Slovakia? Has the totalitarian system affected people’s meanings of democracy? Were the
attempts to re-define political concepts successful, and if so, in what ways? Through the
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particularisation of meaning through the use of adjectives, e.g. ‘bourgeois democracy’,
‘Soviet democracy’, it is conceivable that after 40 years or so of Communist rule where the
people were socialised under ‘socialist democracies’ and ‘people’s democracies’ the very
word ‘democracy’ might become associated with different meanings. For example, Miller et
al (1997) question whether citizens who have been dominated for decades by totalitarian
regimes are able to form coherent belief systems regarding democracy. These authors repeat
two main arguments put forward by those who share the ‘sceptical’ approach to the post-
communist period. Firstly, the previous regimes did not provide enough political information
or experience to allow the average citizen to form stable and meaningful beliefs regarding
democracy. Secondly, the present situation carries too much ideological and political
uncertainty and confusion to allow stable and coherent understandings of an abstract term
such as democracy.
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 Methods
Participants
In order to explore representations of democracy in Slovakia and possible shifts in
meaning of various concepts related to political changes in the country, three generations of
Slovaks and Scots were chosen on the basis of the most important political events that
occurred in Slovakia during their twenties, that is, during the period in which each generation
began their adult life.
In an established, stable democracy such as Scotland, whether an individual was born
during the 1930s, 1950s or 1970s may matter less than for individuals in the post-communist
countries. Older Slovaks, for example, have lived under four very different types of regime;
as part of the Czechoslovak Democratic Republic prior to 1939, Nazi occupation, Communist
rule and since 1989 under a popularly elected democratic government. In contrast, people
born and living in Scotland over the same period of time experienced at relatively event free
history, as compared to Slovaks, and were ruled under a stable parliamentary democratic
system.
Two groups of respondents, 300 from Slovakia and 275 from Scotland, participated in
the present study. Both the Slovak and Scottish respondents consisted of three generations.
The three generations of the Scottish sample were chosen to match the age-range of the
Slovak sample. The oldest generation (Slovaks N = 100; Scots N = 75) was between 65 and
73 years’ old. The oldest Slovak generation lived during their childhood and adolescence in
the democratic society of the First Czechoslovak Republic. Their transition into adulthood
was affected by the communist coup in 1948. The middle generation (Slovaks N = 100; Scots
N = 100) was between 38 and 46 years’ old. This generation of Slovaks entered into their
adulthood during the events of the Prague Spring in 1968, resulting in the Soviet occupation.
The youngest generation (Slovak N = 100; Scots N = 100) was between 18 and 25 years’ old.
This generation of Slovaks grew up during the period of Soviet ‘normalization’ and entered
adult life around the time of the collapse of communism in 1989.
In each generation, half of the respondents were men and half were women, half were
educated to university level and half had below university level of education. The data were
collected in Slovakia from January until October 1992. This was before the split of Czecho-
167
slovakia into the Czech and Slovak Republics. In Scotland, data were collected from March
to October 1993.
Measures
To construct the collective meanings of political concepts, both within and between
the Slovaks and Scots, two paper and pencil measures, using the same political terms, were
used. First, the freely produced, unreflective responses using word associations, and, second,
a more reflective, context-based approach which involved asking the respondents to directly
judge how characteristic each of the terms was of a democratic society. The political terms
used in both tasks are shown in Table 1. The terms used were selected on the basis on several
small pilot studies carried out in Slovakia and Scotland (Fifkova & Hrabovska, 1992;
Plichtova & Svetonova, 1992).
Procedure
Each respondent was presented with a small word association booklet and a rating
scale sheet. The booklet contained the thirty terms, each printed on a separate page. The
order of terms presented in each booklet was randomised across particpants. The instructions
printed on the first page of the booklets were:
 “On each of the following pages you will find a single word or short phrase that has
something to do with the economy or with politics. We want you to note down on
each page the first word that comes into your mind that is associated with the word
or phrase printed on that page. Work as quickly as you can, noting only the first
association that comes to mind when you read the word. For example, in response to
the word ANARCHY* your first association might be DISORDER, so write this
down on the page next to the word ANARCHY. For someone else their first
association might be DISOBEDIENCE. For someone else it might be
TERRORISM. There are no right or wrong answers. Simply note down the first
related word that comes to mind; then turn over the page in the booklet and respond
to the next word in a similar fashion”.
* The example given was not included in the list of terms used.
After the word association task the respondents completed the rating scale task. Here
the same list of terms were printed on a single sheet and the respondents were required to
indicate the extent to which each term was characteristic of an ideal democratic society. Each
term was rated on a five point scale from ‘not at all characteristic’ to ‘very characteristic’.
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Demographic information collected was age, gender and educational level to fulfil the
three age-groups and equal gender and educational split across the samples. Prior to
completion of the tasks both the word association booklets and rating scale sheets were
numbered in matching pairs. The demographic questions were included only in the rating
scale section, therefore, as soon after completion as possible the demographic information
was transferred to the association booklets. Through the prior numbering of the two sets of
materials, if the two sections became separated before processing, no demographic
information was lost.
Participants were recruited through various methods; these included university
students from different departments, local colleges of further education for both full-time
students and those in employment but attending day release courses across various vocational
courses., local youth groups and clubs. For the older generations these included a range of
university staff from academic departments, catering, portering, secretarial, gardening.
Through numerous contacts with other employers such as schools, supermarkets and so on
access was gained to varying employees. The eldest generation were obtained through
bowling clubs and lunch groups, golf clubs etc. This generation proved to be most difficult to
contact, hence the reduction in sample size from an intended 100 to an eventual 75.
Where ever possible the tasks were carried out in small groups of around 5-10 people
at a time. Although on occasions this was extended to include seminar groups and classes
made up of larger numbers. It was more practical for the researcher and more comfortable for
the respondents if the data was collected in small group form as it was noticed during the
course of collecting the data that respondents were more at ease, in particular with the word
association task, if the process took place in group form. To help retain anonymity all
materials were handed out in blank envelopes and when completed they were handed back to
the researcher in the envelope. However, at times, data was collected from individual
respondents, this became essential nearing the completion of the data collection period where
gaps in the sampling frame required to be filled. Here individuals that appeared to fit into
which ever categories required to be filled were approached.
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Table 1. List of terms used
 1.  CITIZEN 16. MARKET ECONOMY
 2.  DICTATORSHIP 17. COMMAND ECONOMY
 3.  LAW AND ORDER 18. DEMOCRACY
 4.  POWER 19. INDIVIDUAL RIGHTS
 5.  CONSTITUTION 20. FREEDOM
 6.  PARLIAMENT 21. EQUALITY
 7.  POLITICAL PARTIES 22. JUSTICE
 8.  TRADE UNIONS 23. PERSONAL SECURITY
 9.  GOVERNMENT 24. PROSPERITY
10.  OPPOSITION 25. GLASNOST
11.  MASS MEDIA 26. PERESTROIKA
12.  RELIGION 27. CAPITALISM
13.  PUBLIC OPINION 28. SOCIALISM
14.  IDEOLOGY 29. COMMUNISM
15.  INDIVIDUAL WILL 30. NATIONALISM
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Results
Word Associations
Thirty concepts, each evoking one association, would produce 9000
associations by the 300 Slovaks, and 8250 associations by the 275 Scots. In the event the
Slovaks produced 8540 (5.1% missing associations) and the Scots produced 7980 (3.3%
missing associations). In the Slovak group the missing associations ranged from 2.2% (6
missing from a possible 300) for ‘citizen’, ‘dictatorship’ and ‘ideology’ (7.3%); ‘trade
unions’ and ‘individual rights’ with (8.0% missing); ‘nationalism’ (8.3%); ‘individual will’
(9.3%); and ‘glasnost’ (14.6%). For the Scottish group a different pattern of missing
associations was found, with ‘ideology’ having 40 missing responses (14.5% from a possible
total of 275) and ‘command economy’ producing 89 missing responses (32.3%). The
remaining missing associations were generally lower (from 0 to 2%) and more evenly spread
over the remaining 28 terms.
Data obtained from word associations can be studied by a variety of descriptive and
quantitative approaches. In this study two approaches were used. In both approaches, the
main focus was on the term ‘democracy’ rather than on the other political terms. The first
approach concerned the position of the term ‘democracy’ in semantic space with respect to
the other 29 terms. The second approach of the analysis was based on content analysis of
associations produced by the term ‘democracy’.
Representation of Democracy in Semantic Space
A common way of representing the structure of associations is the use of an
associative matrix. In the present matrices the headings of the 30 columns represented the
stimulus words and the headings of the 30 rows represented the evoked associations. The
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cells contained the frequency of associations to the corresponding terms. As the primary
concern was with the conceptual relationship between the term ‘democracy’ and the other 29
terms, the matrices were comprised of inter-word associative frequencies, specifically, the
frequencies with which the words elicited each other (Deese, 1965, p. 58). Therefore, only
those associations were used that corresponded either to any of the stimulus words or to their
synonyms and derivations. For example, one of the stimulus words was ‘individual rights’.
Therefore, if any of the other 29 terms evoked an association such as ‘individual rights’,
‘rights of citizens’, ‘human rights’, ‘rights’, etc. these were collated and were included in the
analysis. Altogether 1071 (11.9%) of such associations were produced by the Slovak group
and 956 (11.5%) by the Scottish group. This part of the analysis was based on the method of
multi-dimensional scaling. Multi-dimensional scaling requires the data to be in the form of
proximities, in the form of a similarity/dissimilarity matrix. As the data were in the form of
frequencies, proximity measures firstly had to be computed. Using the program
PROXIMITIES (SPSSx, 1988), the measure phi-squared was used to compute the similarity
matrices for the distribution of the frequency of associations to each stimulus word. The
proximity matrices were then subjected to multi-dimensional scaling using ALSCAL
(SPSSx, 1988) resulting in a two-dimensional graphic representation of the stimulus
coordinates. As a result, political terms with similar distributions of associations appeared
close together while unrelated terms appeared more distant on the plot. The plot thus
represents a descriptive map of terms and their clusters. The researcher is free to interpret
such configurations in ways that are meaningful to him or her (SPSSx, 1988, p. 352). As
multi-dimensional scaling is primarily a descriptive technique, the encircled terms were
selected by the researcher purely on the basis of visual inspection of the output rather than on
a statistical basis.
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Figures 1 and 2 plot the descriptive two-dimensional configurations for the total groups of
Slovaks and Scots. Visual inspection of Figure 1 indicates that for the Slovak group the term
‘democracy’ forms an associative cluster with ‘freedom’, ‘citizen’, ‘personal security’,
‘individual rights’ and ‘equality’. A second cluster of terms close to democracy contains the
terms ‘justice’, ‘law and order’, ‘opposition’, ‘public opinion’, ‘constitution’ and
‘parliament’. Terms furthest in distance (dissociated) from democracy show ‘command
economy’, communism’, ‘socialism’, ‘religion’, ‘nationalism’, ‘dictatorship’, ‘ideology’ and
‘power’.
Figure 1: Clustering of terms close to democracy in the Slovak sample
In the Scottish group (Figure 2), ‘democracy’ is associated with a larger, single
cluster of terms including the following; ‘justice’, ‘freedom’, ‘equality’, ‘public opinion’,
‘socialism’, ‘perestroika’, ‘market economy’, ‘individual rights’ and ‘individual will’. Terms
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furthest in distance show ‘command economy’, ‘dictatorship’ and ‘religion’.
In summary, the terms close to ‘democracy’ in semantic space for both the Slovaks
and Scots were ‘freedom’, ‘individual rights’ and equality’. Terms close to ‘democracy’ in
the Slovak group, but not in the Scottish one, were ‘citizen’ and ‘personal security’; terms
close to ‘democracy’ in the Scottish group, but not in the Slovak group, were ‘socialism’,
‘perestroika’, ‘market economy’ and ‘individual will’.
Figure 2: Clustering of terms close to democracy in the Scottish sample
Comparisons between Generations in the Slovak Group
A procedure similar to that applied to the whole sample was used to examine the
frequency matrices for the three generations in Slovaks and Scots separately. Table 2 shows
the terms which appeared close to ‘democracy’ in semantic space for each of the three
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Slovak generations. Four core terms appeared close to ‘democracy’ for all three generations:
‘equality’, ‘freedom’, ‘personal security’ and ‘individual rights’ (see table 2). In the youngest
generation, the terms ‘market economy’ and ‘prosperity’ were shown to be related to
‘democracy’. However, these two terms were not shown in either the middle or oldest
generations. In both the middle and oldest generations, the terms ‘justice’, ‘individual will’,
‘political parties’, ‘law and order’, ‘parliament’ and ‘opposition’ were closely connected to
‘democracy’. These terms were not found to be associatively linked to ‘democracy’ in the
youngest generation. In general, for Slovaks, although there were four core terms common to
all three generations, it appears that the middle and oldest generations were more similar in
their representations of democracy than the youngest group.
Comparisons between Generations in the Scottish Group
Table 3 shows the terms related to democracy for the three generations of Scots.
Across all three generations, ‘perestroika’, ‘freedom’, ‘justice’, ‘equality’, ‘individual will’
and ‘individual rights’ formed a cluster with ‘democracy’. Terms which differentiated the
generations were the following: ‘public opinion’ was found to be associated with
‘democracy’ in the youngest generation; ‘citizen’, ‘socialism’ and ‘mass media’ were
associated with ‘democracy’ in the middle generation; and ‘ideology’, ‘capitalism’ and
‘nationalism’ were associated with ‘democracy’ in the oldest generation. In summary,
although there were core terms of associations between all three generations of Scots, no two
generations showed any similarity with one another.
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Table 2: Terms close to democracy in the three generations of Slovaks
TERMS
Youngest
generation
Middle
generation
Oldest
generation
Equality    *    *     *
Freedom    *    *     *
Personal security    *    *     *
Individual rights    *    *     *
Market economy    *
Prosperity    *
Individual will    *     *
Justice    *     *
Political parties    *     *
Law and order    *     *
Parliament    *     *
Opposition    *     *
Citizen    *    *
Public opinion    *     *
Glasnost     *
Table 3: Terms close to democracy in the three generations of Scots
     TERMS
Youngest
generation
Middle
generation
Oldest
generation
Perestroika    *    *     *
Freedom    *    *     *
Justice    *    *     *
Equality    *    *     *
Individual will    *    *     *
Individual rights    *    *     *
Public opinion    *
Citizen    *
Socialism    *
Mass media    *
Ideology     *
Capitalism     *
Nationalism     *
Market economy     *     *
Glasnost    *     *
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Categories of associations evoked by the term democracy in Slovaks and Scots
The second way of analysing word associations was to examine all associations given
by the Slovaks and Scots to the term ‘democracy’. For this purpose, the associations given to
the term ‘democracy’ were content analysed and placed into one of nine categories of
association. The procedure for the inclusion of an association into a category was as follows.
First, all associations occurring at frequencies of two or more times were selected for content
analysis. Nine mutually exclusive and exhaustive content categories were created. All
remaining associative responses that occurred only singly were re-examined for possible
inclusion into the content categories. All remaining singly produced associative responses
that could not be placed into any of the nine categories were ignored. This procedure resulted
in 210 (69.5%) of the responses produced by the Slovak sample being included; and  223
(83.1%) of the responses by the Scottish sample included. Table 4 shows the distribution of
associations for total sample of Scots and the total sample of Slovaks.
Category I (rights/freedoms) contained associations such as ‘rights of people’,
‘freedom’, ‘freedom of expression’, etc. Category 2 (people/places or events) contained
associations such as ‘the revolution’, ‘the square’, ‘Scotland’, ‘Britain’, ‘America’, ‘Havel’,
and so on. Category 3 contained associations connected with voting and the electoral system.
Associations connected to ‘equality’ were included in (category 4) and those to ‘government/
parliament’ in (category 5). Category 6 reflected ‘positive’ associations   such as ‘good’,
‘necessary’, ‘fair’, etc., and negative associations such as ‘corrupt’, ‘does not work’, ‘not
fair’, etc were included in category 7.
Category 8 (rule of people) generally contained associations directly in the form ‘rule of
people’. In the final category (legal system/laws) contained associations such as ‘law
abiding’, ‘laws’, ‘rules’, ‘law and order’, etc..
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Table 4:  Associations given in response to the term ‘democracy’ by the Slovak sample and the
Scottish sample
Category of Association
Slovaks
n=210
(%) col
Scots
n=223
(%) col
Freedom and rights 76 (36.2) 72 (32.3)
People/places or events 20 (9.5) 32 (13.3)
Voting/elections 4 (1.9) 51  (22.9)
Equality 7 (3.3) 7 (3.1)
Government/Parliament 6  (2.8) 11 (4.9)
Positive associations 30 (14.3) 23 (10.3)
Negative associations 22 (10.5) 18( 8.1)
Rule of People 27 (12.8) 6 (2.7)
Legal system/Laws or Rules 18 (8.6) 3 (1.3)
Descriptively, the highest proportion of responses for both the Slovak and Scottish
samples fell within Category 1, ‘freedom and rights’, this was followed in frequency in the
Scottish sample by associations referring to the electoral process such as voting/elections
which resulted in over 50% of the Scottish samples associating ‘democracy’ with either
‘rights/freedom’ or the electoral process. The second highest category in the Slovak sample
was characterised by associations that were positive in nature, followed in frequency by ‘rule
of people’ and ‘negative associations.
Log-linear analysis of the nine categories by national group
The frequency data were entered into a log-linear analysis in the form Category (9) x
Nation (2). Table 5 gives the summary statistics which shows that the 2-way model Category
x Nation was significant (p<0.001) indicating that the two national groups varied as a
function of category of response.
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Table 5:  Log-linear analysis for the 9 categories of response to the term
democracy in Scots and Slovaks.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
df L.R. Chisq p
2
1
8
17
79.25
300.91
0.000
0.000
Tests of partial associations
df Partial Chisq p
Category
Nation
8
1
221.27
0.39
0.000
0.532
Three categories of response were shown to differ between the two national groups;
the Scottish sample clearly associated the term ‘democracy’ with the electoral process with a
high proportion of responses such as elections/ voting compared to the Slovak sample. A
higher proportion of Slovaks associated ‘democracy’ with ‘rule of law’  and the legal system
compared to the Scots. No differences were evident between the two national groups on
associations reflecting ‘rights/freedoms’, negative associations or positive associations to
democracy.
Comparison of the Scots and Slovaks on the democracy rating scale
The analysis of the rating scale data proceeds over three phases. The first stage
presents a descriptive account of a sub-section of the 30 items in the rating scale. Total group
means for all items are shown in Appendix 1. The prime focus of the rating scale section of
the study was to compare the two national samples and the three generations on the relative
importance of various aspects of democracy. For example, what is the relative importance
between economic aspects of democracy between the samples? or those relating to the
institutional aspects of democracy? do these vary between the samples and between the
generations? To this end the data from the rating scales from both the Slovaks and Scots were
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pooled and entered into a factor analysis. The internal reliability for the resultant factors are
checked for each national sample using Cronbach’s Alpha. In effect, this was a cross-national
treatment of the rating scale data, ignoring national origins in the compilation of the factors,
however, using the resultant factors to carry out a between nation and generation comparison
of the various dimensions of democracy through Multi-variate Factor Analysis in the form
Nation (2) x Generation (3).
In addition to this main analysis, factor analyses were carried out separately on the
rating scale data for the Scots and Slovaks. This analysis asks a different question. Rather
than examining the relative importance of various dimensions of democracy for Scots and
Slovaks, this examines descriptively the similarities and differences in the underlying
structure of how these terms are conceived in Scots and Slovaks. This examines aspects, such
as can we find a similar structure in relation to economic aspects or institutional aspects? can
the structures be considered similar or not between the two nations?
Descriptive analysis of the rating scale
The mean scores were examined for each of the three generations of Scots and
Slovaks and those rated the highest, with a score above ‘4.00’ signifying that the term was
‘characteristic/highly characteristic’ of democratic society, were selected and are presented in
Table 6. The terms for the three generations of Slovaks are presented under section A of the
table, and for the Scots in section B. Terms in bold text indicate those that are common
across the three generations of Slovaks and across the three generations of Scots.
In the Slovak sample, four common terms characteristic of democracy were highly
rated by all three generations: ‘freedom”, ‘justice’, ‘law and order’ and ‘constitution’. These
terms form the core across the three generations. However, the most interesting difference
within the Slovak data is the number of terms contained within the highly rated terms
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between the youngest generation and two older generations. Along with the four core terms,
the youngest generation also include terms reflecting the media and expression, rights,
prosperity, the political and economic spheres.
Table 6: Terms rated ‘characteristic/highly characteristic’ of democracy in three generations of
Scots and Slovaks.
(A) SLOVAK
Generation 1
18-25 years
Mean (sd) Generation 2
38-46 years
Mean (sd) Generation 3
65-73 years
Mean (sd)
Freedom
Law and order
Constitution
Justice
Public opinion
Mass media
Individual rights
Prosperity
Parliament
Market economy
4.49 (0.78)
4.36 (0.64)
4.32 (0.82)
4.27 (0.82)
4.16 (0.77)
4.12 (0.81)
4.09 (0.94)
4.02 (0.91)
4.02 (0.85)
4.02 (0.85)
Freedom
Justice
Law and order
Constitution
4.29 (0.90)
4.07 (0.90)
4.05 (0.88)
4.04 (0.88)
Freedom
Law and order
Justice
Constitution
4.34 (0.92)
4.14 (1.05)
4.13 (0.90)
4.07 (0.99)
(B) SCOTTISH
Justice
Freedom
Equality
Individual rights
Public opinion
Personal security
Individual will
Law and order
Opposition
Government
Parliament
Prosperity
Constitution
4.83 (0.40)
4.80 (0.40)
4.75 (0.56)
4.72 (0.64)
4.51 (0.67)
4.46 (0.69)
4.45 (0.78)
4.45 (0.70)
4.26 (1.19)
4.20 (1.10)
4.16 (1.20)
4.07 (0.98)
4.05 (1.02)
Justice
Freedom
Individual rights
Public opinion
Equality
Personal security
Opposition
Law and order
Government
Constitution
Parliament
Individual will
Political parties
4.60 (0.73)
4.56 (0.73)
4.53 (0.72)
4.52 (0.61)
4.51 (0.72)
4.36 (0.77)
4.29 (1.05)
4.26 (0.88)
4.19 (1.08)
4.13 (0.80)
4.11 (1.20)
4.10 (0.95)
4.01 (1.10)
Individual rights
Justice
Freedom
Public opinion
Law and order
Equality
Opposition
Parliament
Personal security
Government
4.51 (0.69)
4.37 (0.73)
4.33 (0.66)
4.33 (0.66)
4.29 (0.75)
4.25 (0.90)
4.25 (1.00)
4.21 (1.12)
4.20 (0.82)
4.11 (0.88)
There were no such differences between the number and range of terms across the
three generations of Scots with all three generations relatively consistent in the number and
type of terms which were rated highly. Core terms within the Scottish sample characteristic
of democracy included ‘justice’, ‘freedom’, ‘equality’, ‘rights’, ‘security’,
‘government/parliament’. It is clear that the youngest generation of Slovaks were more
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similar in their ratings to the three generations of the Scottish sample than to the other two
generations of the Slovak sample.
A similar procedure was applied to the lowest rated terms (< 2.00) which signified
that the term was not characteristic of democracy. In the Slovak sample four terms were rated
‘not characteristic’: ‘dictatorship’, ‘nationalism’, ‘communism’ and ‘socialism’. For the
Scots, ‘dictatorship’ was included in all three generations with the addition of ‘communism’
in the youngest group.
Separate factor analysis of the rating scale for Scots and Slovaks
A principle components factor analysis with varimax rotation was applied to the
rating scale data for each national sample. Table 7 shows the resultant five-factor solution for
each sample along with the eigenvalues and the percentage of variance accounted for by each
factor. For ease of comparison similar factors are positioned together on the table and
corresponding terms are highlighted in bold text..
Factor One for the Slovak sample corresponds to that of Factor Two in the Scots. This
factor for both samples contains items relating to the ‘institutional’ aspects of democracy.
Similarly, Factor Five in both samples are the same, containing the terms ‘perestroika’ and
‘glasnost’. Five items in Factor One correspond to Factor Two in the Slovaks; these were
‘freedom’, ‘equality’, ‘justice’, ‘personal security’ and ‘law and order’. Other terms not
included in this factor for the Slovaks were; ‘individual will’, ‘individual rights’ and
‘citizen’. One factor showed no similarities between the two samples. Factor Four for the
Scots contained two terms ‘socialism’ and ‘communism’; in the Slovaks this factor contained
‘individual will’, ‘capitalism’, ‘prosperity’ and ‘citizen’. Factor Three in both samples
include ‘’power’, ‘nationalism’ and ‘dictatorship’, in the Slovak sample this also contains
‘socialism’ and ‘communism’ and for the Scots, ‘capitalism’ and ‘prosperity’.
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Table 7: Factor analysis of the rating scale separately for Scots and Slovaks
Scottish Slovak
Factor 1
4.55, 18.21%
Freedom
Equality
Justice
Personal security
Individual will
Individual rights
Law and order
Citizen
Loading
0.78
0.72
0.72
0.68
0.68
0.59
0.49
0.42
Factor 2
3.93, 15.72%
Personal security
Justice
Equality
Law and order
Freedom
Loading
0.73
0.67
0.62
0.54
0.31
Factor 2
3.18, 12.74%
Parliament
Political parties
Government
Opposition
Mass media
Trade unions
Constitution
Public opinion
0.80
0.80
0.79
0.68
0.59
0.50
0.38
0.31
Factor 1
3.98, 15.95%
Parliament
Opposition
Government
Constitution
Mass media
Public opinion
Political parties
Trade unions
Individual rights
0.78
0.72
0.72
0.68
0.68
0.60
0.59
0.55
0.44
Factor 3
2.26, 9.06%
Power
Nationalism
Prosperity
Dictatorship
Capitalism
0.62
0.61
0.58
0.56
0.39
Factor 3
2.08, 8.35%
Dictatorship
Socialism
Nationalism
Communism
Power
0.74
0.64
0.61
0.60
0.51
Factor 4
1.88, 7.53%
Socialism
Communism
0.82
0.79
Factor 4
1.80, 7.23%
Individual will
Capitalism
Prosperity
Citizen
0.65
0.,62
0.52
0.48
Factor 5
1.50, 6.03%
Glasnost
Perestroika
0.88
0.84
Factor 5
1.72, 6.88%
Glasnost
Perestroika
0.77
0.74
In summary, four of the five factors show similarities between the two national samples:
democracy through its institutional aspects, that of the relationship between
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glasnost/perestroika,  and that of ‘equality/justice/freedom’ with the Scots including terms
relating to the individual within this factors whereas, for the Slovaks these are spread across
two other factors. Not surprisingly, for the Slovaks the terms ‘socialism’ and ‘communism’
are related to  ‘power’ whereas the Scots include ‘capitalism’ and ‘prosperity’. The most
interesting difference between the two national samples is the linking of terms related to the
individual in a democracy in the Scottish sample, for the Slovaks this structure was not
identified.
Factor Analysis of the Rating Scales across the two national samples
The data from the rating scales for Slovaks and Scots were pooled and the terms were
factor analysed to assess which terms were inter-correlated. A principal components factor
analysis (with iteration) was performed to identify groups of variables which accounted for
the observed correlations in the data set. A varimax rotation was also applied to ensure that
as far as possible each variable appeared in only one factor grouping. Only those items with
factor loadings greater or equal to 0.40 were included in the analysis. Table 8 lists 25 terms
grouped statistically into five factors and gives the mean scores and standard deviations for
each of the five factors for Slovaks and Scots. Variables were ordered and grouped by size to
facilitate interpretation. Factor scores for each individual participant were calculated to allow
comparison of the Scots and Slovaks for each factor.
Factor I (Eigenvalue 5.91; 23% variance) was characterized by nine terms: ‘personal
security’, ‘justice’, ‘individual rights’, ‘freedom’, ‘individual will’, ‘equality’, ‘law and
order’, ‘prosperity’ and ‘citizen’. This factor was interpreted as relating to issues connected
to the individual in democratic society.  Factor 2 (Eigenvalue 2.56; 10.3% variance) was
made up of eight terms: ‘parliament’, ‘government’, ‘opposition’, ‘political parties’, mass
media’, ‘trade unions’, ‘constitution’ and ‘public opinion’, and was interpreted as reflecting
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democratic institutions. Factor 3 (Eigenvalue 2.46; 9.9% variance) contained four terms:
power’, ‘nationalism’, ‘capitalism’ and ‘dictatorship’, and was interpreted as reflecting
oppressive power relations. Factor 4 (Eigenvalue 1.44; 5.8% variance) contained two terms:
socialism’ and ‘communism’, and was labelled as socialism/communism. Factor 5 also
contained two terms: ‘perestroika’ and ‘glasnost’ (Eigenvalue 1.21; 4.9% variance), and was
labelled perestroika/glasnost. Cronbach’s Alpha coefficients for the two national samples
were: Factor 1: Scots, 0.78, Slovaks, 0.80; Factor Two: Scots, 0.79, Slovaks, 0.85; Factor
Three: Scots, 0.60, Slovaks, 0.58. For the two factors containing only two items in each both
samples showed strong positive correlations (p<0.0001) for each set.
Table 8: Factor analysis of the democracy rating scale.
Factors Factor
loading
National
sample
Mean (sd)
1. The individual in democratic society      
Personal security
Justice
Individual rights
Freedom
Individual will
Equality
Law and order
Prosperity
Citizen
0.72
0.68
0.63
0.62
0.60
0.59
0.57
0.53
0.49
Slovak
Scottish
-0.19 (1.00)
 0.30 (0.89)
2. Democratic institutions  
Parliament
Government
Opposition
Political parties
Mass media
Trade unions
Constitution
Public opinion
0.78
0.72
0.71
0.70
0.59
0.58
0.49
0.40
Slovak
Scottish
-0.04 (0.90)
 0.03 (1.09)
3. Oppressive power relations
Power
Nationalism
Capitalism
Dictatorship
0.75
0.64
0.59
0.56
Slovak
Scottish
-0.28 (0.90)
 0.30 (1.00)
4. Socialism/communism
Socialism
Communism
0.78
0.75
Slovak
Scottish
-0.04 (0.84)
 0.44 (0.96)
5. Perestroika/Glasnost
Perestroika
Glasnost
0.80
0.77
Slovak
Scottish
-0.42 (0.89)
 0.46 (0.89)
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Comparison of Factor Scores between the Slovaks and Scots
The five factors were entered into a Multivariate Analysis of Variance (Manova) in
the form Nation (2) x Generation (3). Table 9 shows the summary statistics indicating that
the Multivariate F was significant for both Main effects of Nation and Generation (p<0.001)
and the Nation x Generation interaction at p<0.05.
Table 9:  Multivariate Analysis of Variance of Five Factors with Nation and
Age as Main Effects
 (a) Multivariate F
Effect Wilk’s
Lambda
df F p
Nation 0.44 5,560 137.46 0.000
Age 0.89 5,560 6.56 0.000
Interaction 0.96 5,560 2.04 0.027
 (b) Univariate F (1,570)
Univariate F p
1 Nation
Individual in democratic society
Democratic institutions
Oppressive power relations
Socialism/Communism
Perestroika/Glasnost
50.57
1.64
52.56
127.45
147.25
0.000
0.200
0.000
0.000
0.000
2. Age
Individual in democratic society
Democratic institutions
Oppressive power relations
Socialism/Communism
Perestroika/Glasnost
20.09
0.55
4.27
5.58
6.05
0.000
0.574
0.014
0.004
0.002
3. Nation x Age
Individual in democratic society
Democratic institutions
Oppressive power relations
Socialism/Communism
Perestroika/Glasnost
1.43
2.73
1.94
2.93
1.09
0.242
0.066
0.145
0.056
0.335
The univariate comparisons revealed significant main effects of Nation (<0.001) on
four of the five factors, with factor two ‘democratic institutions’ showing no differences
between the two nations. Similarly, main effects of generation were revealed for the same
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four factors, again with factor two ‘democratic institutions’ showing no generation effect. All
means, for all factors, across both samples, and for the three generations are shown in figures
3 to 7.
Issues connected to ‘the individual in democratic society’ (factor one) were rated
more characteristic of democracy by the Scots than by the Slovaks. Post hoc scheffe
comparisons (<0.01) revealed across both samples, the youngest generation rated ‘the
individual in democratic society’ more characteristic of democracy than both the middle and
oldest generation (see figure 3). Although no main effect of Nation or Generation were
obtained for factor two ‘democratic institutions’, the mean scores are displayed in figure 4.
Figure 3: National and generational means for the ‘individual in democratic society’
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Figure 4: National and generational means for ‘democratic institutions’
In the remaining three factors ‘oppressive power relations’, ‘socialism/communism’
and ‘perestroika/glasnost’ the Scottish sample were shown to rate all three as being more
characteristic of democracy, than the Slovak sample (see figures 5, 6 & 7). Post hoc scheffe
comparisons across the three generations revealed factor three ‘oppressive power relations’
were rated more highly by the youngest generation compared to the oldest generation (<0.01)
(see figure 5). The comparison of the generations in the factors four and five
‘socialism/communism’ and ‘perestroika/glasnost’ were not significant the 0.01 level.
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Figure 5: National and generational means for ‘oppressive power relations’
Figure 6: National and generational means for ‘Socialism/Communism’
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Figure 7: National and generational means for ‘Perestroika/Glasnost’
In summary, national differences were obtained for four of the five factors, with the
only factor not showing differences being factor 2 (democratic institutions). All other factors
– the individual in democratic society, oppressive power relations, socialism/communism and
perestrika/glasnost, were rated higher by the Scottish sample, than by the Slovak sample.
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Discussion
The aim of this study was to explore the meaning of the term ‘democracy’ in Slovaks
and Scots through using responses to single terms. Lay representations of democracy, as for
any complex phenomena, are likely to integrate different kinds of knowledge, from that
which may be deep-seated and resistant to change, relatively stable across generations or
across cultures to other forms of knowledge reflecting common or current practices,
reflecting what is changing and what is new.
It was suggested that after 40 years of Soviet Communism the term ‘democracy’ may
have acquired a different meaning. Stroinska (2002) noted the intensity of the struggle
portrayed in Klemperer’s writings against the backdrop of Nazi propaganda and that the most
powerful force was in the consistent use of distorted terms and phrases. Others have
questioned whether the transition period in the post-communist nations is too chaotic to
allow a stable and coherent meaning system for an abstract term like democracy.
For both for Slovaks and for Scots, the most important cluster of terms associated
with democracy were value terms ‘individual freedom’, ‘justice’ and ‘individual rights’. This
core cluster emerged in the analysis of the data whatever method of data collection was used;
whether the task required the participant to make free associations to ‘democracy’ or whether
he or she was required to rate, in a more restricted way, preselected terms. In addition, in the
word association data ,‘freedom’, ‘rights’ and ‘equality’ were closely linked to ‘democracy’
in semantic space across all of the three generations of both Scots and Slovaks. These terms
can be conceived of as comprising the central core (Abric, 1993) of the representation of
democracy and appeared relatively stable between the Scottish and Slovak samples and
across the generations.
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Democracy and Freedom
Although, today, it may seem relatively obvious that the concept of ‘democracy’ is
associated with freedom and individual rights. Even a cursory look through European history
shows that this association is a relatively recent social representation. While the relationship
between freedom and democracy was, for the first time, explicitly spelled out in classical
Athens, it was not, even there, always viewed favourably. Both Plato and Aristotle
disapproved of democracy and freedom for all citizens because, they thought, it would lead
to anarchy and tyranny (Davies, 1997).
One can only speculate about the formation of lay representations of ‘democracy’ in
European thought. Naess et al.’s (1956) semantic analysis of democracy was not a study of
social representations as such. However, it was on the basis of their detailed research that the
authors concluded that ‘the French revolution was the first great popular movement in
history’ the proponents of which proclaimed and regarded themselves as ‘democratic’ (ibid,
p109). As a result, ‘democracy’ was introduced as a key term into political language and
became widely used in Europe. One consequence of this wide use was that the term obtained
multiple meanings and ambiguous significations.
In contrast, the term ‘freedom’ and other terms relating to individual agency emerged
in the vocabularies of European languages in the 16th and 17th centuries (Fromm,
1942/1991). The modern notion of freedom was an essential value of individualism (e.g.
Farr, 1991; Marková, 1997). The Renaissance and humanism started portraying the
individual as an agent who is self-determining, responsible and moral and freedom and
individualism soon became a pervasive feature of life in the modern age.
When the term ‘democracy’ became widely used in North America, it was clearly
associated with American individualism and with the formation of a democratic
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community (Miller, 1967). One of the new features of the modern term ‘democracy’, both in
North America and in Europe, was the emphasis on equality with respect to individual rights
and individual freedoms, on individuals’ own choices and decision-making. Freedom in the
modern world consists of individuals’ perceptions of both freedom from oppression, and the
freedom to pursue, to engage and to follow their own aspirations (Rose, 1995).
The data presented here indicates a lack of difference between Slovakia and Scotland
with respect to the association between freedom and democracy. As pointed out earlier, in the
communist countries the term 'democracy' was given persistently a different meaning from
that it had had before the creation of the Soviet bloc. Yet, after 40 years of Soviet
totalitarianism, efforts to re-define the meaning of democracy and erode the relationship
between freedom and democracy have appeared to be unsuccessful. Similar comments were
made recently by other researchers. Buchowski et al (1994) in their examination of the
Communist regimes’ attempts to change the meaning of core concepts suggested,
linguistically, it is more difficult to change the meaning of a word acquired early in life or if
a word is learned as part of the process of learning language itself. Free or freedom is one
such word. However, other terms such as ‘democracy’ are derived concepts, in which “words
acquired later in life are more likely to have their core meaning in combinations of other
words” (ibid, p570), and therefore, more flexible, and less resistant to change. However,
despite long attempts to redefine “traditional European notions of freedom and
democracy...and related terms in order to make them a Communist reality” (ibid, p555), such
attempts failed in Poland. Similarly, in Bulgaria, Patzeva (1994) found in an experimental
study using word associations that the most frequent response to ‘democracy’ was ‘freedom’.
In another Polish study, Reykowski (1995) found that the ‘popular concept of democracy’ in
Poland, differs from the normative textbook meaning. In searching for underlying
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dimensions of the socio-political perception he found that new democracy was primarily
described in terms of attained freedom. Simon (1996) in a multi-lingual 12-nation survey of
political culture in Central and Eastern Europe asked his respondents what democracy meant
to them. He found, once again, that freedom was the most common meaning of democracy.
Earlier data also corroborate the close association between freedom and democracy. For
example, freedom and liberty were found to be essential components of democracy (the most
essential if combined with rights as in our own study) by Szalay and Kelly (1982) in their
comparative study of Americans and Koreans.
Structure of meaning
Freedom and rights can be thought of as comprising the central core of the
representations of democracy in both Slovaks and Scots, forming a stable and coherent
meaning system, as the ‘root’ meaning of democracy (Buchowski et al, 1994) or comprising
what Moscovici & Vignaux (1994/2000) term ‘themata’, the deeply seated meaning systems
which give coherence to representations. However, the meaning of democracy by Slovaks
and Scots was not only expressed in terms of ‘freedom and rights’. Although the central core
of a representation may give stability and coherence to the overall representation, the
peripheral elements allows flexibility and variation in how meanings are expressed across
various contexts (Abric, 1993). Various elements of a representation will be co-constructed
by individuals reflecting the interdependencies between meaning and current political and
social practices. The structural aspect of social representation theory implies that different
components of representations of democracy may be more salient, and may be expressed
differently reflecting various economic and political realities.
In the word association data, where the responses are given automatically and without
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much conscious thought, the Slovak sample gave a higher proportion of associations relating
to the ‘rule of people’ and to the legal aspects of democracy. Both the rule of people and a
stable set of laws governing society were absent in the previous regimes, and for Rose (1995)
the existence of the arbitrary use, or absence, of the rule of law was a defining feature of
Soviet Communism. Here, the Slovaks are elaborating their meaning of democracy in
relation to what was absent in the past and to what democracy promises. In the Scottish
sample, in addition to rights and freedom, democracy was largely associated with voting and
the electoral process. Although democracy was associated with the ‘rule of people’ in the
Slovaks, no such associative link between democracy and voting or the electoral aspects was
evident in their associations. Interestingly, Szalay and Kelly (1982), too, using slightly
different methods of studying associative links between democracy and other political
concepts, found that while for the Americans democracy was most saliently a process of
voting, for the Koreans it was not.
In the rating scale data, where the participants were required to reflect upon their
responses and to consider each term and its relationship to democracy, the results show that
for Factor two (democratic institutions), no differences were obtained between the two
samples or between the three generations. Here, institutional aspects of democracy such as
political parties, government, parliament, opposition and the media were clearly of equal
importance to the Slovaks and Scots. The items contained within this factor relate more to the
normative understanding of democracy, as expressed by specialists and politicians (Neass et
al, 1956), therefore, democracy as sets of political arrangements, comprising varying
components, carried equal meaning and agreement between the two national groups.
However, in Factor 4 (Socialism/communism) the Scots rated these more highly than the
Slovaks. This is not surprising having not had the same experiences of ‘socialism’ as
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Slovaks, and no experience of communism. For the Slovaks both these terms refer to that
part of the past which was now being rejected. This is also reflected in the separate factor
analyses for both nations with both ‘socialism’ and ‘communism’, in the Slovak sample
appearing in a factor reflecting oppressive power along with that of dictatorship. Factor five
(perestroika/glasnost) was also rated more highly by the Scots than the Slovaks. Additionally,
‘perestroika’ appears closely associated to democracy in the semantic space analysis for all
of the three generations of Scots. Here the differences in the relationship between
perestroika/glasnost and democracy indicate differences in the meaning structure and
understanding between the Scots and Slovaks. While western politicians and the western
mass media celebrated Gorbachev and linked his reforms to that of democracy, no such
relationship between his reforms and that of democracy was evident in the countries of
Central and Eastern Europe (Davies, 1997; Glenny, 1993). Slovakia, like all of the
communist nations, understood these terms as meaning purely reconstruction without any
fundamental change in ideology, for these nations it was evident that Gorbachev was
attempting reform but still very much following the ideology of Lenin, and principle of
Leninsim (Volkogonov, 1999). Although rated more important for democracy by the Scots
than the Slovaks, on the separate analyses of the rating scale items both ‘perestroika’ and
‘glasnost’ appeared together on the same factor in both samples.
Across all three generations of Slovaks, four terms appeared common among those
rated most highly- ‘freedom’, ‘law and order’ ‘constitution’ and ‘justice’. In contrast to the
two older generations, the youngest generation of Slovaks included a wider range of terms in
those most highly rated and more similar to all three generations of Scots. Generational
effects were also indicated across the two samples in two of the factors. The youngest
generation of both samples rated ‘the individual in democratic society’ more highly than the
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other two generations, and ‘oppressive power relations’, higher by the youngest than by the
oldest. A similar pattern was found by Rose and Makkai (1993), who examined
individualistic values across various post-communist nations. Using multiple regression
techniques on pooled data from nine nations, the younger generations (less than 30 years of
age) were shown to be more individualistic, that is, were oriented more towards freedom and
individual choice than were the older generations. However, since in this study both the
young Slovaks and the young Scots rated the individualistic values higher than did the older
generations, one cannot conclude whether these differences are a function of age or whether
they indicate a more general change in lay representations of democracy.
By using word associations and rating scales, this study has examined the social
representations of democracy at the level of the meaning potentialities of single words.
Through the content analysis of associations produced to the term democracy and through the
semantic space analysis, the meaning democracy was primarily associated with freedom and
rights in both Slovaks and Scots. In addition to this common core meaning of democracy,
associations reflected the most salient aspects of democracy for the two samples. For Scots,
voting and the electoral process had a strong associative meaning. For Slovaks, although
strongly associating democracy with the rule of people, this had not yet been anchored to the
electoral process or to voting. However, had voting or aspects of the electoral process been
included as one of the items in the rating scale, these may have featured dominantly in their
responses. The examination of social representations can rarely capture the totality of a
representation. To understand a representation it its entirety would require an examination of
all facets of that representation, in reality, representations can only be partially examined
(Bauer & Gaskell, 1999; Markova, 2001).
197
CHAPTER 8: THE MEANING OF THE INDIVIDUAL AND THE COMMUNITY IN
SLOVAKIA AND SCOTLAND
For those from both sides of the Iron Curtain the Cold War was not simply a contest
of military power but also a struggle between two sets of opposing political, economic and
social ideologies. When communism finally fell this was largely perceived to be a victory of
the Western conception of individual freedom and rights within a liberal democratic
framework. Would the ‘return to Europe’ of the nations of the old communist bloc, through
their re-embracing of classic western ideologies, now result in these “ideas prevailing
throughout the entire continent that gave rise to them” (Armstrong & Croft, 1993, p48). The
purpose of the present study was to examine what meanings people in Slovakia and in
Scotland attach to terms such as ‘the individual’ and ‘the community’. For example, how are
lay images of the individual, the collective and the community embedded in cultures and in
ideologies? (Farr, 1991). Are they interrelated in the same way on different sides of the
former Iron Curtain? Are they linked to co-existing political and economic issues? To
examine issues such as the relationship between the individual and society in contemporary
times, in a changing Europe, poses considerable challenges to social psychology. Firstly, this
debate has more than fully occupied political, philosophical and social thinkers from ancient
Greece to the present day Communitarian theorists, both in Europe and the USA (eg.
Donahue, 1990; Etzioni, 1991; Haste, 1996). And secondly, the challenges are increased
when viewed from status of the people of Central and Eastern Europe who have experienced
not only four decades or so of Marxist-Leninist, totalitarian collectivism, but also from
within the context of their pre-communist pasts and their more recent experiences of their
transitional period from post-communism and transition to democracy.
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Individual/Community debate
Broadly speaking, this debate can be traced back to Aristotle for whom the whole
always comes prior to the part. In his view, individuals were not invisible or insignificant, but
it was only through the community (polis) that individuals could realise their worth, they
were part of, and embedded in, communities (Markova, 1997).
More recently it has been suggested that almost every political and social institution
has some underlying theory of the relationship between the individual and society. Western
liberal democracy, through its various forms, both unites members of society to act
collectively for the common good and it also gives various freedoms to the individual. Each
individual has equal freedom from the constraints of others to act freely within the bounds of
his society. In contrast, totalitarianism attempted to stipulate the aims of the society as a
whole. Political elites laid down plans for an ‘ideal society’ with individual freedom,
individual uniqueness oppressed, public opinion silenced and heterogeneous communities
destroyed (Miller, 1967).
These two brief snapshots of how ‘the individual’ may be viewed under a liberal
democracy and totalitarianism barely touch the surface of the complicated relationship
between the individual and society as it has been conceived throughout history and in
contemporary times. The question that arises here is, would the fall of communism finally
end one of the debates that has dominated European intellectual and political thought since
the time of the Renaissance that is, the debate surrounding the sets of ideas that gives weight
to the rights, needs and interests of the individual?
The freeing of the individual
There were numerous social, political, religious and economic movements that led to
the greater prominence of the individual and the changing relationship between the
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individual and society. The Reformation and the Renaissance were the periods when it was
commonly understood that people started to revolt against the restraints of the natural order
which prevailed throughout the medieval period in Europe (Davies, 1997). What
characterised medieval society, as opposed to modern society, was the lack of individual
freedom. Individuals were identified by their fixed roles in the structure of society which
were unchangeable and unquestioned and under the command of the church. These roles
were taken as true and absolute. An individual’s salvation lay in saving and not developing
his soul (Miller, 1967). Although the individual was very much constrained within a rigid
social order, set in place by birth and rooted in a structural whole, he was not free in the
modern sense of the word, however, neither was it likely that he felt alone, isolated or
alienated (Fromm, 1942/1991). A society so highly rigid, unquestioned and unchangeable in
some respects gave man a sense of security and place, although very much still in bondage.
Lack of individual freedom then, was not comparable to the deprivation of freedom
characterised by later authoritarian regimes as, at that time, ‘individual freedom’ as a concept
generally perceived today, did not yet exist (Miller, 1967).
In speaking of, for example, the medieval period, the Renaissance, modernity and so
on, I am characterising types or movements in social change. These, similar to the emergence
of democracy do not end at one point and start at another. Social change occurs constantly
through both continuity and discontinuity, sometimes through a relatively seamless flow of
change, and other times through what appears to be radical transformations. Throughout
Continental Europe and the British Isles macro-social reform emerged from varying roots
and in differing time-scales. For example, the Renaissance is commonly understood to have
originated earlier in Italy and the idea of economic individualism proceeded earlier the
British Isles (Hobsbawm, 1962). However, for the present purpose, in order to understand or
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examine macro social change, the structure and dynamics of society and the resultant rise of
individualism in Europe it is sufficient to take a broad historical approach.
Freedom from and Freedom to
Religious crusades, new trade routes to the East, new scientific world views, the
development of the printing press and the protestant Reformation all played a significant role
in helping free medieval man (Porter, 2000). The writings of Luther also played a part
through his claim that the interpretation of the bible was to be made by the individual himself
through his own conscience and not through external forces (Miller, 1967). This was a major
leap forward in religious and institutional doctrines and pushed the advancement of the idea
of freedom from the constraints of institutions and also more firmly rooted the conscience as
belonging to, and originating from, the individual. However, as yet, the individual was not
viewed as dynamic, as a source important for social change and growth. The advancement
and practice of individualism requires not only freedom from bounds and constraints but also
freedom to (Armstrong & Croft, 1993). These positive freedoms are associated with the
belief of the dignity of the individual, the pursuit of property and happiness, individual
advancement and freedom enabling the individual to shape his own destiny. Miller (1967) in
his historical account of the rise of individualism places the thinking of George Herbert Mead
as crucial to the debate on individualism. For Mead, individuals were viewed as being at the
centre of human value and dignity, the source of new ideas, the growth of society is
dependent of the creativity of individuals and that new social values originates in the thinking
of individuals. For Mead, the relationship between the individual and society was clearly
viewed as being highly interdependent, which in many respects mirrors the much earlier
thinking of Arsitotle, but for Aristotle, the community (polis) was the centre where
individuals could achieve their true potential.
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It is important to point out that individualism and the concept individual/society as
conceived here refers to sets of values, a Common European Heritage (Markova et al, 1998;
Davies, 1997) as forms of open societies conducive to open selves (Millar, 1967) or as values
comprising political, economic and moral components (Armstrong & Croft, 1993) and not as
conceived by, for example, Triandis, (1995) as a dichotomy individualism/collectivism, both
being viewed as two extremes of a scale, one being taken as the opposite of the other.
In addition to the theory of individualism viewed historically as a set of core
European values, individualism also contains economic and political dimensions which have
also been debated over the centuries. However, the theory of individualism as core values
cannot be separated from economic or political principles from either an historical
perspective or in contemporary times. Theorists will invariably be influenced by current
events just as new ideas will become incorporated into the language and ideas of economists,
politicians and government.
Individualism as an economic principle
For Calvin, man was totally depraved and only through God’s will could he achieve
salvation. By virtue of his own abilities and toil he could obtain, legally and rationally,
material wealth, however, his salvation was not dependent on these efforts. Some may be
pre-destined to obtain salvation through the will of God others, irrespective of their toil,
could never achieve salvation. Calivin’s separation of toil and salvation had a huge effect on
capitalism (Millar 1967). By freeing toil and the acquisition of goods from salvation, worldly
activities, in themselves, were given a new kind of morality. Economic growth and pressures
led to the decline of traditional communities based on subsistence economies and
individualism became institutionalised in trade, the mobility of populations, through
development of cities and through the growth of education. These new events brought to the
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foreground individual values such as freedom, individual rights, dignity and self-
determination without interference from external authority.
Individualism as a political principle
The political dimension can be traced back to the writing of John Locke in the 17th
century, who stated that society arises through the voluntary contract of individuals
attempting to maximise their own self interest. The common good should arise through
everyone behaving according to this social contract. Central to western political thought is
the idea that legitimate government only exists through the consent of the governed.
Individualism within the political sphere takes precedence within political democracy under
which the mass of people shape their social world through forms of collective action and
through the mechanisms of public choice (Twine, 1994) and operating as a two-way process
between rulers and the ruled (Schopflin, 1993b). The idea of the social contract and the role
of government to advance and protects the rights and freedom of the individual, first put
forward by Locke, was later central to the setting up of the American Constitution and the
French Revolution’s Declaration of the Rights of Man and Citizen (Armstrong & Croft 1993;
Davies, 1997). And, more recently, after the ending of the Second World War, through
American influence, these were again incorporated into the setting up of the United Nations
Universal Declaration of Human Rights (Davies, 1993). Violations of these basic principles
were often at the core of the debate between the Western nations of Europe, the USA, and the
former Communist regimes in Central and Eastern Europe.
Re-defining individualism and morality
The gradual separation of public life and religious life opened up new debates
surrounding the nature of the individual and morality. Previously, man’s moral position, the
knowing of right from wrong and his eventual salvation was tied to divine reward and
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punishment. If man was no longer seemingly bound by tight external forces, did this now
leave an individual free to decide his own morality, his own destiny?
For Rousseau and Herder, mans destiny was clearly linked to a moral voice
originating within himself and through some moral connectedness within our own selves
(Taylor, 1992). However, the growth of the ‘individual’, along with the breakdown of the
existing paradigms, resulted in a period of general uncertainty, what was to be the guiding
force surrounding social existence now that the individual was placed at centre stage. This is
not to argue that the concept of human identity or morality did not exist prior to this, but
simply that they were not viewed as problematic. The idea that Man’s morality was guided
through God and his identity was linked to his fixed social position in a hierarchical society,
were previously unquestioned and unproblematic. However, in that, then, new period of
modernity and enlightenment, of which we now term pre-modern, these previously
unquestioned issues were arising.
The idea of civil society as a guiding force driving the social order emerged during
this period of thought. Seligman (1993) points to the Scottish thinkers of the period, such as
Adam Smith and Adam Ferguson, as being central to this debate. Primarily, through the
breakdown of the old moral codes guiding society issues such as individual/society,
private/public, egotism/altruism and reason/passion came to the fore. For these Scottish
thinkers of the 17/18th centuries, man could not be abstracted from his social arena, that
social existence was based on the idea of moral affections and sentiments serving as a basis
of civil society. Adam Smith expanded on this in his Theory of Moral Sentiments by arguing
that the moral basis of individual existence is the need for recognition and consideration on
the part of others  “to be observed, to be attended to, to be taken notice of with sympathy and
approbation...is the driving force of all the toil and bustle of the world’ (cited in Seligman,
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1993 p144). Individual self-interest, for the Scottish moralists, was tempered by a mutuality
of moral sentiments rooting men firmly in society.
Although the Scottish Enlightenment thinkers brought to the fore concepts such as
reciprocity, mutuality, recognition into the moral debate in the 17th/18th century, a few of
centuries earlier in Central Europe the idea of Humanism was emerging. Here the individual
was not viewed in terms of the accumulation of wealth, or purely self interest, but in terms of
humanity (Davies, 1997). According to Masaryk, the President of the first Czechoslovakian
Democratic State, Humanism emerged as a new social and ethical principle and redefined the
nature of the individual in terms of the dialogical I and You (Markova et al, 1998). Dialogical
is taken here to mean more than simply linguistic communication, the transfer of ideas
through dialogue, but in terms of the dialogical I/You, or Self/Others in relational
interdependencies from which communities, collectives or society cannot be conceived in
separation from that of the individual, and conversely the individual cannot be abstracted
from the wider public sphere (Taylor, 1992, Twine, 1994).
As a result of various political, economic, religious and social changes over about a
500 year period, individualism became one of the inherent qualities of Western civilisation
(Davies, 1997) with the idea of the individual with individual thoughts, moral consciousness,
freedom and responsibility came into being (Fromm, 1942/1991). Although the rise of the
value and dignity of the individual and the changing nature of the individual/society
relationship emerged over a long period in the history of European thought, arising through a
variety of interdependent bases such as religious, economic, political and moral thinking,
these issues, however, have not remained static in modern thought. The relationship between
individual rights and freedoms, both positive and negative, and the nature of governance and
order in modern societies continues to the centre of debate. These relationships will
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necessarily be embedded not only in the meaning of the individual/society as conceived
historically as a broad European heritage, but have once again risen to the centre of the
debate, primarily due to the collapse of the Soviet regimes which carried their own
conception of rights and freedom, separate and distinct from ‘traditional’ western
conceptions (Armstrong & Croft, 1993).
Modern societies all carry tension between the conflicting rights, freedoms and needs
of the individual and those of society, of the tension between the individual and general
public good. As society is not composed of a homogeneous mass of individuals, all equal in
their needs and desires, there will always be tension or asymmetry in the individual/society
relationship. Although often debated in the language or individual rights and freedoms,
Taylor (1992) conceives of these tensions as arising through a lack of recognition. Through
exchanges with others, or more often, through the struggle or tension associated with
exchanges, we define what it is to be human in a mutually reciprocal way from our own
conscience, and in interdependence through the recognition we obtain from others. Implicit
in Taylor’s writing is the idea that within any complex society there will always be tension
between prominent and less prominent competing thoughts and social values. These tensions
are more visible in society where individuals or groups of individuals experience problems in
what he terms as non-recognition, the withdrawal or absence of recognition, for example, in
modern and in particular, multicultural societies. The push for rights for minorities, the issues
of race and religious beliefs, special interest groups, feminist movements, environmental
movements and so on, all exemplify the struggle for recognition in modern liberal
democracies.
Although this is a very simplified account of an example of the asymmetry of
recognition, it is, however, at the centre of debate in many Western liberal democracies
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today. The concepts of recognition or social recognition may not feature in modern day
discourse, terms most likely are rights, justice, equality of opportunity and freedom of
expression and so on. These ideas can be traced back to the Kantian idea of human dignity
which is inconsistent with the deprivation of equal consideration or treatment (Markova et al,
1998).
The fall of communism: the individual and community
Although the fall of Communism has brought into this debate the many nations of the
former Soviet bloc, as stated above, these issues have not remained static in Western Europe,
or in any modern liberal democracy. It is clear, however, that in examining the meaning of
the individual in a post-communist Europe, it is also necessary to examine the meaning of its
co-compliment, that of the ‘community’; and that of the ‘collective’ (Markova, 1997).
What is community
Terms such as individualism, collectivism and community have their conscious and
unconscious representations in the minds of ordinary people. Consider the term ‘community’.
As used in everyday speech it is easily understandable to both speaker and listener. It may be
possible to agree that indeed community is important or that a community spirit gives a sense
of belonging or identity. However, when the term ‘community’ is imported into the discourse
of the social sciences it becomes more problematic. The main problems arise from
contradictions of what is meant by community in the professional and academic literature.
For example, Hillary (1966) noted around 90 discrete definitions in use when community is
talked about. An essential split, highlighted by Puddifoot (1995), emphasises whether
community is conceived of as a territory/locality based notion or as sets of network
relationships. Clearly, talking about ‘community’ within the context and language of the
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social sciences raises numerous questions such as, where does community begin or end? how
many different communities may individuals belong to? is it possible to move in out of
communities? can communities be essentially destroyed, for example, through Soviet
totalitarianism? and so on. Cohen (1985) in his Symbolic Construction of Community
attempts to avoid this confusion by not providing a definition of community at all, but argues
for the idea of community as a system of shared symbols, values, moral codes, practices and
ideologies. What Cohen does is to emphasise a shared, symbolic view of community and that
community exists in the minds of its members. It is not only necessary to simply share
similar experiences or practices, but that these must carry meaning for the individuals
concerned. These symbolic symbols, values, practices come into being through implicit or
explicit contrast. Just as the idea of the self arises through exchanges with others, or
exchanges with ‘significant’ others, communities come to exist not only by virtue of what
they are, but also what they are not (Cohen, 1985). These contrasts are not opposites, not
absolute, but always in terms of the relational whole. The relational whole will vary, contain
boundaries, and by definition boundaries are oppositional, but they will only become
meaningful to those concerned when viewed within its co-compliment. The complex nature
of the meaning, for example, of the individual, the community, different kinds of
communities, of collectives and so on will be dependent on and will vary with respect to its
co-complements. Markova (1997) describes co-compliments in terms of figure/ground
relationships, they form a whole without which each other is meaningless. These
figure/ground relationships determine what is meant or not meant by, for example
community in a given context, ie. religious communities, political communities, localities,
shared experiences, shared knowledge, or community as a form of stigma (Howarth, 2000).
They also, according to Markova (1997), co-determine what will be foregrounded and what
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may be viewed as less important in different contexts. As meanings conceived in this way are
embedded within a host of other meanings, depending on the nature of the asymmetry of the
figure/ground relationship, ie. what is foregrounded and what is not, the relationship may co-
exist, or clash resulting in a redefinition of meaning. Here meanings, depending on the
figure/ground relationship will vary, and be dynamic in their content and structure.
The Individual, the Collective and the Community under Soviet domination
Until 1989 Slovakia, as all the nations of the former Soviet bloc, experienced a
totalitarian regime and totalitarian collectivism which rejected the basic values of
individualism such as personal uniqueness, freedom of choice and individual rights.
Collectivism here refers not to a general construct in which closely linked individuals view
themselves as being part of one or more collectives, motivated by norms, duties and goals of
these collectives (Triandis, 1995), but as a particular ideology, imposed from above and to
which individuals were forced to conform. Collectivism as expressed here refers to an
historical reality rather than a general classification system. In contrast to other forms of
collectivism, as essential characteristic of Marxist collectivism was that is dissociated itself
from the histories and traditions of the people who were supposed to become part of these
collectives (Schopflin, 1993a; Markova, 1997). Under Marxism, only the collective, ie. the
masses, are the decisive political force that will shape the course of history and establish a
just and fair system for all. It is the masses who instinctively distinguish right from wrong:
they are the creators of history. As Arendt (1967, p249) commented, the Marxist theory of
the proletariat as the saviour of humankind was vulgarized by the bolshevist agitators:
“These men began to tell the mob that each of its members...would automatically be the very
incarnation of Loyalty, Generosity, Courage”. This ideology divided the world into simple
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dichotomies: friends of the people and enemies of the people, there were workers and there
was the bourgeoisie, things were either good or bad and there could be no compromises. The
interests of the individual were unquestionably subordinated to those of the collective
(Davies, 1997). The celebration of the individual was restricted to a few selected individuals,
who through their achievements such as ‘heroes of work’ or political leaders, contributed to
the dictatorship of the proletariat. In the struggle of the masses, those who did not conform
had to be punished. Terror, bloodshed and dictatorship were justified if the goals of the
regime were to be achieved (Davies, 1997). The aim was uniformity in lifestyle, attitudes and
thinking, ie. a herd mentality based on the abolition of difference.
Communities, in contrast to Marxist collectives, have their histories through
collective memories and their own community heroes. They have specific moral convictions
which arise from within (Cohen, 1985). Since the sense of a community, or communities,
grows from loyalties to past traditions and moralities, the affiliation of individuals to those
communities posed a threat to the creation of an anonymous, uniform, Marxist type
collectives (Markova, 1997). Breaking up communities and creating collectives required
some focused strategies.
Destruction of local communities and the enforcement of collectivism
Concerning local communities, there were a variety of ways in which they were
destroyed. Secret police developed networks of informers fostering the impression of having
total control over the local community. Interrogations of particular individuals were designed
to undermine the standing of that individual in the eyes of his or her neighbours. It was,
therefore, advisable not to trust your neighbour, either the neighbour might be called for
interrogation and mention your name in some context or other or he might be part of the
network of secret  informers. By creating fear and distrust the regime gave the impression
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that they control everybody and everything (Markova, 2004). During interrogations tactics
were employed that gave the impression that they intimate details of a person life, that which
may only have been known to family or neighbours. The possibility that a telephone or flat
may be bugged increased the fear and anxiety. Individuals were hailed as either ‘friends of
the people or enemies of the people’. The Soviet regime, like that of any totalitarian regime,
whether left or right, was based on an absence of rule of law, or more specifically, laws were
applied in an arbitrary fashion. (Rose, 1995). “Disappearances’ and internment in
concentration camps without trial were, throughout various periods, commonplace. If greater
control of the people was required, or if the goals of each of the successive ‘Five Year Plans’
were not met, new directives were issued. These ranged from increasing the numbers of
secret informers, termed ‘punitive organs’ (Volkogonov, 1999) to ‘show trials’ of ‘enemies
of the people’ or ‘wreckers’ in the workplace to cover up accidents, production failure or
inefficiency due to poor central planning and the expulsion of individuals from their
workplace or community (Service, 1997; Hosking 1992: Applebaum 2003). These extreme
methods of ‘divide and rule’ created fear and distrust, both in the workplace and the local
community (Markova, 2004; Rose, 1994a; 1994b).
Total control was a defining feature of the Soviet regime which extended to the
destruction of any sense of past history of communities and nations. Everything that
remained that would enable individuals to retain a sense of identity or belonging was
destroyed through the renaming of streets, towns, the removal of statues of past heroes or
political leaders; literature, theatre or art that did not fit with the ideology was removed
(Hosking, 1992). Local political, church and interest-based clubs and societies were
disbanded and replaced by ‘ideologically correct’ groups (Howard, 2002). Strict child-rearing
practices and forced participation in youth groups all required conformity and led to
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anonymity. Markova (1997) has described how new ceremonies, symbols and new moral
codes were created to destroy the collective memories from the past, and “the history of the
Marxist collectives was a history…in which individuals and communities had no role to
play” (ibid, p13). For Ashwin (1998), Soviet ‘collectives’ extended beyond the sphere of the
workplace and were the entire apparatus of the Soviet State and under which access to all
goods and services could only be obtained. Collectives encompassed the space between the
individual and the public sphere, between the individual and the hostile State, collectives
were the instruments serving the cause of Communism. What can be thought of as
communities or local networks under ‘traditional’ conceptions, in reality, under communism,
were agents of oppression and coercion (Gibson, 1993).
So far I have highlighted the aims and tactics of the totalitarian regime, but what of
the people themselves? Did they believe and internalise the daily propaganda? Was it
necessary for the survival of the regime to change the fundamental thinking and beliefs of the
people? With respect to the Soviet regime, it is clear that active opposition carried huge
personal consequences not only for the individual concerned, but also for their families.
However, for the regime to survive it was not necessary for individuals to actively accept its
ideology, but to simply comply with its rules and demands. The regime and its ideology were
recycled by their own conduct because it was enough to be passively loyal and act in public
‘as if’ they were in agreement. People, therefore, lived in a unreal world giving an impression
of reality. Klicperová et al (1997) describes how party control of the mass media and
ideological brainwashing created an artificial social environment, a new kind of double-
reality and double-think. The socialist system was presented as a perfect society in which
citizens possessed all the virtues of socialist and Soviet man. Yet, their actual experience was
quite different from that and even if the propaganda was not generally believed, it succeeded
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in creating confusion and insecurity in the minds of citizens (Hosking, 1992). It was this
double standard of truth and fiction, the contradiction between official ideology and reality
which led to a double standard of morality. Most people lived with one truth for themselves
and their family, and with another truth for the public domain (Scheye, 1991).
The Individual in Western Europe.
If similar phenomena have not been experienced in the West, important changes,
nevertheless, have occurred, some of which have been conceived of as worrying. Here,
individualism has apparently reached its zenith as a form of self-centeredness. A number of
social scientists have argued that the post-modern Western glorification of the individual has
resulted in the atomisation of society and alienation of individuals and may pose a possible
threat to both communities and to democracy.
Modern conceptions of Western Individualism
The Western vision of society as composed of, and in some way constituted by,
individuals, poses, according to Taylor (1992), the first malaise of modernity. The legacy of
Western political thinking in which some notion of rights plays a significant role has led to
the fragmentation and atomisation of society. In the push for rights and in search of self-
fulfilment, individuals have lost any sense of purpose which transcends them as individuals.
Traditional Enlightenment thought has been transformed from the idea that the individual is
upheld and responsible to the idea that the individual is only responsible for oneself, a
general failure to see the individual as part of a whole which would give meaning to the self
(Haste, 1996). A culture of excessive self-fulfilment and self-centreredness, termed ‘rights
mania’ by Donahue, (1990) has resulted in the inability or unwillingness of individuals to
have any sense of purpose beyond that which transcends them as egoistic individuals.
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Donahue views the primacy of rights, with no similar status assigned to the principles of
belonging and obligation, as a peculiarly late twentieth century phenomenon. Having lost a
broader vision, people are either unable or unwilling to see societal perspectives.
Historically, the idea of individualism in Western societies, has evolved through both
the pursuit of individual interest and some measure of the common good (Armstrong &
Croft, 1993; Miller, 1967). The idea of the common good or public interest has been eroded,
according to Eztioni (1991), and for Taylor (1992), not only through the rise of self-centered
individualism where the individual is willing to take but not to give, but also through the rise
in interest groups. Taylor points, specifically, to fragmentary and polarised campaigns run by
specialist groups, for example, abortionists argue for the rights of the mother while anti-
abortionists argue for the rights of the foetus. Such polarised views regarding rights from
only one perspective ignores the fact that rights can only be sustained by and in
interdependence with communities. Rights are effective only in relation to corresponding
social responsibilities. Singer (1993) argues that what today is ordinarily called a right is only
what is meant by that individuals entitlement without much consideration of the community
within which the right is valid. She insists that the notion of right as being inherently
adversarial is a distortion. To assert a right is a consideration of both the right and the mutual
obligation of that right. Etzioni (1991) maintains that the balancing of the rights of
individuals along with social responsibilities is an essential requirement of any civil society.
Inglehart (1999) views this in relation to a rise in the importance of self-expression within
modern society and linked specifically to a cultural shift in the ideas surrounding authority.
Historically, the individual/authority sphere was linked to the religious domain, during
modernity this shifted to the governmental/State sphere. In advanced industrial societies the
shift has moved from both the religious and the State spheres to that of the individual. A
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cultural shift has moved towards individual authority and autonomy and the general pursuit
of subjective, individual well-being.
In Britain, there had been up until 1979 a ‘political consensus’ among the main
political parties relating to the welfare state and to a measure of Government planning in
relation to the economy (Deakin, 1989). This, however, has been gradually dismantled and
individuals have been forced to become more responsible for their own welfare.
Individualism even became an explicit governmental policy. Recently, it spread from the
private into the public sector with the notion of the market being introduced into the National
Health Service and into education. During this period, Margaret Thatcher’s well known
phrase ‘there is no such thing as society’ was taken to reflect the dominant ideology of
individualism being advocated by the Conservative government at that time. However, the
above extract was generally taken out of context. Her entire statement continued:
  “There is not such thing as society. There are individual men and women, and there are
families. And no government can do anything except through the people, and people must look
to themselves first. It’s our duty to look after ourselves and then to look after our neighbour”.
(cited in Humphrys, 2000, p233)
Although still strongly reflecting the idea of individual responsibility which was
dominant throughout the Thatcher years, and remains so, it does include some measure of
social responsibility. Irrespective of the full context of Thatcher’s phrase, Phillips (1998) has
argued that ‘Thatcherism’ sought to create change not only through the implementation of
policy, but also through discursive practices. Through a combination of the traditional
‘authoritarian’ nature of Conservatism, political and economic individualism and popular
appeal, the government attempted to effect political, economic and social change. This was
not attempted through the substitution of one representation by another directly, but through
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the combination of old and new representations: “the vocabularies of citizenship, rights and
communities were embedded firmly within Thatcherite discourse” (ibid, p863). One example
given by Phillips refers to the introduction of the Citizens’ Charter by the government in
1991, and how the notion of ‘citizenship being presented did not belong to the Enlightenment
discourse on civil liberties, but firmly embedded within Thatcherite consumer discourse.
It is also argued that the nature of modern life itself separates individuals and has
resulted in a sense of alienation and low social responsibility (Markova, 1997) and Taylor
(1992) maintains that the recent concerns with the modern expression of individualism in
Western society, of alienation and fragmented communities, reflects a loss of commitment, a
reduction in any sense of belonging and a loss in moral meaning in individuals’ lives.
In view of these societal changes in the UK during the 1990’s, there have been a
number of research initiatives and government papers on issues such as renewal of
communities, education for citizenship, active citizenship, what citizenship means in the
twentieth century. Government directives were fuelled over the growing concern of a lack of
interest and participation, in particular in young people, in the democratic process and in
public life. A Citizen Advisory Group, chaired by Bernard Crick (1998), highlighted the need
for the introduction of compulsory education for citizenship in schools. Although, the
outcome of the report indicated that young people were, in general, disengaged from the
democratic process, it did reveal that there was an increase in single-issue campaigns (Pearce
& Spencer, 1999). However, to fully engage the young of today, the adults of tomorrow, in
public life, and to reduce the sense of alienation and general moral decline the remit of the
advisory committee extended well beyond simply increasing political participation, but to
aim to change the culture of the country and to educate people to think of themselves as
‘active citizens’. Kerr (1999) summarises the main points of the report which encompassed
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both liberal and communitarian thinking; linking issues of individual autonomy with
communal mutuality. Its specific aims are:
“..through .effective education...nature and practices of participation in democracy,
duties, responsibilities and rights of individuals and the value to individuals and to
society of community activity” (Kerr, 1999, p276)
Having considered the emergence of individualism, as a European phenomenon, how
the meaning of the individual and of the community was redefined under Communism to fit
the ideological goals of the regime, and also to the concerns regarding the modern conception
of individualism in western democracies, it appears that totalitarian collectivism and
democratic individualism, although arising from different bases, may have some features in
common. These include the isolation of individuals, alienation and a loss of some sense of
communal mutuality. In view of these concerns, arising from both sides of the former divide,
the meanings of the terms ‘the individual’ and ‘the community’ are examined in Slovaks and
Scots.
The various questions considered in this chapter relate to the different meaning, as
accessed through word associations and ratings scales, to the terms ‘the individual’ and ‘local
community’ in Slovak and Scottish respondents during the period 1994. Similar to the data
previously presented for the meaning of ‘democracy’ through word associations, two
analyses techniques are again employed. Firstly, through a content analysis of all responses
given by the Slovaks and Scots to the two terms ‘the individual’ and ‘local community’ it
was assumed that the responses would reveal habitual and culturally shared meanings. Again,
similar to the democracy data presented, the positioning of the two terms in semantic space in
relation to the other 36 political and economic terms is examined. Through an examination of
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inter-word associative frequencies the relationship between the ‘the individual’ and ‘local
community’ the structure of the associative meaning would be revealed across the two
national groups. In addition to the 38 political and economic terms presented as word
association tasks, these same lists of terms are presented within two rating scales. In the
previous democracy rating scale, respondents were required to rate the political and
economic terms in relation to only one target, that of the importance of each of the terms to
democracy. In this section the list of terms are presented twice to the respondents. Firstly, to
be rated in relation to the well-being of the Individual and secondly, in relation to the well-
being of the Community. These two separate rating scales, using the same list of terms,
requires the respondents to reflect upon each of the terms differently, firstly towards one
target, the individual, and secondly towards the community. What is the relationship between
the various political and economic terms when asked specifically to focus on either the
individual or the community? Do the Slovak and Scottish samples display similar patterns in
their responses? What is the relative importance of the various terms in relation to the
Individual or the Community? What is stable between the two samples, what varies between
the two samples? What can the use of these two methods of word associations and rating
scales reveal about how the Individual and how the Community is viewed by Slovaks and
Scots?
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Method
Participants
Two groups of respondents, 200 from Slovakia and 200 from Scotland, participated in
the present study. Both the Slovak and Scottish respondents were selected from two age-
groups, those aged 18-23 years and those aged 40-45 years. The rationale for the choice of
these two age-groups was to capture the following two Slovak
generations. Firstly, the generation born around the time of the Communist takeover in
Central and Eastern Europe and who entered into their adulthood during the events of the
Prague Spring in 1968 and its aftermath, the Soviet occupation of Czechoslovakia. Secondly,
the generation who grew up during the period of so called 'normalisation' which followed the
Soviet occupation in 1968 and who entered adult life around the time of the collapse of
communism in 1989. The Scottish sample were chosen to match these two generations of
Slovaks. The data were collected in Scotland and Slovakia in during 1994.
In each generation, 100 respondents were male and 100 were female; 100 were
educated to university entrance level and 100 had below university entrance education. The
data were collected, in Slovakia, between February and May 1994, ie. almost immediately
after the split of Czechoslovakia into the Czech and Slovak Republics. In Scotland, data were
collected between February and July 1994. The respondents completed the tasks in small
groups of 5-10 people. Two kinds of data were collected. The participants were first
presented with a word association task and they then completed two tasks involving rating
scales.
Procedure
The word association task included 38 political and economic terms each printed on a
separate page of a booklet. Respondents were asked to note down, as quickly as possible, the
first word that came into their minds in association with each stimulus word. The instructions
given to the respondents for the completion of the word association task were the same as for
the 1992 data collection period (see the Methods section in Chapter 7 for the description of
the instructions, sampling and the recruitment of respondents)
219
Table 1(a): Terms used in the word association task and the two rating scales
PERSONAL RESPONSIBILITY MINORITY RIGHTS
LAW AND ORDER FREEDOM
THE STATE EQUALITY
MONEY JUSTICE
PRIVATISATION PRIVATE ENTERPRISE
PROFIT PUBLIC INTEREST
WELFARE FRATERNITY
LOCAL COMMUNITY PERSONAL SECURITY
WEALTH CAPITALISM
POVERTY SOCIALISM
PASSIVITY COMMINISM
RELIGION DICTATORSHIP
PUBLIC OPINION RISK
IDEOLOGY NATION
SELF INTEREST CHARACTER
MARKET ECONOMY SELF DETERMINATION
POLITICAL PARTIES CORRUPTION
DEMOCRACY PEACE
HUMAN RIGHTS
Having completed the word association task, the respondents were presented with two
separate rating scales containing the same list of terms as used in the word association task.
They were asked, first, to evaluate, on a five-point scale, from 'not at all important' to 'very
important' (with higher scores indicating greater importance) the political and economic
phenomena to which those terms referred. First, they rated these phenomena with respect to
their importance for the well-being of the individual (Individual Scale). Second, they rated
them with respect to their importance for the well-being of the community (Community
Scale). The term 'the individual' was absent from the 'Individual Scale' and the term
'community' was absent from the 'Community Scale',  resulting in 37 terms in each of the two
scales.
Demographic information collected was age, gender and educational status to fulfil
the two age-groups and the equal split for gender and education across the samples. In
addition, information was obtained on religion and how often the respondents attended a
place of religion. Tables 1(b) and 1(c) presents this information. The categories compiled for
religion were: Protestant, Catholic, Other and No religion and for attendance, Never,
Occasionally and Regularly.
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Table 1(b):  Religious categories in the Slovak and Scottish respondents
Protestant
Frequency (%)
Catholic
Frequency (%)
Other
Frequency (%)
No Religion
Frequency (%)
Scottish 94 (47.2) 39 (19.8) 4 (2.0) 60 (30.5)
Slovak 15 (7.6) 114 (57.6) 7 (3.5) 62 (31.5)
Table 1 (c): Attendance at a place of religion in the Scottish and Slovak respondents
Never
Frequency (%)
Occasionally
Frequency (%)
Regularly
Frequency (%)
Scottish 63 (32.5) 104 (53.6) 25 (12.9)
Slovak 56 (32.4) 95 (54.9) 22 (12.7)
The Scottish sample were predominantly Protestant with around 20% Catholic, in
contrast, in the Slovak sample, 60% were Catholic with only around 8% Protestant.
Attendance at a place of religion was shown to similar for the two national samples,
however, for the Slovak sample for around twenty five respondents, data was missing for this
question.
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Results
Local community and the individual: An analysis of word associations.
Similarities and dissimilarities in word associations can be studied using various
descriptive and quantitative approaches. In accordance with the aims of this study two
approaches were selected. The first is a post hoc content analysis of associations to the terms
‘local community’ and ‘the individual’. The second type of analysis concerns whether these
two terms, are related to other political and economic terms included in the present study.
Content analysis of word associations to the term ‘local community’ by two generations of
Slovaks and Scots
The data from the word associations tasks were analysed by examining all responses
given by the Slovaks and by the Scots to the term ‘local community’.  The procedure for the
inclusion of an association was similar to that in Chapter 6. First, all associations occurring at
least twice in each sample were selected for analysis. Eight mutually exclusive and
exhaustive post hoc categories were then created. Second, all remaining associative
responses that occurred only once were re-examined for possible inclusion in one of the eight
categories. All remaining single responses were included in the category ‘other’. Table 2
show the frequency distribution of the associations for each of the two generations of Slovaks
and Scots for the eight categories, those for the category ‘other’ and the missing responses.
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Table 2: Categories of response to the term ‘local community’ by the Scottish and the Slovak
samples.
Slovak Scottish
CATEGORY OF
RESPONSE
18-23yrs
n=100
40-45yrs
n=100
18-23 yrs
n=100
40-45 yrs
n=100
1. Place 8 13 34 29
2. People/groups/society 29 29 8 8
3. Friends/family/neighbours 2 2 22 23
4. Closeness/togetherness 3 3 14 12
5. Lost/gone 2 10 1 11
6. Services/councils 5 3 6 6
7. Negative/meaningless 19 19 3 2
8. Religion/religious groups 4 0 0 0
Other 13 8 8 7
Missing 15 13 4 2
Category 1 contained associations referring to the names of streets, places, towns,
villages etc. Category 2 contained references to people, groups of people and society in
general. Category 3 referred to family, friends, neighbours, and associations in category 4
reflected a sense of closeness or togetherness. A feeling of something that has been lost, gone
or no longer existing is reflected in category 5. Category 6 simply refers to local services or
local councils. Associations in category 7 reflected negative associations or something that is
meaningless. Within this category, associations in the Slovak sample contained references to
‘the mafia’, ‘corruption’, ‘hate’ etc. Category 8 contained associations referring to religion or
religious groups.
Comparison of the Slovaks and Scots on the frequency of missing responses revealed
that more Slovaks, of both generations, failed to produce an association to the term ‘local
community’ compared to the Scottish sample (18-23 years, X2=5.81, p<0.05; 40-45 years,
X2=7.21, p<0.01). Descriptively, most common type of response in the Slovak sample
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referred to people, groups or society in general (category 1) with close to 30% of both
generations responding in this way. The second most common type of response fell into the
negative/meaningless with responses referring to the mafia, corruption, hate etc, with around
20% of both generations of Slovaks producing associations of this type. In the Scottish
sample, the most common type of association referred to a place, whether a street, village
with around 35% of the younger generation, and 29% of the older generation of Scots
producing associations to ‘local community’ which referred to a particular geographic
locations. Two other high frequency categories in the Scottish sample reflected people in
some way, such as friends family, neighbours (category 3) followed in frequency by
associations which reflected a sense of closeness or togetherness (category 4).
Log-linear analysis of the categories of response to ‘the local community’ in two generations of
Slovaks and Scots.
The main analysis involved entering the frequency data into a log-linear analysis.
Only categories which contained non-zero cells for Slovaks and Scots of both generations
were included, resulting in seven content categories in the analysis, with the removal of
‘religion/religious groups’. The model of interest for the 3-way comparison was Nation (2) x
Category (7) x Generation (2), and for the 2-way comparisons, Nation (2) x Category (7) and
Category (7) x Generation (2). Table 3 shows the summary statistics.
The analysis revealed that the full 3-way interaction was not significant (p>0.05)
however, two 2-ways were; Nation x Category (p<0.001) and Category x Generation
(p<0.05). Table 4 presents the data for both generations combined for Slovaks and Scots for
each of the seven categories in the analysis.
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Table 3:  Log-linear analysis for the seven categories of response for two generations of Slovaks
and Scots.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
df L.R. Chisq p
3
2
1
6
19
27
2.17
144.80
224.65
0.900
0.000
0.000
Tests of partial associations
df Partial Chisq p
Category x Nation
Category x Generation
Nation x Generation
Category
Nation
Generation
6
6
1
6
1
1
127.40
15.00
0.32
76.10
3.14
0.60
0.000
0.020
0.568
0.000
0.076
0.438
Table 4: Frequency and percentage of categories of association to ‘local community’ in the
combined generations of Slovaks and Scots
CATEGORIES
Slovak
n=146
Scottish
n=179
1. Place 21 (14.4%) 63 (35.2%)
2. People/groups/society 58 (39.7%) 16 (8.9%)
3. Friends/family/neighbours 4 (2.7%) 45 (25.1%)
4. Closeness/togetherness 5 (3.4%) 26 (14.5%)
5. Lost/gone 12 (8.2%) 12 (6.7%)
6. Services/councils 8 (5.5%) 12 (6.7%)
7. Negative/meaningless 38 (26.0%) 5 (2.8%)
Five categories varied between the Slovak and the Scottish sample. More Scots than
Slovaks associated ‘local community’ with a place, town, village or geographic region; to
friends, family or neighbours, and also a higher proportion of associations which reflected a
sense of closeness or togetherness. In contrast, a greater number of the Slovaks’ responses
reflected people in general, groups in general, and associations which that were negative or
that the local community was meaningless concept.
The analysis also revealed a Generation x Category effect. On inspection of the data
for the combined national groups, the older generation (40-45 years) gave a higher proportion
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of responses to ‘local community’ that reflected that this was something that has gone or has
been lost (18-23 years, 1.92%; 40-45 years 12.4%).
Content analysis of word associations given in response to the term’ the individual’ in two
generations of Slovaks and Scots
A similar procedure was applied to all associations given in response to the term ‘the
individual’ by Slovaks and by Scots, resulting in six mutually exclusive and exhaustive
categories. Category 1 contained associations referring to people in general, persons,
everybody. Category 2 contained references to the self, me, I, etc. The essential difference
between the types of associations in categories 1 and 2 were that associations in category one
were expressed in the third person (singular and plural) whilst those in category 2 were
mainly expressed in the first person singular. A sense of loneliness or isolation were
contained in the associations in category 3. Associations in category 4 reflected positive
values of individualism such as equality, freedom, strength, power, responsibility. Category 5
reflected sentiments such as good or important and the final category reflected a sense of
selfishness related to the individual. Table 5 shows the frequency distribution of all responses
for the six categories along with those classified as ‘other’ and the missing responses. No
differences were found between Slovaks and Scots in the number of  missing responses to the
term ‘the individual compared to the higher proportion of Slovaks who failed to give a
response to ‘local community, in the previous section.
Descriptively, in the Slovak sample, the majority of responses fell into category 1
(person, people, everybody), followed by associations reflecting as sense of loneliness or
isolation. Only around 8-13% of the Slovaks responded to the stimulus term ‘the individual’
with ‘me, self,I’. In the Scottish sample, the largest category contained responses such as
‘me, self or I’, with 42% of both generations producing association in this category, followed
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in frequency with associations referring to people or person in a more general way (21-26%).
Table 5: Categories of response to the term ‘the individual’ by the Scottish and the Slovak
samples.
Slovak Scottish
CATEGORY OF
RESPONSE
18-23yrs
n=100
40-45yrs
n=100
18-23yrs
n=100
40-45yrs
n=100
1. Person/People/everybody 45 53 21 26
2. Me/self/I 13 8 42 42
3. Lonely/isolation/small 22 17 11 2
4. Positive individualism 6 1 10 9
5. Important/good/positive 1 3 5 5
6. Selfish/selfishness 0 3 1 2
Other 10 12 7 12
Missing 3 3 3 2
Log-linear analysis of the categories of response to ‘the individual’ in two generations of
Slovaks and Scots
Similar to the analysis of the categories of response to the local community, the
categories for association to ‘the individual’ were entered into a log-linear analysis. Again,
only those categories which contained non-zero cell were entered resulting in five categories
included, with the removal of category six (Selfish/selfishness). The model of interest, for the
3-way was Nation (2) x Category (5) x Generation (2), and for the 2-ways, Category (5) x
Nation (2), and Category (5) x Generation (2). Table 6 shows the summary statistics.
The analysis revealed no significant 3-way model, however the 2-way Nation x
Category was significant (p<0.001) indicating differences between the two national groups
across the categories. Table 7 shows the data for the combined generations for the two
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national groups for the categories entered into the analysis.
Table 6: Log-linear analysis for 6 categories of response to the term ‘the individual’ for Slovaks
and Scots over three periods.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
df L.R. Chisq p
3
2
1
4
13
19
8.02
95.43
280.44
0.110
0.000
0.000
Tests of partial associations
df Partial Chisq p
Category x Nation
Category x Generation
Nation x Generation
Category
Nation
Generation
4
4
1
4
1
1
80.79
6.63
0.02
184.67
0.04
0.29
0.000
0.156
0.878
0.000
0.828
0.588
Table 7: Frequency and percentage of associations to ‘the individual’ in the combined
generations of Slovaks and Scots.
CATEGORIES
Slovak
n=169
Scottish
n=173
1. Person/people/everybody 98 (58.0%) 47 (27.2%)
2. Me/Self/I 21 (12.6%) 84 (48.5%)
3. Lonely/isolation/small 39 (23.1%) 13 (7.5%)
4. Positive values of individualism 7 (4.1%) 19 (10.9%)
5. Important/good 4 (2.4%) 10 (5.8%)
Three categories of response revealed differences between the two national samples,
with a greater proportion of Slovaks associating ‘the individual’ in general terms such as
people, person, everybody (category 1) and also in terms of loneliness, isolation, insignificant
(category 3) compared to the Scottish sample. A higher number of Scots associated ‘the
individual’ within the category ‘me/self/I’ (category 2).
In summary, across both sets of analyses differences were evident in the responses of
the Slovaks and Scots. For the Slovaks, ‘local community’ was to responded to in a more
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general terms by primarily referring to people/ groups or society in general with also around
one quarter of the sample responding in a negative way. Taking categories 1 and 2 together
suggests that ‘local community’ is a meaningful concept for the Scottish sample with a high
proportion indicating a particular place/local geographic area; with friends family and
neighbours and with a sense to closeness or togetherness. In the categories of association to
the term ‘the individual’ again the Slovaks sample responded in a general way compared to
the Scots, with a higher proportion of Slovaks referring to the more general ‘people, person,
everybody’ category. Slovaks, compared to Scots,  indicated no great sense of personal
identity with low proportions responding within the category ‘me/self/I’. The individual, for
the Slovaks, is also viewed through the association data as something that is small, isolated
or insignificant.
A semantic space analysis of associative nets.
As the prime interest was the conceptual relationship between ‘local community’, ‘the
individual’ and the other political and economic terms, matrices were constructed that
comprise inter-term associative frequencies, that is, the frequencies with which the terms
elicited each other (Deese, 1965, p.58). Similar to the matrices for the democracy word
association data presented in Chapter 6, only those associations were entered into the matrix
that corresponded either to stimulus terms or to their derivations or synonyms. Altogether
1084 (14.3%) of such associations were produced by the Slovaks and 1077 (14.2%) by the
Scots.
Using the program ‘proximities’ (SPSSx,1988), the measure phi-squared was used to
compute the similarity matrices for the distribution of the frequency of associations to each
stimulus word. The proximity matrices were then subjected to multi-dimensional scaling
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using ‘alscal’ (SPSSx, 1988) which resulted in a two-dimensional graphic representation of
the stimulus coordinates. As a result, political and economic terms with similar distributions
of associations appear close together while unrelated terms appear further apart on the graph.
The plot thus represents a descriptive map of terms and their clusters. The researcher is free
to interpret such configurations in ways that are considered  meaningful (SPSSx, 1988,
p.352).
Figure 1 shows the descriptive two-dimensional configuration of the relationship
between the terms for the Slovak sample and figure 2, for the Scottish sample.
Focusing on ‘the individual’ and ‘the local community’, visual inspection of Figure 1
reveals three clusters of associations. One cluster contains terms that relate primarily to
economic issues such as market economy, capitalism, profit, privatisation, money, and so on.
The term ‘the individual, in the Slovak sample, is embedded within a cluster containing
concepts such as democracy, freedom, rights, equality and justice. ‘Local community’ in the
Slovak data is contained within the third cluster of terms, which also included terms related
to negative and dictatorial aspects of the past such as communism, socialism and
dictatorship.
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Figure 1: Positioning of the terms ‘the individual’ and ‘local community’ in the Slovak sample
Figure 2 shows the Scottish data as consisting of two distinct clusters, compared to
the three clusters in the Slovak data. Two of the clusters are similar to the Slovak diagram.
One cluster containing terms such democracy, freedom, rights, equality and justice and,
similar to the Slovaks, to which the term ‘the individual’ is closet to. The second cluster,
again similar to that of the Slovaks, contains terms that are economic in nature such as
market economy, profit, capitalism, privatisation and so on. The remaining terms do not form
any distinct cluster, with the term ‘local community’ appearing largely unrelated to the other
political and economic terms, although it appears furthest away in semantic space from the
terms it was closest to in the Slovak sample.
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Figure 2: Positioning of the terms ‘the individual’ and ‘local community’ in the Scottish sample.
The Community and The Individual: An analysis of rating scales
The first stage of the analysis presents a descriptive account of a selection of items
from the Community Scale (all means, for all items across both scales are shown in
Appendix 2a & 2b). The following sections present an examination of separate items from
both scales (Community and Individual Scales), followed by a factor analysis of items in the
Community Scale, the construction of comparator sets of items from the Individual Scale
matching the extracted Community factors with a comparison of the two national samples
using mixed model 3-way Anovas.
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Descriptive analysis of the Community Scale
The mean scores for the Slovaks and Scots were examined and the highest rated items
by each sample (with a mean score above 4.00 signifying ‘highly important’) were selected.
The highest rated items for each national sample are shown in Table 8. Eleven terms were
common across both samples in the highest rated category (indicated by bold text in the
table); these were ‘peace’. ‘law and order’, ‘justice’, ‘equality’, ‘freedom’, ‘human rights’,
‘democracy’, ‘public interest’, ‘personal responsibility’, ‘money’ and ‘the State’. Terms
included in the Scottish sample, but not in the Slovak sample, were ‘welfare’, ‘minority
rights’ and ‘the individual’. Those appearing in the Slovak sample but not in Scottish sample
included two terms related to the economy ‘profit’ and ‘market economy’ along with
‘personal security’ and ‘nation’. The distribution of items across both samples were similar
with the exception of the inclusion related to personal security and the economy in the
Slovaks. Lowest rated terms in the Scottish sample included ‘religion’ (2.80) ‘communism
(2.43) and ‘dictatorship’ (2.27) and for the Slovaks, ‘socialism’ (2.20) ‘communism’ (2.05)
and ‘dictatorship’ (2.02).
Table 8: Highest rated terms from the Community Scale for Scots and Slovaks
Scottish Slovak
Terms Mean (sd) Terms Mean (sd)
Peace 4.71 (0.65) Peace 4.77 (0.66)
Justice 4.68 (0.57) Law and order 4.65 (0.66)
Law and order 4.65 (0.64) Freedom 4.60 (0.78)
Equality 4.61 (0.65) The State 4.59 (0.79)
Freedom 4.60 (0.70) Justice 4.58 (0.76)
Human rights 4.55 (0.75) Human rights 4.55 (0.77)
Welfare 4.47 (0.67) Democracy 4.31 (0.96)
Democracy 4.37 (0.87) Money 4.29 (0.94)
Minority rights 4.37 (0.90) Profit 4.27 (0.93)
Public interest 4.11 (0.92) Market economy 4.19 (0.97)
Personal responsibility 4.10 (0.89) Personal responsibility 4.18 (1.00)
The individual 4.07 (0.97) Equality 4.11 (1.07)
Money 4.04 (0.91) Nation 4.11 (1.06)
The State 4.04 (0.97) Public interest 4.08 (0.90)
Personal security 4.04 (1.07)
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An analysis of two items from the Individual and Community Scales
Two items, one each from the Individual Scale and the Community Scale, were
examined in more detail. Namely, ‘How important for the well-being of the individual is the
community?’ (Individual Scale), and ‘How important for the well-being of the community is
the individual?’ (Community Scale). A 3-way mixed model analysis of variance was applied
to the data in the form Nation (2) x Age (2) as between subjects factors and Target (2) as the
within subject factor. The within subject factor compared the responses to the two questions:
the importance of the community for the individual (labelled as ‘community for individual’
and the importance of the individual for the community (labelled as ‘individual for
community’). Summary statistics for the analysis are shown in table 9 and the mean scores
are presented graphically in figure 3.
Table 9: Summary Anova results for the comparison of the two items
Within subjects Wilk’s
Lambda
df F p
Target 0.67 1,385 186.79 0.000
Target x Nation 0.97 1,385 11.37 0.001
Target x Age
Target x Nation x Age
0.99
1.00
1,385
1,385
1.78
0.15
0.182
0.698
Between subjects df F p
Nation 1,385 42.49 0.000
Age 1,385 14.88 0.656
Nation x Age 1,385 0.34 0.025
The analysis revealed a main effect of Target indicating that across both samples, ‘the
individual for the community’ was rated more highly than ‘the community for the
individual’. The Target x Nation interaction indicated that the ratings by the Slovaks and the
Scots varied as a function of Target. For the Scottish sample, no differences were obtained in
their ratings of the ‘importance of the individual for the community’ or the ‘importance of
the community for the individual’ with means of 4.01 and 3.93, respectively. In contrast, the
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Slovaks rated these two items differently, with the ‘importance of the community for the
individual’ rated significantly lower than that for the ‘importance of the individual for the
community’, with mean scores of 3.06 and 3.91, respectively. From figure 3 it can be seen
that the Scottish sample showed no differences in their rating of the two items, both Scots
and Slovaks equally rated the ‘importance of the individual for the community’; however, the
Slovaks do not perceive the community as being important for the individual.
Figure 3: Mean scores for two items from the individual and the community rating scale.
Factor analysis of the ‘Community Scale’.
To determine how the Community Scale items were related to each other, the data
from both samples, i.e. from the Slovaks and the Scots, were pooled and entered into a
principal components factor analysis using varimax rotation. An item was included in a given
factor if (a) its loading on that factor was higher than on any other factor and (b) its loading
was equal to or greater than 0.40. Factor scores for each individual were calculated to allow
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comparison between the Slovaks and Scots. The analysis revealed four factors which
accounted for 50.4% of the total variance.  Factor one, items relating to the economy,
(Eigenvalue 6.03; 23.2% variance) comprised ten terms; ‘market economy’, ‘privatisation’,
‘profit’, ‘private enterprise’, ‘the State’, ‘political parties’, ‘capitalism’, ‘money’, ‘nation’
and ‘public interest’. Factor two, items relating to democracy, (Eigenvalue 3.70; 14.2%) was
characterised by eight terms; ‘freedom’, ‘justice’, ‘human rights’, ‘minority rights’,
‘equality’, ‘democracy’, ‘peace’, and ‘law and order’. Factor three, items relating to the self,
(Eigenvalue 2.15;  8.3% variance) contained six terms; ‘self determination’, ‘character’,
‘personal security’, ‘personal responsibility’; ‘self interest’ and ‘the individual’. Factor four,
welfare, (Eigenvalue 1.22; 4.7% variance) contained two terms; ‘welfare’ and ‘wealth’.
Table 10 shows the items making up the four factors and their loadings.
Factor 1 clearly relates to markets and to economy with market economy, privatisation,
profit, private enterprise - together with the state sharing the highest loadings. The next factor
contains a group of items best described, collectively, as democracy, with freedom, justice
and human rights being the items loading most highly on this factor. The next factor contains
a group of items relating to the nature  of the self. These items are concerned essentially, with
autonomy (i.e. self-determination, personal security and personal responsibility). They are
very much a social expression of the human self. The item with the lowest factor loading (out
of six items) is ‘the individual’.  The final factor, comprises the two items ‘welfare’ and
‘wealth’.
236
Table 10: Factor analysis of the community scale items.
Factors                Eigenvalue (variance) Factor
loading
Factor 1: The economy            6.03 (23.2%)
Market economy
Privatisation
Profit
Private enterprise
The State
Political parties
Capitalism
Money
Nation
Public interest
0.78
0.75
0.74
0.71
0.70
0.62
0.59
0.55
0.48
0.40
Factor 2: Democracy               3.70 (14.2%)
Freedom
Justice
Human rights
Minority rights
Equality
Democracy
Peace
Law and order
0.73
0.71
0.71
0.61
0.60
0.58
0.50
0.46
Factor 3: The self                      2.15 (8.3%)
Self determination
Character
Personal security
Personal responsibility
Self interest
The individual
0.74
0.68
0.67
0.65
0.64
0.48
Factor 4: Welfare                      1.22 (4.7%)
Welfare
Wealth
0.72
0.64
The construction of a comparator set of items from the Individual Scale
As the primary interest was in the relationship between the community and the
individual, items from the Individual Scale that corresponded to the items making up the
factors obtained from the Community Scale were selected and combined to form a second set
of scores. Therefore, for example, factor one from the community scale contained ten items,
these same ten corresponding items from the Individual scale were selected. Similarly, the
eight items making up factor two, and the six making up factor three were selected and
combined to form three new comparative sets of scores, now reflecting the target, the
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importance to the Individual. The construction of this second set of matching items allowed
the comparison of the relative importance of items relating to ‘the economy’ (set 1), to
‘democracy’ (set 2) and to ‘the self’ (set 3) in relation to both the well-being of the
community and the well-being of the individual. Since the original factor four from the
community scale contained only two items and accounted for a relatively low percentage of
the variance (4.7%), this item was omitted from any further analysis. Reliability analyses
(Cronbachs alpha coefficients) of the newly constructed second set of items was moderate to
good (0.75; 0.73 and 0.63 for the three sets, respectively).
Comparison of the two national groups on the three sets of items
Three (one for each set of items) 3-way mixed model Anovas were applied to the data
in the form Nation (2) x Age (2) as between subject factors and Target (2) [community or
individual] as within subjects factors. The summary statistics are presented in table11
(sections (a) (b) & (c) and the means are presented graphically in figures 4 to 6
Table 11: Summary Anova results for three sets of items
 (a) Set 1: The economy
Within subjects Wilk’s
Lambda
df F p
Target 0.67 1,385 186.79 0.000
Target x Nation 0.97 1,385 11.37 0.001
Target x Age
Target x Nation x Age
0.99
1.00
1,385
1,385
1.78
0.15
0.182
0.698
Between subjects df F p
Nation 1,385 37.31 0.000
Age 1,385 0.15 0.691
Nation x Age 1,385 5.15 0.024
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(b) Set 2: Democracy
Within subjects Wilk’s
Lambda
df F p
Target 0.98 1,387 7.98 0.005
Target x Nation 1.00 1,387 0.07 0.784
Target x Age
Target x Nation x Age
0.99
1.00
1,387
1,387
0.36
0.49
0.547
0.825
Between subjects df F p
Nation 1,387 13.53 0.000
Age 1,387 2.70 0.101
Nation x Age 1,387 0.00 0.994
(c) Set 3: The self
Within subjects Wilk’s
Lambda
df F p
Target 0.65 1,387 207.03 0.000
Target x Nation 0.99 1,387 3.17 0.076
Target x Age
Target x Nation x Age
0.99
0.99
1,387
1,387
2.09
0.22
0.149
0.634
Between subjects df F p
Nation 1,387 17.98 0.000
Age 1,387 0.19 0.656
Nation x Age 1,387 5.03 0.025
Significant main effects of Target were obtained across all three sets (p<001);
significant main effects of Nation were also obtained across all of the three sets, along with a
significant Target x Nation interaction for set 1,’items relating to ‘the economy’- and a
Nation x Age interaction for set 3 (<0.05), items relating to ‘the self’.
As shown in figure 4, set 1, items relating to the economy were rated, by both
samples, as being more important for the Community than for the Individual. In addition,
whatever the target, the Slovak sample rated these higher than the Scottish sample. However,
the Target x Nation interaction indicates that the Slovak sample showed a larger
differentiation depending on whether the target was the Community or the Individual.
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Figure 4: National mean scores for set 1: items relating to the economy
Figures 5 and 6 show the main effect of Target and the main effect of Nation for sets
2 and 3, respectively.
Set 2 (items relating to democracy), like set 1, were rated as being more important for
the Community than the Individual, by both Slovaks and Scots. From the means displayed in
figure 5, it can be seen, whatever the target, Individual or Community, the Scottish sample
rated these as more important than the Slovak sample.
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Figure 5: National mean scores for set 2: items relating to democracy
Items related to ‘the self’ (set 3), were rated by both Slovaks and Scots as being more
important for the Individual than the Community. Across both targets, Slovaks rated these
more importantly, than the Scottish sample did (see figure 6). In addition to these main
effects of Target and Nation, shown in figure 6, the Nation x Age interaction indicated that
irrespective of target, the nations varied as a function of Age. For the Scottish sample, mean
values across both targets were: 4.01 (younger) and 4.11 (older); in the Slovak sample, the
older age-group rated these higher (4.23) compared to the younger group of Slovaks, (3.92).
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Figure 6: National mean scores for set 3: items relating to the self
In summary, the analyses has revealed that it was meaningful to ask the respondents
to rate a number of political and economic terms both in relation to the importance of the
Community and the importance to the Individual, and with the construction of a second set of
items reflecting this dimension revealing differences in whether the items were viewed more
pro the Community or pro the Individual. All three sets of items revealed main effects of
Target, with items relating to the economy and to democracy being rated more pro the
Community than the Individual. The interaction effect in set 1 (the economy) indicates the
differential nature of economic aspects of the transition process in the Slovak sample.
Similarly, both samples rated items relating to the self as being more pro self than pro
community. The lack of interaction effects for sets two and three indicates that both samples
are viewing these items in a similar manner, ie. both samples are rating them in a similar
direction to each other. However, the main effects of Nation indicates that they carry
different degrees of importance for Slovaks and Scots with differences in the overall mean
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ratings, irrespective of target, revealing that the Scottish sample rating items relating to
democracy more highly than the Slovaks, and the Slovaks rating items relating to the self
more highly than the Scottish sample.
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Discussion
It has been suggested that both modern western individualism and Soviet
Communism, although arising from different bases, share some features in common - the
isolation of individuals, alienation and a loss in the sense of community mutuality. This study
aimed to examine these issues through an examination of the meanings attached to the terms
‘the individual’ and ‘the community’ in Slovaks and Scots, accessed through spontaneously
produced free associations, and through more reflected upon responses through the use of
two rating scales. The examination of all freely produced associations given in response to
the two terms allows an examination of the meaning these terms carry for Scots and Slovaks
as individual terms, in isolation from one another. However, as ‘the individual and the
community form an interdependent relationship in which one cannot be considered in
isolation from the other (Markova, 1997), the relationship between the individual and the
community was examined through the positioning of the two terms in relation to various
political and economic terms in semantic space and through the differential rating of the
Scots and Slovaks in their responses to items in the rating scales.
From the content analysis of all responses given to the term ‘local community’, the
commonest response given by the Scottish sample was to refer to the locale where he/she
lived, followed by responses referring to friends/family/neighbours and also responses
reflecting ‘local community’ as a sense of closeness/togetherness (table 4). In contrast, in the
Slovak sample, responses to ‘local community’ referred to people/groups in general and also
to something that is negative or meaningless. In addition, in the Slovak sample, significantly
more respondents failed to produce an association to the term ‘local community’. Many
individuals in Scotland derive a sense of identity, both in their own eyes and in the eyes of
others, from where they reside. Individuals in Scotland are more likely than individuals in
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Slovakia to have a measure of choice in where they live. If, in addition, they own their
homes, then they are likely to have a personal, as well as an economic, investment in the
community where they reside. Arendt (1967) argued that totalitarianism destroys
communities not only by isolating individuals but also by creating loneliness. Isolation and
loneliness are not one and the same thing: one can be isolated but not lonely; and one can be
lonely in a crowd. Totalitarianism, however, affects both spheres simultaneously. While
totalitarianism breaks up social traditions and isolates people in their public and political
lives, loneliness engulfs the whole of their lives. It uproots individuals. Associations given in
responses to the term ‘the individual’ suggest this sense of loneliness and isolation in the
Slovak sample, but not in the Scottish sample. In the Slovaks, the commonest response to the
term ‘the individual’ was to refer to person/s in general, groups or everybody (see table 7)
followed by associations reflecting the individual as lonely, isolated or small. In contrast, the
Scottish associations reflected responses to ‘the self’ and a sense of individual agency.
Loneliness and isolation has often been claimed to part of modern life in democratic
societies. The present results, as accessed through free associations to the terms ‘the
individual’ and ‘local community’, do not reflect this for Scots. Etzioni (1991) commented
on the growing degree of ‘me-ism’ within American society, the high incidence of responses
(close to 50%) from the Scottish sample reflecting ‘me/self/I’ to the term ‘the individual’
may indicate forms of extreme individualism or to a rise in the importance of self-expression
and self-fulfilment (Inglehart, 1999). In contrast, in Slovaks, both ‘the individual’ and ‘local
community’ carry different meanings, reflecting their specific experiences under Soviet
totalitarianism.
The disruption of naturally occurring community bonds under totalitarianism can be
observed through the examination of the positioning of the terms ‘the individual’ and ‘local
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community’ within semantic space in relation to the other political and economic concepts
used in the word associations (figures 1 & 2). For both Scots and Slovaks, the term ‘the
individual’ was embedded within, or close to, concepts related to ‘traditional’ values of
democracy and individualism such as rights, equality, justice and freedom. In the Scottish
sample, the term ‘local community’ was not embedded within a distinct cluster of terms but
fell between two clusters related to democracy and the economy. Local community, in the
Slovak diagram, was embedded within a cluster of terms including dictatorship, communism
and socialism. The Slovak data gives some support to the claim that under Soviet
totalitarianism, the local community became part of the State apparatus, as an agent of
oppression and coercion, through the use of networks of secret informers and secret police
(Gisbson, 1993; Ashwin, 1998) or through forced compliance (Howard, 2002).
Interdependencies between Individual and Community
The rating scale data examined more the inter-relationship between the individual and
the community. In what ways is the interdependency between the individual and the
community conceived between Slovaks and Scots? From the analysis of single items taken
from the two rating scales (figure 3) the Scottish sample indicated a close interdependency
between the individual and the community. From the rating of the two items ‘how important
is the individual for the community’ and ‘how important is the community for the individual’
the Scottish data suggested a close relationship in the two items, both being as equally
important as each other. However, the Slovaks did not perceive the community to be
important for the individual. Although based purely on responses to two single items, this
gives some further support to that found in the examination of the word association data, that
Soviet totalitarianism changed the nature of the interdependencies between the individual and
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the wider community, under which the community became to be viewed as hostile
(Schopflin, 1993a) and that the nature of the public sphere or civil society, which are
dependent on a sense of community, were destroyed or re-defined (Sztompka, 1998).
Although these have been identified as characteristic features of the previous regime, they
have also been identified as powerful lasting legacies from the communist period, and which
may potentially pose large obstacles in the progress to democracy.
Smolar (1996) questioned whether the individual/wider community relationship
characteristic under Soviet domination, based largely on the opposition of the individual and
the wider community, would be functional within societies undergoing vast political and
economic transformation. There may be little argument that different forms of
individual/community relationship existed, and that these performed different functions
under Soviet communism, largely to adapt to living under oppressive regimes. There is also
little dispute that in transforming both political and economic spheres, the Slovaks are having
to come to terms with, and to adapt to, a whole range of new institutions and social practices,
and a changing relationship between the individual and the community. The main analysis of
the rating scales data specifically examined the relationship between the individual and the
community, focusing on the political and economic aspects of the transitions.
From the factor analysis of the community scale items, three factors emerged
corresponding to ‘the economy’, to ‘democracy’ and to ‘the self’. The results show that
although main affects of nation and target were obtained (figures 4 to 6), the responses of the
Slovaks and the Scots, whether rated pro the community or pro the individual, were generally
consistent. Both samples indicated that items relating to the economy were more important
for the Community than for the Individual, the interaction effect indicated that the Slovaks
differentiated between the importance for the community and the importance for the
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individual in economic issues. In a period of rapid economic change it is hardly surprising
that that the Slovaks rated economic issues as more important for the community than for the
individual. The other two factors did not reveal any interaction effects, both samples rated
items related to democracy as pro the community, and both rated items related to the self as
pro the individual. What is relevant from these data is that when the respondents were asked
to consider a list of political and economic terms and rate them in their importance to both
the community and the individual, the pattern of responses from both the Slovaks and the
Scots were generally consistent. Although the various factors may contain different degrees
of importance for the two nations, how these political and economic aspects are perceived at
the level of importance for either the community or the individual were consistent.
Structure of representations
Concerning the structure of representations, what is stable between the two nations in
their meanings of the terms ‘the individual’ and ‘the community’? Through the content
analysis of the freely produced associations, the meaning of the two terms for Slovaks and
Scots resulted in different distributions of responses. What became relevant when processing
this data was the comment by Szalay & Brent (1967) that often the distribution of responses
we get from associations results in a ‘so what’ response. The responses to the two terms in
the Scottish data led to no great surprises. However when processing the Slovak data,
differences immediately emerged in how these two terms were being responded to. On the
basis of the content analysis of the word associations, it is clear that no central common core
of meaning can be observed across both national samples. However, in the semantic space
analysis of the positioning of the two terms in relation to the other concepts, the term ‘the
individual’, for both Slovaks and Scots, was linked to a cluster containing terms linked to
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democracy and to individualism. However, for the term ‘local community’ no similarity
emerged. It was only through the analysis of the factors that shared common understanding
was evident, and although varying in importance reflecting current political and economic
contexts, the relative importance of economic and political aspects to either the community
or the individual was similar across the two samples.
All social practices and social realities are in a constant process of change and this
includes social representations and their structure (Markova et al, 1997). Social
representations express what is known and taken for granted from the past as well as what is
new or in conflict. These meanings will clash and create tension in the creation of new
meaning and understanding. The individual/community inter-dependencies, in all societies,
form a dynamic process, presenting different forms, performing different functions, and
carrying different meaning under different political, social or historical contexts.
This study has captured the meaning of these two terms at a particular point in time in
Slovakia and Scotland, reflecting common meaning and understanding as accessed through
the responses to single terms. In societies undergoing rapid political, economic and social
change, the meaning of the individual/community relationship will necessarily change, some
aspects may remain relatively stable, some may change more rapidly. Similarly, in Scotland,
if some event, social change or tension occurs that challenges the individual/community
relationship, the boundaries of the various meaning systems will also change. The question of
whether the attempt to destroy communities or the isolation and the insignificance of the
individual, as legacies of Soviet totalitarianism, will remain a pervading feature in the minds
of Slovaks, this study cannot answer.
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CHAPTER 9:  CHANGES IN THE MEANING OF THE TERM ‘DEMOCRACY’ IN SLOVAKS
AND SCOTS.
By the mid 1990s, the political climate in Central and eastern Europe was probably at
its most dynamic and changing compared to the recent past histories of the various nations
involved. After the initial period of optimism and expectation, immediately after the fall of
the previous regimes, the people were now facing the realities of the democratic transition
process, and were now all following their own route to democracy. What does democracy
mean to the Slovaks seven years after the collapse of the previous regimes? From the initial
period in 1992 when the word association and rating scale date were first sampled, by 1996
what has remained stable in how democracy is understood, what has changed? Comparable
word association data for the Czech Republic are also included for the period 1994 to 1996,
allowing the examination of the meaning of democracy in these two separate, but historically
linked nations.
The question of stability also featured prominently in the specialist literature. In view
of the unique and complex situation of mass political reform along with mass economic
reform, concerns were being raised regarding the overall stability of the newly formed
democratic regimes. Many argued that mass commitment to democracy would not be able to
withstand any economic crisis and that possibly the democratic reforms may collapse. Any
initial support for democracy may only reflect the rejection of the Soviet-led regimes along
with high levels of optimism about the benefits of democracy, characterised through the
initial embracing of the symbols of democracy, without real experience of what democracy
means in practice (Shin, 1994; Gibson, 1996).
Schopflin (1993b) identified two major strands underlying the political and economic
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transitions. Firstly, a widespread desire for economic improvement and for a much higher
standard of living than was previously experienced, ie. the most obvious and visible aspects,
in comparative terms, of the material benefits of Western cultures. Secondly, the legacy of
having lived under a system that was persistently regarded by many as lacking in legitimacy.
Accepting the complex and far-reaching nature of the transformation from political, legal,
economic, belief systems, morality and so on, he viewed the process ahead as resulting in a
widespread feeling of disunity, arising from two main sources. The misbelief that somehow
the market was tied to prosperity, and not as a complicated system of prices and wages,
supply and demand which would necessarily result in the differential access to goods and
services, he believed, would lead to a high level of economic impatience. The combination of
historically a high level of state dependency, low economic and political literacy would, he
predicted, result in widespread disillusionment. In 1991, Kornai maintained that in the long
term the discipline of markets will increase economic efficiency but in the short term
economic pressures may threaten popular support for democracy. In view of these types of
concerns, various solutions had been proposed: from the slowing down of economic reforms
to allow democracy to become more stabilised (Kirschbaum, 1997) to the idea of the
suspension of politics to allow greater economic stability to be established (Dahrendorf,
1990). Similarly, Agh (1990) predicted that the 1990s would be a decade of chaos and
uncertainty in Central and Eastern Europe characterised by intense social unrest threatening
the democratisation process and resulting in the very real threat of the re-emergence of right-
wing dictatorships. One solution was the speedy integration of the Central and Eastern
European nations into the wider Europe which, would, through binding contracts and
economic assistance not only smooth the political and economic reforms but also alleviate
the threat of anti-liberal and anti-democratic movement. He viewed the possible separation of
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politics and people as a real threat.
In addition to the complexities of combining both political and economic reform,
concerns were also being raised regarding the general political climate in the region, viewed
largely as arising through the experiences and legacies of the communist period. Plichtova
(1993) questioned, specifically for Slovakia, whether the new constitution of 1992 was
simply yet another set of empty slogans, reminiscent of the communist period, with the new
Declaration far removed from the experienced reality, with ambiguous combinations of old
and new political and economic power structures, bribable judges and lawyers and massively
corrupt officials in all levels of institutional life.
Agh (1998) also linked the issue of mass public support to the idea of a ‘cultural
deficit’ in relation to the low democratic behaviour of the new elites. He described the
behaviour and mentality of the new parliamentary elites as displaying less democratic
behaviour patterns than that of the people. Within a broad post-communist perspective, he
identified the transitions on two levels. The initial negotiated, and relatively smooth, transfer
of power between the old elites, ie. corresponding to the first round of the new parliaments.
The second, missing level, was not extended to include any negotiations between the new
elites and their opposition; or between elites, opposition and the people. Politically, the
climate became overly fragmented, characterised by political and ideological infighting
displaying low levels of compromise and low levels of tolerance of opponents. These
sentiments were mirrored by the Slovak President, during an address to the political leaders
and the public during the 1994 elections “..the election campaign should not turn into a life
and death struggle where the sole aim is the moral and political destruction of
opponents…after the election we must meet and cooperate with those we have insulted [to
the public]…to respect the results of the election…in a democracy the minority must accept
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the majority view…in future elections, the winners may become the losers” (Leff, 1998,
p105/106).
If the transformation process is viewed from the most basic procedural requirements
of a democratic system, ie. the holding of elections with more than one party, and that the
opposition has at least some chance of winning, by the mid 1990s Slovakia, like the other
nations, had completed a series of elections. Although free elections may be viewed as a
necessary requirement for democracy, are they, in themselves, sufficient? Reisinger et al
(1995) point out two competing theories: democracy rests on the general contestation
between elites, in essence, requiring no more that periodic opportunities for the public to pass
judgement on the performance of the elites, ie. periodic elections or to the growing emphasis
that democracy rests on some other additional requirement on the behalf of the general
public, however, “what these are remain poorly understood” (p943). Carothers (2002)
criticised the false assumption that the existence of regular and genuine elections would give
post-totalitarian governments legitimacy. An additional conception calls for some sort of
mass participation and general support for government decisions, in effect, government for
the people by the people (Rose, 1997: Mishler & Rose, 2002).
Popular support for democracy
Across recent decades popular support for democracy in the ‘older’ democracies
have, through the use of various conceptions and indicators, been of prime concern for those
interested in comparative politics. As indicated in Chapter 4, these have been perceived to
reflect various crises of democracy (Norris, 1999). Since the 1990s, the new post-communist
nations have opened up new opportunities to assess, predict and evaluate democratic
transition, stability and consolidation through the use of large-scale public opinion surveys.
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Within the ‘older’ democracies, swings of support or falling rates of participation in the
democratic process although may be of concern, the stability of democracy as a political
regime is not under threat. Public apathy may increase, political divides may be large, parties
and political institutions may be distrusted, corruption may be high and there may be
widespread dissatisfaction. However, these do not threaten the actual democratic regime.
Major democratic reforms may often be necessary but not the question of democratic rule.
Whereas, in the newly emerging democracies, the question of popular support for the new
regimes was identified as a crucial issue in advancing or hindering the transition (Miller et al,
1997).
Evaluating democracy at the institutional level, for example, in comparative terms in
the characterisation of a nation, or various nations, as being more or less democratic is
fraught with difficulties (Munck & Verkuilen, 2002). The evaluation of support for
democracy at the level of the general public brings additional problems. Sztompka (1998) has
suggested that the question of mass support for democracy may be approached by
considering indicators that may point to a lack of support. One such indicator, he argues, is
low voter turnout observed within Poland, with around 50% of the population choosing to
abstain, dropping to around only 32% in local elections. Other indicators were increased
mass demonstrations, political rallies and waves of strikes; along with low interest in private
investment or in saving for the future. Although these indicators may point to some level of
dissatisfaction with the democratic reforms, however, in themselves do not threaten the
stability of the new democratic regimes, but possibly only that reforms are necessary.
In view of the dynamic nature of the post-communist period along with the general
fear that the ‘new’ democracies may be lacking in stability, a whole range of large-scale
public opinion surveys were conducted and framed within the growing view that democratic
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regimes are dependent on public support for their stability (Mishler & Rose, 2000; 2002).
Comparative support with ‘traditional’ democracies
One method of examining popular support is to compare support in newly emerging
democracies with support in established democracies. Between 1993 and 1994 the
Eurobarometer, sponsored by the European Commission, surveyed a number of European
Union nations. The survey specifically asked: ‘ on the whole, are you satisfied with how
democracy is working in your country’? Support was measured on a 4-point scale from ‘not
at all satisfied’ to ‘very satisfied’. Results reported by Rose (1997) revealed that across the
European Union there were vast disagreements about whether or not democracy was working
across the surveyed nations. On the whole, across all nations, 53% were satisfied to some
extent, with 47% reporting some level of dissatisfaction. There were, however, vast cross-
national differences, with only around 19% of Italians satisfied with around 80% of Danes
satisfied. The question was also surveyed across a number of Central and Eastern European
post-communist nations and although overall support was lower, around 30%, again, there
were large cross-national differences with 50% of Czechs and 42% of Poles expressing some
satisfaction, dropping to 16% and 17% in Belarus and the Ukraine. Post-communist and
European Union comparisons revealed that seven of nine Central and Eastern European
nations showed higher satisfaction than Italy; Czechs, Poles and Romanians expressed
greater satisfaction than the Greeks and the Spanish.
From comparative surveys such as these a number of interpretations are possible. If
low popular support is identified in established democracies and in newly emerging
democracies, are the possible consequences for the stability of the regimes identical in both?
would low support in a newly emerging democracy result in a different outcome than low
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support in an established democracy? Both are very different kinds of regime and is the
question suitable or comparable in both? Rose raises the issue of asking about the evaluation,
or level of support, of democracy in countries with very different political histories. When
individuals are required to respond to questions such as how much support they have or how
satisfied they are with democracy, what is this relative to? does it refer to, for example, to
what is experienced or to some imagined ideal? Referring to a study conducted in 1993
across eight post-communist nations asking about the aims of introducing democracy, and
the actual practice of their experienced democracy revealed consistent trends- across all
nations, those in favour of the aims of democracy outnumbered those against; those negative
about the reality of democracy outnumbered those who were positive (Rose, 1997, p13)
Churchill hypothesis – democracy as the ‘lesser evil’
Rose (1997) maintains that instead of viewing the transition process as a move to
some possibly unattainable democratic ideal, the crucial issue for the post-communist nations
may be linked more to the idea of escape from dissatisfaction. Surveys investigating
satisfaction with democracy, or the gap between experienced and ideal democracy, allow
some evaluation of the process, but for the post-communist nations in a transitional period
the evaluation of the Churchill hypothesis of democracy may be of greater importance.
“Many forms of government have been tried and will be tried in this world of
sin and woe. No one pretends that democracy is perfect or all wise. Indeed, it
has been said that democracy is the worst form of government, except all
those other forms that have been tried from time to time” (Churchill, 1947, cited
in Rose & Mishler, 1996, p31).
Given that societies need some form of government, democracy may be deemed better
than any other alternative that has existed, it doesn’t have to be perfect or even that good but
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may simply be evaluated as the ‘lesser evil’. Testing this hypothesis requires questions which
reflect real experienced political regimes, rather than ideals, should refer to the regime as a
whole without dissecting parts accepted and parts rejected and should reflect negative as well
as positive sentiments. Under the auspices of the New Democracies Barometer (NDB), Rose
and his colleagues, during the early 1990s, carried out a series of surveys across various
Central and Eastern European post-communist nations in an attempt to test the ‘lesser of two
evils’ hypothesis (Rose & Mishler, 1996; Mishler & Rose, 1999). The scales used were
devised to measure negative as well as positive evaluations and ran from -100 as worst to
+100 best. Two questions were used: where would you place your current regime with free
elections and many parties, and where would you place the former communist regime,
thereby directly measuring past and present evaluations on a common scale. Data were
collected in 1991, 1992, 1993 and 1995. Seven nations were included in this series of surveys
and here I will report primarily on data relating to the Czech Republic and Slovakia, where
available. Table 1 shows the initial 1991 baseline survey data for Slovakia and the Czech
Republic along with the average for the seven NDB nations.
Table 1: 1991 Baseline Support
Slovakia Czech
Republic
NDB
average
% supporting current regime 50 71 59
% supporting communist regime 44 23 35
% preferring current vs previous 51 78 62
      from Mishler & Rose 1999 (p84)
In 1991 in percentage terms, majorities supported the new regimes, however,
Slovakia was among the lowest with 50% and the Czech Republic, the highest (71%).
Support for the previous, communist regime, was lower for Czech (23%) and among the
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highest in Slovaks (44%). Comparisons between the relative scores for previous vs current
revealed that for Czechs 78% preferred the current regime and only 51% of Slovaks preferred
the new. Although across all nations there was overall preferences for the new regimes, this
was indicated by giving less negative scores to the new  regimes than the previous regimes
(Mishler & Rose, 1999).
Table 2:  Percentages supporting current and communist regimes: 1992-1995
Slovakia Czech
Republic
NDB
average
Current regime support
NDB-II 1992 58 71 60
NDB-III 1993 52 78 61
NDB-IV 1995 61 77 65
Communist regime support
NDB-II 1992 48 29 43
NDB-III 1993 50 23 41
NDB-IV 1995 52 24 40
         From Mishler & Rose 1999 (p87)
The data for subsequent years (Table 2) revealed that the Czech Republic remained among
the highest for current regime support and among the lowest for previous regime support;
whereas Slovakia fell among the average for current regime support and above average for
previous regime support. Unfortunately, relative data on ‘present versus previous’ were not
included by the authors for the three later time periods, 1992, 1993 and 1995. However, the
authors conclude that in all nations, except Bulgaria, support has been growing steadily for
the new regimes and after early indications of a rise in nostalgia, support for the previous
regime has been declining.
Extending the 1995 NDB data, Rose (1998) divided the survey population into four
distinct groups based on their relative positive/negative evaluations for previous and current
regimes. The four classification groups were:  ‘Democrats’ (disapprove communist, approve
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current); ‘Sceptics’ (disapprove both regimes); ‘Compliant’(approve both regimes) and
‘Reactionary’ (approve communist, disapprove current). Table 3 shows the pattern of the
distribution for the four classifications for Slovakia and the Czech Republic along with the
average NDB data.
Table 3: Classification groupings
Slovakia Czech
Republic
NDB
average
Democrats 30 61 41
Sceptics 18 15 20
Compliant 31 18 24
Reactionary 22 8 15
         from Rose 1998 (p289)
Over sixty percent of the Czech sample were classified as confirmed ‘democrats’
compared to only 30% of the Slovaks. Both ‘democrats’ and ‘sceptics’ are within the view of
democracy held by the Churchill hypothesis in that, democracy doesn’t have to be liked or
even valued, only that it is deemed better than the alternatives. Comparing the Czechs and
Slovaks across these two categories indicates that less than 50% of the Slovaks evaluate their
current regime as relatively more attractive, or less unattractive, than the previous communist
regime: whereas, in the Czech sample this figure rose to around three quarters. The largest
group within the Slovaks were classified as ‘compliant’ (31%), with high compliance either
signifying a ‘wait and see’ attitude or passivity (Rose & Mishler, 1996). For the future
stability of the new regimes, the ‘reactionary’ category would pose the greatest threat with
attitudes more positive to the communist regime and negative to the new democratic regime.
For the data presented during 1995, almost a quarter of the Slovaks fall into this category and
only 8% of the Czechs classified as ‘reactionary’. Across these various surveys, clearly, the
Czech Republic appear to embrace their new democracy more than that found in Slovakia.
Low support for democracy, either through the lack of positive support for the new regimes
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or relatively higher support for the communist regime could, theoretically, pose stability
problems.
Political cultural theorists maintain that if the structure of government conflicts with
the general political culture the regimes will lack legitimacy; if regimes lack legitimacy,
enabling them to be sustained through periods of uncertainty, then democracy itself may be
threatened (Norris, 1999). However, under this view, two paths are possible, either a rise in
anti-democratic thinking or dissatisfied democrats. Most questions concerning the post-
communist period ask whether or not there exists a democratic culture receptive to
democracy that would sustain democratic institutions and processes (Fleron, 1996).
Democratic culture has been approached from a variety of ways, using indicators
such as trust in various political institutions (Rose, 1994 a, b; Mishler & Rose, 2001), to the
breaking down of the concept of democracy as a process into varying sets of component parts
and applying these in survey form across various nations (Dalton, 1999; Klingemann, 1999).
Fuch’s (1999) equates democratic culture with support for democracy, however, he adds -
which aspects of democracy have still not been identified. Rather than adding to the debate
on political culture and its variants, in a period of rapid political and economic change it may
be more useful to focus on anti-democratic culture or anti-democratic thought. Is there any
evidence of an anti-democratic culture threatening the stability of the new regimes?
Memories of Europe’s troubled twentieth century reminds us of the coming together of
various events: from those generated outwith the region, to local and to historical, that led
Germany, a well established democracy with a complex civil society and highly
differentiated class structure to choose another fateful route (Mazawer, 1998). Although the
surveys conducted through the New Democracies Barometer indicated that majorities
favoured the new regimes as compared to their previous, communist regimes, other
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alternatives are possible. Bufacchi (2001) argues that threats to democracy arise in those who
have a belief in certainty; certainty and truth are usually proclaimed through two dominant
forces, totalitarianism and religious fundamentalism. However, underlying certainty and truth
as extreme beliefs, there lies stability and security. Soviet societies were characterised by
their rigidity, the concept of change was generally alien (Schopflin 1993a). Democracy in
itself carries no promise of stability, and for Golubovic (1994) what may be desired in the
post-communist period is a sense of stability and security. Both Dahrendorf (1990) and
Klicperova et al (1997) have suggested that to alleviate the often complex, slow to achieve
results, and often untidy nature of democracy, some other form of authoritarian rule may be
preferable to democracy.
Beyond the democratic ‘lesser evil’ – alternatives to democracy
The Churchill hypothesis as presented above emphasises comparative evaluations
between two competing regimes: the previous regime and the present regime. With the
sudden collapse of Communist rule the nations of Central and Eastern Europe were not only
free to choose their form of government, but were forced to choose, in a relatively short
period of time and under conditions of rapid political and economic change with highly
fluctuating circumstances (Rose et al, 1998). Even if a new democracy is far from sufficient
it may still be preferred as the lesser evil as compared to communist rule. If disenchantment
is high, or patience low, if the new democracies are failing to provide adequately for the
populations or if the populations have unrealistic or idealist expectations of what democracy
should provide, other undemocratic alternatives are possible. Could, for example, an
authoritarian regime or military rule be evaluated as the lesser evil as compared to
democratic rule? Is there any evidence of anti-liberal or anti-democratic thinking in the
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nations of post-communist Europe?
Haerpfer (2001) also using data collected through the NDB surveys during the 1990s,
extended the question beyond an assessment of previous regime vs present regime to include
additional indicators which may point to instability of the democratic reforms and/or
evidence of ant-liberal or anti-democratic movements. In addition to asking the respondents
to assess the previous communist and present regimes, he included questions covering issues
such as optimism about the future of parliaments, support for parliaments, three alternatives
to democracy: authoritarian rule,  military rule or rule by a monarchy, and general optimism
about the future of democracy. He created a nine-item Index of Democracy across five
Central European nations reflecting various periods of time between 1991 and 1998. The
final scores were based on the responses to nine items, with a value of 10 indicating that a
person was ‘democratic’ on all 9 items; a value of 9 indicating a ‘democratic’ evaluation on 8
from the 9 items, down to a score of 1 indicating that a respondent was ‘non-democratic’ on
all 9 items. Although the resultant index scores could run from 1 through to 10, the values
were collapsed to form four groups (‘democrats’,  ‘weak democrats’, ‘weak non-democrats’
and ‘non-democrats’), the results were presented by the author only for the percentages of
those scoring 8-10 (democrats and weak democrats). The five Central European nations
included were Hungary, Poland, the Czech and Slovak Republics and Slovenia. Here I will
report of the data for the Czech and Slovak Republics along with the overall mean for all five
nations. Table 4 shows the percentage of Slovaks and Czech respondents identified as
‘democrats’ or ‘weak democrats’ along with the five nation average.
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Table 4: Percentage of Slovak and Czech respondents scoring eight or above on Haerpfer’s
Index of democracy
Slovakia Czech
Republic
NDB
average
1994 55 77 57
1996 53 69 52
1998 55 65 61
      From Haerpfer, 2001 (p270)
Haerpfer interpreted the results in terms of three levels of democracy: ‘consolidated
democracy’ as reflected by more than 60% labelled as ‘democrats’: ‘emerging democracy’,
by more than 40% labelled as ‘democrats’ and less than 40% ‘democrats as reflecting a
‘transforming society’. From the percentages presented in Table 4 it is clear that using this
Index, the Czech Republic were well within a ‘consolidated democracy’ and were shown to
be the most democratically positive nation throughout the entire period. The Slovak
Republic, although within the overall average, failed to reach ‘consolidation’ and was
classified as an ‘emerging democracy’. Unfortunately, the author did not provide nation-level
data for all 9 Index items. For non-democratic alternatives to democracy there was little or no
evidence to support either military rule or rule by a monarchy with an overall percentage
below 5 in all nations. The item tapping authoritarian rule specifically asked – ‘do you agree
with the view that it is best to get rid of parliament and elections and have a strong leader
who can decide things quickly’. During the first survey in 1992, in both the Slovak and
Czech Republics, 24% of the respondents were in agreement with the idea of an authoritarian
leader, however by 1998 the Czech Republic had dropped by 11 points to 13%; in the Slovak
Republic, over the same period of time, little or no change was indicated (23%). From these
data the Slovak Republic had not yet reached ‘consolidation’ and was classified as still
‘emerging’, however, it can be argued that the future of the democratic regimes were not
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under threat of anti-democratic tendencies. The desire for a strong leader who can get things
done, in itself, is not anti-democratic. However, the suspension of parliament, however one
chooses to define democracy, is anti-democratic. Unfortunately these two aspects were
combined within one question making it impossible to separate out the question of the desire
for a strong leader which may be desired by the Slovaks in a period of general political unrest
(Evans & Whitefield, 1998); or to the question of the suspension of parliament.
The strength of the above work is that a large body of comparable data has been
gathered across many of the post-communist nations since the fall of the previous regimes.
For those interested in the global assessment of democracy and regime change this data
provides an invaluable source of evidence. The major weakness, from a social science
perspective, is the strict institutional grounding of the survey questions – one regime versus
another- along with the reduction of democracy into typologies created through the
combining and collapsing of various components and processes. Norris (1999) has also noted
that through the use of large-scale comparative surveys, support for democracy has been
reported in large numbers of counties from Western and Central Europe, North and South
America and Asia. This work, she argues, may only tap “abstract approval for the broad
ideals and principles of democracy which may be rooted in shallow support for particular
aspects, like tolerance of dissenting views or minority rights” (p17). However, whether
tapping into broad ideals like democracy or support for particular aspects, the existence of
popular approval could be misleading (Fleron, 1996). What has to be considered is whether
these carry the same meaning for all concerned; specifically, whether they carry the same
meaning in traditional democracies and newly emerging democracies. To illustrate Fleron
(ibid), described a conversation in a Chinese University around the time of the Tienanmen
massacre: the students were enthusiastic about American style democracy and when further
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pressed they were enthusiastic about the idea of ‘one man-one vote’. However, when
explained to them that, in reality, this would mean that illiterate peasants would have an
equal say in voting as they did, they began to question democracy as performed in the USA.
This anecdotal example indicates the inherent problems in trying to examine the
meaning of complex issues, or complex terms like democracy. What may appear on one level
as an agreement, when more fully examined different meanings are attached and what may
first appear as agreement may in fact only be a pseudo-agreement (Markova, 1996). For
example, in a study of elected Mayors in Slovakia (Plichtova, 1993), the majority of the
mayors were in agreement with the importance of civil and political rights and freedoms for
democracy. However, when further examined, the overwhelming majority (around three-
quarters) supported the introduction of laws restricting the freedom of expression, and in
particular the expression of dissenting political views. Rather than political rights and
freedoms conceived and understood broadly as various institutions consisting of opposition,
the recognition of minority rights and popular opinion which may balance of control of
power, at a deeper level these were conceived more as threats to democracy by the Mayors.
To what may appear as an agreement or support in principle, that civil and political rights
and freedom are important for democracy, in substance, different understandings were
elaborated. In addition, this data also indicates prevailing legacies from the communist style
of thinking. Decades of an ‘ideological correct’ approach to society which expressed high
intolerance of opposition views, that the State knows best and that in some way the people
have to directed still clearly remain in the thinking of the elected elites (ibid). Similarly
Gibson (1996), although finding overwhelming support for political rights and freedom in
relation to democratic principles and values in the former USSR, when explored further, in
relation to what he calls the ‘acid test’ (p339) of whether this involved the toleration of
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minority opinions or political opposition, these were rejected. Gibson raises the question of
whether support for democracy, or the structure of the meaning of democracy is “a mile
wide, but only a inch deep” (p397).
The aim of this chapter is to specifically examine whether or not the meaning of the
term democracy changes across three time periods, 1992, 1994 and 1996 in Slovakia and
Scotland. The original word association data for Slovaks and Scots formed the basis of
Chapter 6, with the addition of a similar data-set from the periods 1994 and 1996. Is it
possible to identify changes in the meaning of the term democracy? The data presented in
Chapter 6 represents a static picture of the meaning of democracy in Scots and Slovaks in
one period of time, by 1994 and 1996 had the meaning of democracy changed, specifically
for Slovaks, in light of greater experiences of the new regime. Were hopes unrealistically
high in 1992?
Chapter 6 also reflects the meaning of democracy only for Slovaks, who experienced
the revolutions of 1989 and the initial setting up of the new institutions as part of the joint
Czecho-slovak state, by early 1993 two independent Czech and Slovak nation states had been
established. No data were available for Czechs during this initial period, by 1994 and 1996
the study has increased to include word association data from the Czech Republic. How does
the meaning of democracy, as accessed through word associations, vary between Slovaks and
Czechs over two periods of time. Can a common core be identified signifying a common
meaning in these two nations, what varies between the nations that may reflect their differing
present day realities of the transitions?
In addition to word association data presented for the Slovaks and Scots in 1996, two
other data sets are included from this period. Firstly, a rating scale similar to that presented in
Chapter 6 in which various terms are rated in relation to their importance for democracy,
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interview data are included from the same period collected in Scotland and Slovakia. What is
the meaning of democracy, the experiences of democracy, and how are the meanings of
democracy reflected in how it is talked about in these two nations.
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Methods
Summary of data presented
Three kinds of data are presented: word associations to the term democracy; a rating scale of
33 terms/concepts which may or may not help to explain democracy and in-depth interviews
examining the meaning and experience of democracy. The results are presented in three parts
Part 1(a): the possible changes in the meaning of democracy accessed through word
associations to the term democracy over three time periods (1992, 1994 & 1996) in
Scots and Slovaks .
Part 1 (b)  a comparison of word associations to the term democracy in Slovak and
Czech participants from 1994 to 1996
Part 2:  a comparison of Scots’ and Slovaks’ ratings of 33 pre-selected terms which
may or may help in their explanation of what democracy means to them. The data
for this part were collected in 1996.
Part 3: in-depth interviews carried out during 1996 with Scottish and Slovak
participants concerning their definition and experience of democracy.
Part 1 (a) Associations to the term ‘democracy’ in Slovaks and Scots over three time
periods.
Word associations to the term ‘democracy’ were collected in Scottish and Slovak
samples over three time periods: 1992, 1994 and 1996. The 1992 data has already been
presented and forms part of the analysis section of Chapter 6. These data have been included
here to allow comparison of the possible changes in the meaning of the term ‘democracy’
across all three data collection periods. The 1992 data already presented in Chapter 6
included data collected from 300 Slovaks and 275 Scottish comprising three generations- 18-
25 years, 38-46 years and 65-73 years. During the later two periods (1994 & 1996) no data
were collected from the oldest age-group; the samples in these two periods comprised only
two age-groups, 18-23 years and 40-45 years. To allow greater comparability of the 1992
data with the data collected during the two later periods, the word associations from the
oldest age-group in 1992 were excluded from the analysis. In summary, the word
associations data presented comprises:
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For 1992: the combined data from the two age-groups(18-25 years and 38-46 years)
for Scots and for Slovaks.
For 1994 and 1996: the combined data for the two age-groups (18-23 years and 40-45
years) for Scots and for Slovaks.
Participants and general procedure
On all three occasions there were 200 Scottish participants in each sample and in the
Slovak samples, 200 in both 1992 and 1994 with 296 in 1996. Half of the sample for both
Slovaks and Scots in 1992 were 18-25 years and half were 38- 45 years, and during 1994 and
1996 half were 18-23 years and half were 40-45 years. Half were male and half female with
50% educated to university level and 50% were not. The same instructions were given to the
participants on all three occasions: that the aim of the study was to examine people’s
perceptions of various political and economic terms. See Chapter 7 Methods section for the
instructions given to the respondents and more detailed data collection information. Each
term was printed, in a random order, on a separate page within a booklet and the respondents
were asked to produce one association for each stimulus term. In contrast to the analysis of
the word association data for 1992 presented in Chapter 6, where two approaches, both
focussing on the term ‘democracy’ were employed: the positioning of the term ‘democracy’
in semantic space with regard to the other terms and content analysis of all responses to the
term ‘democracy’ only the latter is presented here. The 1992 data were re-classified and re-
analysed (see below).
Reclassification of the word association data
All associations to the term ‘democracy’ were content analysed and placed into one
of thirteen mutually exclusive categories. The original classification scheme for the 1992
data contained nine categories. When the word association data was collected again during
1994, the original 1992 data-set was re-examined and incorporated into a new classification
scheme. The classification scheme was enlarged from the original to incorporate a greater
proportion of the associations (rising from 70% for Slovaks and 83% for Scots in the 1992
classification to close to 90% for both samples): rights and freedoms were combined in the
original scheme, in the new classification, freedom was retained as a separate category with
no further sub-division. The remaining associations were grouped into two general broad
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categories, those pertaining to associations which were more definitional and those more
evaluative in nature. These two broad categories were further sub-divided into eight sub-
categories of definitional type responses and 4 sub-categories of responses which were
evaluative. Table 5 shows the three broad categories of response along with the further sub-
division of the definitional and evaluative responses.
For all comparisons log linear analyses were applied to the categorical data. For the
first set of analyses the samples were compared across the three broad categories of response
(see table 5) over the three time periods, followed by a comparison of the sub-categories
making up the definitional responses, then the sub-categories making up the evaluative
responses. The three-way model of interest was Category x Nation x Time, and the two-way,
Category x Nation.
Table 5. The three broad categories of responses along with the breakdown of the definitional
and evaluative categories
Three broad categories of
response
Sub-categories within the
definitional and evaluative
categories.
(1) Freedom no further sub-division
(2) Definitional rights
equality
politics/government
justice/laws
voting/election
reference to own nation
reference to other nations
other definitional
(3) Evaluative hopes/desires
doesn’t exist
negative/disappointment
positive evaluation
Part 1 (b) Associations to the term ‘democracy’ in Slovaks and Czechs over two time
periods.
During 1994 and 1996 data were collected from participants from the Czech
Republic. The methods, participants and categorisation of the word associations were the
same as for Part 1(a). During 1994 there were 168 Czech respondents, and in 1996, 200. The
analysis of the data also followed the same format: examination of the three broad categories
of response (freedom, definitional and evaluative) in the Slovaks and Czechs over two time
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periods followed by an examination of (a) the sub-categories making up the definitional and
(b) the sub categories making up the evaluative responses.
Log-linear analyses were applied to the categorical data across the various
comparisons and these followed the same format in Part1(a). For the full 3-way interaction
the form was Nation x Category x Time and for the 2-way, Nation x Category.
Part 2: Comparison of Scots and Slovaks across a rating scale of terms relevant to
democracy
Two hundred respondents from both Slovakia and Scotland completed a rating scale
task during 1996. The respondents taking part in this task were the same as those taking part
in the 1996 word association task i.e. 50% aged 18-23 years and 50% aged 40-45 years; 50%
male and 50% female and 50% educated to university level and 50% below university level
education. For the Slovak sample, 200 respondents from the 296 completing the word
association task took part in the rating scale task. Each respondent was presented with a list
of 33 terms and were asked to indicate using a 4-point scale the extent to which each of the
terms would help them to explain what democracy means to them. A score of ‘0’ indicated
‘does not help to explain democracy’ to a score of ‘3’ ‘explains a great deal’. The 33 terms
are shown in table 6 (a).
Table 6 (a): The 33 items used in the democracy rating scale
1 Political parties 18 Private enterprise
2 Public opinion 19 The individual
3 Money 20 Privacy
4 Religion 21 Personal responsibility
5 Capitalism 22 The State
6 Privatisation 23 Self interest
7 Minority rights 24 Personal security
8 Parliament 25 Fraternity
9 District/local council 26 Freedom
10 Justice 27 Equality
11 Wealth 28 Public interest
12 Market economy 29 Ideology
13 Socialism 30 Opposition
14 Nation 31 Law and order
15 Government 32 Human rights
16 Profit 33 Dictatorship
17 Constitution
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Demographic summary for word association and rating scale sections
1992/1994/1996 phases in the Scottish and Slovak samples
As has been consistent throughout the various studies, additional demographic
information other than age, gender and educational status, if requested, was included in the
rating section of the tasks. No additional demographic questions were asked in 1992.
Religious status and religious attendance were included during the 1994 phase and these data
have been presented in Chapter 8. Similarly, in 1996, these same two questions were asked
again. Tables 6 (b) and 6 (c) duplicates the information from Chapter 8 (for 1994) and adds
the 1996 data. The 1996 data presented for the Slovak sample has been taken from the 200
respondents taking part in the rating scale section. However, the 1996 word association data
was obtained from 294 Slovak respondents, 200 of those taking part in the rating scale
section with the remaining extra 94 Slovaks in the word association section having no
religious demographic data available.
Table 6 (b):  Religious categories in the Slovak and Scottish respondents in 1994 and 1996
Protestant
Frequency (%)
Catholic
Frequency (%)
Other
Frequency (%)
No Religion
Frequency (%)
Scottish 1994 94 (47.2) 39 (19.8) 4 (2.0) 60 (30.5)
Slovak 1994 15 (7.6) 114 (57.6) 7 (3.5) 62 (31.5)
Scottish 1996 121 (60.5) 25 (12.5) 4 (2.0) 50 (25.0)
Slovak 1996 19 (9.5) 102 (51.0) 6 (3.0) 73 (36.5)
Table 6 (c): Attendance at a place of religion in the Scottish and Slovak respondents in 1994 and
1996.
Never
Frequency (%)
Occasionally
Frequency (%)
Regularly
Frequency (%)
Scottish 1994 63 (32.5) 104 (53.6) 25 (12.9)
Slovak 1994 56 (32.4) 95 (54.9) 22 (12.7)
Scottish 1996 86 (44.8) 92 (47.9) 14 (7.3)
Slovak 1996 32 (19.4) 106 (64.2) 27 (16.4)
Czech 1994/1996 phase
No religious data are available for the 1994 Czech sample. For the 1996 phase,
religious status and religious attendance were included. From the total sample of 200 Czech
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respondents, 10 (5.0%) indicated ‘Protestant’ as their religion, 36 (18.0 ‘Catholic’, 7 (3.5%)
‘Other’ and 147 (73.5%) indicated ‘No Religion’. Attendance at the place of religion
contained 26 missing responses, for those who gave attendance information 102 (58.6)
indicated ‘Never’, 52 (29.8%) ‘Occasionally’ and 20 (11.5) indicated ‘Regularly’.
Part 3: Interviews with Scottish and Slovak participants on the meaning and experience
of democracy
Interview Schedule
Interview research methodologies aim to examine the social world in a relatively non-
restrictive way compared to, for example, rating scales, surveys and questionnaires. In-depth,
semi-structured interviews allow the researcher to explore the subjective context of the
participant and enable the examination of the individual’s social context and past experiences
of the topic under consideration. As social representations emerge, circulate and become re-
represented during the course of communication, interviews are one such form of the many
varieties of communicative practices. Semi-structured interviews may therefore resemble a
dialogic exchange as they require both the interviewer and interviewee to respond to, to
question and to negotiate meanings and understandings. The interviewer aims to understand
what meanings or interpretations are provided in response to particular positions in dialogue
and how these relate to the wider context. The interviewee also aims to understand the
interview process, what is the nature of this research, what is being asked of me, how much
do I disclose or not disclose, how relevant or engaging is the topic and so on. Therefore, for
both of the participants the interview process is an ongoing social interaction and under
which both parties bring preconceptions and presuppositions to the interaction. Interviewees
may attribute meaning to the particular research situation they are in, for example, the type of
language used and explanations given may vary depending on how the researcher describes
himself/herself –as a psychologist or more generally as a social scientist (P. Duckitt, no date,
personal communication). As forms of social interaction, each interview process can never be
fully replicated across different interviewees or interviewers.
Although interviews may become close to naturally occurring conversations, they are
nevertheless always directive to some degree. The interview process, from the researchers
point of view, is the outcome of a series of decisions and choices made at various stages of
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the research, occurring both at the planning stage and during the implementation, - for
example,  what questions to ask, the number and range of questions, which aspects occurring
during the course of the interviews are followed up and which are not, the nature of the
prompts and so on. These vary depending on the sensitivity of the topic, the rapport between
the interviewer and interviewee, the exact nature of the enquiry and also the practical
concerns of the research as a whole.
The object of inquiry of the interviews are the social representations of democracy in
Scotland and Slovakia. However, as stated at the outset, the research tools were devised as a
collaborative effort between all the research centres involved in the background study. The
theoretical background and empirical objectives require consideration that allow the
researchers to examine and understand the complexity and multi-dimensionality of social
representations of democracy across differing cultures and at the same time the interviews
must be applicable and comparable across the different research centres. These two
considerations underpinned the framework for devising and conducting the interviews. The
comparability of data obtained from semi-structured interviews became a prime focus during
the planning stage of the interviews as previous experience in conducting interviews, across a
range of differing research locations, during an earlier stage of the research highlighted the
issue of comparability. During an earlier planning and review meeting it became clear that
interviewer techniques differed widely between the various centres- some interviewers were
more directive in their style, some didn’t complete all the questions in the interview schedule,
largely due to the talk ‘deviating’ and the interviewer failing to complete all sections of the
interview. Through this previous experience these issues revealed themselves as highly
important in studies which incorporate multi-centre, multi-interviewer designs, and which
may never emerge in studies using single centre, single interviewer designs. If effect, the
design of the schedule reflected both a high degree of openness balanced with control and
comparability of the data obtained. In view of these considerations the number of questions
were kept low, the description of the background of the study to the participants was
standardised across the various centres (see below) and the prompts were neutral and non-
directive, taking the form of prompting the interviewees to explain points more fully, give
examples and so on.
Rather than having an extensive ‘list’ of questions reflecting various conceptions of
democracy such as the political, the economic or reflecting the self or the individual that
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would constrain the interview to those aspects considered important by the researchers or that
duplicated aspects already covered in associations or rating scales, the focus of the interview
was more general and more open concerning the possible meanings of democracy. The
purpose of the interview was not to validate aspects obtained through either word
associations or rating scales. Early arguments on the use of different methods in the research
process (eg Denzin, 1978) were generally concerned with the use of different methods as a
process of validation of the data. Thus, if different kinds of data support the same conclusion,
then confidence in the obtained data is increased. The underlying assumption being that as
researchers we are attempting to examine one reality and one conception of the phenomena
under consideration. However, the theoretical background of social representations is that
there is no single conception of reality, aspects of representations may reveal themselves or
may remain hidden under varying social, communicative and linguistic contexts. Responding
to associations, to rating scales or during interviews all constitute different linguistic and
communicative contexts and under which different aspects of representations may be
revealed or not revealed.
The interview questions were: what for you are the differences between a democratic
and a non-democratic society; whether, in the opinion of the respondents, there was enough,
not enough or too much democracy in his/her country at present and what, in their views,
were the advantages and disadvantages of democracy. These were open enough to allow the
interviewees the opportunity to express their own personal understanding of democracy and
also allowed similar aspects of democracy, not directly asked, to emerge in both samples, for
example, the contrasting of ‘real’ and ‘experienced’ democracy, and for the Slovak sample,
the contrasting of the past and the present (see below).
Participants and general procedure
Forty eight participants from each nation took part in the interviews during 1996.  The
participants again comprised two generations, those aged between 18-23 years and those
between 40-45 years, 50% men and 50% women, half of whom had education enabling them
to enter higher education, and half of them whom did not fulfil this requirement.
The participants were informed that the interview was part of a larger study being
conducted across numerous European nations examining the ideas and meanings of
democracy in a changing European context. They were informed that no ‘knowledge’ was
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required, there were no right and wrong ideas of democracy and whatever they had to say
about the concept of democracy would be meaningful and helpful. They were told that the
information provided would remain anonymous and confidential and the only information
recorded was age, gender and educational level. Consent was obtained for the tape recording
of the interviews and they were informed that at any time during the course of the interview
they were free to terminate it. The interviews were tape-recorded and later transcribed
verbatim.
Method of analysis
The analysis of the interview material was carried out in several stages. The first
stage involved becoming fully immersed in the data. For both the Slovak and the Scottish
data this took the form of reading and re-reading the transcribed interviews. For both sets of
interviews the procedure was kept the same ie working directly from the transcribed texts.
However, it must be noted that relying solely on the transcribed material, irrespective of how
detailed the transcriptions are, diminishes the scope of the resultant analysis and
interpretation. For example, mood, intonation, emphasis and so on, all add crucially to the
elaboration of the data. This is strikingly obvious when comparing the transcribed text to the
‘live’ recorded interview, however, being based on two languages, this study relied solely on
the transcribed texts for both samples.
The first stage allowed me to become familiar with the interview data and to gain an
initial sense of the main themes emerging, the dynamics of the interviews and broad
similarities and differences. From this stage three main areas were identified which were then
followed up through a more systematic process; the three main areas were how: democracy
was defined by the two national samples, their experience and understanding of real and
experienced democracy, and for the Slovaks the contrast between the past and the present.
The analysis progressed through the coding of categories and sub-themes emerging from the
data rather than through a process of identifying instances within pre-conceived categories,
thus, following closely Glaser & Strauss’ (1967) argument that theories about the social
world which fit and make sense are those that emerge from the data. One issue in the coding
of categories or sub-themes, whether they are words, phrases, sentences or meaning units is
the loss of contextual information, and for this reason the coded segments extracted on an
interview by interview basis were treated as provisional and then cross-checked within the
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original context.
Having coded the interview texts into basic coding categories, the analysis moved on
to the comparison of the coded content within and across the interview material. This
allowed an examination of the variation in how a category or sub-theme was expressed, to
check for consistency in the use of codes, the further elaboration of the codes and the linking
of themes. The use of frequency counts draws up issues relating to the unit of analysis and
although frequency counts are used in qualitative coding, these can often be misleading.
When coding for categories or sub-themes where the unit of analysis is, in effect, a unit of
meaning, rather than word or phrase occurrences, it is not always clear where a sub-theme
(unit of meaning) begins or ends, how they overlap and thus, how often they should be
counted. In the present analyses exact frequency counts are only presented for the section on
how democracy is defined and under which clear definitional statements could be identified
and quantified.
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Results
Part 1 (A):  Scottish and Slovak associations to the term ‘democracy’ over three time
periods
The first stage of the analysis examines the three broad categories of response
(Freedom, Definitional and Evaluative) in Scots and Slovaks over three periods of time. The
second stage examines in greater detail the sub-categories within the Definitional responses,
followed by an examination of the sub-categories within the Evaluative responses. For all
comparisons, log-linear analyses were applied to the categorical data.
Three broad categories of response
Table 7 shows the frequency and percentage within each data collection period for the
three main categories along with those which were unclassified and the missing responses for
both national groups. A log-linear analysis was applied to the frequency data in the form
Category (3) x Nation (2) x Time (3). Table 8 shows the summary statistics.
Table 7:  Frequency distribution of the associations to ‘democracy’ in terms of the three main
categories of response in Slovaks and Scots over three time periods.
Categories
Slovak 1992
n=200
(col %)
Slovak 1994
n=200
(col %)
Slovak 1996
n=294
(col %)
Scots 1992
n=200
(col %)
Scots 1994
n=200
(col %)
Scots 1996
n=200
(col %)
Freedom 49
(24.5%)
44
(22.0%)
84
(28.6%)
49
(24.5%)
41
(20.5%)
38 (
19.0%)
Definitional 69
(34.5%)
62
(31.0%)
85
(28.9%)
117
(58.5%)
114
(57.0%)
115
(57.5%)
Evaluative 58
(29.0%)
70 (
35.0%)
94
(31.9%)
16
(8.0%)
17
(8.5%)
30
(15.0%)
Unclassified 18
(9.0%)
14
 (7.0%)
20
(6.8%)
13
(6.5%)
16
(8.0%)
12
(6.0%)
Missing 6
(3.0%)
10
(5.0%)
11
(3.7%)
5 (
2.5%)
12
(6.0%)
5
(2.5%)
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Due to the number of analyses presented in the following section the summary
statistics in each of tables, under the heading tests of partial associations, show only the one
2-way interaction of interest - Category x Nation. All other interactions and main effects
obtained reflect only the differences in the sample size, across each of varying conditions.
The full tables are presented in the Appendices.
Table 8: Log-linear analysis for three broad categories of response for Slovaks and Scots
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
df L.R. Chisq p
3
2
1
4
12
17
7.10
147.28
285.00
0.130
0.000
0.000
Tests of partial associations
df Partial Chisq p
Category x Nation 2 123.50 0.000
The model generated reveals that the Categories vary only as a function of Nation
with no 3-way model Nation x Category x Time. Figure 1 shows the data for the Scottish and
Slovak samples collapsed over the three time periods. In the Slovak sample, the three
categories were, more or less, evenly distributed, ranging from around 29% for ‘freedom’,
35% ‘definitional’ and 36% ‘evaluative’. The Scots predominantly gave responses which
were definitional in nature (64%), with only around 12% which were evaluative (compared
to the Slovaks, 36%) and 24% of the Scottish responses were classified under ‘freedom’.
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Figure 1: Three broad categories of response in Slovaks and Scots.
Definitional categories of response
This section of the analysis examines in greater detail the eight sub-categories making
up the ‘definitional’ responses’, the following section examines the four categories falling
within the ‘evaluative’ category. The broad category ‘freedom’ was excluded from any
further examination, primarily due to the type of response obtained within this category; in
the main, responses were more often in form of ‘freedom’ as a single term. On a few
occasions responses such as ‘freedom of expression’ or ‘freedom of travel’ were produced,
however, these were not common enough to warrant the separation of ‘freedom’ any further.
Table 9 shows the frequency and total percentage for all the eight definitional, along with the
four evaluative categories. Relevant to the present examination are the frequency data
comprising section (A) of the table. On examination of table 9 it is evident that the Scottish
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sample produced a high proportion of responses relating to voting and the electoral process,
with around 30% of the Scottish total falling within this category, compared to one single
response in the Slovak sample. The category ‘other definitional’ was not as clearly defined
within the classification scheme, containing a variety of single responses not directly
included within the other categories. On average, 14.9% of the Slovak and 12.5% of the
Scottish fell within this category. In view of the almost total absence of responses within the
Slovaks relating to ‘voting’, and the mixed nature of the ‘other definitional’, these two
categories were excluded from the main analysis (but see below for voting). The six
categories retained were ‘rights’, ‘equality’, ‘politics/government’, ‘justice/laws’, ‘reference
to own nations’ and ‘reference to other nations’. The summary statistics for the analysis are
shown in Table 10.
Table 9: Eight definitional and four evaluative categories of response for Slovaks and Scots over
the three periods.
Categories of response
Slovak
1992
(% col)
Slovak
1994
(%)
Slovak
1996
(%)
Scots
1992
(%)
Scots
1994
(%)
Scots
1996
(%)
(A) Definitional categories
rights 2 (1.6) 14(10.6) 7 (3.9) 5 (3.8) 12 (9.2) 4 (2.7)
equality 8 (6.3) 12(9.1) 3 (1.7) 8 (6.0) 9 (6.9) 12 (8.3)
politics/government 7 (5.5) 6 (4.5) 18(10.1) 14(10.5) 26 (19.8) 21 (14.5)
justice/laws 16 (12.6) 9 (6.8) 20 (11.2) 9 (6.8) 8 (6.1) 6 (4.1)
voting/elections 1 (0.8) 0 0 42 (32.1) 30 (22.9) 31 (21.4)
reference to own nation 8 (6.3) 1 (0.8) 0 16 (12.0) 11 (8.4) 10 (6.9)
reference to other nations 8 (6.3) 4 (3.0) 5 (2.8) 10 (7.5) 6 (4.6) 4 (2.7)
other definitional 19 (14.9) 16 (12.1) 32 (17.9) 13 (9.7) 12 (9.2) 27 (18.6)
(B) Evaluative categories
hopes and desires 20 (15.7) 8 (6.1) 13 (7.3) 2 (15) 2 (1.5) 3 (2.1)
doesn’t exist 20 (15.7) 24 (18.1) 14 (7.8) 5 (3.7) 4 (3.0) 6 (4.1)
negative/disappointment 7 (5.5) 32 (24.2) 55 (30.7) 4 (3.0) 4 (3.0) 11 (7.6)
positive evaluation 11 (8.7) 6 (4.5%) 12 (6.7) 5 (3.7%)    7 (5.3%) 10 (6.8)
Total 127 132 179 133 131 145
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Table 10:  Log-linear analysis for 6* sub-categories of definitional response for Slovaks and
Scots over three periods.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
df L.R. Chisq p
3
2
1
10
27
35
20.56
81.66
126.02
0.024
0.000
0.000
Tests of partial associations
df Partial Chisq p
Category x Nation 5 31.28 0.000
* running this analysis again with voting included, the 3-way model remained significant
at p<0.05, and the 2-way Nation x Category at p<0.001, df=6.
Descriptively, collapsing the data across the three time periods (see Table 11), the
most common response from the Slovak sample was related to ‘justice/laws’ (around 30%)
with only around 12% of the Scottish sample producing responses within this sub-category.
Across all of the six sub-categories, responses relating to ‘justice/laws’ produced the largest
difference between the two groups. For the Scots, the commonest responses were those
pertaining to ‘politics/government’ (around 31%), the Slovaks produced around 20% in this
category. The categories ‘rights’, ‘equality’ and ‘reference to other nations’ showed little or
no difference between the samples, however the Scottish sample associated the term
‘democracy’ to their ‘own nation’ at a higher proportion than the Slovaks (around 19% and
6% respectively).
Table 11:  Six definitional categories to the term ‘democracy’ in Slovaks and Scots collapsed
across the three periods.
Categories Slovak
(%)
Scottish
(%)
Rights 23 (15.5) 21 (11.0)
Equality 23 (15.5) 29 (15.2)
Politics/government 31 (20.9) 61 (31.9)
Justice/laws 45 (30.4) 23 (12.0)
Own nation 9 (6.1) 37 (19.4)
Other nations 17 (11.5) 20 (10.5)
Total 148 191
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The prime interest of this analysis was not only whether the categories varied
between the nations, but whether or not there were differences between the two nations in the
type of definitional response over the three time periods. The analysis revealed that the three-
way model Category x Nation x Time was significant. In order to examine in greater detail
the nature of these differences the analysis was run again, but this time separately for the
Slovaks and for the Scots. These both took the form Category  x Time (3) and the summary
statistics are shown for Slovaks (a) and for Scots (b) in Table 12. For the Scottish analysis,
the category ‘voting’ was included in this analysis, however, for the Slovaks it was not
included.
Table 12:  Log-linear analysis for 6 sub-categories of definitional response for (a) Slovaks and
(b) Scots over the three time periods.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
(a) Slovaks
df L.R. Chisq p
2
1
(b) Scots
2
1
10
17
12
20
41.37
68.73
15.96
252.72
0.000
0.000
0.184
0.000
Slovak changes over time
For Slovaks the two-way model (Category x Time) was shown to be significant
(p<0.001) indicating that the definitional sub-categories varied as a function of time. The
data for the three time periods are shown in Figure 2. For three of the subcategories a pattern
of incremental increasing/decreasing of responses can be observed: responses relating to
‘politics/government’ rising from 13%/14% in 1992 and 1994 to 34% in 1996;  reference to
the Slovak nation drops from around 16% in 1992 to around 2% in 1994 and absent in 1996;
reference by the Slovaks to other nations also shows a decline, primarily between 1992 and
the two later periods. For the remaining three sub-categories ‘rights’, ‘equality’ and ‘justice’
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although showing differences across the three time periods no clear pattern emerged. Both
‘rights’ and ‘equality’ were produced at  higher rate during 1994 than either 1992 or 1996,
whereby responses relating to ‘justice/laws’ were lower in 1994 than either 1992 or 1996.
Figure 2: Slovak responses to the six definitional categories over three periods of time
Scottish changes over time
For the Scottish sample the interaction Category x Time was not shown to be
significant with only the main effect of Category reaching significance. Although no effect of
Time was observed, the Scottish responses across the seven categories over the three periods
are presented in Figure 3. On a descriptive level, categories revealing trends of change were
responses relating to ‘politics/government’ rising after 1992 and equality rising after 1994
with rights rising in 1994, compared to 1992 or 1996. The data for the combined time periods
for the Scottish sample are shown in Table 10, excluding that of the voting category. Voting
was found to be the most single largest category in the Scottish definitional responses
accounting for around 35% of all their definitional responses.
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Figure 3: Scottish responses across the six definitional categories over three periods of time
Evaluative categories of response.
 Across the entire period, 285 evaluative responses to the term ‘democracy’ were
recorded of these, 222 (77.9%) were produced by the Slovaks and only 63 (22.1%) were
produced by the Scots (see Table 14). A log-linear analysis was applied to the data using the
form Category (4) x Nation (2) x Time (3). The data entered into the analysis are shown in
section (B) of Table 9. No three-way interaction Category x Nation x Time was observed
(see Table 13). The two-way interaction of interest Category x Nation was significant at
p<0.01.
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Table 13: Log-linear analysis for 4 sub-categories of evaluative response for Scots and Slovaks
over three periods.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
df L.R. Chisq p
3
2
1
6
17
23
7.27
60.51
272.89
0.254
0.000
0.000
Tests of partial associations
df Partial Chisq p
Category x Nation 3 15.14 0.001
Table 14:  Evaluative categories of responses to the term ‘democracy’ in Slovaks and Scots
collapsed across the three periods
Categories Slovak Scottish
Hopes and desires 41 (18.5%) 7 (11.1)
Doesn’t exist 58 (26.1) 15 (23.8)
Negative responses 94 (42.3) 19 (30.2)
Positive responses 29 (13.1) 22 (34.9)
Total 222 63
Across the entire period, the most frequent type of evaluative response produced by
the Slovaks was shown to be negative in nature (around 42%), followed by those within the
category ‘doesn’t exist’ with only 13% of the evaluative responses reflecting positive
sentiments. For the Scots, the most frequent type of responses given were positive (around
34%), however, followed closely by ‘negative’ responses (30%). The most striking
difference between the two samples can be seen within the ‘positive’ category with almost
35% of the Scots and only 13% of the Slovaks producing evaluative type responses which
reflected positive associations to the term ‘democracy’.
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Changes over time in the evaluative responses in Slovaks and Scots
In order to examine in detail the possible changes over time in the evaluative sub-
categories of response in Slovaks and Scots, two log-linear analyses were run separately for
each national sample. These both took the form: Category (4) x Time (3) and the summary
statistics for the Slovaks (a) and the Scots (b) are shown in Table 15.
Table 15: Log-linear analysis for four sub-categories of evaluative response for (a) Slovaks and
(b) Scots over the three time periods.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
(a) Slovaks
df L.R. Chisq p
2
1
(b) Scots
2
1
6
11
6
11
40.08
113.35
1.70
17.19
0.000
0.000
0.944
0.102
The two-way interaction (Category x Time) was found to be significant for the
Slovaks (p<0.001) but not for the Scots. Figures 4 and 5 shows the percentage of responses
falling within each of the four sub-categories for the three time periods, for Slovaks and
Scots, respectively. For the Slovaks, the largest incremental difference can be seen within the
‘negative’ category, rising dramatically from around 12% in 1992 to 45% in 1994, to almost
59% of all evaluative responses in 1996. Responses to the term ‘democracy’ which reflected
hopes and desires fell from around 34% in 1992, to stabilise at around 11-13% in 1994 and
1996. Responses within the category ‘it doesn’t exist’ fell from almost identical levels in
1992 and 1994 (34%) to 15% in 1996. Positive evaluations to the term ‘democracy’ showed
very little change over the three time periods. For the three sub-categories showing change
negative responses rose steadily over the three periods, hopes and desires faded after 1992
and the category ‘it doesn’t exist’ dropped after 1994.
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Figure 4: Slovak responses across the four evaluative categories over three periods of time
Figure 5: Scottish responses across the four evaluative categories over three time periods
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Similar to the definitional categories of response reported above, the Scottish analysis
revealed no effect of time on the proportion of responses falling into the four evaluative
categories. On a descriptive level, responses relating to ‘it doesn’t exist’ show a slight
downward trend over the period and ‘negative’ responses rising somewhat from 199 (see
Figure 5).
In summary, within the three broad categories of response, the Scottish sample gave
predominantly more responses that were definitional and the Slovaks more that were
evaluative. Freedom remained constant at around a quarter of all responses across both
samples, across all three time periods. In the Scottish sample, following freedom,
associations to voting and the electoral process was the next most frequent single category
across the three time periods, accounting for 40% of the definitional (1992), 29% (1994) and
35% (1996), revealing one of the major differences in the distributions of responses between
the two samples. Breaking down the other definitional categories and collapsing across the
time periods, Slovaks predominantly gave responses linked to ‘justice/laws and
‘politics/government’. Changes in the responses of the Slovaks over time did not fall into a
distinct pattern, however, associations linked to ‘politics/government’ rose in 1996, those
relating to ‘equality’ dropped in 1996 and associations linking democracy to their own nation
dropped between 1992 and 1994 and were absent in 1996. The Scottish data did not reveal
any significant effect of Time in the definitional categories, however, a trend of associations
linked to ‘equality’ rose from 1992 to 1996 as did association linking democracy to
‘politics/government’.
Within the evaluative categories, from 1992 to 1996 in the Slovak sample, there was a
dramatic rise in negative type associations to the term democracy, from around 12% in 1992
to around 59% of all evaluative responses in 1996; associations reflecting ‘hopes/desires’
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decreased from 1992 to 1996. The evaluative responses in the Scottish sample showed little
variation across the period.
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Part 1 (B):  Slovak and Czech associations to the term ‘democracy’ across two time
periods.
Similar to analyses presented for the Scottish and Slovak data, the first stage of the
Slovak/Czech analysis initially examines responses to the three broad categories (Freedom,
Definitional and Evaluative), followed by an examination in greater detail the categories
making up the definitional responses, then those making up the evaluative responses.
Three broad categories of response
Table 16 shows the frequency and percentage for the Czech and Slovak respondents
over the two time periods for the three categories of response, along with the missing and
unclassified responses. A log-linear analysis was applied to the frequency data in the form
Category (3) x Nation (2) x Time (2). The summary statistics are shown in Table 17.
Table 16: Broad categories of response to the term democracy in Czechs and Slovaks
Categories
Slovak
1994
n=200
(% col)
Slovak
1996
n=294
(% col)
Czech
1994
n=168
(% col)
Czech
1996
n=200
(% col)
Freedom 44
(22.0)
84
(28.6)
52
(30.9)
60
(30.0)
Definitional 62
(31.0)
85
(28.9)
60
(35.7)
79
(39.5)
Evaluative 70
(35.0)
94
(31.9)
35
(20.8)
38
(19.0)
Unclassified 14 (7.0) 20 (6.8) 16 (9.5) 20
(10.0)
Missing 10 (5.0) 11 (3.7) 5 (3.0) 3 (1.5)
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Table 17: Log-linear analysis for three categories of response for Slovaks and Czechs over two
time periods.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
df L.R. Chisq p
3
2
1
2
7
11
1.69
24.01
64.43
0.429
0.001
0.001
Tests of partial associations
df Partial Chisq p
Category x Nation 2 20.13 0.000
The analysis revealed no 3-way (Nation x Category x Time) effect, however, the two-
way – Nation and Category comparison was significant. The Czech respondents gave more
‘definitional’ responses than the Slovaks (42%; 33%, respectively); Slovaks produced more
‘evaluative’ responses than the Czechs (37%; 22%, respectively), and the ‘freedom’ category
ranged from 29% for the Slovaks to 34% for the Czechs.
Definitional categories of response
Table 18 shows the data for the two groups for the breakdown of the definitional
category (section (A) of the table) and the evaluative category (section (B) of the table), over
both time periods. Similar to the analysis of the sub-categories within the definitional
responses presented in Part 1 for Slovaks and Scots, the sub-category ‘other definitional’ was
removed from the analysis of the Slovak and Czech data. From the data presented in Table18
it can be seen that the Slovak group produced no responses relating to voting/elections, over
both periods; and the Czech sample produced one single response in 1994 and 5 responses in
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1996. For the initial analysis, voting was also removed (but see below). The six categories
entered into the analysis were ‘rights’, ‘equality’, politics/government’, ‘justice/laws,
‘reference to own nation’ and ‘reference to other nations’ and the analysis took the form
Category (6)  x Nation (2) x Time (2). The summary statistics are presented in Table 19.
Table 18: Frequency and percentage of the eight definitional and the four evaluative categories
for the Slovaks and Czechs over two periods.
Categories of
response
Slovak
1994
(%total
col)
Slovak
1996
(% total
col)
Czech
1994
(% total
col)
Czech
1996
(% total
col)
(A) Definitional categories
rights 14
(10.6)
7  (3.9) 2  (2.1) 10  (8.6)
equality 12  (9.1) 3  (1.7) 3  (3.2) 5  (4.3)
politics/governm
ent
6  (4.5) 18
(10.1)
10
(10.5)
19
(16.4)
justice/laws 9  (6.8) 20
(11.2)
14
(14.7)
7  (6.0)
voting/elections 0 0 1  (1.0) 5  (4.3)
reference to own
nation
1  (0.8) 0 7  (7.4) 8  (6.9)
reference to other
nations
4  (3.0) 5  (2.8) 4  (4.2) 4  (3.4)
other definitional 16
(12.1)
32
(17.9)
19
(20.0)
21
(18.1)
(B)  Evaluative categories
hopes and desires 8  (6.1) 13  (7.3) 11
(11.6)
6  (5.2)
doesn’t exist 24
(18.1)
14  (7.8) 6  (6.3) 6  (5.2)
negative
evaluation
32
(24.2)
55
(30.7)
5  (5.3) 8  (6.9)
positive
evaluation
6  (4.5) 12  (6.7) 13
(13.7)
18
(15.5
Total 130 179 95 117
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Table 19: Log-linear analysis for the Czech and Slovak samples across the six* definitional
categories over two time periods.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
df L.R. Chisq p
3
2
1
5
16
23
19.64
47.05
91.75
0.001
0.000
0.000
Tests of partial associations
Category x nation
df
5
Partial Chisq
20.79
p
0.000
* running the analysis again including voting, the 3-way remained significant at p=0.001,
the 2-way Nation x Category at p<0.001 with df,6.
Collapsing the data across both time periods (see Table 20), the largest difference was
shown to be in the category ‘reference to own nation’, with the Czech participants producing
around 16% of their definitional responses within this category, compared to only one
instance in the Slovak sample. Responses referring to ‘rights’ were higher in the Slovaks
(21.2%) than Czechs (12.9%); and ‘politics/government’ higher in Czechs (31.2%) than
Slovaks (24.2%).
Table 20: Six definitional responses to the term ‘democracy’ in Slovaks and Czech collapsed
across the two periods
Categories Slovak (%) Czech (%)
Rights 21 (21.2) 12 (12.9)
Equality 15 (15.2) 8 (8.6)
Politics/government 24 (24.2) 29 (31.2)
Justice/laws 29 (29.3) 21 (22.6)
Own nation 1 (0.01) 15 (16.1)
Other nations 9 (9.1) 8 (8.6)
Total 99 93
The main analysis revealed that the full 3-way model (Category x Nation x Time) was
required to explain the data. In order to examine this interaction in greater detail, the analyses
were run again, separately, for the Slovaks and the Czechs, both in the form Category  x
Time (2). Similar to the Scottish/Slovak analyses, presented in the previous section, the
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category ‘voting, was included for the Czech analysis, but not included in the Slovak
analysis. The summary statistics for the Slovak analysis (a) and for the Czech analysis (b) are
shown in Table 21. The full 2-way interaction was shown to be significant for the Slovak
analysis, but not so in the Czech analysis. The data are presented for Slovaks in Figure 6a,
and for Czechs, in Figure 6b.
Table 21: Log-linear analysis for the six sub-categories of definitional response for (a) Slovaks
and (b) Czechs over the two time periods.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
(a) Slovaks
df L.R. Chisq p
2
1
(b) Czech
2
1
5
11
6
13
19.72
61.66
11.59
42.07
0.001
0.000
0.071
0.001
Within the category ‘rights’ the Slovak sample decreased from an initial high of 30%
to 13 % between 1994 and 1996; within the same period the Czech responses rose from 5%
to 19%. In the category ‘justice/laws’ a similar switching effect is obtained with the Slovaks
increasing from 20% to 38% between the two periods and the Czechs dropping from an
initial high of 38% down to 13%. For the remaining two categories showing three-way
effects the prime difference between the nations occurred in the earlier period, 1994. For
Slovaks responses relating to ‘equality’ were initially high in 1994, 26% compared to the
Czechs 6%, by 1996 both groups produced responses relating to ‘equality’ at similarly low
levels (7-9%). In contrast, within ‘politics/government’ during1994 the Slovaks were initially
lower than the Czechs (13% to 25%), by 1996 both samples rose to similar higher levels (34-
36%). Overall, across both periods the Czech sample were more likely to associate
democracy with their ‘own nation’ than the Slovaks and reference to ‘other nations’ varied
little between the nations. For the Czech sample, voting increased from around 2% to 9%
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over the two periods.
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Figure 6a: Slovak responses across the six categories over two time periods
Figure 6b: Czech responses across the seven categories over two periods of time
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Evaluative categories of response
The data entered into the analysis for the Czech and Slovak samples are shown in
section (B) of Table 18. The analysis was in the form Nation (2) x Category (4) x Time (2)
and the summary statistics are shown in table 23. The analysis revealed a two-way Category
x Nation interaction and the data are presented in Table22. Of the 237 evaluative responses
produced by the combined Czech and Slovak samples, 164 (69.2%) were given by Slovaks
and 73 (30.8%) by the Czechs. Collapsing the data across both time periods (Table 23), the
Slovaks produced over 50% ‘negative’ style responses, compared to around 18% in the
Czech sample, followed by the category ‘it doesn’t exist’ (23.2%); whereas, in the Czech
data, the two highest categories were ‘positive’ (42.5%) evaluations and
‘hopes/desires’(23.4%).
Table 22:  Four evaluative categories of response to the term ‘democracy’ in Slovaks and
Czechs collapsed over the two periods.
Categories Slovak  (%) Czech (%)
Hopes and desires 21 (12.8) 17 (23.4)
Doesn’t exist 38 (23.2) 12 (16.4)
Negative responses 87 (53.0) 13 (17.8)
Positive responses 18 (11.0) 31 (42.5)
Total 164 73
Table 23: Log-linear analysis for the Czech and Slovak samples across four evaluative
categories over two time periods.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
df L.R. Chisq p
3
2
1
3
10
15
3.11
57.40
171.10
0.372
0.000
0.000
Tests of partial associations
Nation x category
df
1
Partial Chisq
43.64
p
0.000
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Although the analysis did not reveal a significant effect of Time, in keeping with the
other sets of analyses, it was decided to run the analysis again, separately for the two nations.
These took the form Category (4) x Time (2). The summary statistics are shown in Table 24.
The analyses revealed that the Category x Time interaction was significant for the Slovak
sample (p<0.05), but not in the Czech sample. The data for both nations, across both periods
of time for the four categories of evaluative response are shown in Figure 7.
Table 24: Log-linear analysis for the four sub-categories of evaluative response for (a) Slovaks
and (b) Czechs over two periods.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
(a) Slovaks
df L.R. Chisq p
2
1
(b) Czech
2
1
3
7
3
7
8.53
79.43
2.85
15.87
0.036
0.000
0.415
0.026
For the Slovak sample, responses reflecting democracy as not existing fell from
around 34% in 1994 to around 15% in 1996; hopes/ and desires stayed relatively constant,
however, negative style responses rose between 1994 and 1996 from around 45% to around
58%. For the Czech sample, hopes and desires fell from around 31% in 1994 to 16% in 1996;
and positive evaluations grew from 37% in 1994 to almost 48% in 1994.
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Figure 7: Slovak and Czech responses across the four evaluative categories over two period of
time
In summary, within the broad categories of response, the Czech sample gave more
definitional responses than the Slovak sample and the Slovaks gave more evaluative; the
category ‘freedom, was relative constant across both samples. No differences were observed
in these over the two time periods.
Collapsing the sub-categories of definitional response over the two periods, the
Slovaks gave more associations linked to ‘rights’ and ‘equality’ than the Czech sample. The
Czech sample gave more associations linking democracy to ‘politics/government’, along
with associations linking democracy with their own nation (16%), compared to one instance
in the Slovak sample over the same period. Slovaks failed to produce responses related to
voting across the two periods, in Czechs, voting increased from 2 to 9% over the period. The
Czech definitional categories did not vary greatly over the two periods, however, the
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Slovaks’ responses varied; ‘rights’ and ‘equality’ dropped from 1994 to 1996 and the
category ‘politics/government’ rose between 1994 and 1996.
Within the evaluative categories, collapsed over the two periods, the Slovaks gave
more responses reflecting democracy as ‘not existing’ than the Czech sample; along with a
higher number of negative responses. In contrast, in the Czech sample, more positive
associations to democracy were produced. The evaluative categories were not shown to vary
over the two periods in the Czech data, however, in the Slovak sample, negative associations
rose between 1994 and 1996.
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Part 2:  Comparison of Slovaks and Scots on the democracy rating scale.
The first stage of the analysis presents a descriptive account of a selection of items in
the rating scale (the ratings for all items are shown in Appendix 5). In the second stage, the
items are factor analysed and the two samples are compared across the factors using a
multivariate analysis of variance (Manova).
Descriptive analysis of the rating scale
The mean scores for the Slovaks and the Scots were examined and those rated highest
by each sample (with a score above 2.00, signifying that the term helped to explain
democracy ‘a great deal’) and those rated lowest by each sample (with a score below 1.00,
signifying that the term ‘does not help to explain democracy’. The ‘highest’ and ‘lowest’
rated terms for both the Slovaks and the Scots are shown in Table 25. Six terms were
common across both samples in the ‘highest’ rated group (indicated by bold text in the table),
these were: ‘human rights’, ‘freedom’, ‘parliament’, ‘public opinion’, ‘justice’ and
‘government’. In total, seven terms were rated above  2.00 in the Scottish sample, whereas in
the Slovak sample, twelve terms fell within this category. Within the lowest rated terms, only
‘dictatorship’ was rated by both the Scots and Slovaks as not useful in explaining democracy.
Along with ‘dictatorship’, ‘ideology’ and ‘socialism’ were rated low by the Slovaks. In the
Scottish sample, 11 terms were rated as not useful in the explanation of democracy.
Examination of these terms indicates that primarily these terms are all related in some way to
the economic sphere with terms such as  ‘capitalism’, ‘private enterprise’, ‘wealth’,
‘privatisation’, ‘money’ and ‘profit’ included here. From this descriptive account it appears
that the Slovak sample, in their explanation of democracy, rates a broader group of
terms/concepts as having some explanatory power with a greater number of terms within the
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highest rated group, with the Scottish sample indicating more terms in the lower end of the
scale.
Table 25: Highest rated terms by Scots and Slovaks (A) and terms which do not help to explain
democracy (B)
(A) Highest rated terms
Scottish mean (sd) Slovak mean (sd)
equality 2.47  (0.87) human rights 2.78  (0.58)
human rights 2.39  (0.94) freedom 2.74  (0.62)
freedom 2.39  (0.95) justice 2.59  (0.80)
parliament 2.19  (0.95) constitution 2.43  (0.96)
public opinion 2.13  (0.99) public opinion 2.34  (0.90)
justice 2.12  (0.96) parliament 2.33  (1.02)
government 2.04  (1.01) minority rights 2.33  (0.90)
law and order 2.01  (1.06) the State 2.26  (0.95)
political parties 2.22  (0.95)
government 2.19  (0.90)
private enterprise 2.00  (0.96)
opposition 2.00  (1.01)
(B) Lowest rated terms
Scottish mean (sd) Slovak mean (sd)
privacy 0.93  (1.00) ideology 0.79  (1.04)
fraternity 0.92  (0.96) socialism 0.65  (0.96)
capitalism 0.89  (0.94) dictatorship 0.54  (0.93)
private enterprise 0.79  (0.92)
self interest 0.76  (0.96)
wealth 0.68  (0.86)
privatisation 0.68  (0.90)
dictatorship 0.48  (0.93)
money 0.43  (0.79)
profit 0.39  (0.74)
religion 0.21  (0.89)
Factor Analysis of the Rating Scales
The data from the rating scales for Slovaks and Scots were pooled and the 32 terms
were factor analysed to assess which terms were inter-correlated. A principal components
factor analysis (with iteration) was performed to identify groups of variables which
accounted for the observed correlations in the data set. A varimax rotation was also applied
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to ensure that as far as possible each variable appeared in only one factor grouping. Only
those items with factor loadings greater or equal to 0.40 were included in the analysis. Table
26 lists 32 terms grouped statistically into five factors. Variables were ordered and grouped
by size to facilitate interpretation. Factor scores for each individual participant were
calculated to allow comparison of the Scots and Slovaks for each factor. The analysis
revealed seven factors which accounted for 54.0%of the total variance.
 (1) ‘Markets/economy’ ( 20.5%; 6.55) comprised seven terms, all relating to the
economy; ‘privatisation’, ‘profit’, ‘money’, ‘wealth’, ‘market economy’, ‘private enterprise’
and ‘capitalism’.
(2) ‘Democratic institutions’ (10.0%; 3.20) contained six terms which characterise
institutions of a democratic society; ‘parliament’, ‘opposition’, district/local council’,
‘constitution’, ‘political parties’ and ‘law and order’.
(3) ‘Freedom’ (6.7%; 2.21) contained six terms reflecting the core concept of democracy,
such as ‘freedom’, equality’, ‘human rights’, ‘justice’, ‘fraternity’ and ‘public interest’.
(4) ‘The individual’ (5.1%; 1.61) was made up of six terms; ‘privacy’, ‘personal
responsibility’, ‘the individual’, ‘personal security’, ‘religion’ and ‘self interest’.
(5) ‘State/Nation’ (4.4%; 1.40) contained three terms; ‘nation’, State’ and ‘government’.
The final two factors were made up of only two terms in each. Factor 6 (3.9%; 1.23 )
contained the terms ‘ideology’ and ‘socialism’ and was simply labelled ‘Ideology’; and the
two terms making up Factor seven (3.2%; 1.03) were ‘public opinion’ and ‘minority rights’
and was labelled as such.
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Table 26: Factor analysis of the democracy scale.
Factors Loadings Factors Loadings
Factor 1. Markets/economy
Privatisation
Profit
Money
Wealth
Market economy
Private enterprise
Capitalism
(20.5%)
0.74
0.70
0.67
0.65
0.65
0.63
0.62
Factor 5. State/nation
Nation
State
Government
(4.4%)
0.72
0.64
0.59
Factor 2. Democratic institutions
Parliament
Opposition
District council
Constitution
Political parties
Law and order
(10.0%)
0.70
0.68
0.63
0.56
0.54
0.50
Factor 6. Ideology
Ideology
Socialism
(3.9%)
0.74
0.70
Factor 3. Freedom
Freedom
Equality
Human rights
Justice
Fraternity
Public interest
(6.9%)
0.73
0.69
0.67
0.54
0.50
0.50
Factor 7. Public
opinion/minority rights
Public opinion
Minority rights
(3.2%)
0.69
0.50
Factor 4. The individual
Privacy
Personal responsibility
The individual
Personal security
Religion
Self interest
(5.1%)
0.73
0.68
0.64
0.60
0.48
0.47
Table 27 shows the mean scores for the Scots and the Slovaks across the seven
extracted factors.
Table 27: Mean scores and standard deviations for the Scots and Slovaks across the seven
factors
Factors
Scottish
mean (sd)
Slovak
mean (sd)
Markets & economy -0.54 (0.89)  0.48 (0.90)
Democratic institutions -0.07 (1.07)  0.15 (1.29)
Freedom -0.01 (1.07)  0.04 (0.81))
The individual -0.70 (0.85)  0.10 (1.01))
State/nation -0.11 (0.84)  0.16 (0.94)
Ideology  0.34 (0.80) -0.46 (0.94)
Public opinion/minority rights  0.18 (0.95)  0.09 (0.78)
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Comparison of the two samples across five of the seven democracy factors
Four of the extracted factors were entered into a multivariate analysis of variance
(Manova) in the form Nation (2) x Age-group (2). The four factors were: ‘markets/economy’,
‘democratic institutions’, ‘freedom’, and ‘the individual’. The final three factors (factors 4,5
& 6) were excluded on the basis of : (i) two of them were made up of only two terms in each
factor and also, (ii) all three factors accounted for less than 5% of the total variance each. The
multivariate and univariate statistics are shown in Table 28. The multivariate results show
significant main effects of both Nation and Age-group(p<0.001), with no significant
interaction effect. The univariate comparisons revealed significant main effects of Nation on
three of the factors, ‘markets/economy’, ‘the individual’ and ‘democratic institutions’. In
addition, main effects of Age-group  were obtained for two of the factors: ‘markets/economy’
and ‘democratic institutions’, along with Nation x Age interaction for ‘democratic
institutions’. Figures 8 through to 11 show the mean scores for all factors for Scots and
Slovaks, for both age-groups.
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Table 28: Mutivariate Analysis of Varaiance of Four Factors with Nation and Age as Main
Effects
 (a) Multivariate F
Effect Wilk’s
Lambda
df F p
Nation 0.60 4,377 54.17 0.000
Age 0.90 4,377 8.32 0.000
Interaction 0.98 4,377 1.95 0.085
 (b) Univariate F (1,380)
Univariate F p
1 Nation
Markets/economy
Democratic institutions
Freedom
The individual
143.63
4.47
0.27
71.05
0.000
0.035
0.597
0.001
2. Age
Markets/economy
Democratic institutions
Freedom
The individual
17.25
20.15
0.13
0.13
0.001
0.001
0.717
0.717
3. Nation x Age
Markets/economy
Democratic institutions
Freedom
The individual
2.18
3.99
1.22
0.11
0.141
0.046
0.269
0.732
For factor one (markets/economy) the univariate comparison revealed both a main
effect of Nation and a main effect of Age-group. The Slovaks were shown to rate this factor
more highly (indicating greater explanatory power in the meaning of democracy) than the
Scots did. In addition, across both samples, the younger age-group (18-23 years)  rated
‘economy/markets’ higher than the older age-group (40-45 years) (see figure 8).
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Figure 8: Mean factors scores for ‘markets/economy’
Democratic institutions (factor 2) revealed a main effect of Nation (p<0.05) , with the
Slovak sample rating this factor more highly than the Scottish; a main effect of Age
(p<0.001) with the older age-group higher than the younger, and a significant Nation x Age
interaction (p<0.05). From figure 9 it can be seen that in the Scottish sample, no differences
were obtained between the two generations, in Slovaks, the older generation rated democratic
institutions higher than the younger generation.
For factor three (freedom), no difference were obtained either between the two
samples or between the two age-groups. The mean scores for all are presented in figure 10.
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Figure 9: Mean factor scores for ‘democratic institutions’
Figure 10: Mean factors scores for ‘freedom’
For the final factor, ‘the individual’, (figure 11) only a main effect of Nation was obtained,
with the Slovak sample rating this factor as having greater explanatory power for democracy,
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than the Scottish sample.
Figure 11: Mean factors scores for ‘the indvidual’
In summary, both ‘markets/economy’ and ‘the individual’ have greater explanatory
power for the meaning of democracy for the Slovaks; no differences were obtained between
the nations, or between the age-groups, for the factor relating to ‘freedom’. A Nation x Age
interaction for ‘democratic institutions’ revealed that the older Slovaks rated this items higher
than the younger Slovaks, no such generational effects were evident in the Scottish sample.
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Part 3:  Scottish and Slovak interviews on democracy, 1996.
Descriptive account of the interviews
Initially, I shall present a descriptive account of the interview data and in the
subsequent section I shall present a comparison between the Slovaks and the Scots on
specific themes contained in the data.
The democracy section of the interview opened by asking the respondents ‘what, for
you, are the differences between a democratic society and a non-democratic society?’  Issues
relating to non-democratic society rarely appeared spontaneously in the talk of the Scottish
sample. However, a clear pattern emerged in how the talk was organised. In general, the
respondents would start by providing a definition of democracy. Most of the respondents had
no problem in providing a definition. The main categories, in which democratic society was
defined, were the following: ‘freedom’; ‘something related to government/parliament’;
‘voting/elections’; ‘majority decisions’; ‘to have a voice/a say’; to have some influence’.
None of the Scottish respondents spontaneously compared democratic versus non-democratic
society. The majority of the respondents defined democracy in terms of ‘voting/elections’,
either directly or indirectly.  Despite this, a large number of respondents experienced some
conflict with their own verbalisations of democracy.  Having defined democratic society,
they usually qualified their definitions by modifiers such as ‘but’, ‘however’ and so on. For
example, they would say, ‘but real democracy is…’ or ‘the way it should be is…’ or ‘ideal
democracy is…’. There was often a spontaneous explanation as to how they saw ‘real or
ideal democracy’, opposing it to the democracy they experienced. Rather than offering a
comparison between democratic and non-democratic society, as was requested by the
question, the Scottish respondents opposed democracy as they knew it and experienced it, to
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an ‘ideal’ or ‘real’ democracy. They discussed democracy as they experienced it and real
democracy in terms of the process of representation, the voting system, decision-making
concerning important issues affecting the country. The most striking feature of the Scottish
interviews was the similarity in how their talk was organised. Generally, democracy was
defined and then followed almost spontaneously by an explanation of what an ideal
democracy would be.
 The Slovak respondents did not necessarily start by defining democracy. Definitions
were contained in the talk but they did not present a clear and decisive point of view, more
evident in the Scottish sample. The Slovaks also contrasted democracy as they experienced it
with that of a true or ideal democracy, and they often compared the present system with the
previous regime, spontaneously using the terms such as ‘a democratic state’ and ‘ a
totalitarian state’; ‘in the past’ or ‘in the present’. The most striking feature of the Slovak
interviews was the sense of personal involvement with democracy, more specifically, with
the effect that the change to democracy had on the respondents’ lives. Main themes included
the following: ‘lack of faith’,’ widespread helplessness just like during the previous regime’,
‘a sense of fearfulness to talk openly about politics’, ‘fear of punishment for the expression
of different opinions’. Other topics emphasised the advantages of the old regime concerning
security of jobs, low price of food, minimal difference in social status. The participants
frequently compared the old and the new regime in terms of who was in power. Thus,
powerful people today are even more corrupt than they were in past. The previous regime did
not allow them to steal and cheat as much as the present regime: now they simply steal and
cheat without limits. Freedom creates chaos and people do not possess enough discipline.
Democracy is seen as a much more demanding system and governmental policy making is
seen as too confrontational.
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A comparison of Slovak and Scottish definitions of democracy
The transcripts of the Slovak and Scottish interviews were examined with the aim of
identifying all utterances, which expressed how democracy was defined. For example,
‘democracy is freedom of expression’ (Slovakia) or ‘democracy is participation as fully as
possible (Scotland) would be taken as a definitional utterance. The denial of negative
characteristics of democracy such as, for example ‘democracy is not Mafia’ (Slovakia) were
excluded. It was clear from the examination of the data that some respondents produced
several definitional utterances, some produced one definition and in a small number of cases,
they failed to produce what could be recognised as a definition. The data presented,
therefore, are made up of the total number of definitions per total sample of Slovaks and total
sample of Scots. Altogether the Scottish respondents produced 127 definitional utterances
and Slovaks gave 86. The data are summarised in Figure 12.
The figure shows that overwhelmingly the Slovak sample defined democracy in terms
of ‘freedom’ (43% of all Slovak definitions). These freedoms were expressed in terms of
freedom of expression, of travel, of opinions. The Scottish sample also defined democracy in
terms of freedom, but the distribution of responses were more evenly spread over ‘freedom’,
‘voting/elections’ and ‘having a voice’. Neither sample defined democracy in terms of
‘market/economy’ to any great extent. This is interesting with respect to the Slovaks, who
have been experiencing both a political and an economic transition and that there may have
some linking of democracy to economic issues. In the  Scottish sample, voting/election was a
predominant theme (21%) and taken together with definitions relating to ‘having a voice’ and
‘majority views’ account for around 47% of all of the Scottish definitions. In Slovaks these
three categories make up only around 10% of the definitions. A category missing in the
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Scottish sample but making up around 10% in Slovaks were definitions relating to issues of
‘justice and the law’.
Figure 12: Scottish and Slovak definitions of democracy
Experienced and Ideal Democracy
On initial inspection of the transcripts it was evident that the interviewees were
clearly opposing democracy as they experienced it with what they saw as ‘true’ or ‘ideal’
democracy. They would often provide a definitional response followed, spontaneously, by an
utterance such as ‘but, in an ideal democracy…’ or ‘…however, in a true democracy…’ .
Here are some typical examples from the Scottish data:
“democracy is freedom of choice but do we really...lots of things where decisions are
made for us, in a true democracy we should have greater opportunity to have a say”
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“well, for example, freedom of the press, but can we be truly democratic when you have a
blanket on the new”’
And from the Slovak sample:
 “democracy is freedom of expression, but in a democracy we should not be punished for
having alternative views”
“democracy means there should be respect for laws but if we had real democracy we would
be treated equally under the law”
On some occasions, the participants’ accounts concerning experienced and ideal
democracy were narrated in extended episodes comprising several sentences. Below are one
example from the Scottish sample and one from the Slovaks sample in response to the
question: ‘What, to you, is democracy?’
A Scottish episode:
“We have freedom but really we are quite constrained. Freedom, if you have the
money but if you don’t have a job you have a great lack of freedom, only really enjoy
democracy if you have sufficient money but if you are the bottom of the pile it doesn’t really
matter what system you live under. There is need to build up communities. You can only have
true freedom if you also have a sense of social responsibility. A free society may be less free
than a non-free society as self discipline must come from within and think about the
consequences of your actions”.
A Slovak episode:
“Democracy, to me, means that I can give my own opinion or point of view and that I
am responsible for what I say and do. But here, it is not like that. People are frightened to
give their opinion or do something according to their opinion or conviction. They suppress it
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themselves, we do not have enough democracy. People are not satisfied with such a situation.
There are countries, which have always had democracy, even fifty or sixty years ago. We
have it only for five years. Political parties constantly change and people do not know what
they want and what is democracy”
An ideal democracy in Scots and Slovaks
In light of this, all references to democracy in its ideal form were identified and the
relationships between these various references traced in both samples. These are presented as
a map of the totality of utterances expressing specific ideas and their inter-relationships, for
the Scots in Figure 13 and for the Slovaks in Figure 14.
 Figure 13 shows that for Scots, one aspect of an ideal democracy would mean greater
political involvement, improvement in democratic procedures and in policy decisions, often
with these leading to the issue of Scottish devolution; Scottish decisions for Scottish issues
made with greater representation from the Scottish people. A second aspect viewed by the
Scottish sample is the question of democracy being more than ‘just freedoms’ with the
interlinking of issues of social responsibility and the education of people regarding social
responsibility, taking democracy beyond simply freedom.
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Figure 13: Ideal democracy in the Scottish sample
The figure illustrating the Slovak sample shows no overlap with that from the
Scottish sample. For Slovaks, one major aspect of an ideal democracy is clearly linked to
issues related to justice and laws, linking greater respect and equal protection under the law.
Responsibility, as a theme for the Slovaks was talked about more in relation to ‘individual
responsibility, as opposed to, in the Scottish sample, the issue of greater ‘social
responsibility’.
Ideal
Democracy
Greater involvement in decision making
System of representation
Other representational
issues
The Scottish
question
More than just
freedoms
Social
responsibility Education of people
317
Figure 14: Ideal democracy in the Slovak sample
Past/present comparisons in the Slovak sample
As stated above, the Slovak data contained spontaneous references comparing the
present day situation to that of from the past. Here are some typical examples:
“There is no difference between the past and the present regimes. Only words are
different. Instead of socialism it is now spoken about democracy”
“In the past everything was directed from above: certain things were allowed, certain
things were forbidden. There were clearly defined duties and no space for self decision-
making. After the revolution in 1989 we were allowed to be free. However, later new
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To have a voice
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Individual
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restrictions were established. Now I do not see any differences between the present and the
past regime”
“Now it is only another type of dictatorship. Freedom of expression is very much
restricted”
In view of these spontaneous references to past/present in the Slovak sample, all such
references were identified in the data. On some occasions these were clearly identifiable such
as, ‘ in the past we had restrictions, but now we can travel’. This example clearly identifies a
negative aspect of the past which has now improved (negative/positive). Other utterances
reflected a ‘negative/negative’ relationship such as ‘we still have corruption and cheating’,
some simply stated ‘we now have unemployment’. In view of the various ways in which
these utterances could be expressed; either as a direct comparison between an aspect in the
past and in the present or simply by a single reference, all such references in the data are
presented in Table 29, under four main headings: Past (positive and negative) Present
(positive and negative). It is clearly evident that the categories under which the contents
could have been presented are not mutually exclusive, for example the Past/Negative
‘repression’ category and the present/Positive ‘restrictive powers removed’ category are
linked.
The format of the interview was not designed to specifically examine the perception
of past and present. The content of the utterances came spontaneously from the participants
during the course of the interview. Had the interview specifically asked the respondents to
talk about the negative and positive aspects of the past and the present, a very different
content may have been evident.
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Table 29: References to the past and the present in the Slovak sample.
Past/Positive
under socialism, more democracy
higher standard of living
fuller employment
no social problems-alcohol/drugs
lower prices
Past/Negative
repression
no access to information
no private enterprise
Present/Positive
restrictive powers removed
greater freedoms of all types
Present/Negative
now have greater restrictions
unemployment
standard of services lower
rules are missing
less equality
secret police active again
another type of dictatorship
too much responsibility for own life
value of money higher than value of life
greater insecurity
no trust between people
citizens divided politically
corruption and cheating is growing
There are of course vast differences between the past and the present political systems
in Slovakia and the degree of repression is not comparable to what they were in the past. It is
evident in Slovakia, as in the other post-communist nations, that the newly found freedoms
have transformed the lives of many. However, the increased freedoms have also opened up
other issues that clearly penetrate the lives of the people. Under the previous regime, the
positive aspects are linked to a greater sense of security, including issues such as ‘fuller
employment’ ‘higher standard of living’ and less ‘social problems’. The increased freedoms
lead to feelings of less security with a ‘less equal society’, ‘higher unemployment’, lower
services, a more divided society (both politically and economically) and lacking a sense of
trust. It is not possible within this data-set to come to any conclusion about the relative costs
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and benefits even if, in pure content, the negative aspects appear to dominate over the
positive. The interview was not designed to explore these issues. But what is evident is that
the positive aspects may not be strikingly obvious and may not penetrate far enough into the
daily lives of the people. What this data reveals is that the negative aspects appeared more
spontaneously in their talk than the positive aspects.
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Discussion
The aims of this study were three-fold. Firstly, to examine any changes in the
meaning of democracy, as accessed through word associations to the term democracy, over
three periods of time, in Slovaks and Scots. Secondly, to re-examine the meaning of
democracy through the use of a rating scale in Slovaks and Scots, along with the inclusion of
interview data, focusing on democracy, in Slovaks and Scots. Thirdly, through the inclusion
of word association data for the Czech Republic, similarities and differences in the meaning
of democracy, in these two nation were examined.
As suggested in the Introduction the prime concerns during the period were the
overall stability of the newly emerged democratic regimes, the interaction of the political and
economic aspects of the transitions with the suggestion that, through either intense
disappointment or unrealistic expectations, some form of anti-democratic thought may
emerge. However, in addition to these concerns, the problems inherent in the attempts to
understand what the concept of democracy means to people from very different historical
backgrounds were being raised. Firstly, the Scottish and Slovak sets of results will be
discussed, followed by the Slovak and Czech results.
From the word association data, responses falling into the three broad categories of
response of ‘freedom’, definitional’ and ‘evaluative’ did not vary over the three periods in
Slovaks and Scots. Across all periods, associations linking democracy with freedom
remained the most common single category across both samples. In addition, in the analysis
of the rating scale data, the ‘freedom’ factor was the only factor from the set of four that did
not reveal either main effects or interaction effects between the samples, and in interviews,
freedom was identified as a defining feature of democracy by both Slovaks and Scots. Across
the two other broad categories, in all three periods, the Scottish sample produced more
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associations that were definitional in nature and the Slovaks produced more responses that
were evaluative. The greater incidence of the production of definitions of democracy was
borne out in the interview data, with the Scottish sample producing more definitional
utterances than the Slovaks, and the evaluative or emotive component appearing more salient
for the Slovaks
From these results, freedom, as a broad concept, can be taken as forming the central
core of the representations of democracy across both Slovaks and Scots, and this appears
relatively stable over time, and stable over the three methods. Rose (1995) has identified
freedom as a fundamental value, and as Davies (1997) has pointed out, in reality, the essence
of democracy is its fundamental opposition to tyranny.
Although the distribution of responses across the three categories did not vary
between the two samples over time, the types of responses within the definitional and within
the evaluative were shown to change in Slovaks, but not to the same extent in the Scottish
sample.
The structure of meaning
From a structural approach to social representations, the central core of the
representation gives coherence and meaning to the representation. The peripheral items may
vary and change dependent on particular contexts, allowing flexibility and change in the
meaning without transforming the entire representation. Only if a change in the peripheral
items directly challenges the central core would a representation completely change its form
(Abric, 1993). The core and the peripheral items are not conceived as distinct entities, but
that they form a dynamic relationship in which cores and peripheries may co-change
together, however, it may be expected that the cores may change more slowly (Markova et al,
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1998). From the data in figure 2, it is clear that most of definitional categories, in Slovaks,
showed variation over the three periods. Concentrating on those that show a distinct pattern
of change, associations referring to ‘politics/government’ rose and those linking democracy
to their own nation fell from around 16% in 1992 and were absent in 1996. In the Scottish
sample (figure 3) associations referring to equality rose after 1994, those referring to
politics/government rose after 1992. However, the category referring to voting and the
electoral process was, after ‘freedom’, the next most single, frequent category in the Scottish
sample. This category remained absent in the Slovak sample over the three periods of time.
Across the evaluative categories, in the Slovaks, a more distinct pattern can be found, ‘hopes
and desires’ fell over the period, ‘negative’ associations dramatically rose, and democracy as
‘not existing dropped after 1994. This sense of extreme disenchantment with democracy
along with a rise in negative evaluations was also found in Hungary between 1990 and 1993
(Simon, 1996). The inter-relationship between the core of the representation, ie. freedom, and
the peripheral components, it can be argued, is dependent upon both the definitional and the
evaluative aspects for Slovaks. For the Scots, this relationship is more linked to the
definitional aspects only and primarily linked to that of voting and the electoral process.
The fight for freedom in modern history was largely framed against ‘freedom from’
various external sources of authority. Along with the growth in ‘freedom from’, grew
positive freedoms consisting of franchise rights (democracy, freedom to influence
government) and social and civil rights and freedoms, enabling individuals to realise their
own welfare (Rose, 1995). This is not to say the idea of freedom, or of democracy, remains
unproblematic today. The nature of modern societies continues to pose constant tension
involving individual freedom and constraints on that freedom, and tension between the role
and influence of government and politics and individuals’ abilities to influence and effect
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change.
In the present study, the meaning and understanding of ‘freedom’, itself, was not
examined in any detail, therefore, it is not possible to fully explore the inter-relationships
between freedom and the definitional and evaluative components of the representations of
democracy. As Fleron (1996) pointed out, the high incidence of global support for, or
agreement with, any of the broad ideals of democracy, of which freedom is one, can be
misleading without further examination of what other meanings and understandings underlie
these ‘ideals’. Bearing these cautions in mind, it is, however, possible to draw some links in
the present study.
If we consider the factor analysis, the ‘freedom’ factor contained terms/concepts that
were largely linked to the expansion of individual freedoms such as equality, rights, and
justice. The importance of these in the explanation of democracy in Slovaks and Scots did
not differ; in addition, these were, descriptively, amongst the terms carrying the most
explanatory power in both samples (table 25). It can be argued that along with ‘freedom’, the
central core of the representation of democracy contains these concepts in both Slovaks and
Scots, (this is also strengthened through the analysis of a rating scale not directly focused on
democracy, but on aspects important for the well-being of the community, in which the factor
containing democracy also contained freedom, rights justice and equality, see Chapter 7,
table 10). The present factor relating to markets and the economy was rated by the Slovaks as
more important for democracy than by the Scots, indicating the importance of the economic
transitions along with the political transitions. For the institutional aspects of democracy
(factor 2), the interaction effect obtained indicated that for the older generation of Slovaks,
these were more important than for the other sub-samples. Although not made up of identical
items, the factor obtained in the 1992 data set relating to the institutional aspects of
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democracy (Chapter 6, table 7) also revealed no differences between the Scots and the
Slovaks. In the present 1996 data , ‘the individual’ (factor 4) was rated more highly by the
Slovaks than the Scots. Again, in comparison to a similar, but not identical set in the 1992
data (Chapter 6 table 7), the individual in democratic society was rated, then, as less
important by the Slovaks than by the Scots. This suggests a possible shift in the meaning of
the role of the individual and democracy.
Through word associations and rating scales we get a partial examination of the
representations of democracy across both samples. In word associations, the responses are
not constrained by the methods, other than through the restriction of the production of the
first response to the term democracy. Rating scales constrain the responses through the pre-
selection of the items by the researchers. Responses to items in rating scales may only give
an indication of general support, or agreement/disagreement, with various ideals of
democracy or whatever aspects of democracy were conceived of by the researcher. Word
associations, being more open, allow the expression of the evaluative or emotive components
of meaning. When respondents are engaged in talk during interviews, they are responding at
a more complex level than that of either of the other two methods. When they define
democracy they relate it to their own experiences and meaning, when contrasting
experienced or democracy in its ideal form and for Slovaks when they oppose it to the past,
they elaborate, and further elaborate various aspects depending on their salience.
The Slovaks defined democracy in interviews in relation to freedom, justice/laws,
rights, government/parliament, to having a voice and to voting and the electoral process.
Interestingly, voting or the electoral process did not appear at all in the word association data
for the Slovaks, although appeared prominently in that of the Scots across all three periods of
time. The Scottish sample, in interviews, also defined democracy using the same
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components, although freedom to a lesser extent, and having a voice and voting to a greater
extent. The aspect of experienced democracy to that of an ideal, or improved, democracy was
not specifically requested during the course of the interviews, these aspects appeared
spontaneously in the talk of both samples, as did references to the past and the present in the
Slovaks. What is produced spontaneously, without prompting, it can be argued, may reflect
more deeply felt aspects of meaning and understanding, as opposed to simply the answering
of questions, irrespective how in-depth these are or how prompted these are. For Scots, the
idea of an ideal, or improved, democracy related largely to the extension of participation in
decision making, through greater involvement in the decisions made affecting the nation as a
whole, in greater freedom to have a voice and to influence. The salience of this aspect
appeared spontaneously in the word association data for the Scots, through the high incidence
of associations referring to voting and the electoral process. In addition, an ideal democracy
was viewed by the Scots as something more than just freedoms, and that democracy carries
some measure of social responsibility. Ideal democracy in the Slovak interviews was talked
about primarily in terms of having a voice without fear of punishment, greater clarity
regarding rules and regulations, respect for laws, greater and more equal protection under law
and some measure of individual responsibility. As these aspects were talked about in terms of
an ideal democracy it can be taken that these were missing. There is no doubt that after the
fall of the previous regime, the fear of oppression previously experienced in Slovakia had
largely gone and that all forms of freedoms had increased. Indeed, the past was characterised
as repressed and the present as free, by the Slovaks. However, the meanings of freedom
associated with democracy were entangled with aspects from the past and the present and
how these had changed. The past, although not free, was secure, with more fuller
employment, had less social problems and so on. Increased freedom had brought with it a
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reduction in rules and regulations, less equality, greater opportunities for corruption and
cheating, no trust and a politically divided society. This is also strengthened through the
production of more associations related to ‘justice/laws’ in the Slovaks than in the Scots.
Although the interview did not explicitly set out to examine the meaning and understanding
of freedom, however, implicit in the Slovak interviews is the inter-relationship between
freedom, democracy and the perception of current social and economic practices. Process of
change is also reflected in the word association data collected from 1992 to 1996. The 1994
data collection period was after the separation into the two separate Czech and Slovaks
Republics and, therefore, periodic changes reflect both the underlying meaning and
understanding of democracy along with these separate constitutional changes. However, by
considering those reflecting an upward or downward trend, these appear more prominent in
the evaluative categories, with democracy as ‘not existing’ rising over the period, hopes and
desires falling with a large rise in negative evaluations of democracy.
The meaning of democracy for both Slovaks and Scots was firmly embedded
within a relatively stable central core understanding involving freedom and its associated
rights, equalities and justice. The peripheral components were expressed in terms of better
representation in the Scots, as more than just freedoms, as an extension to these freedoms and
rights. In Slovaks, democracy and freedom were linked to the costs/benefits and relative
negative/positive relationships directly involving both the past and the present. Rose (1995)
commentated that under Soviet Communism, many freedoms were traded against a sense of
security (eg, security of employment, health care, child care, and so on), and for Gibson
(1993) democracy, as all systems of power, carry differential allocation of freedom, rights
and bases of authority. For Slovaks, it may be argued, that their meaning is still dependent
upon the meaning that these aspects carried in the past. In examining the meaning of freedom
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using interviews across a range of post-communist nations, Simon (1996) found that
although freedom was highly valued, often a qualifier was added to restrict in some way the
new freedoms – not too many freedoms, not too many demonstrations, freedom of expression
but only after careful deliberation. The peripheral elements of representations serve to protect
the coherence of the central core, in essence, a defence system. Fundamental to the dynamic
nature of representations is the presence of the peripheral elements allowing flexibility and
change in the meaning without totally disrupting the entire representation (Abric, 2001).
Wagner (2001) has approached this through the idea of ‘coping’ and, he argues, that the idea
of ‘symbolic coping’ lies at the heart of social representations. When faced with new
challenging and changing events and practices individuals have to desire to understand and to
make sense of these new events. Initially, this occurs by setting what is new and changing
into an already established meaning system, that what is already known and understood. In
the context of the political and economic changes occurring in Slovakia during the period of
this research not only would ‘symbolic coping’ be prominent, but also ‘material coping’.
Therefore, the idea of coping would occur at different levels, symbolically though the
understanding and making sense of the new social practices and also materially through daily
practical experiences of these practices. These would necessarily interact. These boundaries
are always in a state of tension and change, in all societies. What was evident for the Slovaks,
was the saliency of these issues and that they were challenging the meaning of the inter-
relationship between democracy and freedom with that of security and stability. Although
through the word association data is was evident that democracy carried a strong emotional
content for the Slovaks, it was only through the elaboration during interviews that the nature
of this could be examined. Of course, this is not to say that democracy is ideal in Scotland. In
the Scottish sample, democracy was not unproblematic or ideal with numerous complaints
329
regarding representational issues such as voting and the electoral process. It is clear that
voting is closely linked to the meaning of democracy for the Scottish. Within an established
and stable democracy, voting and the electoral process may be the most visible and salient
aspects, for the Scottish, the meaning of democracy was largely elaborated in relation to
these.
For the Scottish, the period of research coincided with a time when discontentment
with their historically negotiated meaning of both their identity and that of democracy being
nested within that of the UK as a whole was at its most heightened. Not surprisingly, the
‘Scottish question’ was foregrounded and elaborated within the interview data. This
negotiation had been historically framed within the shifting boundaries of meaning in relation
to autonomy/integration within the UK State. Interview data revealed this tension in meaning
and touched on issues reflecting power and authority in democracy with that of freedom and
autonomy. However, for the Scottish, democracy was elaborated in terms of more than
simply freedoms, but with freedom comes increased social responsibilities. This elaboration
of freedom reflects strong symbolic carriers of what historically it has meant to be Scottish,
culturally transmitted through myths and beliefs and was being challenged under the present
political, economic and social context. At other points in time, other issues may arise that
may be of such concern that the Scots also become highly emotionally charged. Similarly, for
Slovaks, as the democratic transitions progress, other issues may dominate the peripheral
components in the meaning and understanding of democracy. However, unless these begin to
directly challenge the essential core in a fundamental way, the meaning will remain largely
stable, without changing its form.
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Slovak and Czech word associations to democracy
Through the use of repeated large-scale barometer type surveys conducted over the
1990s, a consistent trend emerged indicating that Czechs were more favourable to the
democratic reforms than Slovaks. Whether through direct comparisons of support for the
present regimes, support for the previous regimes or through various batteries of questions
resulting in indices, these remained consistent. Haerpfer (2001) concluded that the Czech
Republic was a ‘consolidated’ democracy, whereas, Slovakia was classified as an ‘emerging’
democracy. In what ways, if any, are these trends reflected in word associations to the term
democracy in Czechs and Slovaks from 1994 to 1996.
From the examination of the three broad categories of response -Freedom,
Definitional and Evaluative- associations reflecting freedom was the single most common
single category across both samples, across both periods of time. Czechs, like Slovaks,
primarily associated democracy with freedom. Czechs, similar to the Scottish, produced more
associations that were definitional in nature, and Slovaks, more that were evaluative or
emotive. Periodic shifts within the definitional and evaluative categories are to be expected,
reflecting ongoing political, economic and social issues as they arise. In the Scots, a long and
established democracy, periodic shifts were also evident. What is more interesting, however,
is the existence or non-existence of trends between and within the Czechs and the Slovaks.
From figure 6, both Czechs and Slovaks, showed an upward trend of associating democracy
with politics/government in general. During the period 1994 to 1996, as earlier indicated, the
Slovaks produced no associations referring to voting or the electoral process. In 1996, in the
Czech sample, voting did appear more prominently. If voting is included in the overall
breakdown of the definitional categories it accounted for over 8% of the definitional
responses in the Czechs. Also interesting is the almost total absence in the Slovaks in
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associating democracy with their own nation, whereas, in the Czech sample, this account for
a large proportion of the definitional categories. However, the most striking difference
between the two samples was the almost overwhelming positive response to the term
democracy by the Czech sample and the equally overwhelming negative response in the
Slovaks (figure 7). For the Slovaks, as already suggested, the negative aspects of the
increased freedoms were not yet balanced by a sense of stability or security.
The differences in the evaluative components in the meaning of democracy may be
accounted for by an interaction between both their past histories and present circumstances.
Although sharing a common history, their relationship to one another never became fully
resolved. Even during the ‘golden period’ of  democracy between the two wars, under the
leadership of Masaryk, the positive sentiments held by the Czechs were never matched by the
Slovaks (Leff, 1997). Throughout their history, the Czech portion was always economically
stronger than that of the Slovak, this economic disparity was reduced during the period of
Soviet rule. After separation, the Slovak Republic, through a combination of economic
factors and a relatively poorer political and economic climate, was predicted to have a more
troubled transition than the Czechs (Kirschbuam, 1997; Evans & Whitefield, 1998).
Although based solely on word associations to the term democracy, the differences in the
evaluative component of democracy reflect these political and economic factors. For both
Czechs and Slovaks, the central core meaning of democracy was linked to freedom and its
associated rights, for Slovaks the negative evaluative aspects reflect a desire for stability, and
for some time this meaning may reflect the balance between the positive aspects from the
past and what is unstable and changing in the present. Interestingly, for the Czech Republic,
their troubled period had not yet arrived. After around 1996/1997, data indicates that a
dramatic downturn in positive support for the new democratic regimes occurred, with support
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falling from around 76% to 56% (Haerpfer, 2001). Around the same period (1998)
Slovakia’s previously more troubled democratic reforms became more stabilised (Harris, no
date).
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CHAPTER 10: CONCLUSIONS
Prominent in the professional thinking concerning the events of 1989 was the
prevailing idea that the democratic transitions for the nations of Central and Eastern Europe
would be problematic. Various specialists in the area drew their understandings from a range
of knowledge sources in their attempts to understand the present and from which to predict
the future. Drawing these together, an overall sense of pessimism was evident. Their main
focus was on the potential negative legacies of decades of oppression and isolation and the
effect this would have on the transition process. The lack of dynamism, rigidity and general
passivity along with the atomisation of society, characteristic of totalitarian regimes, were at
the core of the specialists’ understandings. Loosely, in the terminology of social
representations, their meanings and understandings were ‘anchored’ to their own conceptions
of the realities and experiences of decades of Soviet Communism and in what ways these
would carry over to the post-communist period. The various researchers and commentators
selected and drew from what they considered important in order to aid or explain their
understanding of the process of social change. These will necessarily be determined by the
dominant conceptions within the various disciplines, by the cultural traditions in which the
researchers live and through their own theoretical and methodological paradigms. Similarly,
any examination of the social representations of complex phenomena will also reflect the
researcher’s choices on how to examine such phenomena and the framework under which
they are interpreted.
In 1990, Agh commented that the examination of all social change sheds new light on
the process of adaptation, on the creation of new meaning structures and frames of reference,
both in relation to understandings conceived in the past and to new structures arising through
social change.
Although this study was relatively modest in attempting to answer these questions
and based, largely, on the meaning and understanding of single terms and concepts, some
conclusions can be proposed.
Democracy and Freedom
In relation to the core meaning of democracy, across the national groups, across
methods and across time democracy was primarily conceived in terms of a core set of
concepts including freedom, equality, rights and justice. Structurally, these can be taken
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as comprising the central core of the lay representations of democracy. In ‘traditional’
democracies, like Scotland, democracy is in a sense a given, it is taken for granted and part of
the background and fabric of society. Tensions between democracy and freedom may
occasionally rise to the surface, become debated, be challenged, resulting in the boundaries
of meaning changing. For Slovaks, however, democracy is not a given, not something to be
taken for granted and occasionally brought to the surface, but comprising more salient and
intertwining meaning systems to be struggled over, and from which the creation of meaning
reflect the more the dynamic process of the tension and integration of both old and new
meaning systems. It may be expected that in examining the meaning of democracy across
two cultures, one a long-lived democracy and one in transition, that the relationship between
stability and change in meaning and understanding be more prominent and more accessible
to examination within the context of rapid social change.
Irrespective of the differing political, economic and social backgrounds, the term
‘democracy’ was anchored to sets of value terms such as freedom, rights, equality and
justice. These meanings reveal components that may remain stable across generations, and
across cultures in which explicit attempts were made to change the fundamental
understandings of democracy and freedom. The relationship between democracy and
freedom may have a long history in human thought, this relationship, however deeply rooted
across cultures, does not remain unchallenged or unchanging. Through both implicit
understandings of the relationship between democracy and freedom and explicitly through
current practices challenging or clashing with these, new meaning and understanding is
generated.
Using word associations, rating scales and interviews this study has revealed that
although anchored to aspects of freedom and related values in both Slovaks and Scots,
through different political, economic and social contexts these were elaborated, or
thematised, differently. The Slovak’s experience of democracy revealed tension between
democracy and freedom, elaborated through current aspects of increased freedoms with the
changing nature of stability/instability arising from the new freedoms. Aspects of the lay
representations of democracy, in Slovaks, were located in the space between two dominant
and opposing meaning systems- Soviet Communism and democracy.
Representations of democracy, like any complex or salient concept, will intermingle
with a host of other representational systems. Exploring the meaning of one, depending on
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context, may reveal salient aspects of other meaning systems. It would be expected that under
a period of rapid social change and upheaval that aspects of the meaning of democracy would
be co-constructed, and reveal tension, between what is familiar and what is changing. This
tension in the Slovak sample was evident in the salience and emotive content of their
meaning of democracy. For the Slovaks, familiarity, change and tension in the meaning of
democracy was elaborated in relation to aspects of representations, both past and present, of
societal or individual stability, security and certainty. Although the Slovaks rejected Soviet
Communism and may have initially embraced the idea of freedom, the experience of
increased freedoms along with that of general instability in the political and economic
climate led to tensions. Here the contrast between Communism and democracy is salient.
Freedom, like that of oppression under Communism, touches on all aspects of life. Although
the present study was not focused on the meaning of freedom the data suggests that the
balance between freedom and authority was a salient issue for the Slovaks. The
understanding of freedom can only be understood relative to that of oppression or non-
freedom. What is perceived as freedom within one context may be perceived as oppression or
non-freedom in another. Here I would suggest that for the Slovaks the relative tension, during
this period, is not one of freedom/oppression but of freedom/authority. What is desired, the
data suggests, is greater emphasis on authority through protection, legal structures and so on.
Whether these can be considered as legacies arising from the communist period which may
impede social change or are responses to a general climate of instability and rapid change
these data cannot answer.
In the Scottish sample, although experiencing, relative to the Slovaks, a stable and
longer-lived democracy, their identity as a nation and that of democracy as being nested
within that of the UK was being challenged. It can be argued that for the Scottish, their ideas
of freedom historically have been tied to ideas involving the changing relationship between
autonomy/integration within a British State. This basic antinomy has been potent in their
political and cultural history, intermingled with that of nationhood and to distinctive aspects
of civil society comprising both political and non-political symbolic markers that conferred a
deep sense of Scottishness. This complex relationship defining both their political identity
and their sense of nationhood were being challenged. It may be thought that in an established
democracy, elaborating democracy in terms of freedom, voting and having voice may reflect
what is already known, rather than reflecting change in meaning, social change or tension
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and contradiction in understanding. As social representations “makes out of known things the
things to be known” (Moscovici, 1984, p431), within the present political, economic and
social climate, it may be argued, that these elaborations reflected more deeply felt aspects
reflecting identity issues, both political and cultural.
For both Slovaks and Scots, examining the meaning of democracy suggested tension
in the relationship between democracy and freedom. This tension clashed with other meaning
structures and although these inter-relationships could be identified, they could not be further
elaborated on.
The individual and the Community
Although based on the responses to single terms, the results of this study gives some
support to the idea that Soviet totalitarianism distorted or destroyed the interdependencies
between the individual and the community. In contrast to the concept ‘democracy’ where
democracy and freedom formed a relatively shared understanding across the samples,
through the content analysis of the spontaneously produced associations to the terms ‘the
individual’ and ‘local community’ the results suggest that there was very little overlap in the
meanings of these two terms for the Slovaks and the Scots. Conceived of separately, the
contents of the lay representations of these two concepts were not found to be largely shared
between Slovaks and Scots.
The structural approach to social representations argues that social representations
differ if the content/s of their central elements differ. Here I would argue that although the
structural approach to examining social representations has, in many ways, helped clarify the
‘paradoxical’ nature of thought as comprising layers of meaning and understanding,
reflecting both stability and change. In addition, it has provided a framework allowing the
empirical examination of complex social issues to be set within. However, there is a danger
in paying too much attention to identifying structure at the expense of dynamics. The
complexities in the examination of social representations arise through the attempt to capture
meaning and understanding which, in reality, is dynamic and fluid in nature. Core elements
may be stable or they may be sensitive, not only through their interaction with other
representations but also through the context under which they are examined and expressed.
Taking a more holistic approach, by examining and conceiving ‘the individual’ and
‘the community’ not in isolation from one another but as forming a relational whole in which
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one makes sense only in relation to the other, other conclusions can be proposed. For both
samples the term the individual was closely embedded within a cluster of terms associated
with traditional values of democracy and individualism, revealed through the examination of
semantic networks of spontaneously produced word associations and through the more
considered rating of items in a scale. At this level, the meaning of the individual can be
identified as comprising some shared aspects across the two samples. Viewed as co-
compliments, as a relational whole, the relative tension between the individual/community
dyad and what may or may not become foregrounded will vary at any particular point in time
depending on the context (Markova, 1997). For the Scots, a close relationship between the
individual and the community was identified, for Slovaks, although the individual was
viewed important for the community, the community was not viewed as important for the
individual. At yet another level of examination, the relative importance of various political
and economic factors and their relationship to both the individual and the community
revealed similar patterns of meaning and understanding in the Slovaks and the Scots. This
study cannot draw any conclusions as to what will remain stable or what may change.
However, the study did reveal the multi-layered and dynamic nature of meaning and
understanding, that different meanings co-exist which may or may not be elaborated upon, or
identifiable, being dependent upon both the methods used in their examination and also how
these concepts are approached by the researcher. Whether ‘the individual and ‘the
community’ are considered and examined in isolation from one another (through the content
analysis of word associations to each term) or as forming a dyad where one makes sense only
in relation to the other (through the semantic analysis of associations and rating scales)
different levels of meaning and interpretation are possible.
The individual/community relationship revealed a complex meaning structure, less
bound and anchored to deep-seated historical and cultural aspects and more dependent on the
recent past in Slovak history. In order to more fully examine the dynamic inter-relationship
between the individual and the community, and how this co-compliment interacts, influences
or is dependent upon other meaning structures, in both Slovaks and Scots, require methods
that go beyond the understanding of single terms or concepts.
Contribution
The fall of communism presented a unique opportunity for the theory of social
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representations to add to the growing body of knowledge being accumulated across various
academic disciplines. Social change and social knowledge across the various disciplines was
being conceived of in different ways, and which ultimately guided the questions being asked
and interpretations provided. The vast bulk of this literature shared various assumptions
regarding social change. These were largely being phrased and understood in terms of the
eventual convergence of the various nations with ‘western’ Europe, in a sense, a ‘return to
Europe’, focusing on the end state of social change along with that of communist legacies
halting or disrupting this process. Here I argue that applying some form of goal-directed,
modernisation theory to social change ignores distinctive historical and cultural
understandings; while focusing on an historical approach narrows down the understanding to
that of historical legacies. Both of these approaches, dominant in the literature, precludes the
question of dynamics, diversity and innovation in social change.
This present work, within a social representational framework, offered a contribution
to the existing literature by approaching the question of social change and social meaning in
a more ‘social’ manner than is normally considered within the social sciences. What is
implied in the dominant thinking is a mechanistic interaction of separate and discrete entities
and the belief that social phenomena can be explored through reducing them to universal
elements. To overcome these limitations, and to contribute to the examination and
understanding of pressing social issues, it is necessary to reconsider how such phenomena are
studied. These include an understanding of the interdependency of individual and social
thought, that meaning is an expression of, and dependent on, tension in self/other/object
relationships which reflect contradiction, ambiguity, diversity and innovation in social
change and social thinking. Although framed within a social representational approach this
present work has only touched on these issues. Understood within a structural approach to
social representations, that of core/periphery, this work has examined aspects of meaning that
reflects both stability and change in the understanding of democracy, drawing from
historically negotiated understanding of democracy and how these are expressed in current
changing political, economic and social contexts.
However, the understanding of social representations as comprising structure as
conceived within the core/periphery approach may be limited in its application to the
understanding of complex social phenomena such as democracy. The concept of themata as
organising principles or source ideas underlying and generating social representations has
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moved the theoretical understanding of social representations to that which emphasises the
role of social communication in driving social change and social knowledge. Data from the
present study suggests the existence of such themata such as autonomy/integration and
identity issues through recognition/non-recognition in the political sphere in the Scottish
elaborations; and that of stability/instability, certainty/uncertainty and freedom/authority in
the Slovak data. It may be argued that these themata may underlie various meaning domains.
The most pressing question, it seems, is how do we as researchers study such themata? If
themata are thought of as underlying social thinking and contain generative properties for
social representations, then as researchers we need to discover such themata embedded in
cultures and from which representations are generated. Rather than examining themata that
may ‘emerge’ from the data, themata may be the focus of the research questions themselves.
For example, through the examination of themata which have been historically and culturally
established and their intersection with other historical and culturally transmitted themata.
This moves the central issue away from thinking of social representations as merely
comprising structure but that complex social meaning forms nested and overlapping
relationships with other meaning systems which may or may not become foregrounded and
elaborated.
Although this present work applied various methods in the examination of
democracy, it was limited largely through the use of individual terms. Through the use of
word associations and rating scales the content and structure of meaning could be identified
and examined, however, these methods were not sensitive enough to examine the more
dynamic and generative properties of social representations. Interviews allowed greater
elaboration in meaning to be expressed and through this method I would suggest that themata
could be identified which contributed to how the meanings were constructed.
Since the completion of the research phase of this work the concept of democracy has
become more prominent in the public discourse: from a global perspective to that of the
incorporation of a variety of nations in the enlargement process of the European Union.
Issues such as identity, national distinctiveness, autonomy/integration, inclusion/exclusion,
stability/change, freedom/authority will all feature in how such social change progresses and
is understood. Rather than the current global expansion of democracy or that of European
enlargement as a unifying force viewed as both cultural and institutional convergence, its
expansion will continue to reflect cultural specificity along with that of the inter-relationship
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between stability, contradiction and tension. Through these dynamic processes current
aspects of social change and social practices will be reflected in meaning, just as meaning
will effect change in social practices. The concerns, and practical contribution, of social
representations to social change and social knowledge lies in the progression of its theoretical
and empirical approaches, and in its application to such social issues.
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Appendix 1: Mean ratings for Slovaks and Scots in the 1992 democracy rating scale
(Chapter 7)
SLOVAK SCOTTISH
TERMS N Mean SD N Mean SD
market economy 300 3.80 .95 275 3.62 1.09
command economy 299 2.57 1.04 275 2.61 .88
perestroika 300 2.12 1.02 273 3.42 .97
freedom 300 4.37 .87 275 4.59 .64
glasnost 300 3.14 1.21 274 3.68 .94
justice 300 4.16 .90 274 4.62 .65
equality 300 3.42 1.30 275 4.53 .75
individual will 300 3.56 1.06 275 4.19 .93
personal security 300 3.73 1.16 275 4.35 .76
prosperity 300 3.88 .95 275 3.94 .99
citizen 300 3.85 1.04 275 3.81 1.04
ideology 300 2.40 1.09 275 3.36 1.09
capitalism 300 2.73 1.10 275 3.02 1.29
communism 300 1.63 .93 275 2.11 1.09
socialism 300 1.82 .90 275 3.23 1.17
dictatorship 300 1.34 .76 275 1.38 .80
nationalism 300 1.71 .92 275 2.85 1.25
power 300 2.32 1.17 275 2.96 1.27
religion 300 3.06 1.23 275 2.64 1.22
political parties 300 3.62 .97 275 3.93 1.19
mass media 300 3.81 .96 275 3.74 1.10
public opinion 300 3.85 .97 275 4.47 .69
social groups 299 3.37 .99 275 3.67 1.12
constitution 299 4.14 .90 275 4.05 .89
law and order 300 4.18 .94 275 4.34 .79
individual rights 299 3.96 1.00 275 4.59 .68
government 300 3.67 .98 275 4.17 1.03
parliament 300 3.93 .99 275 4.16 1.17
opposition 300 3.93 .97 275 4.27 1.08
trade unions 300 3.59 .98 275 3.72 1.22
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Appendix 2a: Mean ratings for Slovaks and Scots—Individual Scale (Chapter 8)
SCOTTISH SLOVAK
TERMS N Mean SD N Mean SD
personal
responsibility
195 4.46 .79 200 4.62 .60
law and order 199 4.25 .86 199 4.25 .87
the state 198 3.40 .97 199 3.88 .98
money 198 3.99 .92 198 4.24 .94
privatisation 198 2.40 1.07 198 3.09 1.18
profit 198 3.26 1.15 199 3.86 1.01
welfare 199 4.36 .80 199 3.51 1.10
local community 199 3.94 .92 192 3.06 1.14
wealth 199 3.59 1.08 196 3.27 1.05
poverty 198 3.54 1.53 195 2.90 1.28
passivity 195 2.93 1.07 194 2.37 1.15
religion 199 2.77 1.26 199 2.88 1.30
public opinion 198 3.41 1.16 199 3.16 1.16
ideology 197 3.01 1.03 197 2.70 1.24
self interest 199 3.67 1.05 200 4.23 .80
market economy 199 2.92 .97 198 3.56 1.02
political parties 198 2.98 1.17 200 2.51 1.15
democracy 198 4.07 .93 199 4.04 1.01
human rights 199 4.65 .65 199 4.59 .68
minority rights 198 4.29 .95 198 3.46 1.19
freedom 199 4.77 .55 200 4.71 .51
equality 198 4.66 .64 198 4.11 1.04
justice 199 4.66 .71 197 4.76 .58
private enterprise 198 3.27 1.12 197 3.48 .95
pub interest 199 3.72 .96 196 3.41 .87
fraternity 195 3.27 .99 200 3.46 1.16
personal security 196 4.35 .77 199 4.53 .77
capitalism 197 2.84 .98 196 2.45 1.09
socialism 199 3.22 1.07 199 1.98 .98
communism 198 2.30 1.18 199 1.74 .95
dictatorship 196 2.22 1.39 197 1.82 1.19
risk 198 3.32 .96 200 3.31 1.04
nation 197 3.31 1.06 198 3.84 .97
character 199 4.25 .76 199 4.57 .70
self determination 199 4.44 .67 199 4.61 .70
corruption 198 2.88 1.48 196 2.54 1.38
peace 199 4.68 .62 198 4.75 .60
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Appendix 2b: Mean ratings for Slovaks and Scots-Community Scale (Chapter 8)
SCOTTISH SLOVAK
TERMS N Mean SD N Mean SD
the individual 193 4.07 .97 199 3.91 1.16
personal responsibility 191 4.10 .89 199 4.18 1.00
law and order 191 4.65 .64 199 4.65 .66
the state 189 4.04 .97 200 4.59 .79
money 190 4.04 .91 199 4.29 .94
privatisation 190 2.80 1.19 199 3.90 1.12
profit 190 3.46 1.15 198 4.27 .93
welfare 190 4.47 .67 199 3.94 1.05
wealth 189 3.86 1.02 199 3.87 1.05
poverty 189 3.62 1.47 196 2.76 1.47
passivity 187 3.12 1.17 196 2.49 1.25
religion 189 2.80 1.21 199 3.05 1.16
public opinion 190 3.88 1.01 199 3.98 .92
ideology 189 3.15 1.13 197 3.18 1.18
self interest 190 3.05 1.21 197 3.21 1.25
market economy 190 3.29 1.18 200 4.19 .97
political parties 190 3.41 1.19 200 3.58 1.20
democracy 190 4.37 .87 200 4.31 .96
human rights 190 4.55 .75 200 4.55 .77
minority rights 190 4.37 .90 200 3.78 1.07
freedom 190 4.60 .70 199 4.60 .78
equality 189 4.61 .65 200 4.11 1.07
justice 190 4.68 .57 199 4.58 .76
private enterprise 189 3.37 1.22 199 3.82 1.02
public interest 190 4.11 .92 197 4.08 .90
fraternity 189 3.40 1.08 198 3.30 1.23
personal security 188 3.88 .98 196 4.04 1.07
capitalism 190 2.95 1.18 196 2.75 1.09
socialism 190 3.38 1.11 199 2.20 1.07
communism 188 2.43 1.25 199 2.05 1.10
dictatorship 189 2.27 1.45 197 2.02 1.23
risk 189 3.00 1.10 197 3.04 1.14
nation 189 3.66 1.06 200 4.11 1.06
character 189 3.78 .96 199 3.95 1.08
self deter 190 3.74 1.03 196 3.87 1.13
corruption 189 3.06 1.57 197 2.79 1.49
peace 190 4.71 .65 198 4.77 .66
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Appendix 3: Full tables for log linear analyses (Chapter 9)
Table numbers match table numbers in the text
Table 8.  Log-linear analysis for three broad categories of response for Slovaks and Scots
over three periods.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
df L.R. Chisq p
3
2
1
4
12
17
7.10
147.28
285.00
0.130
0.000
0.000
Tests of partial associations
df Partial Chisq p
Category x Nation
Category x Year
Nation x Year
Category
Nation
Year
2
4
2
2
1
2
123.50
3.92
5.82
117.63
5.28
14.79
0.000
0.416
0.054
0.000
0.021
0.000
Table 10.  Log-linear analysis for 6 sub-categories of definitional response for Slovaks and
Scots over three periods.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
df L.R. Chisq p
3
2
1
10
27
35
20.56
81.66
126.02
0.024
0.000
0.000
Tests of partial associations
df Partial Chisq p
Category x Nation
Category x Year
Nation x Year
Category
Nation
Year
5
10
2
5
1
2
31.28
32.77
2.19
34.03
5.47
0.33
0.000
0.000
0.333
0.000
0.019
0.846
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Table 12.  Log-linear analysis for 6 sub-categories of definitional response for (a) Slovaks
and (b) Scots over the three time periods.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
(a) Slovaks
df L.R. Chisq p
2
1
(b) Scots
2
1
10
17
10
17
41.37
68.73
13.16
53.74
0.000
0.000
0.215
0.000
Tests of partial associations
df Partial Chisq p
(a) Slovaks
Category
Year
(b) Scots
Category
Year
5
2
5
2
31.04
0.49
34.05
1.81
0.000
0.779
0.000
0.404
Table 13  Log-linear analysis for 4 sub-categories of evaluative response for  Scots and
Slovaks over three periods.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
df L.R. Chisq p
3
2
1
6
17
23
7.27
60.51
272.89
0.254
0.000
0.000
Tests of partial associations
df Partial Chisq p
Category x Year
Category x Nation
Year x Nation
Category
Year
Nation
6
3
2
3
2
1
38.49
15.14
0.84
35.74
13.79
93.99
0.000
0.001
0.658
0.000
0.001
0.000
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Table 15.  Log-linear analysis for 4 sub-categories of evaluative response for (a) Slovaks and
(b) Scots over the three time periods.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
(a) Slovaks
df L.R. Chisq p
2
1
(b) Scots
2
1
6
11
6
11
40.08
113.35
1.70
17.19
0.000
0.000
0.944
0.102
Tests of partial associations
df Partial Chisq p
(a) Slovaks
Category
Year
(b) Scots
Category
Year
3
2
3
2
41.69
8.93
9.01
5.51
0.000
0.011
0.029
0.064
Table17. Log-linear analysis for 3 categories of response for Slovak versus Czech over two
time periods.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
df L.R. Chisq p
3
2
1
2
7
11
1.69
24.01
64.43
0.429
0.001
0.001
Tests of partial associations
df Partial Chisq p
Category x Nation
Category x Year
Nation x Year
Category
Nation
Year
2
2
1
2
1
1
20.13
1.31
2.51
5.81
17.39
18.01
0.000
0.517
0.112
0.054
0.000
0.000
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Table 19  Log-linear analysis for the Czech and Slovak samples across six definitional
categories over two time periods.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
df L.R. Chisq p
3
2
1
5
16
23
19.64
47.05
91.75
0.001
0.000
0.000
Tests of partial associations
Category x nation
Category x year
Year x nation
Category
Year
Nation
df
5
5
1
5
1
1
Partial Chisq
20.79
8.85
0.50
41.26
0.18
2.08
p
0.000
0.114
0.822
0.000
0.665
0.148
Table 21. Log linear analysis for the six sub-categories of definitional response for (a)
Slovaks and (b) Czechs over two time periods.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
(a) Slovaks
df L.R. Chisq p
2
1
(b) Czech
2
1
5
11
5
11
19.72
61.66
9.78
32.41
0.001
0.000
0.081
0.007
Tests of partial associations
df Partial Chisq p
(a) Slovaks
Category
Year
(b) Czech
Category
Year
5
1
5
1
41.44
0.49
20.79
1.82
0.000
0.481
0.000
0.176
372
Table 23. Log-linear analysis for the Czech and Slovak samples across four evaluative
categories over two time periods.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
df L.R. Chisq p
3
2
1
3
10
15
3.11
57.40
171.10
0.372
0.000
0.000
Tests of partial associations
Nation x category
Nation x year
Year x category
Year
Nation
Category
df
1
3
3
1
1
3
Partial Chisq
43.64
0.61
8.30
3.08
35.85
35.33
p
0.000
0434
0.040
0.079
0.000
0.000
Table 24. Log-linear analysis for the Czech and Slovak samples across four evaluative
categories over two time periods.
Tests that k-way and higher order effects are zero
df L.R. Chisq p
3
2
1
3
10
15
3.11
57.40
171.10
0.372
0.000
0.000
Tests of partial associations
Nation x category
Nation x year
Year x category
Year
Nation
Category
df
1
3
3
1
1
3
Partial Chisq
43.64
0.61
8.30
3.08
35.85
35.33
p
0.000
0434
0.040
0.079
0.000
0.000
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Appendix 4: Mean ratings for Slovaks and Scots-Democracy Scale (Chapter 9)
SCOTTISH SLOVAK
 TERMS N Mean SD N Mean SD
political parties 200 1.95 1.07 200 2.22 .95
public opinion 200 2.13 .99 200 2.34 .90
money 200 .43 .79 200 1.49 1.16
religion 200 .21 .59 199 1.41 1.08
capitalism 200 .89 .94 200 1.24 1.05
privatisation 198 .66 .90 199 1.70 1.04
minority rights 200 1.93 .99 199 2.33 .90
parliament 200 2.19 .95 199 2.33 1.02
district council 200 1.65 1.03 200 1.86 1.13
justice 200 2.12 1.04 200 2.54 .86
wealth 200 .68 .86 200 1.11 1.13
market economy 198 1.10 1.00 200 1.90 1.12
socialism 200 1.60 .98 199 .65 .96
nation 198 1.38 1.06 200 1.79 1.14
government 199 2.04 1.01 199 2.19 .90
profit 200 .39 .74 200 1.13 1.07
constitution 199 1.73 .98 199 2.43 .96
private enterprise 199 .79 .92 200 2.00 .96
the individual 200 1.48 1.11 200 1.95 1.15
privacy 200 .93 1.00 199 1.50 1.24
personal responsibility 199 1.40 .99 200 1.92 1.18
the state 199 1.41 .97 200 2.26 .95
self interest 199 .76 .96 200 1.61 1.16
personal security 197 1.15 .95 200 1.82 1.16
fraternity 198 .92 .96 200 1.14 1.14
freedom 199 2.39 .95 200 2.74 .62
equality 199 2.47 .87 200 1.98 1.15
public interest 199 2.12 .96 200 1.98 1.04
ideology 197 1.21 1.09 200 .79 1.04
opposition 199 1.98 1.05 200 2.00 1.10
law and order 199 2.01 1.06 200 2.59 .80
human rights 199 2.39 .94 200 2.78 .58
dictatorship 199 .48 .93 199 .54 .93
